Illinois Appellate Court Reports

(Ill.App. 12-21-2006) KIMBALL DAWSON, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees. 1-05-3561 Appellate Court of
Illinois, First District. FILED: December 21, 2006.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 04 CH
3470, 04 CH 3472, 04 CH 3473, 04 CH 3474, Honorable Sophia
Hall, Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Kimball Dawson, LLC, filed a complaint in
administrative review, appealing the decision of defendant
City of Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals’ (Board) denial of
its request for a zoning variance. Plaintiff claimed that
the Board was biased and its decision was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court affirmed
the findings of the Board. Plaintiff appeals that decision,
alleging again that the Board exhibited a bias against
plaintiff and that its decision was arbitrary and
capricious. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial


The property in question, 2815-2829 North Dawson Avenue in
Chicago, Illinois, is a triangle-shaped parcel located at
the intersection of North Dawson Avenue and North Kimball
Avenue. In 2001, the property in question was redesignated
from a B (business) zoning designation to an R5
(residential) zoning designation. In 2002, plaintiff
purchased the property for $1.5 million. Plaintiff planned
to build four, three-story multiresidential buildings on
the property. Two of the planned buildings were to have 12
condominium units and the second two buildings were to be
of 8 and 9 units. In total, plaintiff planned for 41
condominium units with one parking space for each unit.

The record is unclear as to the exact date, but at some
point in 2003, construction began on the property. The work
began without building permits or variances for reductions
in the front and side yard requirements for R5 zoned
properties. At some date, again uncertain from the record,
plaintiff applied to the City of Chicago Department of
Zoning for variances for all four buildings. Generally,
plaintiff requested reduction or elimination of certain
yard size and setback requirements and the elimination of
the loading berth for one building.

On August 19-21, 2003, the zoning administrator for the
City of Chicago Department of Zoning denied plaintiff’s
zoning variance requests. Plaintiff filed an appeal of the
variance denials with the Board on August 22, 2003. On
October 24, 2003, the Board held a hearing on plaintiff’s

Joseph Spingola, chairman of the Zoning Board of Appeals,
presided over the hearing. Spingola opened the hearing by
having plaintiff’s counsel introduce himself and then
discussed the sign-in sheets and witness list with counsel.
Spingola noted that 12 people had signed in supporting the
development and asked counsel whether he expected all 12 to
testify. Plaintiff’s counsel responded that he would present
only two witnesses, plaintiff’s managing member Jeff
Dietrich and Louis Martinez, a licensed architect who
designed the project.

Plaintiff first presented the testimony of Dietrich.
Dietrich testified that the site currently contains the
partial development of two of the four proposed buildings
for the development. Dietrich described the proposed
development and the requested variances that were denied
and on appeal. He noted that the triangular shape of the
property and the presence of a subway ventilation grill
presented obstacles in developing the property.

Of the proposed 41 condominium units, plaintiff included 12
handicap accessible units with wheelchair lifts and also
planned to participate in the City of Chicago’s affordable
housing program. Dietrich also testified to the financial
aspects of the proposed development. Plaintiff purchased
the property for $1.5 million and anticipated development
costs of $5.5 million. The anticipated sale price for the
units ranged from $190,000 to $269,000, for a return of 8%
to 12%.

Martinez testified to the difficulties in developing the
property due to its triangular shape and the presence of
the ventilation shaft. Martinez explained that the
philosophy behind the four building proposals was to create
a design in character with the community. He noted that a
single building on the property, with more units than he
had proposed, could fit without any variance required.
However, Martinez opined that such a building would be out
of character for the neighborhood and that his design, with
minimal variations, better fit the residential character of
the area.

Finally, Martinez responded, without any elaboration, that
the proposed development would not: be detrimental to the
public welfare or injurious to other property; impair an
adequate supply of air and light to adjacent properties;
increase the danger of fire or endanger public safety;
substantially increase traffic congestion in the area;
diminish or impair property values in the neighborhood; or
alter the essential character of the locality. At this
point, plaintiff’s counsel rested.

Upon cross-examination, Martinez was asked how he had
determined that there would be no effect on the value of
adjoining properties. Martinez responded:

“If we do an appraisal at the present time on the present
property, and assuming that the property is built, we will
find that more likely by the comments of what actually
happens when this land is developed and primarily it just
goes up. We raise the property tax prices in the area.

