Louisiana Case Law
Unpublished
STATE v. WILLIAMS, 2006 KA 1207 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12-28-2006)
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. BARBETTE WILLIAMS. No. 2006 KA 1207.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit. December 28,
2006. NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the
issuing court.] On Appeal from the 19th Judicial District
Court In and For the Parish of East Baton Rouge Trial Court
No. 08-03-0710 Honorable Todd W. Hernandez, Judge
Presiding.
Doug Moreau, District Attorney, Jeanne Rougeau, Assistant
District Attorney, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana.
Bertha M. Hillman, Thibodaux, LA, Counsel for
Defendant/Appellant Barbette Williams.
BEFORE: PETTIGREW, DOWNING, AND HUGHES, JJ.
HUGHES, J.
The defendant, Barbette Williams, was charged by amended
bill of information with: one count of second degree
kidnapping (count I), a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:44.1; two
counts of attempted first degree murder (counts II and
III), violations of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 14:30; three counts
of attempted carjacking (counts IV, VI, and IX), violations
of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 14:64.2; three counts of carjacking
(counts V, VII, and X), violations of LSA-R.S. 14:64.2; and
one count of attempted second degree murder (count VIII), a
violation of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1. He initially pled
not guilty on all charges and moved for appointment of a
sanity commission. A sanity commission was appointed.
Following a sanity hearing, the defendant was found
competent to proceed. Thereafter, he was rearraigned and
pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as
charged by unanimous verdict on counts I, II, V, VII, and
X; guilty as charged on count III, and not guilty on counts
IV, VI, VIII, and IX.[fn1] On count I he was sentenced to
forty years at hard labor without benefit of probation,
parole, or suspension of sentence. On count II he was
sentenced to thirty-five years at hard labor without benefit
of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, to be
served consecutively to the sentence imposed on count I,
but concurrently with any other sentence. On count III he
was sentenced to thirty-five years at hard labor without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, to
be served consecutively to the sentences imposed on counts I
and II, but concurrently with any other sentence. On each
of counts V, VII, and X he was sentenced to ten years at
hard labor, to be served concurrently with any other
sentence.
The defendant now appeals, designating three assignments of
error:
1. The evidence is insufficient to sustain this
conviction because no rational trier of fact could have
found that the defendant had not shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the
offense.
2. The trial court erred in ruling that the defendant was
capable to proceed to trial.
3. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s challenge
for cause.
We affirm the convictions and sentences on counts I, II,
III, V, VII, andX.
FACTS
On March 18, 2003, at approximately 9:30 a.m. or 10:00
a.m., Jeanetta C. Johnson and her mother went to Oliver Eye
Clinic on North Boulevard in Baton Rouge. In the parking
lot of the clinic, they stopped to talk to a friend, Moses.
The defendant approached and told them he needed a ride
because he was wanted for murder and was trying to get away.
Moses said he did not have a car. Ms. Johnson told the
defendant if he jumped the back fence, he could get away.
The defendant pulled out a gun, told them that he really
did not want to kill them, and told Ms. Johnson to give him
the keys she was holding. In response to Ms. Johnson’s
request, the defendant allowed her to keep her house keys.
The defendant also allowed Ms. Johnson to take her mother’s
purse out of her vehicle before he drove away.
Also on the morning of March 18, 2003, Alfred C. Wilson was
backing a leased truck into his driveway on North 39th
Street in Baton Rouge, when he saw the defendant jumping
over a neighbor’s fence. Mr. Wilson told the defendant not
to use the neighbor’s yard as a shortcut, but to go around
and use the sidewalk. The defendant told Mr. Wilson, “I
just killed someone and the police are looking for me for
murder.” Mr. Wilson testified that the defendant pointed a
gun at his chest and pulled the trigger, but “when he
pulled the trigger the magazine unseated [sic] out of the
weapon.” Mr. Wilson began to run at the defendant, but,
after hearing the magazine of the defendant’s gun click
back into the weapon, Mr. Wilson turned and ran toward his
home. The defendant threatened to “pop a cap” in Mr. Wilson
if he attempted to go in his house, and ordered Mr. Wilson
to walk “up the street. ” Mr. Wilson started walking across
his lawn, and the defendant jumped in the leased truck and
drove away.
Also on the morning of March 18, 2003, Billy Jean Edward
stopped by the Evangeline Street place of employment of her
cousin Lois. As Ms. Edward and Lois stood outside of Lois’s
office on Evangeline Street, they saw the defendant “come
across the fence” with a gun in his hand. The defendant put
the gun in his waistband, approached the women, and asked
them how they were doing. The defendant said he had thirty
police officers behind him because he had done “something
bad” and needed a vehicle. When Ms. Edward turned over her
car keys to the defendant, he stated, “These better not be
the wrong keys . . . I don’t want to have [sic] kill
nobody.” The defendant allowed Ms. Edward to get her
personal belongings and daughter from her vehicle. Before
driving away in Ms. Edward’s vehicle, the defendant told
Ms. Edward he just needed a get-away vehicle and he would
not touch any of her possessions; the defendant stated that
he would leave the vehicle on the side of the road.
