Louisiana Case Law
STATE v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO., 2004-1789 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05) STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY D/B/A CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD, CAPITAL MARINE SUPPLY, AND CTC MINERALS, INC. Nos. 2004 CA 1789, 2005 CW 0886. Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit. December 22, 2005. Page 1
ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (NUMBER 474,715 “I” (24)), PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE STATE OF LOUISIANA, HONORABLE R. MICHAEL CALDWELL, JUDGE.
LEON GARY, JR., WILLIAM L. SCHUETTE, ANTONIO D. ROBINSON, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee State of Louisiana.
SCOTT N. HENSGENS, DOUGLAS K. WILLIAMS, Counsel for defendant/Appellant (1st), Illinois Central Railroad Co.
C. MICHAEL HART, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant (2nd) Capital Marine Supply, Inc.
BEFORE: KUHN, GUIDRY, AND PETTIGREW, JJ. Page 2
KUHN, J.
These proceedings involve a suit filed by the State of
Louisiana (“the State”) against defendants, Illinois
Central Railroad Company d/b/a Canadian National/Illinois
Central Railroad (“ICRR”) and Capital Marine Supply, Inc.
(“Capital Marine”). We consider the trial court’s ruling
sustaining in part and denying in part ICRR’s exception
raising the objection of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and specifically whether the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub.L. No.
104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995), codified at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 10101, et seq. (“the ICCTA”) preempts the
State’s various claims, such that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to resolve them. The State
seeks to be declared owner of certain property in question,
to have competing interests in the property declared
invalid and to recover various monetary awards for trespass
and environmental damages. Additionally, the State seeks
reimbursement for various economic benefits allegedly
received by defendants and to recover costs incurred to
clear the State’s title.
ICRR asserts the State’s suit is an attempt to force a
railroad abandonment and that the question of abandonment
is committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Surface
Transportation Board (“STB”), before which neither party
has instituted an abandonment proceeding. Considering the
nature of the State’s claims and the language of the
federal patent upon which the State’s ownership claim
rests, we find the State’s claims cannot be resolved
without first determining whether the property has ceased
to be used or occupied as provided in the patent. Because
the ICCTA expressly provides that exclusive jurisdiction
over railroad abandonment proceedings rests with the STB
and because the STB has not yet ruled upon the Page 3
abandonment issue presented herein, we find the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to resolve the claims set forth
in the State’s petition. Accordingly, we conclude the trial
court should have sustained the exception raising the
objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction with
regard to all of the State’s claims.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2000, the State filed a petitory action against
defendants.[fn1] In its petition, the State claimed it was
the legal owner of certain property located in East Baton
Rouge Parish, which it described as follows:
A certain tract of land containing approximately 19.4
acres, situated in East Baton [Rouge] Parish, Louisiana,
and being all of Sections 44 and 71, T-7-S, R-1W, St.
Helena Meridian, lying westward of a line 100 feet east of
the center line of the railroad track of the Illinois
Central Railroad Company, including any and all batture
and accretions thereto, and all appurtenances and rights
therein . . . (the “Property”).
In its petition, the State alleged that: 1) prior to 1884,
the Property formed part of a United States military
garrison and barracks in Baton Rouge, Louisiana that was
under the control of the Secretary of War; and 2) on
September 6, 1884, the garrison was declared to be public
lands of the United States, and control was transferred to
the Secretary of the Interior of the United States by
executive order.[fn2] Page 4
A July 12, 1886 act of the Forty-Ninth Congress, Session
1, Chapter 765, 24 Stat. 144, provided, in pertinent part:
That the Secretary of the Interior . . . is hereby
authorized and directed to transfer to the Louisiana State
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, at
Baton Rouge, possession of the buildings and grounds of
the United States barracks at Baton Rouge, for the
purposes of the said university and college, except that
portion of said grounds that lies westward of a line one
hundred feet east of the center of the railroad track of
the Louisville, New Orleans, and Texas Railway Company,
and said excepted lands may be used and occupied by said
railroad company; but should said railroad company cease
to use and occupy said lands, then the possession shall
revert to the United States: PROVIDED HOWEVER, that the
board of managers of the said university and college shall
keep the buildings in good repair and insured for the use
of the United States: AND PROVIDED, FURTHER, that whenever
the said buildings and grounds cease to be used for
educational purposes by the said university and college or
when required by the Secretary of War for the use of the
United States the possession of the same shall revert to
the Government of the United States.
(Emphasis added).[fn3]
An April 28, 1902 act of the 57th Congress, Public Law No.
