Ohio Appellate Reports
Unpublished
IN RE NEVAEH J., Unpublished Decision (12-15-2006)
2006-Ohio-6628 IN THE MATTER OF NEVAEH J. No. L-06-1093.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, Lucas County.
Decided: December 15, 2006.
[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the
issuing court.] Trial Court No. 05139998.
Donna M. Grill, for appellants.
Amy E. Stoner, for appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY.
SKOW, J.
{¶ 1} Appellants, Nicole J. and Adrian S., appeal
the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division, which terminated their parental rights
to Nevaeh J.[fn1] For the following reasons, the judgment
is affirmed.
{¶ 2} Nevaeh was born on March 28, 2005; at the
time, her mother, Nicole J., was incarcerated at the
Franklin Pre-Release Center, in Columbus, Ohio. Nicole was
serving an 11-month sentence for a probation violation
stemming from a conviction for attempt to commit possession
of crack cocaine, and was due to be released in August
2005.
{¶ 3} On April 4, 2005, LCCSB filed a complaint in
dependency and an emergency motion for shelter care. The
complaint alleged that Adrian S., named as Nevaeh’s
putative father, had outstanding warrants for assault and
domestic violence and pending charges for carrying a
concealed weapon and loitering. LCCSB was also
investigating separate allegations that Adrian had
physically assaulted the mother of two of his other
children with the children present. On April 5, 2005, an ex
parte order allowing LCCSB to take Nevaeh into shelter care
custody was issued. Adrian S. was served with the complaint
by personal service at his residence.
{¶ 4} Nicole’s history with LCCSB began in November
2002, when the agency filed a complaint in dependency and
neglect and a motion for temporary custody of two of
Nicole’s other children, Jasmine H. and Ja’Shawn H. Nicole
was given psychological services, drug abuse counseling,
parenting classes, and participated in Drug Court. On June
21, 2004, while she was successfully completing Drug Court,
she voluntary relinquished her parental rights to Madison
W., born April 4, 2004. Soon afterwards, custody of Jasmine
and Ja’Shawn was returned to Nicole. Within a year,
however, she relapsed into drug use and on December 28,
2004, LCCSB filed a motion for permanent custody of Jasmine
and Ja’Shawn. On July 14, 2005, LCCSB’s motion for permanent
custody was granted.
{¶ 5} On April 18, 2005, Nevaeh was placed in
shelter care. The court appointed counsel for Adrian at
that time, and ordered him to undergo a diagnostic
assessment. Nevaeh was adjudicated dependent by consent on
May 24, 2005; although no transcript was filed on appeal,
the judgment entry indicates that counsel for both Adrian
and Nicole were present at that hearing.
{¶ 6} On November 22, 2005, the matter was called
for a hearing on disposition. Adrian requested and received
a continuance in order to allow him to submit to genetic
testing to determine if he was Nevaeh’s biological father.
The matter was continued to January 17, 2006.
{¶ 7} At the dispositional hearing on January 17,
2006, were Debra Wedding, a caseworker with LCCSB; Nicole
J., mother of Nevaeh, and her attorney; Adrian S., father
of Nevaeh and his attorney; and Ms. Rose, the guardian ad
litem (“GAL”) appointed for Nevaeh. At the beginning of the
proceedings, Adrian moved for a second continuance. He
asserted that he was willing to participate in case
planning services and argued that a second continuance was
necessary because he had just received a case plan the
previous week and had not had an opportunity to be referred
to services. Appellee argued that Adrian had been served
with pleadings from the filing of the complaint as a
putative father and had not responded to caseworkers’
efforts to contact him in order to initiate a case plan
until November 2005. The trial court denied Adrian’s
motion, explaining that he would not be prejudiced since he
had been served with pleadings since the filing of the
complaint.