Marva Spears, Park Elementary School Principal, also
testified at trial. On March 18, 2003, the defendant
approached Ms. Spears on the campus of the school. He did
not have Ms. Spears’ permission to be on the campus. The
defendant asked for water, and Ms. Spears directed him to a
water fountain. The defendant then began walking off the
campus toward Capitol High School. A secretary at Capitol
High School subsequently telephoned Ms. Spears to warn her
that an intruder was approaching Park Elementary School and
the police were chasing him. Ms. Spears immediately ordered
a “lockdown” of the school.
Kyla Oliver was a kindergarten teacher at Park Elementary
School on March 18, 2003. On that date, the defendant
“stormed” into Ms. Oliver’s classroom and began mumbling;
he had his arms folded and was holding a gun. Ms. Oliver
asked the defendant what he wanted, but he ignored her. Ms.
Oliver told the children they had five seconds to get into
alphabetical order. Tonya Escort, a teaching assistant, then
began to lead the children out of the classroom. Before one
of the children, B.S., could leave the classroom, the
defendant picked him up, stating, “Come on, little one.”
Ms. Oliver pleaded with the defendant to put B.S. down and
not take him away, but the defendant ignored the pleas. Ms.
Oliver also volunteered to substitute herself for the child;
the defendant stated, “No, I can’t carry you.” Ms. Oliver
testified that B.S. whimpered and looked as though he might
ciy, so she told B.S., “This is just a drill.” Ms. Oliver
pleaded with the defendant not to hurt B.S., and the
defendant stated, “I’m not going to hurt him[,] I just need
him.” Police officers had positioned themselves outside the
classroom and Ms. Oliver heard the defendant tell the
officers, “Don’t come in here. You don’t want to come in
here.” The defendant then took B.S. out of the classroom
without Ms. Oliver’s permission.
On cross-examination, Ms. Oliver indicated when the
defendant was in her classroom, he acted similarly to
someone on dmgs. However, on redirect examination, Ms.
Oliver indicated that after the defendant left her
classroom, she concluded he had not been mumbling, but had
been talking to the police officers outside the classroom.
After taking B.S. out of the classroom, the defendant used
the child to shield himself from the police. He then shot
at the Baton Rouge police officers several times, shot his
way into a house on 39th Street, and barricaded himself
inside the house with B.S. Baton Rouge Police Sergeant
Jerry Bloon spoke to the defendant on the telephone while
he was in the house. The defendant spoke calmly and
indicated he was in the house with B.S. because the police
were outside. The defendant did not allow B.S. to speak to
the police on the telephone until five or six hours had
passed. Subsequently, the defendant released the child.
Thereafter, he shot at the police again as they used tear
gas and broke into the house.
During the trial of this matter, but outside the presence
of the jury, the defendant complained that the restraint on
his leg was too tight. After confirming that the restraint
had not been attached to the defendant’s leg too tightly,
the court asked whether the restraint was so unbearable
that the defendant could not stay in the courtroom until
the completion of trial. The defendant stated, “I’ll tell
you what I have problems with is sitting here and not
having a gun or something so that I can shoot you in your
f[*]ing head, shoot the DA in his head, and shoot
this f[*]ing lawyer in his head. That’s what I got
[sic] problem with.” After the defense rested its case, the
defendant attacked defense counsel with a razor blade and
cut him on his face and neck.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the
evidence established that he engaged in prolonged alcohol
and drug abuse and had a history of psychosis,
schizophrenia, epilepsy, and depression, which rendered him
unable to distinguish between right and wrong.
Insanity at the time of the offense requires a showing that
because of mental disease or mental defect the offender was
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with
reference to the conduct in question. See LSA-R.S. 14:14.
The law presumes a defendant is sane and responsible for
his actions, and the defendant has the burden of
establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the
offense by a preponderance of the evidence. See LSA-R.S.
15:432; LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 652.
The State is not required to offer any proof of the
defendant’s sanity or to offer evidence to rebut the
defendant’s evidence. Instead, the determination of whether
defendant’s evidence successfully rebuts the presumption of
sanity is made by the trier of fact viewing all the
evidence, including lay and expert testimony, the conduct of
the defendant, and the defendant’s actions in committing
the particular crime.
The issue of insanity is a factual question for the jury to
decide. Lay testimony concerning defendant’s actions, both
before and after the crime, may provide the jury with a
rational basis for rejecting even unanimous medical opinion
that a defendant was legally insane at the time of the
offenses. State v. Thames, 95-2105, p. 8 (La.App. 1 Cir.
9/27/96), 681 So.2d 480, 486, writ denied, 96-2563 (La.
3/21/97), 691 So.2d 80.
In reviewing a claim of sufficiency of evidence in regard
to a defense of insanity, an appellate court must apply the
test set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99
S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), to determine whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the defendant had not proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense(s).
Thames, 95-2105 at pp. 8-9, 681 So.2d at 486.