85, provided with respect to the transfer of title to the
military reservation:
That the Secretary of the Interior . . . is hereby,
authorized and directed to transfer to the Louisiana State
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College at
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, full and complete title to the
buildings and grounds of the United States barracks at
Baton Rouge for the purposes of said university and
college, except that portion of said ground that lies
westward of a line one hundred feet east of the center of
the railroad track of the Louisville, New Orleans and
Texas Railroad Company, and said excepted land may be used
and occupied by said railroad company, and should said
railroad cease to use and occupy said land then the title
shall revert to said university.
(Emphasis added.) Page 5
A federal patent, dated February 20, 1903, further
provided in pertinent part:
That the United States of America . . . in conformity
with the provisions of the [above-referenced 1902 Act of
Congress authorizing a transfer of title] have given and
granted and by these presents do give and grant unto the
Board of Supervisors of the Louisiana State University and
Agricultural Mechanical College; in trust for said
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, all
title of the United States to the buildings and grounds
of the United States barracks at Baton Rouge, in the
United States of Louisiana, for the purposes of said
University and College, which said land has been surveyed
and designated as Sections Forty-four and Seventy-one of
township seven South of range one West, Saint Helena
Meridian, State of Louisiana, containing two hundred and
eleven acres and fifty-six hundredths of an acre,
according to the official plat of survey returned to the
General Land Office by the Surveyor General, excepting
therefrom a parcel of ground containing about two acres
and forty-five hundredths of an acre granted to the Roman
Catholic Congregation of Saint Joseph’s Church of the
City of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in trust for said
congregation by Act of Congress, approved September 30,
1890 (26 Stats. 503) and further excepting therefrom that
portion of land that lies westward of a line one hundred
feet east of the center of the railroad track of the
Louisiana, New Orleans and Texas Railroad Company, which
land may be used and occupied by said railroad Company,
but should said railroad cease to use and occupy the said
land, then the title thereto shall vest in the Board of
Supervisors of the Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College in trust for said
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College as
aforesaid to have and to hold in trust, as aforesaid, all
of said described land together with the buildings
thereon, subject to the easement of the said Louisville,
New Orleans and Texas Railroad Company, aforesaid unto
the Board of Supervisors of the Louisiana State
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College and its
successors and assigns forever.
(Emphasis added.)
Based on these transactions, the State alleged that the
fee simple title to the Property was transferred to the
Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Page 6
University. By an authentic act dated January 11, 1951, the
Board of Supervisors purported to formally donate and
transfer record title to the Property to the State.[fn4]
When the State filed the present suit, however, it
acknowledged it did not have possession of the Property.
The parties stipulated that ICRR, a common carrier by rail,
currently operates interstate rail service over tracks
which are on and across the property described in the 1902
Act of Congress and the 1903 patent as the property which
lies west of a line 100 feet east of the centerline of the
tracks of the Louisville, New Orleans, and Texas Railway
Company (“LNTR”). The parties also stipulated that ICRR is
a successor to LNTR. The parties further stipulated that
ICRR and its predecessors have continuously operated
railroad tracks over the property for more than one hundred
years, and they continue to do so presently.[fn5]
The State’s petition addressed ICRR’s possession of the
Property as follows, in pertinent part:
10.
Based on information and belief, at some time prior to
the transfer of control of the Property to the Secretary
of the Interior in 1884, the Secretary of War of the
United States allowed the tracks of the New Orleans and
Mississippi Valley Railroad (“NOMV”) to traverse a
restricted portion of the grounds of the Garrison limited
to the width of the tracks. Page 7
11.
The State believes that NOMV transferred any rights that
it possessed in the Baton Rouge railway line to [LNTR].
The State further believes that the [LNTR] transferred any
rights that it acquired to the Yazoo and Mississippi
Valley Railroad Company (“Yazoo”), and that Yazoo
transferred any such rights to ICRR, or its predecessor
companies Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company (“ICG”),
and [ICRR].
12.
. . . [T]he State has been unable to locate any recorded
act by which the United States and/or the State
transferred any Interest in the Property to the Railroads.
Further despite the State’s request that ICRR provide it
with any document evidencing such Interest, ICRR has
failed or refused to provide the requested documentation.
For these reasons, the State believes that no written
evidence of the transfer of any Interest in the Property
to the Railroads exists.
The State further asserted that ICRR does not possess any
interest in the Property that it is legally entitled to
alienate and that ICRR’s execution of agreements with third
parties related to the Property has created a cloud on the
State’s title to the Property. The State also alleged that
ICG, a predecessor corporation to ICRR, purportedly leased
a portion of the Property to Capital Marine, which has
conducted ship and boat supply, maintenance, and other
operations on the Property. The State alleges that these
operations have caused damage to the Property, reducing its
value.
To the extent that ICRR’s use of the Property has exceeded
using and maintaining its existing tracks across the
Property, the State asserts ICRR has committed a trespass.