Right now at the present time with this property
undeveloped, whatever the values are there, that’s what
they are but by developing this property, it will increase
the property value in the surrounding area.”

Martinez admitted that he had not conducted any studies in
support of this belief. Plaintiff did not cite to any
additional authority for Martinez’s testimony.

Spingola then queried who would speak first in opposition
to the requested variance. Alderman Colon responded that he
would speak first, but Spingola stated that Colon should go
last. Spingola continued:

“You’re the real expert. What you have to do is you have
to tie all of this together for us. Both the good and the
bad. Do you consider sixty-six percent a landslide
victory? I always did. That means a third of the people
can’t stand me. A landslide victory leaves a third of the
people who bothered to vote saying we don’t want this.
So there’s good and bad to everything so I saved it for
last so you can fight altogether. Who’s going to talk?”

At that point, William James, a principal and urban planning
consultant with Camiros, Ltd., presented testimony on
behalf of the objectors.

James submitted a copy of his resume to the Board and
discussed his qualifications. James’ resume indicates that
he received a degree in landscape architecture and had been
an urban planning consultant for over 25 years. He
testified that he concentrates his work on urban planning,
redevelopment and land use and zoning issues. James added
that he has been the principal author of several zoning

James also submitted a “site planning study,” which he had
created as an alternative to plaintiff’s proposed
development. James’ study consisted of sketches of the
“site plan” and “parking level plan” for his proposed
building with data including 36 planned units, 41 planned
parking spots, and various area square footage calculations
for the building. Following a discussion of his “site
planning study” and how his proposed project fits within
the parameters of the zoning classification, James spoke to
plaintiff’s request for a variance and the standards
required by ordinance to receive a variance.

James opined that his alternative design was proof positive
that plaintiff could earn a reasonable return without
requiring a variance. Even if his design would not produce
a reasonable return, James alleged that any hardship was
plaintiff’s own doing for failing to exercise due diligence
when purchasing the property. James next offered that there
are numerous sites within the City of Chicago similarly
situated to the property in question such that it was not a
purely unique property. Further, James claimed that he had
not heard any testimony to show that the purpose of the
variation was not based exclusively on a desire to make
more money. Finally, James argued that plaintiff’s design
would impair an adequate supply of air and light to the
adjacent property and increase traffic congestion.

On cross-examination, James admitted that his alternative
building design was not a complete design and that he could
not speak to every variance factor for his alternative like
he did for plaintiff’s proposal. Spingola also posed some
follow-up questions to James to clarify his understanding.
After James indicated that he felt plaintiff had not proven
any standard, Spingola responded “[t]hat’s two of us. I
understand your testimony correctly.”

Stan Kaderbeck, first deputy commissioner with the City of
Chicago Department of Buildings, testified next. Kaderbeck
testified that it was his understanding that work had begun
on the property without any permits. Further, Kaderbeck had
visited the site and opined that since the work that had
been completed had been left in the open, significant work
would be needed to rehab the buildings to bring them into
code compliance. Plaintiff’s counsel objected to
Kaderbeck’s testimony for relevance, and Spingola
responded, “We’re the Zoning Board. We’re not the Building
Department. We denied your application. The building has to
be torn down. It will solve everybody’s problem.”
Commissioner McCabe-Miele followed up by noting the Board
occasionally encounters these situations and attempts to
approach appeals as if nothing had been built, though they
cannot always hope that the building department takes care
of the issue.

Bruce Anderson and Jane Heron, residents of the
neighborhood of the proposed project, both testified as
objectors. Anderson opined that the proposed buildings were
too large and too closely set to be consistent with the
neighborhood and that this also would not supply adequate
light and air or allow proper access for firefighters.
Heron testified that she had lived in the neighborhood for
25 years. Heron claimed that the community wanted to
maintain a “leafy green village[-]like atmosphere” and the
proposed project was too large and would create too much
congestion. Heron concluded that she feared that the
community has not been presented with all the information
on the project and plaintiff should not now be rewarded for
breaking the law and building before obtaining permits or

Finally, Alderman Colon testified that he was not an expert
on variances, but was there to help provide a “bigger
picture view” in representing the interests and needs of
the residents in his community. The alderman discussed the
2001 zoning change to an R5 designation and the community’s
response to the proposed plan on that date. He believed
that the design was different from plaintiff’s proposal, but
it also involved four buildings. Counsel for plaintiff then
offered documents into evidence to show the 2001 proposed
development similarly detailed four buildings.

