Tennessee Reports


STOCK v. STOCK, W2005-02634-COA-R3-CV (Tenn.App.
12-28-2006) Risa Stock v. Morris Stock. No.
W2005-02634-COA-R3-CV. Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at
Jackson. Filed December 28, 2006.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the
issuing court.] Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Shelby County, No. CT-007329-02 Jerry Stokes, Judge.

This appeal involves a trial court’s distribution of
marital property in a divorce proceeding. The parties owned
their own business, and the husband generally ran its
operations while the wife handled its financial aspects.
After the business caught fire, the husband found $240,000
in the company safe. He took the money to a bank and placed
it in a safety deposit box. The company’s head of security
accompanied the husband to the bank and testified about
these events at trial. The wife also had access to the box,
and the bank records revealed that she accessed it over
thirty times in the next five years. The husband and the
security officer returned to the safety deposit box when he
learned that the wife intended to file for divorce, but
there was no cash remaining in the box. The trial court
determined that the wife had dissipated the marital estate
in the amount of $240,000 and subtracted half that amount,
$120,000, from her award of the marital property. The wife
appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the
Circuit Court Affirmed

Patricia Chafetz, T. Tarry Beasley, II, and Timothy A.
Perkins, Memphis, TN, for Appellant

Mitchell D. Moskovitz and Adam N. Cohen, Memphis, TN, for

ALAN E. HIGHERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in
which DAVID R. FARMER, J., and HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., joined.



I. Facts & Procedural History

Risa Stock (“Wife”) married Morris Stock (“Husband”) in
1984.[fn1] When they married, Wife was 19 years old, and
Husband was 28 years old. Husband had been working in the
iron and scrap metal business for Lazarov Brothers since
1980. Neither party has a college degree. In 1991, Husband
and Wife formed a corporation and purchased Husband’s
employer’s business. They renamed the business Airways Iron
and Metal Company (“AIMCO”). Husband was in charge of
AIMCO, but Wife handled the company’s financial duties such
as paying expenses, providing information to their
accountant, and handling insurance matters and the company
payroll. AIMCO is predominately a cash business.

Mr. Harold Wormser has been the company’s accountant since
the second year of AIMCO’s operation. He would prepare the
monthly books, corporate income tax returns, and payroll
tax returns based on the statements and data that Wife
would provide each month. According to Mr. Wormser, he
frequently had to prepare a reconciliation of the “cash on
hand” reports. In other words, the “cash on hand” reported
by Wife was far less than the amount of cash that AIMCO
should have had on hand each month, and Mr. Wormser would
have to adjust his figures to account for the discrepancy.
During some years, Mr. Wormser’s adjustments would exceed
$50,000 annually.

In 1997, a major fire broke out at AIMCO. Apparently the
only asset that was not destroyed in the fire was a safe,
but the dial had burned off. Husband had a lock company
open the safe, and at that time he discovered a large
amount of cash inside a separate compartment in the safe.
According to Husband, he put the money into a duffle bag and
took it to a bank where he opened a safety deposit box in
both parties’ names. Sergeant Marvin Townsend of the
Memphis Police Department is employed part-time by AIMCO to
provide security for the premises, and he testified that he
accompanied Husband in taking the bag of money to the bank.
Husband claimed that he counted the cash when he placed it
into the safety deposit box, and it totaled $240,000.
Sergeant Townsend testified that he observed Mr. Stock’s
bag of money, and he did not know how much money there was,
“but it was a lot of it.”

The safety deposit box’s admission record reflects that the
box was first opened on November 26, 1997. Husband’s
signature is dated 11/26/97.[fn2] The admission record
displays 33 subsequent entries signed by Wife when she
accessed the safety deposit box between 1997 and 2002.
According to Husband, Wife would tell him she was going to
the box to put more cash into it.

The parties separated on or about December 23, 2002. Wife
accessed their safety deposit box on December 26, 2002.
According to the admission record and Husband’s testimony,
Husband only returned to the safety deposit box on December
30, 2002. He had not accessed the box since he had first
opened it in 1997. Sergeant Townsend claimed that he had
been urging Husband to go to the box to be sure the money
was still there, and he testified that he again accompanied
Husband to the bank on this second visit. Both Husband and
Sergeant Townsend explained that there was no cash in the
safety deposit box when Husband opened it. Wife
acknowledged that she had opened her own safety deposit box
at another bank on or around December 26, but she insisted
that she had only removed her jewelry from the other box.