The State further asserted that Capital Marine has
committed trespass to the extent it has asserted any
interest in the Property, conducted any business operations
on the Property, or attempted to assert possession of the
Property. Page 8
The State’s petition prayed for the recovery of damages
from defendants and sought permanent injunctive relief
prohibiting them from alienating any interest in the
Property. The State prayed for judgment in its favor and
against defendants, and specifically prayed for a judgment:
a. Declaring the State to be the sole owner of the
Property;
b. Declaring all purported transfers, sales, purchase
agreements, leases, licenses, encumbrances or other
Alienations of any Interest in the Property by Defendants
or any of their predecessors or successors null and void .
. .;
c. Awarding general and special damages in an amount
sufficient to compensate the State for Defendants’
trespasses upon the Property;
d. Awarding general and special damages in an amount
sufficient to compensate the State for any environmental
or other damage to the Property, and for remediation of
[any] such damage;
e. Awarding recovery of any rentals, fees or other
economic benefits received by Defendants or their
predecessors as a result of any sale, purchase agreement,
transfer, lease, license, encumbrance or other alienation
of any right, title or interest in the Property;
f. Awarding the value of any minerals, soils, materials
or other fruits or revenues removed from the Property;
g. Awarding but not limited to any costs, including legal
fees, incurred by the State to remove and erase from the
public records any instrument creating a cloud on the
State’s title;
h. Ordering a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants
from transferring, selling, leasing, encumbering or
otherwise alienating any Interest in the Property; and
i. Awarding any other legal or equitable relief to which
the State may be entitled, together with legal interest
from the date of judicial demand, and all costs of these
proceedings.
During November 2003, in furtherance of its plans to
construct a park on the Property, the State and its
contractors began work on the Property without obtaining
ICRR’s consent. ICRR’s railroad tracks sit upon a levee
embankment. Page 9 The contractors’ work involved removing
trees and excavating dirt from the Property. The excavation
work involved cutting into the base of the levee embankment
that supports the railroad track.[fn6] ICRR filed a request
for injunctive relief, seeking to restrain the “forced
abandonment/trespass and unlawful taking of property by the
State. . . .” The trial court granted a preliminary
injunction in favor of ICRR, which prohibited the State and
its contractors from conducting any construction, or
preparatory work operations for construction, including any
clearing, dirt moving, or excavation work upon the Property.
In response to the State’s petition, ICRR filed an
exception raising the objection of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.[fn7] In its exception, ICRR submitted that
the deed the State relies on to establish its title
“specifically excludes the property from what was
transferred to LSU. As to the Property, LSU (and its Page
10 successor, the State) could acquire title only in the
event the railroad or its successors cease to use and
occupy the Property.” ICRR urged, “the State seeks to be
declared owner of the Property which includes [ICRR’s] main
line railroad tracks and seeks to have this Court declare
that [ICRR] has no rights to that property (and thus no
right to operate its tracks over that Property).” ICRR
contended that the STB has the exclusive authority to
govern railroad operations, services and the abandonment of
railroad rights-of-way. The parties stipulated that the
State has not applied for and has not obtained a
certificate of abandonment from the STB. Thus, ICRR
submitted that the trial court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this action prior to any decision by the
STB approving an abandonment of the railroad
servitude/right-of-way or a cessation of railroad
operations.
Following a hearing on the exception, the trial court
signed a May 24, 2004 judgment, which sustained in part and
denied in part the exception. The trial court sustained the
exception “with regard to the State’s claims for trespass,
damages, and recovery of any sums paid to [ICRR] (under
paragraphs C and G of the prayer in plaintiff’s petition).”
The trial court denied the exception in all other respects.
Both defendants appealed the judgment, challenging the
portions of the judgment that denied in part ICRR’s
exception. The State answered both appeals, asserting that
the trial court has “full and complete jurisdiction over
every issue in this matter.”
This court dismissed defendants’ appeals, finding the
judgment was not final and appealable with respect to those
portions of the trial court’s judgment that Page 11 denied
ICRR’s exception.[fn8] However, the State’s answers to the
appeal remain viable, and this court presently considers
these answers pursuant to its appellate jurisdiction.
Upon dismissing ICRR and Capital Marine’s appeals, this
court allowed both parties the opportunity to file an
application for supervisory writs with this court. Although
Capital Marine did not pursue this option, ICRR timely
filed its application. We now also consider this writ
application, 2005 CW 0886, in conjunction with the State’s
answers.