{¶ 8} LCCSB first called Adrian, who testified that
he knew of Nevaeh’s birth; he also acknowledged receipt of
the complaint and all filings in the case. He acknowledged
that he was listed on the complaint as the putative father,
but said that he delayed establishing his paternity because
he was “in denial” about the circumstances. He admitted his
awareness of case planning and services offered, but did
not want to participate in case planning until he had
established paternity. Once his paternity was established,
he attended an administrative review hearing on the case
plan on January 9, 2006, and received referrals to
services. He scheduled a substance abuse assessment for
January 12, 2006; he explained he failed to appear to that
assessment because his other daughter was sick in the
hospital that day. He expressed a desire to have a chance
to receive services through a case plan. When questioned by
counsel for LCCSB, he admitted to a criminal history which
included drug abuse and domestic violence charges, and
admitted to his incarceration for “a day or two” two weeks
prior to the instant hearing. He also admitted to
occasionally using marijuana and parentage of four other
children; he had not paid support for any of his four other
children because he had been unemployed for five years, but
admitted that he received SSI benefits for his learning
disability.
{¶ 9} Next, LCCSB called Nicole, who admitted that
her drug relapse and probation violations had caused her
recent incarceration. She had not had any drug treatment
since her release in August, and admitted to still using
illegal drugs, including crack cocaine and marijuana four
days prior to the hearing. She was currently living with a
family member due to her unemployment and lack of income.
She also asked the court for another opportunity to receive
a case plan and participate in services, explaining that
she had not missed an opportunity to visit with Nevaeh,
visiting at least once a week. LCCSB did not dispute her
visitations. She also discussed a brief stay at a shelter
since her release; she had entered the shelter voluntarily
seeking “a change,” but only stayed four days because she
was still using drugs and was not allowed to “detox” there.
{¶ 10} Debra Wedding, the LCCSB caseworker on
Nicole’s case since the fall of 2002, testified that she
had some contact with Nicole after her release, but that
contact was sporadic. She referred Nicole for two substance
abuse assessments, neither of which Nicole attended. With
respect to Adrian, Wedding stated that she left a card at
his address in April 2005, requesting that he contact her;
she also sent letters in May and July of 2005. Wedding
finally met Adrian in November 2005, after Nicole had
spoken to Adrian and arranged for his paternity testing.
Adrian had told Wedding that he did not want to begin case
plan services until after his paternity had been
determined. Wedding recommended that Adrian complete a
substance abuse assessment and an assessment for domestic
violence classes, because he had had previously been
charged with several domestic violence offenses. She could
not say whether Adrian had any separate investigations
pending with LCCSB. Wedding acknowledged that Adrian had
visited with Nevaeh “two or three” times, that he attended
an administrative case plan review meeting on January 9,
2006, and that at that time he made an appointment for his
substance abuse assessment. She also acknowledged that it
is common for putative fathers not to want to participate
in case planning services until after establishing
paternity; however, in her opinion, failing to establish
paternity for over seven months was a “long wait.”
Ultimately, she opined that permanent custody was in
Nevaeh’s best interests.
{¶ 11} After Wedding’s testimony, the parties
submitted their closing arguments. Immediately thereafter,
the court stated that it found clear and convincing
evidence that granting permanent custody to LCCSB was in
Nevaeh’s best interest, and that reasonable efforts to
reunify had been made.
{¶ 12} Appellate counsel was appointed to jointly
represent Nicole and Adrian. They have raised the following
assignments of error:
{¶ 13} “Assignment of Error No. I: The trial court
erred in granting permanent custody to Lucas County
Children Services Board as Lucas County Children Services
Board failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that
it is in the best interest of the minor child that
permanent custody be awarded to Lucas County Children
Services Board and they failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence Ohio Revised Code §
2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4), (11), (13), and (14) as it relates
to the father, Adrian [S.]
{¶ 14} “Assignment of Error No. II: The trial court
violated appellant Adrian [S.]’s due process [sic] by
failing to grant the continuance requested by appellant
Adrian [S.]
