Minnesota Reports
Unpublished
MORRIS v. STATE, A05-1425 (Minn.App. 11-21-2006) Jeffrey C.
Morris, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota,
Respondent. Nos. A05-1425, A05-2518, A06-433, A06-542.
Minnesota Court of Appeals. Filed November 21, 2006.
[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the
issuing court.] This opinion will be unpublished and may not
be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. §
480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File Nos.
93023601, 97085756, 99119692, 93023158, 00086973, 77901098.
Appeal from the District Court, Dakota County, File No.
K04-01-1837.
Jeffrey C. Morris, pro se appellant, Minnesota
Correctional Facility, and John M. Stuart, State Public
Defender, Jodie L. Carlson, Assistant Public Defender, (for
appellant).
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, and Jay Heffern, Minneapolis
City Attorney, Lisa M. Godon, Assistant City Attorney, and
Patrick G. Leach, Thomas F. DeVincke, Bonner & Borhart,
Llp, and Jason T. Hutchinson, Prosecuting Attorney, City of
Hopkins, Miller, Steiner and Curtiss, Pa, and Amy
Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer,
Assistant County Attorney, and James C. Backstrom, Dakota
County Attorney, Phillip D. Prokopowicz, Chief Deputy, (for
respondent).
Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Lansing,
Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MINGE, Judge
Appellant seeks review of seven separate district court
orders denying petitions for postconviction review. Certain
issues overlap in the various appeals, and all appeals have
been consolidated for purposes of this proceeding.
Appellant asserts that the postconviction courts erred and
abused their discretion by: (1) failing to appoint counsel
and conduct an evidentiary hearing in two proceedings; (2)
summarily denying relief based on a procedural bar in the
Dakota County proceeding; (3) dismissing his postconviction
petitions as not timely in five proceedings; (4) denying
requests to withdraw guilty pleas in six proceedings; (5)
failing to recognize improper waiver of the right to
counsel in one proceeding; (6) denying appellant the right
to represent himself in one proceeding; and (7) holding in
one proceeding that the harassment statute under which he
was convicted is constitutional. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jeffrey Charles Morris has a lengthy criminal
record and an extensive history of mental health issues,
including a brief civil commitment in September 1993.
Appellant is currently incarcerated and serving a 102-month
sentence on a 2001 harassment and stalking conviction in
Dakota County, which is the subject of appellate file
A06-542. He has already appeared before the court of
appeals in several of the cases that are part of this
appeal and in several unrelated matters.
Appellant is currently challenging seven separate orders
denying postconviction relief. These challenges result in
four separate appeals pending before this court (A05-1425,
A05-2518, A06-433, and A06-542). Pursuant to appellant’s
request, and partly on its own initiative, this court
consolidated the various appeals into this single
proceeding. However, each denial of postconviction relief
(and its subsequent appeal) has its own specific facts and
its own procedural history, and each is addressed
individually in this opinion.
DECISION
I. A05-1425[fn1] (Hopkins Window Case)
On August 13, 1993, appellant appeared pro se and pleaded
guilty to a charge of gross misdemeanor criminal damage to
property for breaking the window of a building in Hopkins,
a violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.595 (1992).
Appellant did not directly appeal this conviction. On April
6, 2005, however, appellant filed a pro se petition for
postconviction relief. In his postconviction petition,
appellant argued that his waiver of counsel was not
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that he should be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The Hopkins City
Attorney’s Office challenged the timeliness of the petition.
The postconviction court summarily denied postconviction
relief. It determined that appellant was adequately advised
of the dangers of self-representation, that his plea was
voluntary, intelligent, and knowledgeable, and that the
petition for postconviction relief was untimely. This
appeal followed.
A. Waiver of Counsel and Guilty Plea Withdrawal
The first issue in the Hopkins window case is whether the
postconviction court abused its discretion by finding that
appellant’s waiver of counsel at his 1993 guilty plea
proceeding was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and
whether the postconviction court abused its discretion by
refusing to allow appellant to withdraw his plea.
Appellate courts review the denial of postconviction relief
for an abuse of discretion. Powers v. State, 695 N.W.2d
371, 374 (Minn. 2005); Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251
(Minn. 2001). “We review a postconviction court’s findings
to determine whether there is sufficient evidentiary
support in the record,” and we give great deference to a
postconviction court’s findings of fact. Dukes, 621 N.W.2d
at 251.
Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to counsel
and, reciprocally, the right of self-representation. U.S.
Const. amend. VI; amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art.