II. ANALYSIS
In support of its writ application, ICRR argues that the
State seeks to be declared the “sole owner” with exclusive
authority over the Property and to have all encumbrances
and alienations declared null and void. Thus, ICRR contends
that the State is “seeking nothing less than a declaration
that [ICRR] has no rights to this property (rail or
otherwise)” and that “the State is . . . attempting to
force [ICRR] to involuntarily abandon [the] property.” ICRR
urges that the State’s petition claims ownership of the
property and its “appurtenances,” which term, ICRR asserts,
is broad enough to include ICRR’s servitude/right-of-way
and its railroad tracks.
ICRR maintains that the United States Congress has fully
legislated issues relating to interstate railroads in order
to accomplish its objective of a uniform transportation
system, and that pursuant to the ICCTA, Congress has
expressly vested the authority to regulate railroad
transportation with the STB. As such, Page 12 ICRR urges
the STB has the exclusive right to determine the issues
presented in this case, and that Louisiana’s state courts
do not have jurisdiction to determine title to property that
is part of a railroad transportation system until the STB
issues a certificate of abandonment. ICRR argues the STB
has exclusive and plenary authority over ICRR’s operation
and its rights-of-way, including the abandonment of a
right-of-way. Thus, it contends the State is required to
seek a certificate of abandonment from the STB before it
pursues any remedies based on state law. Additionally, ICRR
posits that the State’s claims for monetary damages are
solely related to ICRR’s railroad operations, and those
claims are likewise preempted under the ICCTA. ICRR asserts
the ICCTA does not require it to establish an ownership
interest before the STB’s jurisdiction attaches.
In response, the State contends ICCTA preemption does not
arise until a Louisiana court determines that ICRR validly
possesses a recognized real right in the Property; the
State asserts that ICRR has never validly acquired such a
right. The State also argues that although the STB
possesses jurisdiction over railroad abandonments, this
case does not involve a claim of abandonment. The State
urges that it has not sought ICRR’s eviction, but has only
sought a declaration that it owns the Property, restitution
of funds received by ICRR, and damages occasioned by ICRR’s
activities. The State further contends that because the STB
only has jurisdiction if the trial court determines that
ICRR validly owns some right in the Property, the trial
court’s ruling finding its claims for monetary damages to
be preempted is premature and should be reversed. With
respect to the scope and operation of the ICCTA, the State
argues that the language of the act and the jurisprudence
interpreting it do not support ICRR’s proposition that
Page 13 Louisiana’s authority to determine title to real
property or to rule on other state law causes of action is
preempted in favor of the STB. The State contends that the
STB has, in practice, deferred to state law and the rulings
of state courts to determine real property rights.
In the State’s answers to the defendants’ appeals, it
asserts that the portion of the trial court’s judgment that
conferred jurisdiction to the STB over the State’s claim
for monetary damages, its claims for costs incurred to
clear the title to the Property, and its claim for legal
fees incurred in clearing the title is erroneous and should
be reversed.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2 defines
jurisdiction over the subject matter as the legal power and
authority of a court to hear and determine a particular
class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of
the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the
right asserted. For the purpose of ruling upon an exception
raising the objection of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court must accept the allegations of the
petition as true. Banks v. Carl Ott Poles and Piling, Inc.,
440 So.2d 803, 805 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1983), writ denied,
444 So.2d 1244 (La. 1984). The party urging the exception
has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence,
documentary or testimonial, to sustain the merits of his
exception. La. C.C.P. art. 930; Id.
While the State in this case asserts that state courts
have traditionally exercised jurisdiction over the various
claims it has set forth in this case, the question
presented is not whether state law gives state courts
jurisdiction over Page 14 particular controversies but
whether jurisdiction provided by state law is itself
preempted by federal law vesting exclusive jurisdiction
over that controversy in another body. International
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380,
387-388, 106 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986). It is
clearly within Congress’ powers to establish an exclusive
federal forum to adjudicate issues of federal law in a
particular area that Congress has the authority to regulate
under the Constitution. Id. Whether it has done so in a
specific case is the question that must be answered when a
party claims that a state court’s jurisdiction is
preempted. The issue presented concerns congressional
intent and the boundaries and character of a preempting
congressional enactment. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 1910-11.
Preemption rests upon the supremacy clause of the federal
constitution, and deprives a state of jurisdiction over
matters embraced by a congressional act regardless of
whether the state law coincides with, is complementary to,
or opposes the federal congressional expression. Painters
Local Union No. 567 of Broth. of Painters, Decorators and
Paperhangers of America v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 81 Nev.
1, 4, 398 P.2d 245, 246 (Nev. 1965); see Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,
775-76, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 1031, 91 L.Ed. 1234 (1947). If a
matter is preempted, a state court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to decide it. Walles v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers AF of L-CIO, 252 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Ia.), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 856, 98 S.Ct. 175, 54 L.Ed.2d 127 (1977).