Wife filed a complaint for legal separation on December 31,
2002, in the Circuit Court of Shelby County, and she filed
an amended complaint for an absolute divorce on April 1,
2003. Husband moved the trial court to require a
third-party to pay AIMCO’s business expenses and to enjoin
Wife from interfering with its business operations. He
alleged that Wife had depleted significant amounts of cash
from the business and requested that Mr. Wormser, the
accountant, be appointed to handle AIMCO’s financial
duties. Attached to Husband’s motion were the affidavits of
Mr. Wormser, Sergeant Townsend, and an AIMCO employee,
Elijah Williams. Mr. Wormser expressed his willingness to
handle AIMCO’s finances. Sergeant Townsend explained the
details of his two trips to the bank with Husband and the
bag of money. Elijah Williams stated that during the latter
part of 2002, he observed Wife at her desk at AIMCO with
“significant amounts of cash,” which she referred to as “her
‘life’s savings.'” The court granted Husband’s motion on
July 8, 2003, delegating the responsibility for paying
AIMCO’s expenses to Mr. Wormser. After Mr. Wormser took
over, Wife no longer worked at AIMCO. Two years later, Mr.
Wormser testified that since he had taken over the
company’s financial operations in July of 2003, AIMCO had
“cash on hand” overages in amounts ranging from $500 to
$1500 per month. Based on Mr. Wormser’s knowledge of
AIMCO’s financial situation, he could think of no other
source for the $240,000 cash in the safe other than the
cash shortages that he had previously detected each month.

The trial court entered a final decree of absolute divorce
on September 7, 2005. In dividing the marital property, the
court awarded all right, title, and interest in AIMCO to
Husband. The court valued the business at $437,000. Wife
was then awarded one-half the value of the business, or
$218,500, for her interest in the company. However, both
parties had borrowed money from AIMCO during the course of
the divorce proceedings, and Mr. Wormser calculated the
total amounts owed by the parties to be $23,412 by Wife and
$15,937 by Husband. The trial court recognized the parties’
loans and subtracted the amount Wife owed to AIMCO from her
interest in the company. In addition, the trial court found
that Wife had dissipated the marital estate in the amount
of $240,000. The judge subtracted half that amount,
$120,000, from the award representing her interest in the
business. In sum, Husband was ordered to pay Wife $75,088
as alimony in solido for her interest in AIMCO.

The court distributed the remainder of the marital property
and debts, and also ordered Husband to pay Wife $4000 per
month in rehabilitative alimony for five years, $1700 per
month in child support, and $25,000 toward Wife’s
attorney’s fees. Wife filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment on September 12, 2005, which was addressed by order
on October 12, 2005. Wife filed her notice of appeal on
November 14, 2005.

II. Issues Presented

Appellant has timely filed her notice of appeal and
presents the following issues, as we perceive them, for our

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Wife
dissipated the marital estate when Husband presented no
evidence showing how Wife allegedly spent the dissipated

2. Whether the trial court failed to effectuate an
equitable distribution of the marital estate because the
majority of the assets were awarded to the party with a
higher earning potential;

3. Whether the trial court erred in dividing marital debts
because the court focused solely on the party who incurred
the debt.

Additionally, Appellee presents the following issues for

4. Whether Wife has waived her right to contest the marital
property division by failing to adhere to Rule 7 of the
Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.

5. Whether Husband should be awarded his reasonable and
necessary attorney fees related to this appeal.

For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the
circuit court. In addition, we decline to award attorney’s
fees to Appellee.

III. Standard of Review

This Court reviews findings of fact by a trial court
sitting without a jury under a de novo standard with a
presumption of correctness for those findings. Tenn. R.
App. P. 13(d) (2006). We review a trial court’s conclusions
of law under a de novo standard upon the record with no
presumption of correctness for the trial court’s
conclusions. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d
87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Estate of Adkins v. White
Consol. Indus., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tenn.Ct.App.

IV. Discussion

A. Equitable Division of the Marital Property

1. Dissipation and the $120,000 credited against Wife’s

On appeal, Wife contends that Husband did not prove she
dissipated an asset because he has no proof that the cash
existed in the first place, or at least no proof as to how
much cash he placed in the box, and he did not specifically
allege how she had spent the missing funds. In discussing
its finding that Wife had dissipated the marital estate,
the trial court gave the following explanation from the

Her figure[] has to be adjusted based upon hearing it from
Mr. Stock as well as hearing it — hearing testimony
of Marvin Townsend, an employee of the Airways Iron and
Metal, as well as a police officer of some 31 years.

