Ohio Appellate Reports


STATE v. DEAN, Unpublished Decision (1-12-2007)
2007-Ohio-91 STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GORDON
DEAN, Defendant-Appellant. No. C-050971. Court of Appeals
of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County. Date of Judgment
Entry on Appeal: January 12, 2007.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the
issuing court.] Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County
Municipal Court.

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed.

TRIAL NO. 05CRB-2653.

Julia L. McNeil, City Solicitor, Ernest F. McAdams, Jr.,
City Prosecuting Attorney, and Jennifer Bishop, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jon R. Sinclair, for Defendant-Appellant.



{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Gordon Dean received a
citation for improper solicitation in violation of
Cincinnati Municipal Code (“C.M.C.”) 910-12. Dean filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that C.M.C. 910-12 was
unconstitutional. The trial court upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinance and found Dean guilty of
its violation. Dean has appealed to this court, and in his
sole assignment of error he argues that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss due to the
unconstitutionality of C.M.C. 910-12.

C.M.C. 910-12

{¶ 2} C.M.C. 910-12, titled “Improper Solicitation,”
regulates solicitation in Cincinnati. The statute defines
“solicit” and “solicitation” as “mak[ing] any request in
person while in a public place, for an immediate grant of
money, goods or any other form of gratuity from another
person(s), or * * * engaging] in such activity on private

{¶ 3} But the ordinance makes clear that “the terms
solicit and solicitation shall not mean the act of
passively standing or sitting with a sign or other
indicator that a donation of money, goods or any other form
of gratuity is being sought without any vocal request other
than a response to inquiry by another person.”[fn2]

{¶ 4} Subdivision (b) of the ordinance lists
specific areas in which solicitation is improper: “(1) [i]n
any public transportation vehicle or at any bus stop; (2)
[w]ithin 20 feet in any direction from an automatic teller
machine or entrance to a bank; (3) [f]rom any operator or
occupant of a motor vehicle or from any person entering or
exiting a motor vehicle; (4) [w]ithin 20 feet of any
crosswalk; (5) [f]rom a person standing in line waiting to
be admitted to a commercial establishment; or (6) [o]n
private property without permission from the owner.”[fn3]
Subdivision (c) further regulates when solicitation may
occur, providing that “it is unlawful for any person to
solicit after sunset or before sunrise.”[fn4]

{¶ 5} C.M.C. 91012(d) prohibits aggressive
solicitation, including “(1) [s]oliciting in a manner that
impedes access to or from, or use of a building, vehicle or
establishment; (2) [s]oliciting in a manner that would
alarm, intimidate, threaten, menace, harass, or coerce a
reasonable person; (3) [b]y following behind, ahead or
alongside, blocking the path of, or continuing to solicit a
person who walks or drives away from the person soliciting
or who gives notice or demonstrates verbally or physically
that such solicitation is offensive, unwelcome or that the
solicitation should cease; (4) [b]y using profane or
abusive language or gestures either during the solicitation
or following a refusal, or making any statement, gesture or
other communication that would cause a reasonable person to
be fearful or would be perceived as a threat; or (5) [b]y
touching the solicited person without a statement, gesture
or other communication that the person being solicited
consents to the touching.”

{¶ 6} And C.M.C. 91012(e) makes it unlawful to make
false and misleading representations while soliciting a
donation. Such representations include “(1)[s]tating that
the donation is needed to meet a specific need, when the
person soliciting already has sufficient funds to meet that
need and does not disclose that fact; (2) [s]tating that
the donation is needed to meet a need that does not exist;
(3) [s]tating that the person soliciting is from out of
town and stranded, or that he or she is homeless when that
is not true; (4) [s]tating or representing that the person
soliciting is a member of a military service when the
person soliciting is neither a present nor a former member
of a military service; and (5) [s]tating or representing
that the person soliciting suffers from a mental or
physical disability or deformity when the person soliciting
does not suffer the disability or deformity indicated.”
Dean has not challenged the constitutionality of
prohibiting, or the city’s right to restrict, aggressive and
misleading solicitation under C.M.C. 910-12 (d) and (e).