Page 15
B. Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution declares
that “the laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Preemption “`may be either express
or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command is
explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.'” Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031,
2036, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (quoting FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56-57, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d
356 (1990).
In 1995, Congress enacted the ICCTA, which abolished the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), established the STB,
and granted it jurisdiction over certain aspects of
interstate rail activity. 49 U.S.C. §§
10101-16106; In re Vermont Railway, 171 Vt. 496, 498, 769
A.2d 648, 651 (Vt. 2000).[fn9] The Act was passed in an
effort to deregulate the railroad industry and to remove
state efforts to regulate the railroads. South Dakota ex
rel. South Dakota R.R. Authority v. Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Ry. Co, 280 F.Supp.2d 919, 931 (D.S.D. 2003); CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, 944 F.Supp.
1573, 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1996). Congress and the courts have
long recognized a need to regulate railroad operations at
the federal level. City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, 154
F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 527 U.S.
1022, 119 S.Ct. 2367, Page 16 144 L.Ed.2d 771 (1999).
Congress’ well-established authority to regulate the
railroads is derived from the Commerce Clause. Id. (citing
Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342,
350-52, 34 S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed. 1341 (1914); Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 491 U.S.
490, 510, 109 S.Ct. 2584, 105 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989)). As noted
in City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1029, “the Supreme Court
repeatedly has recognized the preclusive effect of federal
legislation in this area. See, e.g., Colorado v. United
States, 271 U.S. 153, 165-66, 46 S.Ct. 452, 70 L.Ed. 878
(1926) (ICC abandonment authority is plenary and
exclusive); Transit Com’n v. United States, 289 U.S. 121,
127-28, 53 S.Ct. 536, 77 L.Ed. 1075 (1933) (ICC authority
over interstate rail construction is exclusive); City of
Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 88-89, 78
S.Ct. 1063, 2 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1958) (local authorities have
no power to regulate interstate rail passengers.)”
In the ICCTA, Congress broadened the express preemption
provision at 49 U.S.C. 10501(b), so that both the
jurisdiction of the STB over transportation by rail
carriers and the remedies provided under 49 U.S.C.
§§ 10101-11908 are exclusive and preempt the
remedies provided under Federal or state law. 49 U.S.C.
§ 10501(b); See City of Auburn v. STB, 154 F.3d at
1029-31. The federal courts have interpreted this
preemption to be broad. Id. at 1030.
Initially, the State contends that the jurisdiction of the
STB is not triggered because ICRR has not established that
it holds a valid interest in the Property. We are not
persuaded by this contention. Regardless of whether ICRR
has a valid ownership or servitude interest in the land,
ICRR and its predecessors have continuously operated
railroad tracks over the Property at issue for over one
Page 17 hundred years, and ICRR continues to do so
presently. Recognizing Congress’ well-established authority
to regulate railroads, we conclude these facts are
sufficient to trigger application of the ICCTA. Next, we
must address the scope of this preemption.
As an interstate rail carrier, ICRR’s operations are
subject to the jurisdiction of the STB as set forth in 49
U.S.C. § 10501(a) and (b). The STB has general
jurisdiction over “transportation by rail carrier that is .
. . by railroad.” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(a)(1). Pursuant
to 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b), the STB exercises exclusive
jurisdiction over:
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies
provided in [Part A, addressing rail transportation] with
respect to rates, classifications, rules . . ., practices,
routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation,
abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team,
switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the
tracks are located or intended to be located, entirely in
one State.
“Transportation” as used in § 10501(b) is defined
expansively to include, among other things, “property,
facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related
to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by
rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning
use.” 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9)(A).
The ICCTA also contains an express preemption clause,
which provides, “Except as otherwise provided in this part,
the remedies provided under this part with respect to
regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt
the remedies provided under Federal or State law.” 49
U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2). In interpreting this express
preemption clause, the task of statutory construction must
initially focus on the plain wording of the clause, which
necessarily contains the Page 18 best evidence of
Congress’ preemptive intent. Friberg v. Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439, 443 n. 12 (5th Cir. 2001)
(quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S.
658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993)).[fn10]
In District of Columbia v. 109,205.5 Square Feet of Land,
2005 WL 975745, p. 3 (D.D.C. 2005), the court recognized
that courts throughout the country have interpreted the
scope of this ICCTA preemption differently:
Courts have been split on the broadness of preemption
under ICCTA; some have held it preempts all state efforts,
City of Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1029-103; [Wisconsin Cent.
Ltd. v. City of Marshfield, 160 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1013
(W.D. Wis. 2000)], and others have held it applies only
to the regulation of rail transportation. [Iowa, Chicago &
Easter R.R. Corp. v. Washington County, Iowa, 384 F.3d
557, 561 (8th Cir. 2004)]; Fla. E. Coast R.R. Co. v. City
of West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001).