The Court finds that there has been a dissipation of
marital assets by the wife in the amount of $240,000
somewhere during the period of 1997 through December 2002.
The Court heard the testimony, weighed the credibility of
the parties, and hearing from Mr. Townsend who indicated
that sometime . . . Mr. Stock carried a large bag to the
safety deposit box. And Mr. Stock has indicated that the
bag was not just a regular bag, but a duffle bag or a gym

That bag contained $240,000. Mr. Townsend didn’t count the
money. He did see the money. He doesn’t know how much was
in there, but Mr. Stock indicated that he did, in fact,
count it. As a result, because of the dissipation of
$240,000, half of which would have belonged to Mr. Stock,
Ms. Stock’s $195,088 is hereby reduced by $120,000 to an
amount of $75,088.

From this discussion, it appears that the trial court
treated the $240,000 in cash as a marital asset subject to
division between the parties.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee faced a similar situation
in Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647 (Tenn. 2003) in the
context of a divorce. A husband had withdrawn approximately
$48,000 from the parties’ savings account in response to
the Y2K scare and placed it into his bedroom drawer. Id. at
649. When he went to re-deposit the money in January of
2000, it had disappeared. Id. When the husband later filed
for divorce, both parties disclaimed any responsibility for
the money’s disappearance. Id. The trial court found
insufficient evidence to determine what really happened to
the money, but it noted that the husband was in control of
the money when it was withdrawn, and he should have known
better than to put it into a drawer. Id. The court
proceeded to divide the money like any other marital
property and awarded the wife a judgment for $24,000, half
the missing funds. Id. The Supreme Court determined that
because the funds were missing when the divorce complaint
was filed, the funds were not marital property subject to
division. Id. at 650. However, the Court found that the
husband’s careless handling of the funds could be
considered in distributing the other property that was
classified as marital. Id. at 651. In dividing property, a
trial court is instructed to consider “[t]he contribution
of each party to the acquisition, preservation,
appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or
separate property” and “[s]uch other factors as are
necessary to consider the equities between the parties.”
Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5),(11)
(2001)) (emphasis added). The Court noted that the
husband’s actions could been seen as a “failure to preserve
a marital asset” under the statute. Id. Therefore, the
Court remanded the case to allow the trial court to
consider the relevance of the husband’s careless conduct
with regard to the ultimate disappearance of the funds. Id.

In this case, Husband and Sergeant Townsend returned to the
safety deposit box on December 30, 2002, and both testified
that the cash was missing on that date. Wife filed her
complaint for legal separation on December 31, 2002. As
such, the $240,000 “asset” would not be considered marital
property subject to division. In Tennessee, marital property
is defined as “all real and personal property, both
tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses
during the course of the marriage up to the date of the
final divorce hearing and owned by either or both spouses
as of the date of filing of a complaint for divorce . . .
.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) (2005)
(emphasis added). Because both parties maintained that the
money was not in their possession, the $240,000 should not
have been divided as marital property. Still, this
conclusion does not end our inquiry. “In the final
analysis, the appropriateness of the trial court’s division
depends on its results.” Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676,
683 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2005) (citing Bolin v. Bolin, 99 S.W.3d
102, 107 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002); Watters v. Watters, 959
S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997)). The trial court’s
distribution of marital property may still be affirmed if
it was equitable. See id. at 681 (where a trial court’s
finding of dissipation was error, but its division of the
marital estate was affirmed as being equitable).

2. The trial court’s division of marital property

In dividing the marital property, the trial court awarded
the parties’ house to Husband. Although the trial court did
not specifically assign a value to the house, the parties
estimated it to be worth about $111,000.[fn3] In addition,
Husband was to retain his 2002 Ford F-350, a 1993 Harley
Davidson motorcycle, a Six-wheeler, a trailer, a 1996 Dodge
Ram titled in Husband’s name but driven by their adult son,
and a leased 2005 Chevrolet Tahoe driven by the parties’
daughter. Wife was to retain her leased 2005 Cadillac

