Rhode Island Supreme Court Case Law
STATE v. COREY DAY, 2002-624-C.A (R.I. 12-18-2006) State v.
corey day. No. 2006-8-C.A., (W1/05-109A). Supreme Court of
Rhode Island. December 18, 2006
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and
ROBINSON, JJ.
OPINION
Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.
When a child is waived from the jurisdiction of the Family
Court pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 14-1-7 and
14-1-7.1 to stand trial as an adult, is the Attorney
General then prohibited from charging the child with
offenses different from, and/or in addition to, those upon
which the waiver originally was based? In this case of
first impression, it is our opinion that there is nothing
in the statutory scheme that restricts the Attorney General
from bringing charges against the child in the Superior
Court which are different than those that served as the
basis for waiver from the Family Court, provided the new
charges arise from the same nucleus of operative facts.
On January 28, 2004, the Ocean Tides Residential Treatment
Program (Ocean Tides or the Ocean Tides facility) was
broken into, and one of its employees, Christopher Wilson,
later was found bound, gagged, and imprisoned in a walk-in
freezer on the premises. The defendant, Corey Day
(defendant or Day), who was a juvenile at the time, was
arrested and accused of the break-in. Because Day had not
reached the age of majority at the time of his arrest, the
Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction over him. Pursuant
to §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1, the Attorney
General moved that the Family Court waive jurisdiction over
Day so that he could be tried as an adult for the criminal
charges stemming from the incident.[fn1] In his waiver
motion, the Attorney General contended that the
seventeen-year-old Day had committed four separate offenses:
(1) breaking and entering; (2) second-degree robbery; (3)
kidnapping; and (4) assault with intent to commit robbery
and kidnapping.
After a hearing on November 8, 2004, the Family Court
granted the state’s motion and ordered Day waived from its
jurisdiction, and it ordered him “held for trial under the
procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of
such offense if committed by an adult.”
A grand jury subsequently indicted Day for (1) burglary;
(2) first-degree robbery; (3) felony assault; (4)
kidnapping; and (5) larceny of goods valued at greater than
$500. The defendant then moved to dismiss the indictment
based on Rule 12(b)(2)[fn2] of the Superior Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure on the ground that the Superior Court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the indictment
impermissibly charged him with crimes that were different
from, greater than, and in addition to, the offenses for
which he was waived by the Family Court. The defendant
argued that the Family Court found probable cause only for
the charges of (1) breaking and entering; (2) second-degree
robbery; (3) kidnapping; and (4) assault with intent to
commit robbery and kidnapping.[fn3] The defendant contended
that § 14-1-7.1 prohibited the state from charging
him with crimes different from those for which the Family
Court found probable cause and that served as the basis for
the waiver. A justice of the Superior Court agreed with
Day, and he granted the motion to dismiss the indictment.
The state timely appealed. We reverse.
Standard of Review
“This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation
de novo, * * *, and in undertaking this analysis, we apply
our well-established maxims of statutory construction.”
State v. Oliveira, 882 A.2d 1097, 1110 (R.I. 2005). “It is
well settled that when the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute
literally and must give the words of the statute their
plain and ordinary meanings.” State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d
251, 253 (R.I. 1998) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v.
Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)).
“Moreover, when we examine an unambiguous statute, `there
is no room for statutory construction and we must apply the
statute as written.'” Id. (quoting In re Denisewich, 643
A.2d 1194, 1197 (R.I. 1994)). However, “[i]f we discern a
statutory ambiguity, this Court establishes and effectuates
the legislative intent behind the enactment.” State v.
Fritz, 801 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I. 2002). And, “it is equally
well established that, when confronted with statutory
provisions that are unclear or ambiguous, this Court, as
final arbiter of questions of statutory construction, will
examine statutes in their entirety, and will `glean the
intent and purpose of the Legislature “from a consideration
of the entire statute, keeping in mind [the] nature,
object, language and arrangement” of the provisions to be
construed.'” DiCicco, 707 A.2d at 253 n. 1 (quoting In re
Advisory to the Governor, 668 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I. 1996)
and Algiere v. Fox, 122 R.I. 55, 58, 404 A.2d 72, 74
(1979)).