{¶ 7} Through subdivisions (f) through (i), C.M.C.
910-12 makes it unlawful for any person to solicit without
first obtaining a registration from the police department.
We discuss these provisions in detail below. And
subdivision (j) contains a severability provision, allowing
for independent subdivisions of C.M.C. 910-12 to remain
valid even if other subdivisions are declared invalid.

{¶ 8} Dean received a citation for violating C.M.C.
910-12 by vocally requesting money from pedestrians within
20 feet of a crosswalk. We first analyze the
constitutionality of subdivisions (a) through (e), and we
then scrutinize the constitutionality of the registration

First Amendment Protection

{¶ 9} The city argues that the solicitation
regulated by C.M.C. 910-12 constitutes commercial speech,
and, consequently, that it deserves less constitutional
protection than other forms of protected speech.

{¶ 10} Commercial speech is speech that “relate[s]
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience.”[fn5] It is speech that is entitled to some form
of protection from government regulation, although “[t]he
Constitution * * * accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed

{¶ 11} We find no merit in the city’s argument that
solicitation is entitled to less constitutional protection
than other types of protected speech. The United States
Supreme Court has clearly determined that solicitation is a
form of speech entitled to undiluted First Amendment
protection.[fn7] The Court has specifically stated, “`[Our]
cases long have protected speech even though it is in the
form of * * * a solicitation to pay or contribute
money'”[fn8] and that “[solicitation is a recognized form
of speech protected by the First Amendment.”[fn9] In so
concluding, the Court has recognized the “variety of speech
interests” associated with charitable requests for money,
namely “communication of information, the dissemination and
propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of

{¶ 12} Having established that the speech regulated
by C.M.C. 910-12 is entitled to undiluted First Amendment
protection, we must determine what level of scrutiny to
apply when analyzing the ordinance.

{¶ 13} C.M.C. 910-12 regulates speech occurring in
public areas, predominantly on the sidewalks of Cincinnati.
Such areas are public forums, and in these areas “the
rights of the State to limit expressive activity are
sharply circumscribed.”[fn11]

{¶ 14} In such public forums, a regulation that is
content-based may not be enforced unless the government
shows that it “is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.”[fn12] Alternatively, regulations that are
content-neutral may impose time, place, and manner
restrictions, so long as they are “narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communication.”[fn13]

{¶ 15} We must determine whether C.M.C. 910-12 is
content-based or content-neutral.

C.M.C. 910-12 is Content-Neutral

{¶ 16} To determine whether a regulation is
content-neutral, the principal inquiry must focus on
“whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”[fn14]

{¶ 17} The city of Cincinnati did not adopt C.M.C.
910-12 because it disagrees with the messages conveyed by
solicitation. The ordinance only restricts certain forms of
solicitation. Vocal solicitation is still permitted in
specific areas and at specific times. And non-vocal
solicitation is not prohibited or regulated by the ordinance
at all. Because solicitation may still take place, it is
clear that the city does not disagree with the messages
that solicitation conveys.

{¶ 18} Dean argues that C.M.C. 910-12 is
content-based because it prohibits immediate requests for
money but permits for-profit transactions, such as the sale
of an item. We disagree and note that “[a] regulation that
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is
deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some
speakers or messages but not others.”[fn15]Moreover, because
C.M.C. 910-12 solely imposes time, place, and manner
restrictions on the act of solicitation, it is clear that
the city does not seek to suppress the messages expressed
by solicitors.

