North Carolina Reports

Unpublished

STATE v. WILLIAMS, COA06-109 (N.C.App. 12-19-2006) STATE OF
NORTH CAROLINA v. DIANA SUZANNE WILLIAMS, Defendant. No.
COA06-109. North Carolina Court of Appeals. Filed 19
December 2006. This case not for publication.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the
issuing court.] Davidson County No. 04 CRS 52680-1.

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 13 July 2005 by
Judge Susan C. Taylor in the Superior Court in Davidson
County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 October 2006.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Martin T. McCracken, for the State.

Brian Michael Aus, for defendant-appellant.

HUDSON, Judge.

On 21 June 2004, defendant was indicted for trafficking in
cocaine by manufacture, by transportation, and by
possession. On 13 July 2005, the trial court heard
defendant’s motion to suppress, which motion it denied.
Defendant pled guilty to trafficking in cocaine by
transportation and by possession pursuant to a plea
agreement and the court sentenced her to 70 to 84 months of
imprisonment. Defendant appeals the denial of her motion to
suppress. We conclude that the trial court did not err.

The evidence tends to show that shortly after midnight on
13 March 2004, Sheriff’s Deputy William Byrd observed a
white sedan traveling northbound on I-85. The vehicle was
traveling slower than other traffic, such that other
traffic was coming up behind the vehicle, and the vehicle
was traveling on top of the line on the far right side of
the interstate. Deputy Byrd suspected that the driver might
be fatigued or impaired and pulled the vehicle over.
Defendant was driving the vehicle and there was a female
passenger in the car. Byrd noticed no odor of alcohol and
defendant appeared alert. He asked defendant to step back
to his vehicle for issuance of a warning ticket while the
passenger remained in the car. Defendant provided Byrd with
her driver’s license and a rental agreement for the
vehicle.

While checking defendant’s information, Byrd asked where
defendant was going and she responded that she was
traveling from Georgia to Greensboro to visit a friend
enrolled in “Greensboro at UNC.” Byrd inquired if she meant
UNC-G and defendant responded that she did not know. Byrd
asked how long her friend had been going to college in
Greensboro and defendant responded “a couple of weeks.” Byrd
also asked if defendant planned to wake up her friend in
Greensboro upon arrival or if her friend was waiting up for
her and defendant stated that she might get a hotel room.
The temporary tag number on the rental agreement did not
match the license number contained in the rental agreement
and Byrd returned to the vehicle to gather additional
information. Defendant remained in Byrd’s vehicle when he
went to obtain this information and while retrieving the
information, Byrd asked the passenger where they were going
and she stated that they were traveling to Petersburg,
Virginia, to visit defendant’s sister. Byrd returned to his
patrol car, issued a warning ticket for impeding traffic,
placed defendant’s license and registration on the computer
console between the front seats and told defendant to drive
carefully and watch out for large trucks driving too
closely behind her. As defendant was turning to get out of
the car, Byrd asked her if she had any illegal substances,
guns, weapons, drugs, or cash in excess of $10,000 in the
car. Defendant responded that she did not and Byrd asked if
he could search the car, to which defendant responded, “you
are more than welcome to.” Another officer arrived about
four or five minutes later and helped Byrd search the
vehicle. The search revealed a kilogram of cocaine in a
duffel bag in the back seat.

On appeal, we review denial of a defendant’s motion to
suppress to determine whether the trial court’s findings of
fact are supported by competent evidence, in which case
they are binding on appeal, and in turn, whether those
findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law.
State v. Corpening, 109 N.C. App. 586,587-88, 427 S.E.2d
892, 893 (1993). If the defendant does not assign error to
the trial court’s findings of fact, they are deemed to be
supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.
State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 37, 320 S.E.2d 670, 673
(1984). Here, as defendant did not assign error to any
findings of fact, we review only whether the court’s
findings support its conclusions of law.

Defendant argues that the trial court should have
suppressed the evidence seized from her vehicle because it
was seized during an illegal detention. “A police officer
may conduct a brief investigative stop of a vehicle where
justified by specific, articulable facts which give rise to
a reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct.” State v.
Morocco, 99 N.C. App. 421, 427, 393 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990).
Here, the trial court found and concluded that Deputy Byrd
had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop defendant, as
he suspected that the driver was impaired or fatigued. On
appeal, defendant does not argue that the initial stop was
illegal, but contends that defendant’s detention beyond the
initial stop was an unreasonable seizure. It is
well-established that “the scope of the detention must be
carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” Id. at
427-28, 393 S.E.2d at 549. “Once the original purpose of
the stop has been addressed, there must be grounds which
provide a reasonable and articulable suspicion in order to
justify further delay.” State v. Falana, 129 N.C. App. 813,
816, 501 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1998). However, because we
conclude that defendant consented to the search after the
detention ended, we need not address the scope of the
detention.

This Court has held that generally the initial seizure
concludes when an officer returns the defendant’s documents
and license. State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. 94, 99-100,
555 S.E.2d 294, 298-99 (2001); Morocco, 99 N.C. App. at
428-29, 393 S.E.2d 549. However, the return of documents
“is not always sufficient to demonstrate that an encounter
has become consensual.” Kincaid at 99, 555 S.E.2d at 298.

[T]he return of a driver’s documents would not end the
detention if there was evidence of a coercive show of
authority, such as the presence of more than one officer,
the display of a weapon, physical touching by the officer,
or his use of a commanding tone of voice indicating that
compliance might be compelled. Furthermore, the return of
documentation would render a subsequent encounter
consensual only if a reasonable person under the
circumstances would believe he was free to leave or
disregard the officer’s request for information.

Id. at 99, 555 S.E.2d at 298-99 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). After a detention has ended,
officers are not prohibited from seeking consent. Id. at
100, 555 S.E.2d at 299. See also Morocco, 99 N.C. App. at
428-29, 393 S.E.2d 549. Here, in its order, the court found
and concluded that:

The deputy spoke to the defendant in a very polite manner
at all times. . . . The deputy returned to the car,
completed the warning ticket, told the defendant a number
of times that the warning ticket would not affect her
insurance and that she could throw it away on reaching her
destination. The deputy placed all of the defendant’s
documents and paperwork on the computer console between the
front seats, told the defendant to drive carefully and
watch out for large trucks driving too closely behind her
and made these comments in a friendly manner. As the
defendant was turning to get out of the car, the deputy
asked her if she had any illegal substances, guns, weapons,
drugs, or cash in excess of $10,000.00 in her car. The
defendant said “No.” The deputy asked her if she could
search the Chrysler. The defendant responded by saying,
“You are more than welcome to.”. . . . [T]he defendant was
not placed under arrest and was free to leave after the
warning ticket was issued; that the deputy did not issue the
ticket with any delay, and that the defendant consented
freely, knowingly, understandingly and voluntarily to the
search of her vehicle.

As discussed, defendant does not challenge any of the
court’s factual findings. Furthermore, in her brief,
defendant does not argue that she was not free to leave
after the warning ticket was issued or that her consent to
search was not freely and voluntarily given. Therefore, as
defendant does not contest that the detention had ended at
the time of her consent, we need not address the
reasonableness or scope of the detention. We conclude that
the trial court did not err.

Affirmed.

Judges HUNTER and CALABRIA concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).