{¶ 15} “Assignment of Error No. III: The trial court
erred by granting permanent custody to LCCSB as appellant
[mother] was not granted an opportunity to complete a case
plan regarding this minor child and Lucas County Children
Services Board failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that it is in the best interest of the minor child
that permanent custody be awarded to Lucas County Children
Services Board and they failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence Ohio Revised Code Sections
2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4), (13), and (14).”
{¶ 16} Because the first and third assignments of
error involve the same analysis, we address them jointly.
We first address the arguments relating to the mother,
Nicole J. The trial court relied, in part, on R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d), which allows a trial court to terminate
a parent’s rights upon the child being in the custody of a
public children services agency for 12 out of a consecutive
22 month period. For the purposes of this determination, a
child is considered to have entered the temporary custody
of the agency at the earlier of 1) the date the child is
adjudicated neglected, dependent, or abused, or 2) the date
that is 60 days after the removal of the child from home.
R.C. 2151.414(B). The reliance on this provision is
disturbing, as Nevaeh was only approximately ten months old
at the time of the permanent custody hearing. This
statutory section appears to have been inserted in the
judgment entry as a matter of routine. The Ohio Supreme
Court has made clear that a motion for permanent custody
must allege grounds that currently exist and that an agency
filing for custody under the 12 month provision must show
that the child had been in the temporary custody of the
agency for 12 months on the date the complaint was filed. In
re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411. The time that
passes between the filing of the motion for permanent
custody and the permanent custody hearing cannot count
toward the 12 month period. Id., ¶ 26.
{¶ 17} The other means of gaining permanent custody
is through R.C. 2151.414(E), pursuant to which appellee
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least
one of the statutory factors applied to Nicole. “Because
the right to raise and nurture one’s child is so basic,
statutory conditions which defeat that right must be
strictly construed. In re Cunningham (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d
100, 105.” In re Alexis K., 160 Ohio App.3d 32,
2005-Ohio-1380, ¶ 24. “The court’s decision to
terminate parental rights, however, will not be overturned
as against the manifest weight of the evidence if the record
contains competent, credible evidence by which the court
could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the
essential statutory elements for a termination of parental
rights have been established. In re Forrest S. (1995), 102
Ohio App.3d 338, 345; Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St.
469, paragraph three of the syllabus.” Id., ¶ 26.
{¶ 18} The trial court found that R.C.
2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4), (13), and (14) applied to Nicole.
Those sections provide:
{¶ 19} “(E) In determining at a hearing held
pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the
purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the
Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either
parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be
placed with the parents, the court shall consider all
relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and
convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division
(A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4)
of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code that one or more of
the following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the
court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed
with either parent within a reasonable time or should not
be placed with either parent:
{¶ 20} “(1) Following the placement of the child
outside the child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable
case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist
the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused
the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has
failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy
the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the
child’s home. In determining whether the parents have
substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall
consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric,
psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services
and material resources that were made available to the
parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to
allow them to resume and maintain parental duties.
{¶ 21} “(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic
emotional illness, mental retardation, physical disability,
or chemical dependency of the parent that is so severe that
it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent
home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated,
within one year after the court holds the hearing pursuant
to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of
division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code;
{¶ 22} “* * *
{¶ 23} “(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of
commitment toward the child by failing to regularly
support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to
do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to
provide an adequate permanent home for the child;
{¶ 24} “* * *
{¶ 25} “(13) The parent is repeatedly incarcerated,
and the repeated incarceration prevents the parent from
providing care for the child.
{¶ 26} “(14) The parent for any reason is unwilling
to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other basic
necessities for the child or to prevent the child from
suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical,
emotional, or mental neglect.”
{¶ 27} R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) was inappropriately found
to apply to Nicole. That section states that a child should
not be placed with a parent or cannot within a reasonable
time be placed with a parent if that parent “continuously
and repeatedly” failed to substantially remedy the
condition causing the child to be placed outside her home.