I, §§ 6, 7; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 817-18, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2532 (1975); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45, 83 S. Ct. 792, 796-97
(1963). There is a two-pronged inquiry for determining
whether a waiver of the right to counsel or a guilty plea
by a defendant whose competency may be questioned was
constitutionally valid. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160,
171-72 (Minn. 1997) (adopting the two-prong inquiry outlined
in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400, 113 S. Ct. 2680,
2687 (1993)). First, if a court has reason to doubt a
defendant’s competence, “the court must make a finding that
the defendant is competent to stand trial.” Camacho, 561
N.W.2d at 171 (quotations omitted). The legal standard “for
competence to waive counsel is the same as the legal
standard for competence to stand trial.” Id. Second, the
court must determine that the defendant’s waiver of his
constitutional rights is both knowing and voluntary. Id.
The district court proceedings carry a presumption of
correctness, and a criminal defendant who has waived counsel
and pleaded guilty bears the burden of proving that his
plea was invalid. State ex rel. Shelby v. Rigg, 255 Minn.
356, 366, 96 N.W.2d 886, 894 (1959). In order to meet this
burden, a postconviction petitioner’s allegations “must be
more than argumentative assertions without factual
support.” Gassler v. State, 590 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn.
1999) (quotations omitted).
1. Appellant’s competence
The focus of a competency inquiry is whether the defendant
has the ability to understand the proceedings. Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct. 896, 903 (1975).
Evidence of irrational behavior, demeanor at trial, and
prior medical opinions on competence to stand trial are
relevant in determining whether there is reason to doubt a
defendant’s competence. Id. at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 908. A
Minnesota defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he or
she lacks sufficient ability to consult with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding with defense counsel or is
mentally ill or mentally deficient so as to be incapable of
understanding the proceedings or participating in the
defense. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 171; Minn. R. Crim. P.
20.01, subd. 1 (1992).
Appellant claims that when he waived counsel and pleaded
guilty, he was not given notice of the consequences of
those decisions. But appellant failed to provide a
transcript of the 1993 guilty plea proceeding. The only
record of the guilty plea available for review at the
postconviction stage is a petition to enter a plea of
guilty that appellant completed and signed. A petition to
enter a plea of guilty is a written document that outlines
detailed discussions that defendants must have with an
attorney before pleading guilty. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15
app. A. Such a petition outlines, in detail, the
consequences of pleading guilty. Id. For example, section
19 of appellant’s petition to enter a guilty plea states
that a person with prior convictions may be subject to a
longer sentence if he or she pleads guilty. Although
appellant did not have an attorney, the petition he signed
put him on notice of the consequences of pleading guilty.
The petition to enter a guilty plea does indicate that
appellant had some mental health history at the time of the
plea. However, appellant failed to provide any evidence of
irrational behavior at the time of the guilty plea
proceedings, of his demeanor at those proceedings, or of
any medical opinion on his competence to stand trial.
Because appellant failed to meet his burden to establish
incompetency, we conclude that the postconviction court in
the Hopkins window case did not abuse its discretion in
determining that appellant was competent to stand trial,
waive counsel, and plead guilty.
2. Knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel
The purpose of the “knowing and voluntary” inquiry is to
determine whether the defendant actually understands the
significance and consequences of his or her decision to
waive counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541.
Again, appellant failed to provide evidence of irrational
behavior, medical opinions, or other evidence showing that
he did not understand the significance and consequences of
his decision at the guilty plea proceedings. He has also
failed to provide any evidence that his decision was
coerced. In this consolidated appeal, appellant challenges
convictions dating back to 1977. Throughout that time,
appellant has repeatedly opted to waive the right to
counsel, or even discharged appointed counsel. The guilty
plea petition signed by appellant also indicates he was
fully apprised of the significance of the court proceedings.
Appellant has failed to provide any evidence that he did
not understand the significance and consequences of his
decisions at the 1993 guilty plea proceedings. Therefore,
we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that appellant’s decision to
waive the right to counsel and plead guilty was knowing and
voluntary.
3. Guilty plea withdrawal
Appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion by refusing to allow appellant to withdraw his
guilty plea. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure
define the right of an accused to withdraw a guilty plea.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a
guilty plea. After a sentence has been imposed, a defendant
may withdraw a guilty plea only if the petition is timely
and the defendant shows that withdrawal is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P., subd. 1;
see also Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998)
(stating that burden of proof to establish basis for plea
withdrawal rests with defendant). A district court’s
decision to deny withdrawal of a guilty plea will only be
reversed if the district court abused its discretion. Kim
v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989).