Following closing remarks from plaintiff’s counsel and a
show of hands from supporters of the proposal that were in
attendance, the hearing was concluded. On January 23, 2004,
the Board unanimously denied plaintiff’s appeals. The
Board’s orders denying the variance requests stated: that
no evidence was presented to indicate that plaintiff could
not yield a reasonable return without the variance; that no
unique circumstances existed; and that plaintiff’s plight
was self-created. Plaintiff filed a complaint sounding in
administrative review in the circuit court. The trial court
affirmed the decision of the board without elaboration.
Plaintiff now appeals the trial court’s decision.


Plaintiff asserts two issues on appeal. First, plaintiff
argues that the trial court erred in affirming the Board’s
decision as it was contrary to the evidence presented.
Second, plaintiff claims that the Board chairman exhibited
a bias that tainted the proceedings and prejudiced

In an action under the Administrative Review Law, factual
determinations by an administrative agency are held to be
prima facie true and correct and will stand unless contrary
to the manifest weight of the evidence. 735 ILCS 5/3-110
(West 2004); Amigo’s Inn, Inc. v.License Appeal Comm’n, 354
Ill. App. 3d 959, 964 (2004). To find a determination
against the manifest weight of the evidence requires a
finding that all reasonable people would find that the
opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. North Avenue
Properties, L.L.C. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 312 Ill.
App. 3d 182, 184 (2000). We review the decision of the
Board, not the circuit court, as the hearing officer is the
fact finder responsible for overseeing testimony, making
credibility determinations and assigning weight to
statements made by witnesses. Ahmad v. Board of Education,
365 Ill. App. 3d 155, 162 (2006). In making this
determination, we do not weigh the evidence or substitute
our judgment for that of the administrative agency.
Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional
Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992). Simply put, if there
is evidence of record that supports the agency’s
determination, it must be affirmed. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d
at 88.

Plaintiff argues that the Board made no findings of fact
and only conclusions of law. Plaintiff also argues that the
Board’s orders merely parrot the language of the ordinance
and do not provide a rationale for denying plaintiff’s
variance requests. Further, no specific credibility
determinations were made by the Board anywhere in its four
orders. Therefore, plaintiff asserts, we must review the
issue de novo, not under the more deferential manifest
weight of the evidence standard, to determine if the action
of the agency was arbitrary and capricious. Obasi v.
Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 266 Ill.
App. 3d 693 (1994).

It is true that an agency’s conclusions of law are not
afforded such deference as those of fact. North Avenue
Properties, L.L.C., 312 Ill. App. 3d at 185. However, after
this assertion, plaintiff proceeds to argue that the facts
proved at the hearing support its position and, therefore,
the agency’s determination should not be afforded
deference. For authority, plaintiff also misapplies the
holding in Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm’n, 268 Ill. App. 3d 471, 481 (1994), a case
brought under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5
ILCS 100/1-1 et seq. (West 2004)), not the Illinois
Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3- 101 et seq. (West

Unless a statute requires specific factual findings, an
administrative agency is only required to provide a record
and findings to permit orderly and efficient judicial
review. Board of Education of Park Forest Heights School
District No. 163 v. State Teacher Certification Board, 363
Ill. App. 3d 433, 442 (2006). If the testimony at the
administrative hearing is preserved in the record, as in
this case, a reviewing court has sufficient grounds to
examine an agency determination and specific fact findings
are not required. Board of Education, 363 Ill. App. 3d at
442. Accordingly, the limited fact findings of the Board do
not alter the standard of review and we review the Board’s
decision to determine if it was against the manifest weight
of the evidence. We may rely on any basis appearing in the
record to affirm an agency’s decision. Ahmad, 365 Ill. App.
3d 155 at 162.