The parties also had an escrow account containing funds
from the sale of their previous home. It appears that each
party had received $55,000 in disbursements from the
account during the course of the divorce proceedings. Of
the remaining balance of $207,721, Husband was awarded
$50,000 and Wife received $157,721. Husband retained his gun
collection which the parties had estimated to be worth
between $4800 and $6100. Wife retained several items of
jewelry with an estimated value of $12,150. Husband and
Wife kept their respective IRA accounts; Husband’s was
worth $23,632 and Wife’s had been worth $11,105.78 earlier
in the proceedings, but she had withdrawn approximately
$10,000 from the account since that time. In addition, the
parties were to keep all household furnishings in their
possession, and each was to retain the bank accounts in
their respective names.[fn4] Husband was also allowed to
retain some exotic animals that were on the premises of
AIMCO, including a camel, a llama, an alpaca, an ostrich,
watusi cattle, two horses, and a pony. The AIMCO emblem
displays a camel, and Husband explained that customers and
their children come to see them. Wife also acknowledged
that AIMCO is recognized for having the animals.

The trial court specifically found that AIMCO was worth
$437,000, and Husband was awarded all right, title, and
interest to the business. The trial court awarded Wife
one-half of that amount, $218,500, but then subtracted
$120,000 off of her share because she had “dissipated” the
marital estate by removing the funds from the safety deposit
box. In the end, Wife’s interest in the business was valued
at $98,500.[fn5]

There were also marital debts assigned to each party.
Husband had a loan from AIMCO of $15,937, and was ordered
to pay a $3,049 Haverty’s Furniture bill, a Fleet Visa card
balance of $10,380, and guardian ad litem fees of
$4,506.[fn6] The total amount of marital debt assigned to
Husband was $33,872. Wife was required to pay back her loan
from AIMCO of $23,412 and various other debts, mostly
credit cards, of $37,042.[fn7] The total debt assigned to
Wife equaled $60,454.

We begin by noting that trial courts have wide discretion
in distributing marital property, and their decisions are
given great weight on appeal. Dellinger v. Dellinger, 958
S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997). The trial court’s
decision will be presumed correct unless the evidence
preponderates otherwise. Id.; Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). An
equitable property division is not achieved by a mechanical
application of the statutory factors, but rather by
considering and weighing the most relevant factors in light
of the facts of each case. Tate v. Tate, 138 S.W.3d 872,
875 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003) (citing Batson v. Batson, 769
S.W.2d 849, 859 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1988)). Some factors may be
significant in reaching an equitable division, and others’
importance may be diminished depending on the unique facts
of a case. See Cronin-Wright v. Wright, 121 S.W.3d 673, 675
(Tenn.Ct.App. 2003). A division of marital property is not
rendered inequitable merely because it is not precisely
equal. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 230 (Tenn.Ct.App.
1998). (citing Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn.
1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988)).
Based on our review of the record, we have concluded that
the trial court’s division of marital property was

On appeal, we give great weight to a trial court’s findings
involving witnesses’ credibility because the trial court is
in a better position to weigh and evaluate credibility.
Broadbent v. Broadbent, No. M2003-00583-SC-R11CV, slip op.
at 3 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 2006) (citing Randolph v. Randolph,
937 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tenn. 1996)). In this case, the trial
judge specifically stated that he had weighed the
credibility of the parties in concluding that the $240,000
was, in fact, placed in the safety deposit box and that
Wife had “dissipated” the cash sometime before the
complaint was filed. This factual finding is entitled to a
presumption of correctness on appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P.
13(d) (2006). Upon reviewing the testimony of Wife,
Husband, Sergeant Townsend, Elijah Williams, and Mr.
Wormser, we find sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s conclusion that the $240,000 did exist and that Wife
was responsible for its disappearance. Just as in Flannary,
Wife’s conduct could be characterized as “failing to
preserve a marital asset,” and it is clearly relevant to
the division of the remaining marital property.[fn8] See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5) (2005) (instructing
a trial court to consider a party’s contribution to the
preservation, depreciation, or dissipation of the marital
property). “Preservation” has been defined as “maintenance
. . . not the creation, but the saving of that which
already exists. . . .” Flannary, 121 S.W.3d at 651 (citing
Black’s Law Dictionary, 1184-85 (6th ed. 1990)). At the
very least, Wife’s conduct could properly be considered as
affecting the equities between the parties. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(11) (2005). Besides AIMCO itself,
which was valued at $437,000, the money in the safety
deposit box would have been the parties’ largest marital