The condition which initially caused Nevaeh to be placed
away from her birth mother was her mother’s incarceration.
The judgment entry upon adjudication was based on a consent
finding of dependency with no further specification.
Although Nicole neither availed herself of the services to
which she was referred, nor remedied her prior substance
abuse issues, her incarceration ended in August 2005;
therefore, the condition which caused Nevaeh to be placed
in the temporary custody of LCCSB had been remedied. Since
Nicole’s incarceration was the specific reason for Nevaeh’s
removal, the court should have focused its inquiry under
R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) on whether Nicole had remedied this
specific condition. See In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio
St.3d 95, 100.
{¶ 28} However, the trial court did correctly and
properly find that R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) applied to Nicole.
In her testimony, Nicole admitted relapsing into drug use,
after having admitted to a 19 year history of cocaine
abuse. She admitted to being unable to live independently;
after her release from incarceration, she spent a short
period of time in a shelter, and currently lives with
family members upon whom she is entirely dependent. The
trial court could have also properly found R.C.
2151.414(E)(13) to apply; a list of Nicole’s prior drug
charges and incarcerations was admitted into evidence.
Although Nicole had not been arrested in the six months
since her release, she acknowledged that a continuing
pattern of incarceration was common for her.
{¶ 29} If one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors is
found to exist with respect to a parent, the court is
required to enter a finding of parental unfitness. R.C.
2151.414(E); In re William S., supra, syllabus. Competent
and credible evidence supported the findings of R.C.
2151.414(E)(2) and (13) as applied to Nicole.
{¶ 30} Next, we review the trial court’s finding
that Nevaeh cannot or should not be placed with Adrian
within a reasonable period of time. The same standard of
review applies; each statutory finding must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence. The trial court did not
separately state which factors of R.C. 2151.414(E) applied
to Adrian. However, findings were entered for Adrian
underneath its analysis of R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), (4), and
(14).
{¶ 31} With respect to R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), the
judgment entry stated that Adrian “just recently
established paternity. [He] ignored the many requests and
letters from the caseworker requesting him to meet with her
for assessment of case plan services.” This statement fails
to explain how Adrian has a “[c]hronic mental illness,
chronic emotional illness, mental retardation, physical
disability, or chemical dependency * * * so severe that it
makes [him] unable to provide an adequate permanent home
for the child at the present time and, as anticipated,
within one year after the court holds the hearing pursuant
to division (A) of this section * * *.” Although, during
his testimony, Adrian admitted to occasionally using
marijuana, LCCSB admitted no evidence of a severe chemical
dependency which would render him unable to provide a home
within a year of the disposition hearing. He had been
referred for a substance abuse assessment and made his
appointment on January 9, 2006, only eight days prior to
the hearing. He acknowledged missing his appointment the
previous Thursday, January 12, 2006, five days prior to the
hearing, but testified that his other daughter was taken
sick to the hospital emergency room and he spent the day
with her there; LCCSB did not dispute his explanation.
{¶ 32} R.C. 2151.414(E)(14) was demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence. That section requires a
finding of parental unfitness if the parent “for any reason
is unwilling to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other
basic necessities for the child or to prevent the child
from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or
physical, emotional, or mental neglect.” Although no
evidence of a child support order for Adrian and Nevaeh was
introduced, the lack of one does not preclude one from
providing support. Neither does the fact that Adrian had
not established paternity for over seven months; even a
putative father, if willing to provide basic necessities
for a child, may give to the child such as he is able
without genetic testing. At the hearing and on appeal,
Adrian asserts that, although he is unemployed, he receives
Social Security Disability benefits which would assist him
in providing a home for Nevaeh; this argument, however,
begs the question of why he failed to attempt to do so for
over seven months. The lack of any attempt on his part,
even after he underwent genetic testing, to provide even
small tokens of food or clothing to Nevaeh demonstrates an
unwillingness to do so. The same evidence supports a finding
of R.C. 2151.414(E)(4), which requires a finding of
parental unfitness if the parent demonstrates a lack of
commitment by “failing to regularly support, visit, or
communicate with the child when able to do so, or by other
actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate
permanent home for the child.” By waiting over seven months
to establish paternity, and by failing to contact
caseworkers or to attempt to visit Nevaeh during this time,
he demonstrated an unwillingness to provide an adequate
permanent home for her.