{¶ 19} An identical challenge to this ordinance is
currently pending in federal court.[fn16] In an order
denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio has concluded that
C.M.C. 910-12 is content-neutral. The district court stated
that “[i]t might appear on first blush that Section 910-12
is content-based because it restricts only one category of
speech, vocal requests for `immediate grant of money, goods
or any other form of gratuity’ * * * [but] [t]his Court
holds that Section 910-12 similarly is content-neutral * *
*. Section 910-12 does not impose an absolute ban on
solicitation, but rather restricts the time, place and
manner of vocal solicitation. Second, taken on its face,
the law is not concerned with the message implicitly or
expressly communicated by a solicitor’s request for money *
* *. Third, Section 910-12 is not justified by reference to
the content of the speech, but rather by the act of
solicitation itself.”[fn17]

{¶ 20} The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Gresham v. Peterson,[fn18] considered a challenge to an
anti-begging and aggressive-panhandling ordinance enacted
by the city of Indianapolis, which is almost identical to
the statute presently before this court. The Seventh
Circuit noted that it was uncontested by the parties that
the Indianapolis ordinance is content-neutral.[fn19]

{¶ 21} Having concluded that C.M.C. 910-12 is
content-neutral, we must now determine whether it survives
the appropriate level of scrutiny.

C.M.C. 910-12 is a Valid Content-Neutral Regulation

{¶ 22} As we have stated, a content-neutral
regulation should be upheld if it imposes time, place, and
manner restrictions that are narrowly tailored, serve a
significant government interest, and leave open alternative
channels of communication.

{¶ 23} The city of Cincinnati has identified various
interests that are served by C.M.C. 910-12. The city has an
interest in ensuring that its citizens feel free to move
about on the city’s streets and sidewalks without
experiencing interference or intimidation. The city has an
interest in promoting the public welfare by providing safe
and accessible areas of commerce, which in turn “generate
the tax revenue necessary to support essential public
services and the economic productivity that is required to
maintain and improve property within the City of
Cincinnati.”[fn20] The city further has an interest in
preventing crime and in facilitating “the prosecution of
cases of aggressive * * * and improper solicitation.”[fn21]

{¶ 24} We conclude that the city has sufficiently
demonstrated that it has significant interests associated
with the regulation of solicitation. We recognize the
importance of the societal, economic, and political
messages being conveyed through solicitation. But the
city’s significant interest in maintaining its economic
vitality is not easily accomplished if its citizens do not
feel safe or free to move about the city without being
accosted by those requesting money.

{¶ 25} And we further conclude that C.M.C. 910-12 is
narrowly tailored to serve these significant interests. A
regulation may be narrowly tailored without being the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of regulating
conduct.[fn22] C.M.C. 910-12 solely regulates vocal
solicitation. Solicitors are not prohibited from displaying
signs or from employing other non-vocal methods of
solicitation. Additionally, solicitation is only regulated
in specific areas. Individuals are free to vocally solicit
in areas other than those specifically identified.

{¶ 26} Further supporting a determination that
C.M.C. 910-12 is narrowly tailored is the fact that, in
each of the areas in which the city has chosen to prohibit
solicitation, the city’s significant interests are
furthered. The city has ensured the safety of its citizens
by prohibiting solicitation at bus stops and on public
transportation, within 20 feet of a crosswalk, and from any
person occupying, entering, or leaving a motor vehicle. And
by prohibiting solicitation within 20 feet of an ATM and
from persons waiting to enter a commercial establishment,
the city has served its interests in preventing crime and
furthering economic productivity.

{¶ 27} C.M.C. 910-12 also leaves open ample
alternative channels of communication. As we have stated,
non-vocal solicitation is not prohibited. And vocal
solicitation may still occur from sunrise to sunset in
areas not specifically identified by the ordinance.

{¶ 28} Because C.M.C. 910-12 is a content-neutral
regulation that is narrowly tailored to serve significant
government interests, while leaving open alternative
channels of communication, we conclude that those portions
of the ordinance establishing the content-neutral
regulation, specifically subsections (a) through (e), are

Registration Requirement

{¶ 29} As we have noted, C.M.C. 910-12 also requires
potential solicitors to obtain a registration before

{¶ 30} C.M.C. 91012(f) provides that “[i]t is
unlawful for any person to solicit without possession of a
valid registration issued by the police department. Any
person who has been registered shall keep a copy of the
registration on his or her person at all times while
engaging in acts of solicitation and shall show it to any
police officer upon request * * *.”