Also relevant to the parties’ contributions to the
preservation of the estate is the fact that for nearly two
years during the divorce proceedings, Husband paid a large
share of the parties’ bills. The parties entered a consent
order on October 1, 2003, in which Husband agreed to pay
the insurance, taxes, and note on their house, health
insurance for Wife and the children, the cable bill,
utilities, telephone bill, automobile insurance on all
vehicles, Wife’s car note, home security and pest control
expenses. The parties split the cost of the children’s
medical, counseling, and dental bills that were not paid by
insurance, and the children’s tuition, groceries, and
haircuts. Wife agreed to pay for storage unit costs and the
monthly minimum payments on three credit cards. During this
time, Wife did not work at AIMCO because Mr. Wormser was
handling the company’s financial duties.[fn9] However, Wife
continued to receive her annual salary from AIMCO of over
$77,000 per year.

The parties’ age, physical, and mental health is also
relevant to the distribution of their marital property. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(2) (2005). When the
trial court divided the property, Wife was 40 years old and
Husband was 49. They had been married for 18 years when
Wife filed for divorce. Both parties had previously visited
counselors. Wife testified that she was in good health and
exercised about five to seven days per week. Husband had
developed lung cancer in 2002 and had surgery to move a
lobe of one of his lungs. He needed annual appointments
with his surgeon thereafter.

Regarding vocational skills, employability and earning
capacity, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5) (2005),
neither party had a college education. After their divorce,
Husband would continue to operate AIMCO, and Wife had begun
taking classes to attend nursing school.[fn10]

The parties’ separate property may also be considered. It
appears that Husband had no separate property, and Wife’s
separate property consisted of certain items of jewelry
with an estimated value of nearly $20,000.

“Marital debts” are all debts incurred by either or both
spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of
the final divorce hearing. Alford v. Alford, 120 S.W.3d
810, 813 (Tenn. 2003). In dividing a couple’s marital
debts, a trial court should consider four factors in
reaching an equitable distribution: (i) the debt’s purpose;
(ii) which party incurred the debt; (iii) which party
benefitted from incurring the debt; and (iv) which party is
best able to repay the debt. Id. at 814. By carefully
considering these factors, the spouse who did not incur the
debt will be protected from bearing responsibility for
debts that are the result of personal excesses of the other
spouse. Id. In this case, a review of the factors supports
the trial court’s decision to allocate more of the debt to
Wife. At trial, Wife acknowledged that when her deposition
was taken earlier in the proceedings, she only had a Fleet
Visa balance and the Haverty’s furniture bill. These two
bills were allocated to Husband when the court divided the
marital debts. Wife had accumulated all of the other loans
and credit card balances since the parties separated.
Although they would be classified as marital debts, Wife
incurred these debts individually for her own purposes, and
she benefitted from the debts, not Husband. Keeping in mind
that Wife was not working during that time but was still
receiving her $77,000 annual salary, she received $55,000
in distributions from the parties’ escrow account, and
withdrew $10,000 from her IRA, we agree that the debts Wife
incurred post-separation were properly allocated to Wife.

In sum, we find that the evidence supports the trial
court’s distribution of the parties’ marital property.
Although the $240,000 missing from the safety deposit box
was not a marital asset subject to division, the trial
court specifically found that Wife was responsible for the
money’s disappearance, and that fact is to be considered in
the distribution of the remaining marital property. After a
consideration of the statutory factors, we believe the
evidence provides a sufficient basis for awarding Husband a
larger share of the marital estate.

B. Attorney’s fees on Appeal

Husband has requested attorney’s fees on appeal. When
determining whether to award attorney’s fees on appeal, we
consider the ability of the requesting party to pay the
accrued fees, the requesting party’s success in the appeal,
and any other equitable factor that need be considered.
Dulin v. Dulin, No. W2001-02969-COA-R3-CV, slip op. at 11
(Tenn.Ct.App. W.S. Sept. 3, 2003) (citing Folk v. Folk, 210
Tenn. 367, 357 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tenn. 1962)). In this case,
we find it equitable to decline to award Appellee
attorney’s fees on appeal.

V. Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the decision of
the circuit court. Further, we decline to award attorney’s
fees to Appellee. Costs of this appeal are taxed to
Appellant, Risa Stock, and her surety, for which execution
may issue if necessary.

[fn1] The parties had three children — Isaac,
Rachael, and Benjamin.