Appellant failed to provide a transcript of the 1993
guilty plea proceedings, and the record on this appeal
indicates that a transcript no longer exists in the
district court file. Although this lack of a transcript may
favor an evidentiary hearing, as indicated above, the
petition to enter a plea of guilty provides support for the
postconviction court’s denial of postconviction relief.
Further, appellant has not pointed to anything of record
indicating that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.
Based on the record that exists and the lack of evidence
presented by appellant, we conclude that the postconviction
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.
B. Legal Representation
The next issue in the Hopkins window case is whether the
district court erred by not appointing counsel for appellant
in this postconviction proceeding.[fn2] This is a legal
issue which is subject to de novo review. Hamilton v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Minn. 1999).
Minn. Stat. § 590.05 (2004) provides that a
postconviction petitioner who is financially unable to
obtain counsel for the postconviction proceedings may apply
for representation by the state public defender. If such a
petitioner has not already directly appealed the
conviction, the state public defender must accept
representation. Id. However, a 2003 amendment to section
590.05 allowed the public defender to review the case and
decline representation if the sentence was the presumptive
guidelines sentence and if the public defender determined
there was no basis for an appeal. See Deegan v. State, 711
N.W.2d 89, 97-98 (Minn. 2006) (discussing the 2003
amendment).
In Deegan, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down the
2003 amendment as unconstitutional. Id. at 98. The supreme
court determined that “a defendant’s right to the
assistance of counsel under Article I, section 6 of the
Minnesota Constitution extends to one review of a criminal
conviction, whether by direct appeal or a first review by
postconviction proceeding.” Id. Therefore, the court
severed the 2003 amendment and revived section 590.05 as it
existed before the amendment. Id.
Prior to the 2003 amendment, section 590.05 read as
follows:
A person financially unable to obtain counsel who desires
to pursue the remedy provided in section 590.01 may apply
for representation by the state public defender. The state
public defender shall represent such person . . . if the
person has not already had a direct appeal of the
conviction. The state public defender may represent,
without charge, all other persons pursuing a
postconviction remedy under section 590.01, who are
financially unable to obtain counsel.
Minn. Stat. § 590.05 (2002).
Importantly, both the pre-Deegan and post-Deegan versions
of Minn. Stat. § 590.05 indicate that an indigent
petitioner may apply for representation. In Deegan, the
postconviction petition was the petitioner’s first review
of his conviction, and he specifically requested the
assistance of the state public defender in filing the
petition. Deegan, 711 N.W.2d at 92. The state public
defender denied representation, and the petitioner filed a
pro se petition for postconviction relief that included a
motion for appointment of counsel. Id. The state public
defender’s office reiterated its denial of representation,
and the district court denied the petitioner’s motion for
appointment of counsel. Id. In response, the supreme court
declared the 2003 amendment unconstitutional because it
“deprive[d] some defendants of meaningful access to one
review of a criminal conviction.” Id. at 98. However, the
court did not address the fact that the statute requires
that a postconviction petitioner request counsel.
Appellant relies on Deegan and claims that this case
should be remanded to the district court to recommence
this postconviction proceeding with appointed counsel. But
because appellant makes no claim, and the record does not
indicate, that he ever requested assistance of counsel in
the district court for this Hopkins window postconviction
proceeding, and because he does not challenge the
requirement that he make that request, we conclude that
appellant’s right to counsel was not violated here.[fn3]
C. Evidentiary Hearing
The third issue in the Hopkins window case is whether the
postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily
denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief
without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Appellate courts
address the denial of a petition without an evidentiary
hearing only to determine whether sufficient evidence
exists to support the district court’s findings. Powers,
695 N.W.2d at 374. We will reverse only on proof that the
district court abused its discretion. Id.; Ives v. State,
655 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Minn. 2003).
Postconviction courts are required to schedule a hearing
to address a postconviction petition, unless the petition,
files, and record “conclusively show that the petitioner is
entitled to no relief. . . .” Minn. Stat. § 590.04,
subd. 1 (2004). As a general rule, “a convicted defendant
is entitled to at least one right of review by an appellate
or postconviction court.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246,
252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976). Any doubts about whether
an evidentiary hearing is required should be resolved in
favor of the petitioner. Patterson v. State, 670 N.W.2d
439, 441 (Minn. 2003); see also Minn. Stat. §
590.04, subd. 1. However, allegations of disputed fact must
be more than mere assertions or conclusory allegations
without factual support. Beltowski v. State, 289 Minn. 215,
217, 183 N.W.2d 563, 564 (1971).
