Indiana Case Law

(Ind.App. 2006) John R. DANIELSON, M.D., Appellant, v.
PRATT INDUSTRIES, INC., d/b/a Jet Corrugation Division,
Appellee. No. 93A02-0510-EX-1005. Court of Appeals of
Indiana. March 6, 2006. Publication Ordered April 7, 2006.

Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Board. Page 245

John L. Kelly, Jr., Merrillville, for Appellant.

Mark B. Barker, Orfanos & Alvarado, LLC, Fortville, for


The Appellee, by counsel, has filed a Motion for
Publication of Appellate Decision. The Appellee requests
this case be published because “it would help illuminate
for the practitioner the requirement that before a medical
provider may receive reimbursement from an employer for
services rendered to a worker under Indiana Code §
22-3-3-5, the medical provider must first establish the
jurisdictional requirement that there is a timely filed
worker’s compensation claim initiated by an injured
employee before the Worker’s Compensation Board.”

Having reviewed the matter, the Court FINDS AND ORDERS AS

1. The Appellee’s Motion for Publication of Appellate
Decision is GRANTED, and this Court’s March 6, 2006 opinion
is now ordered published.

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send copies of
this order together with copies of the opinion to the West
Publishing Company and to all other companies and services
to which published opinions are normally sent.

All Panel Judges Concur.


RILEY, Judge.


Appellant-Plaintiff, John R. Danielson, M.D. (Dr.
Danielson), appeals the dismissal of his Application for
Adjustment of Claim for Provider Fee by the Worker’s
Compensation Board in favor of Appellee-Defendant, Pratt
Industries, Inc. (Pratt).

We affirm.


Dr. Danielson raises three issues on appeal, which we
consolidate into one issue and restate as: Whether the
Workers’ Compensation Board erred in determining that it
did not have jurisdiction over Dr. Danielson’s Application
for Adjustment of Claim for Provider Fee.


On May 1, 2003, Dr. Danielson filed an Application For
Adjustment Of Claim For Provider Fee (Application) with the
Indiana Worker’s Compensation Board (the Board) alleging
that Pratt owed him $2,357.50 for emergency medical
services performed on Huang Tien Hsiao (Tien Page 246
Hsiao). On March 30, 2005, Dr. Danielson and Pratt
stipulated to the following facts:

1. [Tien Hsiao] suffered an injury on June 24, 2000.[fn1]

2. [Dr. Danielson] provided medical [treatment] to [Tien
Hsiao] on June 24, 2000.

3. [Tien Hsiao] did not file an Application for
Adjustment of Claim with the Indiana Worker’s Compensation
Board on or before June 24, 2000. In fact, [Tien Hsiao]
has never filed such an application with the Board.

4. [Pratt] has never paid any compensation under the
[Worker’s Compensation] Act to [Tien Hsiao], as [Pratt]
alleges [Tien Hsiao] was never an employee of [Pratt].

5. [Dr. Danielson] alleges [Tien Hsiao] is an employee of
[Pratt], as well as an employee of his Republic of China
company, Tien Chin Yu Manufacturing Company.

6. [Dr. Danielson] filed [h]is [Application] on May 1,

. . .

(Appellant’s App. pp. 1-2). On the same day, a single
member Board hearing was held. Following the hearing, the
hearing judge took the matter under advisement. On April
15, 2005, the hearing judge found in favor of Pratt and
issued the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

. . .

1. It is further found that the [Board] lacks
jurisdiction to interpret and enforce [Ind.Code] §
34-11-2-7 as requested by [Dr. Danielson].

2. It is further found that [Tien Hsiao] did not file an
Application for Adjustment of Claim within the required
two (2) years from June 24, 2000, and thus any claim filed
by [Tien Hsiao] would be time barred by I.C. §

3. It is further found that since [Tien Hsiao] did not
timely file his application and since the Board would lack
jurisdiction over any claim by [Tien Hsiao], the Board
lacks jurisdiction to entertain [Dr. Danielson]’s

4. It is further found that [Dr. Danielson]’s
[Application] is hereby dismissed, and [Dr. Danielson]
shall take nothing by his application filed herein.

(Appellant’s App. pp. 3-4).