Analysis
This case presents an issue of first impression for this
Court and requires us to take an exacting look at the
language of §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1. Together,
these two statutes set forth the requirements for waiver of
jurisdiction of the Family Court over a child who has been
accused of certain misconduct so that the child may be tried
as an adult. Generally, when a juvenile is accused of
conduct that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult,[fn4] the matter is adjudicated under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Family Court, and the child is subject
only to a determination of delinquency. However, when the
Family Court waives its jurisdiction under §§
14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1, the child may be tried as an adult,
and sentenced as an adult if he is found guilty. The issue
squarely presented to us by the facts of this case is
whether §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 require that,
after a waiver has been granted, the charges brought
against a child in the Superior Court must be precisely
aligned with the charges set forth in the Family Court’s
waiver order.
Section 14-1-7 is entitled “Waiver of jurisdiction or
certification hearing” and says, in relevant part,
“(a) If any child is charged with an offense which would
be punishable by life imprisonment if committed by an
adult, that child, upon motion of the attorney general,
shall be brought before the court and the court shall
conduct a waiver hearing pursuant to § 14-1-7.1.
“(b) Any child sixteen (16) years of age or older who is
charged with an offense which would constitute a felony if
committed by an adult shall, upon motion of the attorney
general, be brought before the court and the court shall
conduct a waiver hearing pursuant to § 14-1-7.1.”
Section 14-1-7.1 is entitled “Waiver of jurisdiction
– Proof” and says:
“(a) Upon a motion by the attorney general pursuant to
§ 14-1-7, the court shall conduct a hearing at
which it shall be the duty of the attorney general to
produce evidence to enable the court to determine:
“(1) That probable cause exists to believe that the
offense charged has been committed and that the child
charged has committed it, unless the proof has been
elicited at a prior hearing on detention of the juvenile
and the findings have been made by the same justice of the
family court who is conducting the waiver proceeding; and
“(2) That the child’s past history of offenses, history of
treatment, or the heinous or premeditated nature of the
offense is such that the court finds that the interests of
society or the protection of the public necessitate the
waiver of jurisdiction of the court over the child.
“(b) If the court finds that subdivisions (a)(1) and
(a)(2) of this section have been proven by a preponderance
of evidence, it may waive jurisdiction over the child and
refer the child to the appropriate adult court to be
tried for the offense as an adult.
“(c) A waiver of jurisdiction over a child pursuant to
this section shall constitute a waiver of jurisdiction
over that child for the offense upon which the motion is
based as well as for all pending and subsequent offenses
of whatever nature, and the child shall be referred to
the court which would have had jurisdiction if the offense
had been committed by an adult. In the event that the
child is acquitted of the offense for which the waiver has
been sought, the waiver shall be vacated.”
The defendant argues that the language of §
14-1-7.1(b) is clear and unambiguous, and that the plain
meaning of the words “to be tried for the offense as an
adult” bars the Attorney General from charging a child in
the Superior Court with any crimes different from —
including those that constitute a more serious offense or a
lesser included offense — or in addition to those
for which waiver was granted in the Family Court.
According to defendant, the words “the offense,” used
repeatedly in § 14-1-7.1, can mean only a particular
crime as defined by the laws of this state. The defendant
claims further support for his argument in the last
sentence of § 14-1-7.1(c), that requires a waiver to
be vacated in the event that an accused is “acquitted of
the offense for which the waiver has been sought.” This
precise language, he argues, requires that any and all
offenses for which waiver is sought must be included
verbatim in the charges brought against the child if he is
tried subsequently as an adult in the Superior Court. It is
central to defendant’s interpretation that when the Family
Court waives jurisdiction of the child under
§§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1, it does so only with
respect to its jurisdiction over the offense charged, but
not over the child himself.