Appellant claims that he was not given notice of the
consequences of pleading guilty. However, the record shows
that appellant was provided with a guilty plea petition,
which he signed. Although appellant makes generalized
allegations regarding his competence to waive counsel and
plead guilty, he has provided no evidence that would
support a finding or create a factual dispute over whether
he would be entitled to relief.[fn4] Therefore, we conclude
that based on the available record, the postconviction
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant
appellant an evidentiary hearing.
D. Timeliness
The last issue presented in the Hopkins window case is
whether the postconviction court abused its discretion by
denying appellant’s petition as untimely.
Timeliness is a relevant consideration in determining
whether a postconviction petition to withdraw a guilty plea
should be granted. See James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723,
727-28 (Minn. 2005) (holding that petition to withdraw
guilty plea filed 39 months after imposition of conditional
release term was not untimely). Delays do not automatically
preclude postconviction relief. See, e.g., Rairdon v.
State, 557 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1996) (nine-year delay
did not preclude review on the merits); Riggers v. State,
284 Minn. 543, 543-44, 169 N.W.2d 58, 59 (1969) (33-year
delay alone did not preclude relief). But a delay in filing
a postconviction petition weighs against a petitioner. See
Fox v. State, 474 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. 1991) (affirming
the denial of postconviction relief based in part on
four-year delay); Wieland v. State, 457 N.W.2d 712, 715-16
(Minn. 1990) (affirming denial of postconviction relief and
noting that a ten-year delay weighed against petitioner).
Furthermore, “a delay that is deliberate and inexcusable
constituting an abuse of the judicial process . . . is
sufficient grounds to justify denial of relief solely on
the basis that the petition is untimely.” James, 699 N.W.2d
at 728. Doubts about the legitimacy of postconviction
claims also increase when a petitioner has accepted an
advantageous plea bargain, served the terms of the sentence
without raising any questions about the plea, and raised a
postconviction challenge only after a subsequent violation
includes the initial plea as a factor in the punishment
received for the new violation. Doughman v. State, 351
N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn.App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Oct.
16, 1984).
In the Hopkins window case, appellant’s nearly twelve-year
delay in filing the petition weighs strongly against him.
The statutes identify an exception to the general
timeliness rule in filing petitions for postconviction
relief if “the petitioner establishes that a physical
disability or mental disease precluded a timely assertion
of the claim. . . .” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
4(b)(1) (Supp. 2005). In a supplemental appellate brief
filed with this court, appellant alleged that he delayed in
filing his brief because he suffers from bipolar disorder.
Appellant claims that procrastination and self-destructive
behavior are symptoms of the disorder, and that he delayed
in challenging his plea until he began receiving
psychiatric care at the Rush City detention center in July
2005. However, appellant provided no evidence that bipolar
disorder impaired his ability to understand and participate
in this 1993 legal proceeding. We conclude appellant failed
to show that his delay was justified by his bipolar
disorder.
Appellant also argues that the state failed to establish
that it would be burdened by the twelve-year delay. In the
absence of prejudice to the state, courts generally decline
to hold that a postconviction petition is barred simply
because it is untimely. Bolinger v. State, 647 N.W.2d 16,
22 (Minn.App. 2002). However, it appears this delay has
created a logistical problem for judicial consideration:
there is no transcript of the original proceeding and it is
no longer realistic to reconstruct that proceeding.
Contrary to appellant’s contention at the postconviction
level, the city indicated that it would be burdened by
having to re-try a case that is twelve years old. The
postconviction court focused on the long delay in filing
and implicitly found that the city met its burden in the
postconviction proceedings. We will not disturb this
determination.
Appellant generally argues that there is no evidence that
he is attempting to deliberately abuse judicial process.
However, appellant did not file any of the postconviction
petitions involved in the present appeal until after he was
sentenced in Dakota County. Appellant has testified that he
believes the sentence he is currently serving in Dakota
County was lengthened due to his status as a repeat
offender, and that the sentence would have to be reduced if
his earlier convictions were overturned. The delay in
filing coupled with the incentive to reduce the Dakota
County sentence casts doubt on the justification for the
delay.
We conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse
its discretion by denying relief because of timeliness
based on the limited available record and the nearly
twelve-year delay in filing.