A. The Manifest Weight of the Evidence

A zoning variance may be granted to a petitioner if strict
compliance with the zoning ordinance would create
particular hardship on a petitioner. At the time of the
administrative hearing in this case, the ordinance
governing zoning variances read, in pertinent part:

“The Board of Appeals shall not vary the regulations of
this comprehensive amendment, as authorized in section
11.7-4 hereof unless it shall make findings based upon the
evidence presented to in each specific case that:

A. The property in question cannot yield a reasonable
return if permitted to be used only under the conditions
allowed by the regulations in the district in which it is

B. The plight of the owner is due to unique
circumstances; and

C. The variation, if granted, will not alter the
essential character of the locality.

For the purpose of implementing the above rules, the Board
shall also, in making its determination whether there are
particular difficulties or particular hardships, take into
consideration the extent to which the following facts
favorable to the applicant have been established by the

(1) The particular physical surroundings, shape or
topographical condition of the specific property involved
would result in a particular hardship upon the owner as
distinguished from a mere inconvenience, if the strict
letter of the regulations were carried out;

(2) The conditions upon which the petiton for a variation
is based would not be applicable, generally, to other
property within the same zoning classification;

(3) The purpose of the variation is not based exclusively
upon a desire to make more money out of the property;

(4) The alleged difficulty or hardship has not been
created by any person presently having an interest in the

(5) The granting of the variation will not be detrimental
to the public welfare or injurious to other property or
improvements in the neighborhood in which the property is
located; and

(6) The proposed variations will not impair an adequate
supply of light and air to adjacent property, or
substantially increase the congestion in the public
streets, or increase the danger of fire, or endanger the
public safety, or substantially diminish or impair
property values within the neighborhood.”
Chicago Municipal Code § 17-11.7-3 (1999)
(subsequently revised and recodified in substantially
similar form at Chicago Municipal Code §
17-13-1107-B & 17-13-1107-C (2004)).

Accordingly, by the plain language of the zoning ordinance,
a petitioner must prove all three of the first factors (A
through C): the property cannot yield a reasonable return
without a variance, the plight of the owner is due to
unique circumstances, and the variation will not alter the
essential character of the locality. See also LaSalle
National Bank v. City of Highland Park, 344 Ill. App. 3d
259, 269 (2003). The six additional factors above are then
to be considered by the agency in determining whether a
particular hardship exists. In its orders, the Board
specifically found that plaintiff did not prove any of the
three factors.

As noted above, plaintiff argues that the Board failed to
make specific factual findings. Plaintiff argues that its
two witnesses, Dietrich and Martinez, provided expert
testimony that conclusively established each of the factors
listed above. Furthermore, plaintiff argues that testimony
from objectors at the hearing could not be accepted as
expert testimony and, therefore, cannot overcome the expert
testimony provided by Dietrich and Martinez.

While we agree with plaintiff that the Board did not
provide much detail in its order, the fact remains that the
ordinance only requires specific findings of fact when the
Board grants a variance, an extraordinary action. In any
event, though the Board denied the requested variances, it
did make limited factual findings and specifically stated
that none of the required factors had been proven.
Plaintiff also correctly notes that the orders do not
contain any credibility determinations. Inclusion of these
two factors would have clearly assisted the circuit court,
and this court, in assessing plaintiff’s appeals. However,
the statute does not require the Board to provide specific
factual findings and its conclusions are supported by the
record and that is all that is necessary to affirm.

1. Factor A: Reasonable Return

First, with respect to the reasonable return issue,
plaintiff presented only the testimony of Dietrich.
Dietrich outlined the costs of purchasing the property and
development of the project and concluded that he hoped to
achieve a projected return of 8% to 12%. Plaintiff then
argues that the costs of redesign and altering the present
structure as it stands would significantly alter Dietrich’s
projections to the point of an unreasonable or losing

This argument cannot stand. The only reason costs would
increase because of altering structures is because
plaintiff began work without required building permits or
variances. This certainly fits the consideration under
subfactor (4) of the ordinance — that plaintiff
brought financial hardship upon itself. Plaintiff purchased
the property, commissioned the design of the project and
began construction without proper permitting or variances
to support the proposed design. This difficulty or hardship
was created by a person having an interest in the property
and cannot be considered evidence of a particular hardship.