{¶ 31} Subsection (f) further provides how a
registration is to be issued, stating that “[t]he police
chief or his designee shall issue the registration, without
fee, to any eligible person who presents himself or herself
at the registration location to be designated and operated
by the health department, states his or her true name,
presents a photo identification or signs a declaration
under penalty of perjury that he or she has no such
identification, and permits himself or herself to be
photographed. The regular registration shall expire one (1)
year from the date of issuance.”

{¶ 32} An applicant receives a temporary
registration upon submitting a request for registration.
“Upon receipt of an application for registration that is in
accordance with this section, the police department shall
issue a temporary registration valid for ten (10) days and
shall determine eligibility for a regular registration
before the temporary registration expires. An eligible
applicant shall receive a regular registration upon
determination of the applicant’s eligibility. If such
determination is not made within the ten-day period, the
temporary registration shall remain in effect until such
time that the determination is made.”[fn23]

{¶ 33} Subsection (f) further prohibits the making
of false or misleading statements on a registration
application, and it briefly discusses the penalties for
soliciting with no registration. “First-time offenders of
the registration requirement will be issued a warning
citation by the issuing officer, which will be recorded at
the police department, but such first-time offenders will
not be charged with a violation of this section. Subsequent
violations of the registration requirement will result in a
charge of violation of this section.”[fn24]

{¶ 34} C.M.C. 91012(g) outlines when an applicant
may properly be denied a registration. “A person is
ineligible to register if, and only if, within the past
eighteen (18) months, he or she has (1) been previously
convicted of a violation of Section 910-12 of the
Cincinnati Municipal Code; or (2) has had a registration
revoked pursuant to section (h) of this ordinance; or (3)
has been convicted of an offense under the laws of any
jurisdiction which involve aggressive or intimidating
behavior while engaging in solicitation or false or
misleading representation while engaging in

{¶ 35} C.M.C. 91012(h) provides for the revocation
of a previously issued registration. And subsection (i)
concerns the appellate process available to an applicant
when a registration has been denied or revoked. It provides
that “[a]ny applicant shall have the right to appeal the
denial or revocation of registration by immediately
requesting review by the Office of Administrative Hearings
of the City of Cincinnati. The appeal to the Office of
Administrative Hearings shall be taken by the applicant or
registration holder within ten (10) days after issuance of
the notice of denial or revocation by filing written notice
of appeal with the police chief * * *. The Office of
Administrative Hearings shall consider the appeal within a
reasonable time period as set forth within its regulations
[and] * * * shall direct that the denial or revocation be
rescinded if the applicant has met all of the qualifying
criteria set forth in this section. The applicant or
registration holder may appeal the decision of the Office
of Administrative Hearings to the Court of Common Pleas of
Hamilton County pursuant to Chapter 2505 of the Ohio
Revised Code.”[fn26]

{¶ 36} Dean argues that the subsections of C.M.C.
910-12 imposing a registration requirement are
unconstitutional because they operate as a prior restraint.


{¶ 37} The city argues that Dean lacks standing to
challenge these provisions concerning registration because
he was not cited for failing to possess a registration, but
rather was cited for soliciting in a prohibited area. We

{¶ 38} The Supreme Court of Ohio considered a
similar argument in Oakwood v. Glimmer.[fn27] In Gummer,
the defendant had been arrested for, and found guilty of,
violating an Oakwood ordinance that prohibited
participating in a parade for which no permit had been
obtained.[fn28] On appeal, the defendant alleged that the
ordinance was unconstitutional because the licensing and
permit requirement constituted a prior restraint. Oakwood
argued that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the
ordinance because he had never applied for a permit.

{¶ 39} The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the
defendant had standing to challenge the ordinance. “`In the
area of freedom of expression it is well established that
one has standing to challenge a statute on the ground that
it delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an
administrative office, whether or not his conduct could be
proscribed by a properly drawn statute, and whether or not
he applied for a license’.”[fn29] The court acknowledged
that standing exists in such cases because of the “danger
of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the
existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and
improper application.”[fn30]

{¶ 40} Because of the First Amendment principles
implicated by the registration requirement in the present
case, we conclude that Dean has standing to challenge
C.M.C. 91012(f) through (i). Accordingly, we must now
determine whether these provisions impose a prior restraint.