The state agrees with defendant that § 14-1-7.1 is
clear and unambiguous in its mandate but, not surprisingly,
disagrees about what the statute actually means. The state
contends that the language “as well as for all pending and
subsequent offenses of whatever nature” present in §
14-1-7.1(c) clearly indicates that a prosecutor is free to
charge a child as an adult in the Superior Court with any
and all crimes arising from the conduct that formed the
basis of the waiver. This, urges the state, includes crimes
that constitute a more serious offense or lesser included
offenses. The words “the offense,” the state argues, do not
mean the specific charge alleged in the waiver motion, but
rather the bundle of facts comprising the criminal incident
that led to the waiver in the first place. According to the
state, this interpretation makes sense because
§§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 can be read only to
mean that when the Family Court waives its jurisdiction,
that waiver extends to the child personally and not, as
defendant contends, just to the offense for which the
waiver is sought.
After careful review, we conclude that the terms of this
statute are neither clear nor unambiguous. The ambiguity in
the statute lies in the language of § 14-1-7.1(b).
That section says that once the Family Court finds that
probable cause exists to believe that a juvenile has
committed a particular “offense charged,” and that certain
additional factors are present,[fn5] the court “may waive
jurisdiction over the child and refer the child to the
appropriate adult court to be tried for the offense as an
adult.” Id. (Emphasis added.)
The issue to be decided, then, is framed by the ambiguity
in the statute: did the Legislature intend for a waiver of
jurisdiction under §§ 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 to
constitute a complete waiver of personal jurisdiction over
the child, or merely a waiver of jurisdiction for the
particular offense for which the child is waived?[fn6] To
resolve this ambiguity, we must “glean the intent and
purpose of the Legislature `from a consideration of the
entire statute, keeping in mind [the] nature, object,
language and arrangement’ of the provisions to be
construed.” DiCicco, 707 A.2d at 253 n. 1 (quoting In re
Advisory to the Governor, 668 A.2d at 1248 and Algiere, 122
R.I. at 58, 404 A.2d at 74). We begin our analysis with a
brief history of the Family Court and a discussion of the
jurisdictional interplay between the Family Court and the
Superior Court with respect to juveniles.
I.
History of the Rhode Island Family Court
This nation’s early treatment of juveniles accused of
criminal conduct was much harsher than it is today. Until
the late nineteenth century, most juvenile offenders were
treated as adults, consistent with the common law view that
only children under the age of seven were irrebuttably
incapable of forming criminal intent. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century, legislation in states throughout the
country “gave `criminal courts discretion either to
sentence juveniles to reform school or to impose “such
punishment as [was] otherwise provided by law.”‘” Laureen
D’Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of
Juvenile Offenders is Not a Panacea, 2 Roger Williams U. L.
Rev. 277, 279-80 (1997) (quoting John J. Cloherty III,
Note, The Serious Juvenile Offender in the Adult Criminal
System: The Jurisprudence of Rhode Island’s Waiver and
Certification Procedures, 26 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 407, 414
(1992)). Then, in 1899, the Juvenile Court Act was passed
in Illinois and the first juvenile court was created in
Chicago. This presaged a new trend in the United States,
and “[w]ithin twenty years, all but three states had
created similar juvenile systems.” Lynn A. Foster, School
Shootings and the Over-reliance Upon Age in Choosing
Criminal or Juvenile Court, 24 Vt. L. Rev. 537, 540 (2000).
The philosophy underlying the movement to create juvenile
justice systems, separate from the adult criminal system,
stemmed from the belief that people under a certain age
inherently were less culpable than were adults. Society’s
goal for juveniles, it was believed, should be to
rehabilitate through treatment and supervision, an option
not available under the punishment-driven adult criminal
system. As a result of their philosophical underpinnings,
the newly created juvenile courts of the various states
differed greatly from their adult court counterparts. “The
hearings were civil and confidential in nature,” and
“[r]ehabilitative `sentencing,’ left almost entirely to the
judge’s discretion, varied greatly with each case because
of the diverse needs of each individual youth.” Julie B.