[fn2] Wife testified that she had accompanied Husband to the
bank when he opened the safety deposit box, not Sergeant
Townsend. On the box’s admission record, Husband’s
signature is located on the first line in the first column
under “access signatures” and marked “11/26/97 8:30.” There
are two columns on each card separated by a bold line. Wife
emphasized that her signature on the first line of the
second column across from Husband’s signature was also
marked “8:30.” There is no date next to Wife’s signature,
but not all entries have both dates and times. However,
Husband’s and Wife’s signatures were initialed by different
clerks. Also, for all of the other visits the signatures
were placed vertically in the columns, just below the
preceding signature according to date.

[fn3] We note that Wife’s brief contains three charts
allegedly setting forth the values of several assets
distributed by the trial court. Her chart does not contain
any citations to the record directing us to where these
values were determined, but she explains that the figures
were taken “from the testimony of the parties at trial” and
their memoranda. From Husband’s brief and its chart, we
have learned that the parties had disputed most of the
assets’ values, and Wife’s brief does not include Husband’s
proposed values. There is only a footnote to her chart
indicating that Husband had disputed the value of one of the

Rule 7 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals instructs the
parties to attach a chart displaying the values proposed by
both parties, and any values found by the trial court. The
Rule also provides that “[e]ach entry in the table must
include a citation to the record where each party’s
evidence regarding the classification or valuation of the
property or debt can be found. . . .” (emphasis added). We
have previously held that “where an appellant fails to
comply with this rule, that appellant waives all such
issues relating to the rule’s requirements.” Howell v.
Howell, No. W2001-01167-COA-R3-CV, slip op. at 4
(Tenn.Ct.App. W.S. Aug. 15, 2002) (citing Bean v. Bean, 40
S.W.3d 52 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000)). However, we will proceed
with our review of the trial court’s distribution using the
values and references cited in Husband’s chart.

[fn4] The trial court did not assign a value to the
household furnishings distributed to each party, and it did
not state the balances of the bank accounts each party was
to retain. In the parties’ briefs, they have only listed
approximately 13 items of marital property that the court
divided between the parties such as the house, vehicles,
and IRA’s, but neither party mentions the bank accounts or
household furnishings awarded to either party or their

[fn5] This award was labeled alimony in solido by the trial
court, but the court then noted that Husband was ordered to
pay that amount “for Wife’s interest in [AIMCO].” We
believe the award is more properly characterized as a
division of marital property rather than alimony, and we
will treat it as such in our analysis. See Duncan v.
Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983).

[fn6] Husband was also required to pay $25,000 of Wife’s
attorney’s fees as alimony in solido.

[fn7] Specifically, the debts assigned to Wife included a
Chase/Bank One balance of $11,562, a Bank Tennessee loan of
$3182, a $330 J.C. Penney bill, a Household Finance bill of
$5900, a Target card balance of $134, a Best Buy balance of
$1757, a Value City Furniture balance of $2541, a Nordstrom
card balance of $3166, a Dell card bill of $1943, a Macy’s
card balance of $1180, a Sears Mastercard with a $1967
balance, a Royal Furniture balance of $3290, bills from
Banana Republic, Express, Victoria’s Secret, and a personal

[fn8] We note that in Flannary, our Supreme Court found it
appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for a
reevaluation of its previous property division and alimony
determinations in light of the Court’s finding that the
missing money was not a marital asset subject to division.
121 S.W.3d at 651. The trial court in that case had
originally concluded that there was insufficient evidence
to determine what happened to the money, but it found that
the husband’s careless decision to put the money into a
drawer led to its ultimate disappearance. Id at 649.
Therefore, a remand was necessary in order for the court to
consider the relevance of the husband’s behavior with regard
to the missing funds. Id. at 651. To the contrary, in this
case the trial court explicitly found that Wife was
responsible for taking the missing money from the box. We
do not find it necessary to order a remand because the
trial court has already determined that Wife took the cash
from the safety deposit box, and we can consider that fact
in determining whether the trial court’s division of
property was equitable.

[fn9] For the most part, Wife did not work while the divorce
was pending. Wife did have three different part-time jobs
during the proceedings. First, she worked at a fitness
facility for 4-5 hours per week for a couple of months.
Then, she worked at a caf?© for a couple of days. And
finally, she worked 15-20 hours per week at a law firm from
October to December of 2004.

[fn10] Husband was ordered to pay Wife rehabilitative
alimony for the next five years.