{¶ 33} The other statutory factor which could have
applied to Adrian is R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), although the
trial court made no specific findings in relation to Adrian
under this section in its judgment entry. That section
enables a court to consider “parental utilization of
medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and
rehabilitative services and material resources that were
made available to the parents for the purpose of changing
parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain
parental duties.” This section also requires an agency to
show that a parent has failed to remedy the child’s initial
condition only after the agency has provided “reasonable
case planning and diligent efforts” to assist the parent.
In re S.T., V.T., P.T., 9th Dist. No. 22665,
2005-Ohio-4793, ¶ 22.
{¶ 34} LCCSB argues that, since the filing of the
complaint in April 2005 until December 2005, Adrian failed
to avail himself of case planning and he failed to
establish his paternity. As required by statute, LCCSB
filed a case plan for Nevaeh on May 24, 2005. With respect
to Adrian, the case plan stated that he would “show an
active interest” in Nevaeh, “make arrangements” for an
assessment, “pay child support,” “establish paternity,” and
visit “on a regular basis.” Adrian acknowledged receipt of
the case plan and the letters from the caseworker. By the
time of the dispositional hearing, Adrian had established
paternity, made arranged for a substance abuse assessment
the week prior to the hearing, and visited Nevaeh several
times; however, these actions came only after his first
motion to continue the permanent custody hearing was
granted. The next case plan, updated January 9, 2006, for
which Adrian was present, was filed January 12, 2006;
listed goals for Adrian included becoming drug free, for
which a substance abuse assessment was required. His second
goal was the “learn to resolve conflicts without resorting
to violent behavior * * *” for which a domestic violence
assessment was required. No one testified as to whether he
had, in fact, been referred for a domestic violence
assessment or had an opportunity to schedule the
appointment. Adrian now argues that he had not had an
opportunity to avail himself of services which would allow
him to assume parental duties.
{¶ 35} “The current statutory scheme still
emphasizes the importance of preserving the family unit and
reuniting the child with his natural parents if that can be
done in a timely manner. Case plans continue to be required
in most cases and are to have as one of their general goals
the elimination of the need for out-of-home placement so the
child can safely return home. See R.C. 2151.412(F)(1)(b).”
In Re K.G., S.G., T.G., 9th Dist. Nos. 03CA0066, 03CA0067,
03CA0068, 2004-Ohio-1421, ¶ 19. Although Adrian had
complied somewhat with the initial case plan by the time of
the permanent custody hearing by establishing paternity and
visiting, a finding that he was unsuitable pursuant to R.C.
2151.414(E) was still supported by convincing evidence. That
is, after Adrian was provided with a reasonable case plan,
he was aware of Nevaeh’s circumstances, waited for over
seven months failed to establish paternity in order to
avail himself of services, and failed to “show an active
interest” in Nevaeh until November 2005. His delay
demonstrated a lack of commitment toward Nevaeh and an
unwillingness to provide her with a permanent home, or to
take steps to provide her with a permanent home. Although
this statutory section prescribes no time limit, and must
necessarily be a fact intensive and context-dependent
inquiry, Adrian’s failure to contact LCCSB for this time
period, despite his later attempts at amelioration,
provides clear and convincing evidence supporting this
finding.