Prior Restraint

{¶ 41} A prior restraint is present “when speech is
conditioned on the prior approval of public
officials.”[fn31] There is a constitutional presumption
against prior restraints, primarily because of “the risk of
censorship associated with the vesting of unbridled
discretion in government officials and the risk of
indefinitely suppressing permissible speech when a
licensing law fails to provide for the prompt issuance of a

{¶ 42} To survive a constitutional analysis, a prior
restraint must provide certain procedural safeguards to
protect a person’s First Amendment rights.[fn33] This court
has specified two required safeguards that must be
provided. First, “the licensor must decide whether to issue
the license within a specified and reasonable time
period,”[fn34] and the status quo of the parties must be
maintained during this period.[fn35] Second, “the licensing
procedure must be subject to prompt judicial review.”[fn36]

{¶ 43} C.M.C. 910-12 does require that the
registration be issued within a specified and reasonable
time. An applicant is issued a temporary registration
immediately. This temporary registration is valid until a
permanent registration is issued, which, the ordinance
provides, should occur within ten days. And because of the
immediate issuance of a temporary registration, the status
quo of the parties is maintained while a determination is
made regarding a permanent registration. C.M.C. 910-12
provides the first required safeguard.

{¶ 44} But because the statute fails to provide for
prompt judicial review, we hold that it imposes an
unconstitutional prior restraint.

{¶ 45} C.M.C. 910-12 provides for an appeal to the
court of common pleas. But before an appeal may be taken in
court, the ordinance requires an appeal to the city’s
Office of Administrative Hearings. The ordinance
specifically states that, once an appeal is filed, the
Office of Administrative Hearings shall consider it “within
a reasonable time period as set forth within its

{¶ 46} The ordinance thus specifies no time period
in which the Office of Administrative Hearings must issue a
decision in an appeal. “Within a reasonable time period” is
an ambiguous and open-ended term. We do not presume to
impose an exact amount of time in which a decision must be
issued. But the ordinance itself must specify a time period
to ensure that appeals do not linger in the Office of
Administrative Hearings, thus delaying access to judicial
review. A party is entitled to know how long an appeal may
remain in the Office of Administrative Hearings before the
party may appeal to the court of common pleas.

{¶ 47} Accordingly, when judicial review is
contingent upon the issuance of a decision from the Office
of Administrative Hearings “within a reasonable time
period”, and when “reasonable time period” is not further
defined, we cannot say that C.M.C. 910-12 provides for
prompt judicial review.

{¶ 48} Because C.M.C. 910-12 does not provide for
prompt judicial review, it imposes a prior restraint.
Consequently, we conclude that subdivisions (f) through (i)
of C.M.C. 910-12 are unconstitutional.


{¶ 49} Having concluded that subdivisions (f)
through (i) of C.M.C. 910-12 are unconstitutional, but that
the statute’s remaining subdivisions are constitutional, we
must now determine whether the unconstitutional provisions
can be severed from the ordinance.

{¶ 50} The Supreme Court of Ohio has established a
three-prong test to determine whether a provision is
capable of being severed.[fn37] The three prongs are as
follows: “`(1) Are the constitutional and the
unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each
may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the
unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope
of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the
apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part
is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms
necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from
the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former

{¶ 51} Applying this test, we conclude that
subdivisions (f) through (i) of C.M.C. 910-12 can
appropriately be severed. The remaining subdivisions of the
ordinance are capable of standing alone absent the
unconstitutional provisions. The city may regulate
solicitation, in a content-neutral manner, without
requiring solicitors to obtain a registration. And the
registration requirement is not so connected with the
remaining provisions that the intent of the legislature
cannot be carried out. The registration requirement was
implemented to assist the city in promoting its interests,
but the city’s interests are still furthered absent
registration. And as we have already noted, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld an almost identical
solicitation regulation that did not contain a registration
requirement[fn39] Moreover, no words or terms need be
inserted to separate the constitutional provisions from the
unconstitutional ones.

