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Suspended and laid off in retaliation for complaining to the U.S. Department of Labor Page 10 over Family and Medical Leave Act violations.

Loislaw Federal District Court Opinions

2006) Lee Ann Campbell, Plaintiff, v. Washington County
Public Library, et al., Defendants. Case No.
2:04-cv-0339. United States District Court, S.D. Ohio,
Eastern Division. September 8, 2006


TERENCE KEMP, Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for
summary judgment filed by plaintiff Lee Ann Campbell[fn1]
and defendants Washington County Public Library Board of
Trustees, Larry Nash White, Kathryn Piekarski, and Doug
Unsold (collectively known as the “library defendants”).
This case has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for
full disposition under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the
following reasons, the library defendants’ motion for
summary judgment will be granted, Ms. Campbell’s motion for
partial summary judgment will be denied, and this case will
be dismissed.


The following facts are taken from depositions and
affidavits submitted in conjunction with the parties’
motions for summary judgment.[fn2] Ms. Campbell was hired
by the Washington County Library Page 2 (“library”) in
June 1995. Her most recent position before her termination
in December 2003 was reference manager.

Beginning in July 2001, pursuant to the Family Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), Ms. Campbell used accrued sick
leave to take time off work to care for her mother. From
July 2001 to May 2003, Ms. Campbell missed a total of
thirty days of work.

In 2002, the library hired a consultant, Terry Locy,[fn3]
to conduct interviews with certain library staff members to
improve intra-library communication and efficiency as well
as the library’s service to the general public. After
learning of some problems in Ms. Campbell’s department, Ms.
Locy was instructed by the interim library director, Sandra
Starr, to interview Ms. Campbell and her staff to evaluate
their performances and identify problems. Ms. Locy’s
interviews and evaluations revealed, among other things,
that Ms. Campbell lacked sufficient supervisory skills to
be a successful and effective reference manager. During the
same time period, library staff members were asked to fill
out surveys and questionnaires regarding their supervisor’s
managerial skills. Consequently, Ms. Campbell evaluated Ms.
Starr’s performance and indicated that she felt that Ms.
Starr was a “poor supervisor” who “supervised by gossip.”
(Dep. of Sandra Starr at p. 76.)

In September 2002, as a result of Ms. Locy’s evaluations,
Ms. Starr placed Ms. Campbell on probation for 120 days.
Additionally, Ms. Starr implemented a corrective action plan
to assist Ms. Campbell in improving her managerial skills.
The record indicates that Ms. Campbell was the only known
library employee placed on probation.[fn4] Page 3

Ms. Campbell successfully completed her probationary period
and demonstrated signs of improvement in supervising her
department. At Ms. Campbell’s request, she continued to
have regular meetings with the new library director, Dr.
White, to discuss library efficiency and her performance.
The record states:

Q. And in February she responds to your request for
employee feedback: Larry, I’d like to have monthly
coaching session — or monthly coaching sessions,
meetings with you, and you say yes, and you conduct some
of those meetings, which you say are partly coaching. How
is — how are the monthly coaching sessions that she
has, which you said was in response to her request for
feedback, how are those related to the earlier coaching
sessions with Terry Locy during her probationary period?

A. It is my understanding that a part of her training
with Terry Locy was on learning how to work better with
her staff members, and as part of our monthly meetings I
would present her with feedback on what I felt was her
improvement or areas of continued improvement in those

The topic had been brought up during the training with
Terry and one of the things that Lee requested from me in
the early meetings was please provide me feedback with how
we’re doing, in terms of relating to staff. And so, from
our monthly meetings forward it — a part of the
discussion was what is going on, clarification of
questions. But part of it would also be feedback on her
working relationships with staff in her department.

(Dep. of Larry White at p. 73-74.)

After Ms. Campbell’s last FMLA leave in May 2003, she
returned to work and resumed her full-time status.
According to Ms. Campbell, Dr. White removed some of her
supervisory responsibilities, and, as a result, Ms.
Campbell filed a complaint with the United States
Department of Labor on August 15, 2003. Ms. Page 4
Campbell states:

Prior to my most recent FMLA leave which began on May 17,
2003, for a total of nine (9) days in May 2003, but after
I commenced this usage of FMLA leave, Larry Nash White,
Director of the Library, attempted to remove and/or reduce
my responsibilities before I completed this usage of FMLA
leave. Dr. White told me that he was going to remove the
lab duties from my responsibilities. I asked him if it was
because I had been gone so much. He denied it. But when
asked, he said it was because it was too hard to supervise
two areas on different floors — Reference was one
floor above the computer lab. He then told me he was
going to give the duties to Susan Wells. This information
caused me to believe it was because of my time off and
not because of the physical location because Susan Wells
worked three floors above the computer lab. As a result of
disbelieving Dr. White’s reasoning at the attempted
reduction in duties, I requested that my sister in
Connecticut and my sister-in-law in Virginia come to help
care for my mother so that I would not lose my job or job
responsibilities. * * *