Despite this split, the STB, which is the administrative
body that governs railroad operations, has stated that
“Federal preemption does not completely remove any ability
of state or local authorities to take action that affects
railroad property. To the contrary, state and local
regulation is permissible where it does not interfere
with interstate rail operations.” Maumee & W.R.R. Corp.
and RMW Ventures, LLC — Petition for Declaratory
Order, 2004 WL 395835, at *1 (Surface Transp. Bd. Mar. 2,
2004); see also S.D. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R.
Co., 280 F.Supp.2d 919, 931 (D.S.D. 2003); Fla. E. Coast
R.R. Co., 266 F.3d at 1330-31.
Based on the language of Section 10501(b), however, we
conclude it is “manifestly clear that Congress intended to
preempt . . . state statutes, and any claims arising
therefrom, to the extent that they intrude upon the STB’s
exclusive jurisdiction over `transportation by rail
carriers’ and `the construction, acquisition, operation,
abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team,
switching, or Page 19 side tracks, or facilities, even if
the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely
in one State.'” Railroad Ventures, Inc. v. Surface Transp.
Board, 299 F.3d 523, 563 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 49 U.S.C.
§ 10501(b)).
At the hearing on the exception, John Dining, an ICRR
engineer, who is also a manager of the railroad, testified
that ICRR’s riverside track is a “main switching lead
number one, which provides for industrial switching of the
yard.” Thus, the parties do not challenge that ICRR’s track
is an industrial, switching track. ICRR asserts that the
State’s claims amount to a “forced abandonment” of its
track and, thus, the claims are preempted pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2).
Thus, we consider whether the State’s claims fall within
the preempted category of “abandonment.” Abandonment “is
characterized by an intention of the carrier to cease
permanently or indefinitely all transportation service on
the relevant line.” Chicago and N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo
Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 314 n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 1124,
1128 n. 2, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981) (quoting ICC v. Chicago &
N.W. Transp. Co., 533 F.2d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 1976).) A
railroad line may be abandoned only upon a determination by
the STB that abandonment is consistent with “present or
future public convenience and necessity.” 49 U.S.C.
§ 10903(d).
In the present case, the State seeks to be declared the
sole owner of the Property, including “all appurtenances
and rights therein.” This language is broad and encompasses
the ownership of ICRR’s railroad tracks. See Black’s Law
Dictionary 111 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “appurtenance” as
“[s]omething that belongs or is attached to something else.
. . .”); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pfiffner,
399 So.2d 1250, 1252 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1981). The State
also Page 20 seeks a declaration that all purported
transfers by ICRR’s predecessors are null and void; this
relief is broad and encompasses any servitude rights that
the predecessor railroad companies may have conveyed or
transferred to ICRR. Additionally, the State seeks damages
for trespass resulting from ICRR’s use of the Property.
Thus, although the State did not use the word “abandonment”
in its petition, this litigation seeks to effectively oust
ICRR from the Property, or force it to abandon its tracks.
We deem it appropriate to treat the State’s claim as a
“forced” or “adverse” abandonment claim. See Louisiana &
Arkansas Ry. Co. v. Bickham, 602 F.Supp. 383 (M.D. La.),
aff’d, 775 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1985), wherein the court
determined that the property owner’s interference with a
railroad’s use of servitude was unlawful and that the owner
should have filed an application with the ICC to have the
railroad line declared abandoned prior to destroying tracks
that remained on the property in question.[fn11] The
Bickham court, 602 F.Supp. at 384, found that
extinguishment of the servitude under Louisiana law would
force the railroad to abandon this branch line, stating:
This is in direct conflict with § 10903, which
prohibits an interstate rail carrier from abandoning a
line without ICC approval. See ICC v. Chicago and North
Western Transp. Co., 533 F.2d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 1976).
Thus, state law must yield to Congress’ “paramount
control insofar as interstate commerce is involved.”
Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 165-66, 46 S.Ct.
452, 454-55, 70 L.Ed. 878 (1926); Kalo Brick, supra, 450
U.S. at 321, 101 S.Ct. at 1132. Page 21 Also see
Cedarapids, Inc. v. Chicago, Central & Pacific RR Co., 265
F.Supp.2d 1005 (N.D. Ia. 2003), wherein a lessee of real
property subject to a railroad right of way sued a
railroad-lessor in state court claiming that trackage
covered by the right of way was abandoned under Iowa
statutes and that the railroad-lessor misrepresented its
intent to use trackage when entering into the subject
lease. Upon removal to federal court, the court found that
to the extent that plaintiff’s state law claims sought to
force the railroad to abandon the track in question,
such claims were preempted by the ICCTA.