{¶ 36} It was also in Nevaeh’s best interest to
award permanent custody to LCCSB. A finding of best
interests, made by considering “all relevant factors,”
including the statutory factors of R.C. 2151.414(D), is
required for motions filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413. The
statutory factors include:
{¶ 37} “(1) The interaction and interrelationship of
the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives,
foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child;
{¶ 38} “(2) The wishes of the child, as expressed
directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad
litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
{¶ 39} “(3) The custodial history of the child,
including whether the child has been in the temporary
custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after
March 18, 1999;
{¶ 40} “(4) The child’s need for a legally secure
permanent placement and whether that type of placement can
be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the
agency;
{¶ 41} “(5) Whether any of the factors in divisions
(E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the
parents and child.”
{¶ 42} Nevaeh’s GAL filed a report in which she
expressed that it would be in Nevaeh’s best interest to
grant permanent custody to LCCSB. Nevaeh had spent her
entire life in the temporary custody of LSSCB, placed in
foster care. She is in need of a legally secure placement,
which could not be achieved without granting LCCSB permanent
custody. As clear and convincing evidence supports the
statutory findings, appellants’ first and third assignments
of error are not well-taken.
{¶ 43} The second assignment of error challenges the
trial court’s decision to deny Adrian’s request for a
second continuance in order to allow him time to
participate in case planning services and comply with the
newly stated goals for him. By the time of the permanent
custody hearing, he had established paternity, had
participated in an administrative review of the case plan
eight days prior, and had been referred to substance abuse
counseling. The trial court orally ruled that Adrian would
not be prejudiced, or his counsel hampered, by denying the
continuance.
{¶ 44} With respect to continuances, this court has
held:
{¶ 45} “Juv.R. 23 provides that `[c]ontinuances
shall be granted only when imperative to secure fair
treatment for the parties.’ It is well-settled that `[t]he
grant or denial of a continuance is a matter which is
entrusted to the broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.
An appellate court must not reverse the denial of a
continuance unless there has been an abuse of discretion.’
State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67. An abuse of
discretion is more than an error of law or judgment; it
implies that the court’s attitude was unreasonable,
arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983),
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219.” In re Edward M. and Timothy M., 6th
Dist. Nos. L-04-1282, L-04-1304, 2005-Ohio-3354, ¶
21 (finding an abuse of discretion when father hospitalized
at time of disposition and unable to attend).
{¶ 46} When reviewing a denial of a request for a
continuance, an appellate court employs “a balancing test
which takes cognizance of all the competing
considerations.” State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 65,
67. Potential prejudice to the defendant is weighed against
a court’s right to control its own docket and the public’s
interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice.
Id. “[A] court should note, inter alia: the length of the
delay requested; whether other continuances have been
requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants,
witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; whether the
requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is
dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant
contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the
request for a continuance; and other relevant factors,
depending on the unique facts of each case.” Id. at 67-68.
{¶ 47} Here, Adrian received one prior continuance
in order to receive the results of paternity testing. He
requested the second in order to demonstrate, through his
participation in case plan services, his willingness and
ability to provide a home for Nevaeh. Although this may be
a legitimate reason, Adrian’s actions of choosing not to
establish paternity, visit, or receive services for over
seven months were dilatory. Adrian’s delay in taking these
basic, necessary steps toward reunification with Nevaeh
demonstrates a lack of commitment and an unwillingness to
provide a permanent home. The trial court’s refusal to
continue the hearing was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Appellants’ second assignment of error is
found not well-taken.
{¶ 48} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of
the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division,
is affirmed. Appellants are ordered to each pay one-half
the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgment
for the clerk’s expense incurred in preparation of the
record, fees allowed by law, and the fee for filing the
appeal is awarded to Lucas County.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested
in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit
the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.
PETER M. HANDWORK, J.
ARLENE SINGER, P.J.
JUDGE; WILLIAM J. SKOW, J.
CONCUR.
[fn1] The child’s name appears in the record alternatively
as “Neavaeh.” A single spelling has been used here for
consistency.