In May 2003, I was able to return to work from caring for
my mother, after using my FMLA in intermittent fashion
since July 2001. And again because of the attempted
reduction in duties, I made every effort to reduce or
completely eliminate the hours I needed to care for my
mother. However, because this was not a realistic
expectation given her illness, I took steps to ensure I
could care for her without losing my job. Since the Board
had refused to discuss any part of the 2002 probation in
part resulting from the “she is often not even there”
comment, and Dr. White had given deceptive information
about the rationale for the reduction in responsibilities,
I felt that I had no choice but to contact the United
States Department of Labor to protect my rights under the

(Aff. of Lee Campbell at §§ 8-9.) Moreover,
prior to her Page 5 termination, Ms. Campbell claims that
her responsibilities were diminished beginning in September
2003. The record states:

On September 29, 2003 and thereafter, Dr. White proceeded
to treat me differently from other Library employees who
had not exercised their rights under the FMLA in the
following manner, including, but not limited to: (1)
Adding “MLS (Masters of Library Science degree) preferred”
to the qualifications for the Library Assistant (reference
department only), enabling Justin Mayo to apply, even
though when Mr. Mayo advised me that he had an interest in
working in Reference, I expressed to Dr. White that I had
reservations about Mayo obtaining that position because
of my prior observations of his performance (to which, Dr.
White screamed at me saying “This is not being created for
Justin Mayo!”); (2) Removing the Mezzanine Duty from my
responsibilities on September 29, 2003 (Cathy Piekarski
was aware of this removal of duties as I heard her testify
in her deposition . . .); (3) Soon after September 29,
2003, Dr. White reduced my responsibilities as Reference
Manager in several other respects; (4) On October 14,
2003, Dr. White violated the Board’s Recruitment and
Selection Policy regarding internal applicants relative to
the Reference Department vacancy; (5) On October 16, 2003,
Dr. White disbanded the Planning Team, of which I had
recently been appointed coordinator; (6) On October 17,
2003, I was not permitted to distribute extra department
hours as I had previously been given the discretion to do;
(7) on October 17, 2003, and November 4, 2003, and
November 8, 2003, with regard to position vacancies, Dr.
White removed my authority to select, interview and then
hire whom I chose for my staff, all of which I had been
allowed to do in July 2003 before Dr. White learned of my
complaint to the Department of Labor, which was also in
violation of the Board policy of giving internal
applicants “preferential consideration”. . . .

(Id. at § 15.) Page 6

In November 2003, Ms. Campbell was designated to choose
potential candidates to fill a library assistant position.
Once the candidates were chosen, Ms. Campbell was
instructed to interview the potential employees using a
list of questions provided to her by Dr. White. It appears
from the record that Ms. Campbell failed to choose
qualified candidates for the position and also deviated
from the set of questions provided. Further, Ms. Campbell
also made inappropriate remarks about the potential
employees. First, Ms. Campbell made comments to other
library employees about a potential employee, Crystal
Downer, who allegedly is covered under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Second, it appears that Ms.
Campbell fabricated negative comments about Justin Mayo,
the person ultimately hired for the position. Based on this
conduct, Ms. Campbell received a verbal reprimand.

A short time thereafter, Dr. White appeared in front of
the library’s board of trustees (“board”) to inform them of
Ms. Campbell’s conduct and her verbal reprimand. Based on
this conduct, as well as Ms. Campbell’s prior conduct, the
board suspended Ms. Campbell for two weeks without pay. At
the conclusion of her suspension, Ms. Campbell was notified
that the library was restructuring and reorganizing and
that the library no longer needed her services.

Ms. Campbell filed an appeal to the Ohio State Personnel
Board of Review, but it concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction over the matter. In March 2004, Ms. Campbell
filed a complaint in Ohio state court asserting protections
afforded to classified civil servants under Ohio law. The
Ohio court dismissed the case, determining that Ms.
Campbell was an at-will employee and not subject to special
protections. Finally, Ms. Campbell filed a charge of
discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, and,
after an investigation, the Commission issued Ms. Campbell
a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. Page 7

Ms. Campbell brought suit in this court alleging, inter
alia, retaliation for advising the library that a potential
employee may be covered under the ADA; retaliation in
violation of the FMLA; and wrongful discharge in violation
of Ohio public policy. Both parties have moved for summary


Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

“[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue
of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original); Kendall v.
The Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984).

Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a
material fact is genuine; “that is, if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The purpose of
the procedure is not to resolve factual issues, but to
determine if there are genuine issues of fact to be tried.
Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1978).
Therefore, summary judgment will be granted “only where the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
where it is quite clear what the truth is, . . . [and
where] no genuine issue remains for trial, . . . [for] the
purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from their
right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try.”
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 368 U.S.
464, 467 (1962); accord, County of Oakland v. City Page 8
of Berkley, 742 F.2d 289, 297 (6th Cir. 1984).

In making this inquiry, the standard to be applied by the
Court mirrors the standard for a directed verdict. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Anderson, 477
U.S. at 250.

The primary difference between the two motions is
procedural: summary judgment motions are usually made
before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while
directed verdict motions are made at trial and decided on
the evidence that has been admitted. Bill Johnson’s
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745, n. 11
(1983). In essence, though, the inquiry under each is the
same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it
is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of

Accordingly, although summary judgment should be cautiously
invoked, it is an integral part of the Federal Rules which
are designed “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).

In a motion for summary judgment the moving party bears
the “burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to
any material fact, and for these purposes, the [evidence
submitted] must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the opposing party.” Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 157 (1970) (footnote omitted); accord, Adams v. Union
Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453, 1455-56 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1985). Inferences to be drawn
from the underlying facts contained in such materials must
be considered in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369
U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor
Pullers Association, Inc., 630 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6th Cir.
1980). Additionally, “unexplained gaps” in materials
submitted by the moving party, if pertinent to material
issues of fact, justify Page 9 denial of a motion for
summary judgment. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157-60; Smith v.
Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 65 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 444
U.S. 986 (1979).

If the moving party meets its burden and adequate time for
discovery has been provided, summary judgment is appropriate
if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
opposing party’s position will be insufficient; there must
be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. As is provided
in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e):

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.

Thus, “a party cannot rest on the allegations contained in
his complaint in opposition to a properly supported summary
judgment motion made against him.” First National Bank of
Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 259 (1968)
(footnote omitted).


In Ms. Campbell’s memorandum in support of her motion for
summary judgment, she argues that “there is no genuine
dispute of material fact as to the Defendants’ retaliatory
motive in suspending Ms. Campbell from her employment for
purported performance deficiencies and misconduct. The
evidence clearly demonstrates that Ms. Campbell was
suspended and laid off in retaliation for her complaining
to the U.S. Department of Labor Page 10 over Family and
Medical Leave Act violations.” (Plaintiff’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at p. 15.) Additionally, Ms.
Campbell highlights other examples of retaliation that
allegedly resulted from her exercise of her protected FMLA
rights. Conversely, the defendants assert that they did not
violate the FMLA. Specifically, the defendants highlight
the fact that Ms. Campbell was never denied FMLA leave nor
was she retaliated against for using FMLA leave.

Because Ms. Campbell is attempting to prove a FMLA
violation with indirect evidence, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals has adopted the burden-shifting approach
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
492 (1973). Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Service Co., 272
F.3d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 2001). Under this analysis, Ms.
Campbell must first establish a prima facie case of
retaliation in violation of the FMLA. To do this, Ms.
Campbell must demonstrate that (1) she availed herself of a
protected right under the FMLA; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) that a causal connection exists
between the adverse employment action and the exercise of
her rights under the FMLA. See, e.g., Edgar v. JAC
Products, Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2006);
Skrjanc, 272 F.3d at 314. If Ms. Campbell satisfies these
three requirements, then the burden shifts to the library
defendants to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
rationale for the adverse job actions. Id. Once the library
defendants do this, the burden shifts back to Ms. Campbell
to prove that the articulated reason is in reality a
pretext to mask discrimination. See Skrjanc, 272 F.3d at

In the instant case, the library defendants admit that Ms.
Campbell exercised the rights afforded to her under the
FMLA. The library defendants argue, however, that Ms.
Campbell did not suffer any adverse employment action.
Further, assuming, arguendo, that Ms. Campbell did suffer
adverse action, the library defendants Page 11 claim that
the adverse action was not causally connected to Ms.
Campbell’s use of FMLA leave.

In order to demonstrate an adverse employment action, the
plaintiff must show that the adverse action is material.
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126
S.Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). A material adverse employment
action is one which “might have `dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.'” Id. (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d
1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006) and Washington v. Illinois
Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)). This
may include more than those actions that preclude “hiring,”
prompt “discharge,” or alter “compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.” Burlington
Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2412-14.