Fails, Statutory Exclusion — When the Protector
Becomes the Abuser, 32 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 81, 85 (1998).
Following the national trend, the Rhode Island juvenile
system began to take shape in the early 1900s. In 1944, the
Rhode Island Legislature removed what was then called the
juvenile court from the jurisdiction of the District Court,
created Rhode Island’s first fully independent juvenile
court, and gave that new court its own chief justice. P.L.
1944, ch. 1441. Eventually, in 1961, the juvenile court was
merged with the Family Court, which assumed jurisdiction
over juvenile offenders. P.L. 1961, ch. 73. The Family
Court’s jurisdiction was both original and exclusive and it
extended to, among other things, the adjudication of
matters involving juveniles alleged to be either wayward or
delinquent. As it exists today, the Family Court is a court
of limited statutory jurisdiction, State v. Kenney, 523
A.2d 853, 854 (R.I. 1987) (“the Family Court is a court of
limited jurisdiction whose powers are strictly limited to
those conferred by the Legislature”), and its governing
statutes give it subject matter jurisdiction only over a
very narrow range of criminal violations dealing with
offenses committed by adults against either children or
members of the offender’s family. Thus, children accused of
conduct that would amount to a crime if committed by an
adult are not actually charged with, tried for, or
convicted of the underlying crime in the Family Court.
Indeed, according to § 14-1-40(a), a juvenile never
can be “charged with or convicted of a crime in any court,
except as provided in [that] chapter.” (Emphasis added.)
Instead, juveniles accused of conduct that would be
otherwise criminal in nature are brought before the Family
Court on delinquency petitions and their conduct is
evaluated through an adjudication governed by chapter 1 of
title 14 and the Family Court Rules of Juvenile
Proceedings.[fn7] So, although the Family Court has
exclusive personal jurisdiction over juveniles appearing
before it on delinquency petitions, it lacks the subject
matter jurisdiction needed to adjudge a juvenile’s behavior
criminal in the traditional sense.[fn8]
On the other hand, the Superior Court is a court of
general jurisdiction, and it is fully cloaked with the
authority to hear cases involving violations of our
criminal laws. Conversely, in the absence of a waiver from
the Family Court, the Superior Court lacks personal
jurisdiction to adjudicate allegations of criminal conduct
with respect to children; that is the exclusive province of
the Family Court. The purpose of this jurisdictional
division is, as we have stated in prior cases, “to guard *
* * [children] against the stigma attaching to criminal
proceedings.” State v. Cook, 99 R.I. 710, 713, 210 A.2d
577, 579 (1965) (quoting Givardi v. Juvenile Court, 49 R.I.
336, 337, 142 A. 542, 542 (1928)).
Sections 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 serve as a jurisdictional
bridge between the two courts. Section 14-1-7 says that
waiver of jurisdiction in the Family Court is appropriate
for either (1) any child who is accused of conduct that, if
committed by an adult, would constitute a crime that would
be punishable by life imprisonment, or (2) a child who is
sixteen years or older and who is accused of conduct that
otherwise would constitute a felony. Section 14-1-7.1
delineates the factors that the Family Court justice must
consider in deciding whether to waive a child from the
jurisdiction of that court.
First, the justice must assess whether the Attorney General
has produced enough evidence to find that probable cause
exists to believe that the child in question has committed
the act upon which the motion to waive is based. Second, if
the justice finds that such probable cause exists, he or
she then must find that either the heinous nature of the
juvenile’s alleged conduct by itself, or the nature of the
juvenile’s act in conjunction with his or her past behavior
and treatment in the juvenile system, indicates that the
child is not amenable to rehabilitation.[fn9] If the Family
Court justice finds that the statutory requirements have
been met, waiver is appropriate because the state’s
interest in protecting the child from the stigma of
conviction is outweighed both by the public’s need for
safety from the possible future misconduct of the accused
child and its need for redress for the wrong allegedly
committed.