II. A05-2518 (Tear Gas Case)
On February 23, 1998, appellant pleaded guilty to a charge
of unlawful possession of tear gas under Minn. Stat.
§ 624.731, subd. 3(b) (1996). He did not directly
appeal this conviction. On August 16, 2005, appellant filed
a postconviction petition requesting that the court vacate
his sentence or permit withdrawal of his guilty plea. In
supplemental submissions to the postconviction court,
appellant requested an evidentiary hearing and challenged
his competence to plead guilty.
The postconviction court determined that an evidentiary
hearing was unnecessary based on the factual record
presented. It also determined that appellant’s six-year
delay was not a substantive basis for denying appellant’s
petition. However, the district court denied postconviction
relief because it determined that appellant failed to offer
any evidence supporting his contention that he was
incompetent to plead guilty. This appeal followed.
A. Guilty Plea Withdrawal
The first issue presented in the tear gas case is whether
appellant’s February 1998 guilty plea was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary, and, if not, whether the
postconviction court abused its discretion in refusing to
allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea. The legal
standards that govern our review of this issue have been
summarized previously and apply to our review of this case
as well.
Appellant was represented by counsel when he originally
pleaded guilty to the charge, and the transcript does not
provide any evidence of irrational behavior or any of the
other factors that would cause a court to doubt his
competence. The transcript also provides ample evidence of
appellant’s extensive understanding of the proceedings. For
example, appellant testified that he understood he was
giving up his right to trial, and that he was “fully aware
of all of [his] 5th and 6th Amendment rights.”
Appellant contends that the trial court’s competency
determination should have been called into question because:
(1) he was civilly committed six months after pleading
guilty; and (2) he was initially diagnosed with delusional
disorder and psychosis while in detention for the tear gas
offense. The postconviction court considered appellant’s
petition and extensive evidence regarding appellant’s
mental health history after the plea proceeding. This
evidence shows that appellant was diagnosed with delusional
disorder and psychosis after he was incarcerated in April
1998, but nothing indicates that he was incompetent at the
time he pleaded guilty. The postconviction court also
considered the transcript of the plea proceedings and
appellant’s behavior therein. As indicated above, this
evidence provides ample confirmation of appellant’s
extensive understanding of the proceedings. Therefore, the
postconviction court determined that the district court was
justified in accepting appellant’s guilty plea, and denied
appellant’s request for postconviction relief.
Based on the lack of any record supporting appellant’s
claims of incompetency at the time of the plea and the
evidence tending to show competency at that time, we
conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its
discretion by denying relief.
B. Legal Representation
The second issue present in the tear gas case is whether
the postconviction court erred as a matter of law in
failing to appoint counsel for appellant’s postconviction
proceedings. The legal standards that govern our review of
this issue have been summarized previously and apply to our
review of this case.
Again, absent any claims or briefing showing that
appellant ever requested the appointment of counsel in
connection with the presentation of his postconviction
petition to the district court, we decline to conclude that
appellant’s right to counsel was violated in his
postconviction proceeding.
C. Evidentiary Hearing
The third issue presented in the tear gas case is whether
the postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily
denying postconviction relief without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. The legal standards that govern our
review of this issue have been summarized previously and
apply to our review of this case.
In Morris v. State, No. A04-2095, 2005 WL 1804497
(Minn.App. Aug. 2, 2005), appellant made a similar
competency argument regarding the consolidated Hennepin
County cases that are discussed later in this opinion. In
the Hennepin County cases, this court remanded the issue to
the postconviction court for further consideration. Id., at
*3. However, the tear gas case we are now considering
differs from the remanded Hennepin County cases. Appellant
was unrepresented by counsel at the initial plea hearing in
the Hennepin County cases, and the postconviction court did
not even consider the competency argument in those cases.
Here, appellant was represented by counsel when he pleaded
guilty to the tear gas offense. The postconviction court
evaluated the competency claim, and determined that the
petition, files, and record did not show that appellant was
entitled to relief regarding his competency claim.
Other than mere allegations that he was incompetent at the
time he pleaded guilty, appellant has not provided any
evidence to show that he would be entitled to relief. The
record supports the postconviction court’s findings, and we
conclude that it did not abuse its discretion by denying an
evidentiary hearing.
III. A06-433 (Consolidated Hennepin County Cases)
A06-433 involves a consolidation of four different
Hennepin County files.
1999 Edina Police Harassment
One of the four files involved in A06-433 is, in turn, a
consolidation of four convictions for offenses arising out
of a series of events. In the fall of 1999, appellant was
arrested by an Edina police officer for disorderly conduct.