On May 9, 2005, Dr. Danielson filed his request for a
hearing before the full Board. This hearing was held on
August 20, 2005, following which the Board took the matter
under advisement. On September 2, 2005, the Board adopted
the single hearing member’s findings and conclusions and
affirmed the single hearing member’s decision in favor of

Pratt now appeals.


Dr. Danielson contends that the Board erred in determining
that it did not Page 247 have jurisdiction to entertain
his Application. Specifically, Dr. Danielson appears to
argue that the two-year time limitation in I.C. §
22-3-3-3 does not apply to applications for medical
provider fees, therefore, his claim should be subjected to
the six-year time limitation under I.C. § 34-11-2-7
and he should be reimbursed accordingly. We find Dr.
Danielson’s argument to be misplaced.

Our standard of review in worker’s compensation cases is
well settled. This court is bound by the factual
determinations of the Board, and we will not disturb them
unless the evidence is undisputed and leads inescapably to
a contrary result. Bowles v. General Elec., 824 N.E.2d 769,
772 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. Furthermore, it is
the claimant’s burden to prove a right to compensation
under the Worker’s Compensation Act. Id. In reviewing a
decision made by the Board, we will neither reweigh the
evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
While this court is not bound by the Board’s
interpretations of law, we will reverse the Board’s decision
only if the Board incorrectly interpreted the Act. Id.
Inasmuch as there are no disputes regarding the facts in
this case, we review only the question of law.

Our review of the record reveals that the Board never
determined that Dr. Danielson’s claim was time barred
pursuant to I.C. § 22-3-3-3. Rather, the Board
dismissed Dr. Danielson’s claim because Tien Hsiao never
filed a claim for Worker’s Compensation upon which Dr.
Danielson could base his claim.[fn2] In order to collect
the costs of reasonable medical services from the
“Employer” a physician must provide services, treatment, or
supplies to an “Employee.” See I.C. §§
22-3-3-4(d), 22-3-6-1(i). In the instant case, at no point
in either of the Board hearings was a determination made
that Tien Hsiao was an “Employee” of Pratt, or that Pratt
was the “Employer” of Tien Hsiao as those definitions are
codified in I.C. § 22-3-6-1(a) and (b). Without
those determinations being made, Dr. Danielson does not
qualify as a “Medical Service Provider.” See I.C. §
22-3-6-1(i). Dr. Danielson failed to file this Application,
seeking to have the Board reimburse him for medical costs,
without first determining that Pratt was the employer of
Tien Hsiao, or that Tien Hsiao was the employee of Pratt,
as required under the Worker’s Compensation Act. Claims
which do not meet any one of the jurisdictional
prerequisites do not fall within the Act and may be pursued
in court. Perry v. Stitzer Buick GMC, Inc., 637 N.E.2d
1282, 1285 (Ind. 1994), reh’g denied. Procedurally, Dr.
Danielson should have brought a civil action against Tien
Hsiao for any medical costs. Accordingly, we conclude that
the Board did not err in dismissing Dr. Danielson’s
Application for lack of jurisdiction.


Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Board did not
err in dismissing Dr. Danielson’s Application.


SHARPNACK, J., and BARNES, J., concur.

[fn1] The record is unclear as to where and how Tien Hsiao
suffered his injury. Dr. Danielson includes in his
Appendix, Exhibit 6, which is a letter describing where
Tien Hsiao received his injury. However, Pratt asks us to
strike this letter from the Appendix because it was never
presented during either of the Board hearings. In his reply
brief, Dr. Danielson argues that Exhibit 6 should not be
striken because it was included as part of his Memorandum
In Support Of Motion For Default Judgment (Motion) filed on
November 29, 2004. However, Dr. Danielson did not include
that Motion in his Appendix nor did he introduce Exhibit 6
at either of the Board hearings. Accordingly, because
evidence cannot be submitted for the first time on appeal,
we grant Pratt’s request. See Saler v. Irick, 800 N.E.2d
960, 970 n. 7 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003).

[fn2] The Board also determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to address whether Danielson could bring his
claim under I.C. § 34-11-2-7. Although it is
irrelevant whether Danielson should be given more time to
file his application, the Board did not err in its finding
because nowhere in I.C. § 22-3-1-3 is the Board
delegated authority to increase the two year time limitation
for filing claims found in I.C. § 22-3-3-3. Page