James testified that if plaintiff had exercised proper due
diligence, it would have discovered the issues at hand and
been able to avoid any hardship. Again, James opined that
different designs within the zoning regulations are
possible and may return a financial gain. Plaintiff argues
that James’s testimony cannot contradict that of its expert
Martinez. Plaintiff refers to James as a “landscaper,” while
the Board cites to James in its orders as an “architect.”

Both are technically correct in arguing the credibility of
the witnesses. However, James submitted his resume to the
Board and detailed his extensive experience working on
urban planning issues.

Determinations as to the credibility and weight given to
witnesses are strictly within the purview of the agency
hearing the testimony. Although James is not a licensed
architect and his drawings lacked detail, no testimony was
offered to refute the viability of alternative designs that
did not violate the R5 zoning requirements. In fact,
Martinez testified himself that a 74-unit development would
fit within the R5 zoning regulations, but his 41-unit
design would fit the community much better.

Plaintiff established that it would receive a reasonable
return if its current proposal were allowed to continue,
with the requested variances. The evidence presented by
plaintiff does support the argument that it is not seeking
variances purely to maximize profit from the property.
James did provide testimony that plaintiff’s plans maximize
floor space; however, Martinez also testified that a less
attractive building with 74 units would fit within the
zoning regulations. However, this exact testimony also
admits that other designs that would meet the R5
regulations would fit the space, and though less attractive,
could be viable. Importantly, no evidence was presented
that James’s design or the design mentioned by Martinez
could not achieve a reasonable return.

2. Factor B: Plight of the Owner

There is no doubt that plaintiff is correct in noting that
the lot in question is unusual based on its triangle shape
and the presence of a subway ventilation shaft.
Consideration of additional ordinance factors also provides
support for plaintiff. The configuration of this lot
certainly leads to the conclusion that the conditions would
not be applicable to other similarly zoned properties.
However, based on the record, we cannot say that the
Board’s findings that the plight of the owner was of its
own making and that unique circumstances do not exist to
require granting the variances are against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Again, as noted above, at least a
portion of plaintiff’s plight was self-created. The fact
that construction began before plaintiff received building
permits certainly weighs against its argument that its
plight is unique and necessitates granting variances.

James testified that there are numerous similarly situated
properties in Chicago such that the property at issue is
not so unique as to require a variance. The Board has
experience in reviewing countless requests such as this for
properties throughout the City to determine the validity of
James’s testimony. Furthermore, though “unusual,” the
testimony with respect to a 2001 application and the
alternative design presented by James provides support that
the physical conditions of the property are more an
inconvenience under the ordinance than purely unique.

3. Factor C: Effect on the Neighborhood

Plaintiff attempts to correlate the project that spurred
the 2001 zoning change and proposed project as evidence
that its project comports with the neighborhood’s character
and the desires of its residents. Plaintiff argues that the
projects are the same and thus the neighborhood has already
approved the project. However, the proposals are not
identical, a fact that Commissioner McCabe-Miele pointed out
at the hearing after she had reviewed the 2001 proposal.
Furthermore, testimony was presented by Alderman Colon and
other residents who objected to the instant project. The
residents felt the project would not fit the neighborhood
and would impair the supply of light and air to adjacent
properties. The objectors also presented testimony and
submitted exhibits to show that the project would not fit
and would create public safety issues and increased
congestion in the area.

Plaintiff did not rebut this testimony. Plaintiff argues
that the municipal code only requires one parking spot per
unit: thus, this is not an issue. However, this does not
solve that issue. The fact that the city only requires one
parking spot does not eliminate the possibility that
congestion would increase and the character of the
neighborhood would be negatively affected.

With respect to Martinez’s testimony to the effect on the
property values of the neighborhood, the quote above
highlights that nothing was proven by Martinez. Martinez
did provide positive testimony regarding his design and his
choices. He no doubt attempted to stay within the
residential character of the neighborhood. However, outside
of his design choices, Martinez did not offer substantive
testimony regarding the ordinance factors.

Accordingly, based on the record, the Board’s denial of
plaintiff’s appeal was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Denial is proper if a petitioner fails to
provide compelling evidence of any of the factors. The
record supports denial of the appeal based on any of the
three factors required under the ordinance.