{¶ 52} In addition, C.M.C. 910-12 contains a
severability provision expressing the legislature’s intent
that any provisions found invalid be severed from the
statute, and that the remaining provisions be considered
independent and valid.[fn40]

{¶ 53} Dean’s conviction is not affected by the
provisions we have held to be unconstitutional or by
severance of those provisions from the ordinance. Dean was
cited for and found guilty of improper solicitation, for
soliciting within 20 feet of a crosswalk as prohibited by
C.M.C. 91012(b). This provision is constitutional, and
Dean’s conviction stands.


{¶ 54} The trial court did not err in denying Dean’s
motion to dismiss, as Dean was not cited under an
unconstitutional provision of the ordinance. Accordingly,
we overrule Dean’s assignment of error. But we hold that
those provisions of C.M.C. 910-12 imposing a registration
requirement, specifically subdivisions (f) through (i), are
unconstitutional and are severed from the statute. The
statute’s remaining provisions are constitutional and
remain valid following our decision.

Judgment affirmed.

WINKLER, J., concurs.

PAINTER, P.J., concurs separately.

[fn1] C.M.C. 910-12(a)(1).

[fn2] Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[fn3] C.M.C. 910-12(b)(1) through (6).

[fn4] C.M.C. 910-12(c).

[fn5] Centr. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of
New York (1980), 447 U.S. 557, 561, 100 S.Ct. 2343.

[fn6] Id. at 561 and 563.

[fn7] See United States v. Kokinda (1990), 497 U.S. 720,
110 S.Ct. 3115.

[fn8] Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment (1980), 444 U.S. 620, 633, 100 S.Ct. 826,
quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977), 433 U.S. 350,
363, 97 S.Ct. 2691.

[fn9] United States v. Kokinda, supra, 497 U.S. at 725.

[fn10] Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, supra, 444 U.S. at 632.

[fn11] Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educator’s Assn.
(1983), 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948.

[fn12] Id.

[fn13] Id.

[fn14] Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989), 491 U.S. 781,
791, 109 S.Ct. 2746.

[fn15] Id.

[fn16] See Henry v. City of Cincinnati (2005), S.D.Ohio No.

[fn17] Id.

[fn18] Gresham v. Peterson (C.A.7, 2000), 225 F.3d 899.

[fn19] See id. at 906.

[fn20] Cincinnati Municipal Ordinance No. 0158-2003.

[fn21] Id.

[fn22] Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra, 491 U.S. at 798.

[fn23] C.M.C. 910-12(f).

[fn24] Id.

[fn25] C.M.C. 910-12(g).

[fn26] C.M.C. 910-12(i).

[fn27] Oakwood v. Gummer (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 164, 311
N.E.2d 517.

[fn28] Id.

[fn29] Id. at 168, quoting Freedman v. Maryland (1965), 380
U.S. 51, 56, 85 S.Ct. 734.

[fn30] Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[fn31] Cincinnati v. Jenkins (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d 27,
30, 764 N.E.2d 1088.

[fn32] Id., citing Nightclubs, Inc. v. Paducah (C.A.6,
2000), 202 F.3d 884 (internal quotations omitted).

[fn33] Id.

[fn34] Id.

[fn35] Id. at 31.

[fn36] Id.

[fn37] See Geiger v. Geiger (1927), 117 Ohio St. 451, 160
N.E. 28.

[fn38] Id. at 466, quoting State v. Bickford (1913), 28 N.D.
36, 147 N.W. 401.

[fn39] See Gresham v. Peterson, supra, 225 F.3d 899.

[fn40] See C.M.C. 910-12(j).

PAINTER, P.J., concurring separately.

{¶ 55} So now we have an ordinance regulating
soliciting without a registration requirement. Surely that
sloppy drafting can be fixed. I concur in Judge Hendon’s
excellent analysis.

RALPH WINKLER, retired, from the First Appellate District,
sitting by assignment.