Following appellant’s arrest, he was charged with criminal
damage to property for writing derogatory statements about
the same officer on a bathroom wall in the Southdale court
facility. Appellant was later charged with harassment by
mail after he sent three pieces of derogatory and harassing
mail to the officer’s workplace.
In December 1999, appellant appeared pro se and pleaded
guilty to one count of gross misdemeanor harassment-by-mail
under Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(a)(6) (1998),
one count of misdemeanor criminal damage to property, and
two counts of misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Appellant did
not file a direct appeal in the 1999 Edina case. However,
in 2004, appellant filed a petition for postconviction
relief seeking the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Appellant
argued that he was not competent to waive counsel or plead
guilty and that the harassment statute was
unconstitutional. The postconviction court summarily denied
the petition.
This court reversed the summary denial of postconviction
relief and remanded the 1999 Edina case for an evidentiary
hearing under Minn. Stat. § 590.04 (1998). Morris v.
State, No. A04-2095, 2005 WL 1804497, at *3 (Minn.App. Aug.
2, 2005). We instructed the postconviction court to
consider “appellant’s competency to waive his right to
counsel” and his “challenge to the constitutionality of the
mail harassment statute.” Id., at *3-*4. Collectively, that
proceeding is referred to as the 1999 Edina case.
1977 Theft, 1993 Dayton’s Theft, 2000 Liquor Store
In the other three Hennepin County cases involved in
A06-433, appellant pleaded guilty to a 1977 charge for
felony attempted theft of over $2,500 (1977 theft); a 1993
charge for gross misdemeanor theft at a Dayton’s Department
Store (1993 Dayton’s theft); and a 2000 charge for felony
criminal damage to property for breaking the window of a
liquor store (2000 liquor store). Appellant did not
directly appeal in any of these cases.
After the 1999 Edina case was remanded, appellant filed
additional pro se postconviction petitions in the 1993
Dayton’s theft case and the 2000 liquor store case.
Appellant raised competency arguments in those petitions
that were similar to the arguments in the 1999 Edina
petition. In order to consider the 1999 Edina case on
remand, the postconviction court held an evidentiary
hearing on November 15, 2005. At that hearing, the
postconviction court also received evidence regarding the
1993 Dayton’s theft case and the 2000 liquor store case.
Shortly before the evidentiary hearing, appellant filed
his postconviction petition regarding the 1977 theft
case.[fn5] The 1977 theft case was not a part of the
evidentiary hearing, but the postconviction court still
considered the petition in that case along with the three
that were specifically addressed at the hearing. The
postconviction court ultimately denied all four petitions
involved in A06-433. It determined that none of the
petitions were timely, that appellant was competent to
waive counsel and plead guilty, and that the harassment
statute was constitutional. This appeal followed.
A. Waiver of Counsel and Guilty Plea Withdrawal
The consolidated Hennepin County appeal presents three
issues. The first issue is whether appellant’s waivers of
counsel at his guilty plea proceedings were knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary, and, if not, whether the
postconviction court abused its discretion in refusing to
allow appellant to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Given the common principles, issues, and parallel factual
settings in which these waivers and guilty pleas occurred,
this opinion considers them jointly. Again, the legal
standards that govern our review of this issue have been
summarized previously and apply to our review of this case.
The district court received extensive evidence, including
appellant’s mental health records, his prison records, his
1993 civil commitment order, and his Anoka-Metro Treatment
Center records. The court also heard testimony from
appellant and some of the attorneys involved in appellant’s
prior plea proceedings.
In its findings in each of the proceedings, the
postconviction court analyzed appellant’s competence based
on the two-pronged inquiry for waiving the right to counsel
or pleading guilty. It determined that when appellant
entered his guilty pleas, he understood the proceedings and
conferred with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding with defense counsel. For example, during
cross-examination regarding the 2000 liquor store case,
appellant gave the following testimony:
Q: So you understood you were waiving rights by entering
this plea?
A: Yes.
Q: And you understood that you were getting a reduced
charge for doing this?
A: Well, you have already asked the question.
Q: Yes or no?
A: The answer once again is yes, sir.
The court also determined that appellant’s waiver of
counsel at each of the original proceedings was knowing and
voluntary. For example, during cross-examination regarding
the Dayton’s theft case, appellant testified as follows:
Q: You completed this petition [to enter a plea of
guilty] with your attorney in July, 1993, correct?
A: What year?