In support of their argument that Ms. Campbell did not
suffer adverse employment action, the library defendants
cite Soletro v. Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Businesses, 130
F.Supp.2d 906 (N.D. Ohio 2001), Robinson v. Franklin County
Bd. of Commerce, No. 99-cv-162, 2002 WL 193576 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 28, 2002), and Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673 (8th Cir.
2002). Those cases do not support the defendants’ position.
For example, in Soletro, the Court concluded that a forced
transfer to another employment position after the plaintiff
took FMLA leave was an adverse employment action. See
Soletro, 130 F.Supp.2d at 913. Similarly, in Darby, the
Court concluded that failing to promote a plaintiff or
disciplining a plaintiff for using FMLA was adverse
employment action. See Darby, 287 F.3d at 679-80; see also
Robinson, 2002 WL 193576 at *10 (concluding that “[w]hile
Robinson may be able to establish the first two elements of
the claim,” there was no causal connection between the
adverse employment action and the FMLA leave).

Like the Soletro and Darby courts, this Court concludes
that, at a minimum, there is a factual issue about whether
Ms. Campbell Page 12 suffered material adverse employment
actions prior to her termination. The actions which took
away some of her duties and responsibilities [word missing
from following insert??] her suspension, and her
termination in December 2003 could both be considered such
actions.[fn5] (See Aff. of Lee Campbell at § 15.)
Thus, the question becomes whether there is any evidence of
a causal connection between these adverse employment actions
and the exercise of Ms. Campbell’s FMLA rights.

A causal connection may be established either through
direct evidence or knowledge coupled with a closeness in
time that creates an inference of causation. See Wrenn v.
Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 501 (citing Burrus v. United Telephone
Co., 683 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1982)). In proving a
causal link between protected activity and adverse
employment action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
employer would not have taken the adverse action “but for”
the employee’s protected conduct. See, e.g., Allen v. Dep’t
of Corrections, 165 F.3d 405, 413 (6th Cir. 1999) (“In
order to show a causal connection, a plaintiff must produce
sufficient evidence from which an inference can be drawn
that the adverse action would not have been taken had the
plaintiff not filed a discrimination action”). “Although no
one factor is dispositive in establishing a causal
connection, evidence that the defendant treated the
plaintiff differently from identically situated employees
or that the adverse action was taken shortly after the
plaintiff’s exercise of protected rights is relevant to
causation.” Id. However, temporal proximity alone is
insufficient to support an inference of causation in a case
where retaliatory discrimination is alleged. Page 13
Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563-66 (6th Cir.

In the instant case, Ms. Campbell claims that the direct
evidence of a causal connection is the fact that Dr. White
was “upset” when he learned of Ms. Campbell’s complaint to
the U.S. Department of Labor. (Plaintiff’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at p. 19.) Further, Ms. Campbell
highlights a conversation that was overheard by another
employee in which Dr. White and Ms. Starr mentioned the
Department of Labor complaint and Ms. Campbell’s
suspension. (Id. at p. 20.) These instances are not direct
evidence of retaliation, however. Specifically, according
to the testimony cited by Ms. Campbell, Dr. White was
“upset” because he felt that Ms. Campbell did not believe
him when Dr. White told Ms. Campbell that her probation
period was “something in the past” and that Dr. White “was
not judging her on that.” (Dep. of Sandra Starr at p. 85.)
Moreover, in that same deposition excerpt, Ms. Starr
explains that Dr. White wanted to make sure that Ms.
Campbell was never denied FMLA leave. (Id.) Finally,
without more specifics about what was said between Ms.
Starr and Dr. White, the second-hand conversation cited by
Ms. Campbell, in which the suspension and the Department of
Labor complaint were concomitantly discussed, do not
constitute direct evidence of retaliation.

Additionally, Ms. Campbell failed to provide evidence that
the library defendants treated her differently than other
similarly situated employees. Ms. Campbell highlights
examples where she allegedly received discipline that was
more strict than required under the library’s disciplinary
policy. However, nowhere in the record does Ms. Campbell
provide examples where other employees performed similar
acts but received different discipline. In fact, to the
contrary, the record contains examples of other employees
who, like Ms. Campbell, were terminated or lost employment
at the library. (Id. at pp. 59-64.) Perhaps, most
importantly, the Page 14 record does not contain any
evidence that Ms. Campbell was treated differently than
other employees who used FMLA leave.