B. Bias Against Plaintiff

Plaintiff next argues that the Board, particularly Chairman
Spingola, exhibited a bias against plaintiff. Review of a
claim of bias on part of an administrative agency or
official begins with the presumption that administrative
officials are objective and capable of fairly judging an
issue. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. v. Pollution
Control Board, 175 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1040 (1988). Bias by
an administrative agency may be shown only if a
disinterested observer would conclude that the agency, or
its members, had adjudged the facts and law of the case
before the matter was heard. Waste Management of Illinois,
Inc., 175 Ill. App. 3d at 1040.

Defendant argues that plaintiff waived this issue. A party
must promptly assert a claim of bias or partiality by an
administrative agency upon knowledge of the alleged
disqualification. E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control
Board, 107 Ill. 2d 33, 38 (1985). Otherwise, a party may be
allowed to assert a bias claim only after receiving an
unfavorable decision from an agency.

North Avenue Properties, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 187-88.
Plaintiff’s claim centers solely on comments made by
Spingola during the hearing, to which no objection was
made. Therefore, plaintiff waived this issue by failing to
object or raise the issue at the hearing.

Waiver notwithstanding, plaintiff’s argument fails on the
merits. The Board admittedly offers that Spingola was
“perhaps cavalier” in his approach during the hearings. We
agree that Spingola was cavalier during the hearing. He was
very forthright in his opinion of the evidence presented at
the hearing and, perhaps, too effusive in his statements
about Alderman Colon. However, the record indicates that
Spingola’s attitude was not so blunt, cavalier, or so
deferential to the alderman that he must be considered
biased. Spingola appeared to be most concerned with moving
the hearing along to make sure every party had an
opportunity to present their side and not waste time on
inconsequential testimony. Most importantly, plaintiff was
not prevented from fully presenting its argument.

An administrative official’s public position or expressed
strong views on an issue do not alone overcome the
presumption of objectivity and capability. Waste Management
of Illinois, Inc., 175 Ill. App. 3d at 1040. Inherent in a
hearing officer or judge’s responsibilities is to decide
which party presented stronger evidence, essentially
developing a prejudice against one side. As detailed above,
plaintiff failed to present evidence on the relevant issues
in this case. Spingola’s commentary on this when
questioning James makes this clear. Plaintiff was not
denied an opportunity to present evidence and change
Spingola’s view. Plaintiff’s two planned witnesses were
heard, plaintiff’s exhibits were accepted and reviewed, and
plaintiff was given an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses and present closing arguments.

Spingola’s comments in response to plaintiff’s objections
to Kaderbeck’s testimony also fail to rise to the level of
bias. Spingola properly noted that the zoning department
had denied the application and that the building had to be
torn down. Spingola’s commentary that this would solve
everyone’s problem, i.e., for the building department and
plaintiff because the structure had been damaged, and for
the objectors because they did not approve of the project,
were cavalier, but also true. They are not proof that he
was biased or had prejudged plaintiff’s appeal.

Spingola was clearly upset that plaintiff was trying to
remove its malfeasance from the hearing and he retorted
that everyone’s problem could be solved by tearing the
building down. Spingola’s puffery that Alderman Colon was
the “real expert” was merely an excessive show of respect.
When he testified, Colon clarified that he was not a true
expert. In any event, Spingola’s statements were that Colon
was the real expert who must “tie all of this together.”
That is exactly what Colon testified for, as the elected
representative of the community to “tie together” the
issues from his community.

Finally, plaintiff highlights Spingola’s questions of
Dietrich with respect to parking spaces as evidence that he
was not concerned with the elements of a variance, but was
biased. However, this view ignores factors (C) and (6) of
the ordinance. If the proposed development did not include
enough planned parking spaces to accommodate the increased
population, it would likely impact the character of the
neighborhood and congestion in the public streets. Spignola
was simply eliciting an opinion on the effect on the
neighborhood. The record and plaintiff’s allegations do not
overcome the presumption that administrative officials are
objective and capable of fairly judging issues before them.


Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, the decision
of the trial court is affirmed.


QUINN, P.J., and NEVILLE, J., concur.