Q: 1993?
A: Yeah, yes.
Q: Was this plea inaccurate?
A: I wouldn’t say that it was inaccurate.
Q: Was this plea involuntary?
A: Well, certainly not.
Q: By that do you mean to say it was voluntary?
A: Well, yes, it was voluntarily submitted. If it had
been involuntary I certainly would have made an issue out
of it in court.
The record in each of the proceedings contains evidence
regarding the context of the pleas and waivers. Appellant
argues that the postconviction court erred in holding that
the trial courts did not need to conduct a competency
evaluation when counsel was waived and the guilty pleas
were entered. However, the evidence gathered at the
postconviction hearing, including appellant’s own
testimony, supports findings that appellant was competent
to waive counsel and plead guilty when he did so. In fact,
one of the attorneys who testified at the evidentiary
hearing stated that during the guilty plea proceeding,
appellant appeared more experienced than some lawyers, and
that appellant was able to cite statutes and cases and
articulately discuss complex legal topics such as upward
durational departures and sentence reductions.
Based on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing,
we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse
its discretion by finding that appellant was competent to
waive counsel and plead guilty in each of the four
proceedings.
B. Timeliness
The second issue is whether the postconviction court abused
its discretion in denying appellant’s petitions as being
untimely. Again, the legal standards that govern our review
of this issue have been summarized previously and apply to
our review of this case. After conducting the
postconviction evidentiary hearing, the postconviction
court indicated that appellant knew of the mental
conditions under which he was seeking postconviction relief
but delayed filing postconviction petitions challenging his
competence to plead guilty for five, 12, even 28 years. The
record supports this determination because it shows that
appellant’s mental health issues date back to the age of
seven. In addition, appellant was civilly committed in
1993, and he has been in and out of the state correctional
system since then. The record does not indicate that
appellant just recently become aware of his condition.
Nothing in the record indicates that appellant’s condition
undermined his ability to understand and address the
issues. Further, our earlier observation that appellant’s
interest in these long-closed matters, in which he has
served his sentence, appears to be prompted by his recent
Dakota County sentence, applies here. A defendant aware of
the basis for a postconviction challenge has no right to
wait until collateral consequences arise to challenge his
convictions. Based on the record, we conclude that the
postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that the four petitions in the consolidated
Hennepin County case were untimely.
C. Constitutionality of the Harassment Statute
The third issue presented in the consolidated Hennepin
County case is whether the postconviction court erred as a
matter of law by concluding that the harassment statute
under which appellant was convicted in the 1999 Edina case,
Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(a)(6) (1998), is
constitutional. Because we uphold the postconviction
court’s dismissal of the petition as untimely and its
denial of the request to withdraw the guilty plea based on
competency, we do not reach the constitutional question.
IV. A06-542 (Dakota County Case)
In October 2001, appellant appeared pro se and was
convicted of four counts of felony harassment and stalking
and one count of impersonating a police officer in Dakota
County. Shortly before trial began, the district court
ordered a competency evaluation under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20
to determine if appellant was competent to waive counsel
and appear pro se at trial. The court found appellant
competent to proceed, and accepted his guilty plea. At
sentencing, the district court found that appellant was a
dangerous repeat offender under Minn. Stat. §
609.1095 (2000) and sentenced him to an executed, upward
double departure of 102 months. Appellant directly appealed
his conviction with the assistance of the public defender’s
office. This court affirmed. State v. Morris, No. C8-02-434
(Minn.App. Feb. 4, 2003). Appellant petitioned the
Minnesota Supreme Court for further review, but his
petition was denied.
After appellant’s unsuccessful direct appeal in the Dakota
County case, he filed several pro se petitions for
postconviction relief and raised at least nine different
claims. Those petitions were denied by the postconviction
courts, and they have been the subject of several appeals.
See, e.g., Morris v. State, Nos. A04-683 and A04-725, 2004
WL 2094675 (Minn.App. Sept. 21, 2004) (affirming the
postconviction court’s denial of relief in appellant’s
first and second petitions).
In February 2006, appellant filed his tenth petition for
postconviction relief in the Dakota County case. It is the
subject of this appeal. In the tenth petition, appellant
requested an evidentiary hearing to challenge the validity
of the competency evaluation. Appellant argued that his
history of mental heath issues and a letter he recently
discovered in his prison file cast doubt on the validity of
the rule 20 evaluation. The letter is a prisoner evaluation
written by a Dakota County jail administrator. It outlines
the administrator’s observations, and it describes
appellant as a “[s]trange inmate according to staff, [who]
may have undiagnosed mental concerns.”