Accordingly, we recognize that compliance with the intent
of Congress cannot be avoided by mere artful pleading. See
Chicago and North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile
Co., 450 U.S. at 324, 101 S.Ct. at 1134.[fn12] The State’s
attempt to force an abandonment of the Property cannot be
ignored. To do so would be to ignore the STB’s
authority.[fn13] Because the State’s claims seek to Page
22 force ICRR to abandon the track in question, its claims
are preempted by the ICCTA.
The State contends that its suit advances causes of
actions that are traditionally reserved to the jurisdiction
of Louisiana’s state courts. Specifically, the State urges
that Louisiana courts have subject matter jurisdiction to
determine the nature and extent of real rights in Louisiana
property before any consideration of abandonment is
material. The State urges that the preemptive effect of
ICCTA precludes only state laws that impose economic
regulation of rail transportation.
We recognize that the STB has acknowledged the
jurisdiction of a state court to rule on underlying issues
of state property law in the proceeding of Central Kansas
Railway, Limited Liability Company — Abandonment
Exemption — in Marion and McPherson Counties, KS,
2001 WL 489991 (STB 5/3/01). The STB has also recognized
that a contractual dispute respecting the scope of the
rights retained by or granted by the State under an
operating agreement with a rail carrier must be resolved in
a state court proceeding. See The Burlington Northern and
Santa Fe Railway Co. — Acquisition and Operation
Exemption — State of South Dakota, 2005 WL 79210
(STB 1/14/05). Thus, the STB does not operate without
regard to State’s rights.
Initially, the State’s argument that ICCTA preemption does
not extend to its state law claims is compelling. Upon
closer examination, however, it is apparent that the
state’s claims are derived from the 1903 federal patent,
and all of the Page 23 State’s claims are interwoven with
the issue of whether the Property has ceased to be used or
occupied as provided in the patent. The patent excludes the
Property in dispute from the property transferred and
directs that “should said railroad cease to use and occupy
the [Property] then the title thereto shall vest in [LSU’s
Board of Supervisors].” Thus, whether a reversionary
interest has been triggered is dependent upon a
determination regarding abandonment. See National Wildlife
Federation v. I.C.C., 850 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Since the State’s remaining claims are contingent upon its
claim that it owns the Property, none of the claims can be
determined before the abandonment issue is addressed by the
STB. Thus, we conclude that the ICCTA preemption
encompasses all of the claims advanced by the State. Once
the STB addresses the abandonment issue, the state court
will be able to exercise its jurisdiction to address any
state law issues that may remain. See Hayfield Northern R.
Co., Inc. v. Chicago and North Western Transp. Co., 467
U.S. 622, 634, 104 S.Ct. 2610, 2617, 81 L.Ed.2d 527 (1984)
(quoting Abandonment of Railroad Lines and Discontinuance
of Service, 365 I.C.C. 249, 261 (1981)); Louisiana &
Arkansas Ry. Co. v. Bickham, 602 F.Supp. at 385, n. 5 v.
Accordingly, we find the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate the State’s claims prior to a
ruling by the STB regarding abandonment, and the trial
court should have sustained ICRR’s exception as to all of
the State’s claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Since we find merit in ICRR’s exception, ICRR’s
application for supervisory writs is granted. For the
reasons stated, we affirm those portions of the trial court
judgment that sustained ICRR’s exception, we reverse those
Page 24 portions of the judgment that denied ICRR’s
exception, and we deny the State’s answers. Appeal costs in
the amount of $1,249.14 are assessed against the State.
WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
[fn1] Besides ICRR and Capital Marine, the State also named
CTC Minerals, Inc. as a defendant. CTC was later dismissed
from the suit and is not involved in the proceedings before
this court.
[fn2] The parties stipulated that the Property at issue was
formerly part of a military reservation in Baton Rouge.
[fn3] By Concurrent Resolution No. 97, approved July 8,
1886, the Louisiana Legislature accepted the transfer of
the property referenced in the 1886 Congressional act.
[fn4] By Acts 1950, No. 191, the Louisiana legislature
authorized the Board of Supervisors of LSU to donate and
transfer “all . . . parcels of land and all buildings and
improvements thereon, now owned or claimed by said Board of
Supervisors, including all rights of reverter or otherwise
therein that compose a portion of the Old Campus of [LSU],
situated in the Northern portion of the City of Baton
Rouge. . . .”
[fn5] The State asserted in its petition, however, that the
right conveyed by the United States to the Louisville, New
Orleans, and Texas Railway Company was the limited right to
use and maintain its existing tracks across the Property.
It asserts that ICRR did not acquire any interest in the
Property directly from the United States, and that it does
not have any greater interest than its predecessors in
title.