Once the justice decides that waiver is appropriate,
§ 14-1-7.1(b) authorizes him to “waive jurisdiction
over the child and refer the child to the appropriate adult
court to be tried for the offense as an adult.” And,
according to § 14-1-7.1(c), the waiver constitutes
both “a waiver of jurisdiction over that child for the
offense upon which the motion is based as well as for all
pending and subsequent offenses of whatever nature * * *.”
Armed with a better understanding of the waiver process and
the reasons supporting its existence, we now turn to the
question presented in this case: after the Family Court has
waived jurisdiction over a juvenile in accordance with
§ 14-1-7.1, is the jurisdiction of the adult court
to which the child is referred limited to the charges for
which probable cause was found in the Family Court?
II.
Persuasive Authority
We begin by noting that we are not the first Court to
address this thorny issue, and, although some authority
exists to the contrary,[fn10] the great majority of courts
faced with this question have held that prosecutors may
charge a child who is waived from juvenile court
jurisdiction with any crime that arises from the conduct for
which the waiver was sought.[fn11] See e.g. Knotts v.
State, 686 So.2d 431 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995); People v.
Hamilton, 398 N.E.2d 33 (Ill.App.Ct. 1979); Pharms v.
State, 477 N.E.2d 334 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985); State v.
Randolph, 876 P.2d 177 (Kan.Ct.App. 1994); Osborne v.
Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 234 (Ky. 2001); Johnson v. State,
512 So.2d 1246 (Miss. 1987); State v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 68
(Mo.Ct.App. 1999); State v. Garcia, 596 P.2d 264 (N.M.
1979); State v. Walton, 600 N.W.2d 524 (S.D. 1999); but see
Gibson v. State, 177 N.W.2d 912 (Wis. 1970). Although these
cases involve our sister courts’ interpretation of their
own states’ individual waiver statutes, “their value is in
showing their approach to the problem and not the result.”
Randolph, 876 P.2d at 180. Also, it is significant that
juvenile waiver statutes in this country share a common
thread of consistency emanating from the holding in Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), which set forth the
factors a juvenile court should consider before a child is
waived from its jurisdiction. As a result, even though our
waiver statute might vary from those of other states in
detail, our sister courts’ interpretations of their own
juvenile waiver statutes provide us with both persuasive
authority and valuable insight into the philosophy and
legislative intent of juvenile waiver in general. In
Randolph, the Kansas Court of Appeals interpreted its
state’s juvenile waiver statute with respect to the issue
of whether a child may be charged in an adult court with
charges that were not brought at the waiver hearing. In
Randolph, the court held that
“[t]he juvenile court is to make the judicial
determination of whether a juvenile should remain within
the province of the juvenile court and not determine what
charges the State can file. Once the juvenile court
decides to waive jurisdiction * * * and the respondent
appears in the criminal court as a defendant, the criminal
court acquires personal and subject matter jurisdiction
over the case. The criminal court can try any additional
charges that might arise from the same set of facts that
spawned the juvenile case * * *. The State does not have
to return to juvenile court and again seek its waiver of
jurisdiction. It is sufficient that the procedure starts
in juvenile court.” Randolph, 876 P.2d at 180-81.
In Walton, the Supreme Court of South Dakota echoed the
sentiments of the Randolph court. The Walton court cited
the reasoning in Randolph as persuasive and held that the
factors to be considered by the juvenile court in South
Dakota waiver cases, do not require a strict policy of bringing
every charge before the juvenile court for its approval.
The juvenile court is to make the judicial determination of
whether a juvenile should remain within the province of the
juvenile court and not determine what charges the State
can file.'” Walton, 600 N.W.2d at 533 (quoting Randolph,
876 P.2d at 180-81).
We conclude that the logic of the Randolph and Walton
decisions is sound indeed.[fn12] We agree with our sister
courts that it would be illogical to conclude that the
Legislature intended to give the Family Court the power to
dictate what charges an Attorney General may bring in the
adult court.