The postconviction court summarily denied appellant’s
tenth petition for postconviction relief. The court
determined that the Knaffla case and other procedural bars
prevented appellant from raising this issue in his tenth
postconviction petition because it could have been raised
in an earlier appeal or petition and because the letter
presented “nothing new.” This appeal followed.
The issue presented in the Dakota County case is whether
the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying
appellant’s petition as being procedurally barred. A
postconviction petition filed after a direct appeal has
been completed may not be based on grounds that could have
been raised during the direct appeal. Minn. Stat. §
590.01(2) (Supp. 2005). Although a defendant is entitled to
substantive review of a conviction, “where direct appeal
has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all
claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a
subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” Knaffla,
309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741. Therefore, in
successive petitions for postconviction relief, courts will
not consider claims that the petitioner raised or knew of
and could have raised in earlier proceedings. Id.; see also
Wayne v. State, 601 N.W.2d 440, 441-42 (Minn. 1999)
(holding that denial of petitioner’s third petition for
postconviction relief was not abuse of discretion where
issues raised were known and could have been raised in two
previous petitions); Dunn v. State, 578 N.W.2d 351, 353
(Minn. 1998) (holding that issues raised in successive
petitions were not so novel that their legal bases were not
reasonably available when previous postconviction petitions
were filed).
Appellant argues that this procedural bar should not extend
to his current postconviction challenge to the validity of
the rule 20 evaluation. Appellant argues that his extensive
history of mental illness and the newly discovered letter
in his prison records cast doubt on the validity of the
rule 20 evaluation that was conducted in this case and that
the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying
his tenth petition for postconviction relief.
Appellate courts review the denial of a postconviction
petition for relief for an abuse of discretion. Powers,
695 N.W.2d at 374. Newly discovered evidence will only be
used to grant postconviction relief if: “(1) the evidence
was not known to the petitioner or counsel at the time of
trial; (2) the evidence could not have been discovered
through due diligence before trial; (3) the evidence is not
cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful; and (4) the evidence
probably would produce an acquittal or a more favorable
result.” Sutherlin v. State, 574 N.W.2d 428, 434 (Minn.
1998) (citing Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn.
1997)).
Appellant claims that he was unaware of the letter until he
was recently reviewing his prison records. However, it
could have been discovered as he prepared for the original
proceeding, the direct appeal, or any of the prior nine
postconviction challenges in this case. In addition, the
evidence, even if newly discovered, is cumulative,
doubtful, and unlikely to produce a different result. As
the postconviction court noted, appellant’s mental health
is “nothing new” to this case. Appellant has an extensive
history of mental illness that began when he was seven
years old. In fact, he had been in treatment. The record
indicates appellant knew of his mental condition at the time
of the direct appeal and when he filed the prior nine
postconviction petitions in the Dakota County case. Doubt
about appellant’s mental health was the reason the court
conducted the rule 20 evaluation in the first place. The
letter in question is the observation of a lay staff person
that is not likely to call the validity of the
professionally administered rule 20 evaluation into
question.
Based on the record, we conclude that the postconviction
court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the
“newly discovered” letter and appellant’s history of mental
health issues were insufficient to warrant postconviction
relief.
Affirmed.
[fn1] The state has not made an appearance in connection
with A05-1425. We decide this appeal on the merits. See
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
[fn2] By contrast, the record reflects that appellant did
request appointment of counsel on appeal. The public
defender initially declined appellate representation.
Shortly after the release of the Deegan decision, this
court ordered the state public defender to review its
decision to decline representation on appeal, and the state
public defender undertook representation.
[fn3] Appellant makes no claim that the state had an
obligation to advise him of a right to counsel. He has
shown himself to be aware of his right to counsel in court
proceedings, and he has routinely requested, waived, or
even discharged counsel.
[fn4] As discussed infra, this court remanded the
postconviction proceedings involved in A06-433 for an
evidentiary hearing to address, in part, his competence to
waive counsel and plead guilty. We note that even when a
hearing was held, appellant failed to provide sufficient
evidence to cause the postconviction court to allow
withdrawal of his guilty plea. However, we recognize that
each of the appeals before us arises out of a separate
conviction at a separate point in time and do not by
reference to other cases indicate the facts and result on
an issue in one case to determine the result in another.
[fn5] The 1977 case had been archived, so there was no
longer a district court record for the trial proceedings in
that case.