[fn6] John Dining, an engineer employed by ICRR, explained
that the excavation work impacted the toe of the levee,
which he described as “the base where the embankment stops
and levels out going to the even ground.” He stated the toe
of the levee is part of the support structure of the
railroad track and part of the support structure for the
levee itself. Dining further testified that the Property is
part of ICRR’s emergency preparedness system. He explained
it is the only sizable piece of undeveloped property in the
Baton Rouge area available for ICRR’s use in the event of
an emergency. In the event of a derailment, he explained
the Property would be used for equipment staging and for
storing supplies for work on the rail lines.
Dining testified that the excavation work performed by the
State threatened the integrity of the railroad tracks. He
explained that the soil removal had created drainage
problems, which had created the start of some washouts and
an area of actual collapse. Dining indicated these were
signs of destabilization. The excavation work had also
destroyed all of the vegetation growing along the railroad
embankment that had previously provided support for the
embankment. In his opinion, the State’s work on the
Property had increased the risk of a railroad derailment.
[fn7] ICRR had previously removed the State’s action to
federal court by filing a third-party demand against the
United States of America (“the United States”). Pursuant to
a June 27, 2002 ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Louisiana confirmed the
United States’ full disclaimer of its interest in the
disputed property and granted the United States’ motion to
dismiss the third party complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(1).
[fn8] See this court’s order of dismissal dated April 18,
2005.
[fn9] Under the ICCTA, the functions of the ICC were
transferred to the STB on January 1, 1996. Phillips Co. v.
Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co., 97 F.3d 1375, 1376 n.
2 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Phillips Co. v.
Southern Pacific Rail Corp., 521 U.S. 1104, 117 S.Ct. 2480,
138 L.Ed.2d 989 (1997). The STB was established within the
United States Department of Transportation, 49 U.S.C.
§ 701.
[fn10] The courts have observed, “It is difficult to imagine
a broader statement of Congress’s intent to preempt state
regulatory authority over railroad operations” than that
contained in Section 10501(b). CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia
Public Service Comm’n, 944 F. Supp. at 1581.
[fn11] In Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co., 328 U.S. 134,
145, 66 S.Ct. 937, 944, 90 L.Ed 1132 (1946), the Supreme
Court recognized that an application for abandonment can be
made by persons other than carriers “who have a proper
interest in the subject-matter.” (quoting Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 283 U.S. 380, 393-394,
51 S.Ct. 553, 556-557, 75 L.Ed. 1128 (1931)).
[fn12] In the Kalo Brick & Tile decision, the Supreme Court
ruled on the extent of the preemptive effect of section
1(18) of the Interstate Commerce Act, the predecessor to
49 U.S.C. § 10901, as it applied to railroad
abandonment.
[fn13] Our research reveals a number of cases involving
various types of actions where the courts concluded that a
determination regarding abandonment by the ICC (in cases
occurring before the enactment of ICCTA) was a prerequisite
to proceeding in either state or federal court. See
Phillips Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.,
97 F.3d at 1377 (finding that an authorization of
abandonment from the ICC was needed before the court could
adjudicate the claims presented in a suit to quiet title to
a right of way underlying a rail line); City of Des Moines,
Iowa v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 264 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir.
1959) (finding that regardless of whether a valid
forfeiture would have existed under a city ordinance, a
court could not decree an ouster of the railway from the
street, so long as this might mean an abandonment or
discontinuance of a portion of the railway’s line or
operation in the interstate field, until the ICC gave its
permission to such abandonment or discontinuance being
made); Phillips Co. v. Southern Pacific Rail Corp., 902
F.Supp. 1310, 1312 (D. Colo. 1995), aff’d sub nom., 97 F.3d
1375 (10th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 521 U.S. 1104, 117
S.Ct. 2480, 138 L.Ed.2d 989 (1997) (court found abandonment
could not occur without prior authorization by the ICC in a
suit where plaintiff alleged he owned a portion of a
railroad right-of-way as a result of an alleged de facto
abandonment); Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State,
145 Vt. 510, 515, 496 A.2d 151, 154 (Vt. 1985) (Landowners’
state court action requesting disposition under state law
that railroad easement had been abandoned interfered with
federal regulation of interstate commerce, where no
abandonment proceedings before ICC had been commenced and
there had been no authorization from the ICC permitting
railway to discontinue service, and thus, state court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction); and Mobile & Gulf R.
Co. v. Crocker, 455 So.2d 829, 832 (Ala. 1984) (trial court
did not have jurisdiction to hear petition brought by
landowner requesting declaration that railroad’s
right-of-way across his property had been abandoned, since
ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over abandonment of railroad
rights-of-way).