Ms. Campbell’s burden of proving a prima facie case is not
an onerous one. See, e.g., Skrjanc, 272 F.3d at 315 (“A
plaintiff’s burden of proving a prima facie case is not
intended to be an onerous one”). Although there is no
direct evidence of causation, the library defendants’
knowledge of Ms. Campbell’s use of FMLA leave and the
filing of the Department of Labor complaint, coupled with
the temporal proximity of the filing of that complaint
— August 15, 2003 — to the alleged
retaliatory acts, most of which occurred in September to
November 2003, is sufficient, in this case, to create an
inference of causation. See, e.g., Jootsberns v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 166 Fed.Appx. 783, 793-94 (6th Cir.
2006) (2 months sufficient to establish a causal connection
in a FMLA claim); Parnell v. West, No. 95-2131, 1997 WL
271751 at *3 (6th Cir. May 21, 1997) (unpublished)
(internal footnote omitted) (time lag of less than six
months usually sufficient to establish causal connection);
but see Cooper v. City of North Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265,
1272-73 (6th Cir. 1986) (four months is insufficient to
establish causal connection). Accordingly, the burden
shifts to the library defendants to proffer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory rationale for their actions.

In proving a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for
discharging an employee or altering a material work
condition, the library defendants bear only the burden of
production, not the burden of persuasion. Put simply, the
library defendants must articulate a “valid rationale” for
the adverse employment action. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d
795, 800 (6th Cir. 1996). In cases like this, where the
defendants claim a reorganization or “reduction in force”
as the reason the plaintiff suffered material adverse
employment actions, the reorganization explains why the
adverse employment action occurred but does not explain why
the plaintiff Page 15 was targeted. Tye v. Bd. of Ed. of
the Joint Vocational School, 811 F.2d 315, 319 (6th Cir.
1987). Additionally, therefore, the library defendant must
proffer a legitimate reason why Ms. Campbell was chosen.

In the instant case, the record is clear that Ms. Campbell
lost job duties, did not gain job duties, and ultimately
lost her job, because the library was reorganizing and the
reference manager position was being eliminated. Further,
the record indicates that Ms. Campbell was not offered
another position at the library because of Ms. Campbell’s
actions. In regards to the loss of job duties, which
include the mezzanine service point, the record states:

Q. What is that document?

A. It is a mem — appears to be a copy of a memo
from myself to Lee Campbell.

Q. And what’s it about?

A. Mezzanine service point.

Q. What is the Mezzanine Service Point?

A. It was a service desk on the Mezzanine level of the
building that we were planning on. It had been a point
that had not been staffed in the past and we, through
feedback from the public, felt that we could offer an
extended service by providing staffing for that service
point on the Mezzanine.

Q. Now, you’ll notice in the last section, last
paragraph, Lee suggests that the Mezzanine supervisory
duties remain under the reference manager purview; is that

A. That’s correct.

Q. Now, to what extent do these new duties relating to
the Mezzanine service point, to what extent did they
already exist, or were these brand new duties? Page 16

A. There were going to be some existing duties and some
new duties. Existing duties would have been circulating
material, answering questions from the public. New duties
would have been to provide readers advisory service and to
provide bibliometric — or bibliographic instruction
to teach people how to use the tools and resources of the

Q. Now, would the existing duties have been duties that
were under Lee’s purview as reference manager?

A. Circulation would have been — checking out
materials in under circulation. Answering questions,
depending on the question, would have been something that
reference would have done.

Q. Okay. And then what happened with her suggestion that
these duties be under her, the Mezzanine service duties?

A. I believe, if I recall correctly — yes, I
believe it went to the extension services manager.

Q. That’s not Lee; right?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Okay. Why at that point did you decide not to give
those duties to Lee?

A. The position was going to be more of an adult
programming position. That was not something that
reference was currently doing, and it was not something
that Ms. Campbell expressed an interest in doing.

When the concept was first brought up the extension
services manager had also been a reference department
staff member and had been dealing primarily with
delivering library services to adults and to doing adult
programming [sic]. And it made more logical sense at that
time to put that position under that person for
supervision. Page 17 (Dep. of Dr. White at pp. 64-66.) Dr.
White also provided insight on how the computer lab was
eventually elimiated.

Q. Okay. And the extension service manager ends up
effectively taking over some of the old duties of the
reference department; correct?

A. To some degree, yes.

Q. Okay. Specifically, what duties of the old reference
department were eliminated or are no longer being
performed as a result of your reorganization?

A. Well, the computer lab’s no longer with us. That
— that function of what reference used to do is no
longer there.

Q. So it’s not — it doesn’t exist?

A. Doesn’t exist.

(Id. at p. 137.)

In reference to Ms. Campbell’s termination due to
reorganization, the record states:

Q. Okay. So [Ms. Campbell], in your opinion, did not lose
her job for disciplinary reasons; is that correct?

A. From my understanding that position was restructured.
The organization was undergoing a process and that
position was viewed as unnecessary.