At trial, the defense presented the testimony of Dr. Marc
L. Zimmermann, who holds a Ph.D. in Psychology, and who was
accepted as an expert in the field of Clinical and Forensic
Psychology. Dr. Zimmermann testified about his November 25,
2003 examination of the defendant. The defendant’s grooming
and hygiene were fair. He did not display any unusual
movements. His speech was clear, and he was relevant,
logical, rational, and coherent. He was oriented as to
where and who he was, but was not oriented as to time. The
defendant reported he had previously been stabbed in the
left forehead and had surgery to repair the injury. He
claimed he had a histoiy of seizures and was taking Haldol
and Elavil, anti-seizure medications. He reported visual
hallucinations of dead people chasing him. He claimed
voices told him to kill himself and other people. The
defendant also claimed to smell the odor of dead people.
The defendant reported to Dr. Zimmermann that he had killed
four people. He claimed to have received treatment in
prison for emotional problems, but the defendant’s medical
records did not substantiate that claim. The defendant also
claimed to have been treated for chemical dependency
“everywhere he went.” The defendant claimed that when he
was not incarcerated he would drink until he got drunk and
would use as much cocaine and heroin as he could get. He
claimed to be charged with “a lot of murders.” Dr.
Zimmermann noted signs of confusion and a lack of
comprehension in the defendant, but did not see any signs of
psychosis or a major mental illness. Dr. Zimmermann could
not get enough information from the defendant to give an
opinion on whether the defendant could distinguish right
from wrong on March 18, 2003.
On cross-examination, Dr. Zimmermann conceded that
malingering could account for the defendant’s bizarre
responses. Dr. Zimmermann also could not say that Dr.
Blanche and Dr. Silva were wrong to opine that the
defendant was malingering.
The State presented testimony at trial from Dr. Robert V.
Blanche, an M.D. who is also a Board Certified
Psychiatrist. Dr. Blanche testified that he examined the
defendant on July 19, 2004 and on October 12, 2004. Dr.
Blanche testified that the defendant did a good job of
acting psychotic at the first examination, and at that time
he assessed the defendant’s intelligence as borderline
normal. At the second examination, Dr. Blanche retracted
his lower appraisal of the defendant’s intelligence and
found him very intelligent. Dr. Blanche found that the
defendant’s sentences were organized, and that he had a
fluidity of thought and coherency in his ability to argue
points in an attempt to manipulate.
After reviewing twenty-five years of the defendant’s prison
medical records, Dr. Blanche found nothing in the records
to support the claim that the defendant suffered from
seizures other than the defendant’s own claims. The results
of neurological examinations of the defendant and
evaluations looking at neurological aspects were completely
normal.
In Dr. Blanche’s opinion, the defendant was malingering and
attempting to imitate a mental disease. Dr. Blanche
testified that he looks for “clues” in evaluating a
patient’s ability to tell right from wrong. Dr. Blanche
found that the most important clue in the defendant’s case
was his efforts to flee and evade arrest. According to Dr.
Blanche, the fact that the defendant had taken a child as a
human shield was evidence that he knew what he was doing
was wrong. Dr. Blanche pointed to the fact that the
defendant shot at police officers in order to avoid being
captured as additional evidence of his knowledge of
wrongfulness, and thus, sanity. As a result of his
examination of defendant, Dr. Blanche concluded that the
defendant has an anti-social personality disorder, rather
than a mental disease or defect. Dr. Blanche explained: the
defendant will not conform to any rules; he will not respect
rules or relations of society or of authority; he is out
for his own end; he will manipulate, malinger, use deceit,
and lies to achieve what he wants completely without
regard, empathy, or feelings of consequences to any other
human being. Dr. Blanche testified that the defendant knew
the difference between right and wrong.
On cross-examination, Dr. Blanche conceded that the
defendant’s medical records indicated he had been diagnosed
as suffering from intermittent psychosis, and had been
prescribed anti-psychotic medications (Mellaril, Haldol,
and Serintil), an antidepressant medication (Doxepin),
anti-seizure medications (Dilantin and Phenobarb), as well
as a schizophrenia medication (Geodone) that had been
prescribed to the defendant for an unspecified psychosis.
The defendant’s 1980 electroencephalogram report listed as
the chief finding that the “patient is probably epileptic
with intermittent psychosis[,] possibly explosive
personality.” The clinical impression stated on the report
was: “epileptic with intermittent psychosis. Latent
schizophrenic.” Dr. Blanche also conceded that
schizophrenia is one of the most serious mental illnesses.
However, Dr. Blanche indicated that medications taken by
the defendant were the most likely cause of the abnormal
test results. The defendant’s medical records also
indicated that in 1975, he had suffered a depressed skull
fracture in the left parietal area, which had resulted from
the stabbing incident.
Dr. Blanche explained that the diagnosis of “intermittent
psychosis” referred to psychosis that was present on some
days, but not others. Dr. Blanche indicated that
“psychosis” had been used as a general term and the cause
of the psychosis was not identified. Dr. Blanche further
explained that psychosis can be a symptom of schizophrenia,
but it can also be caused by taking illicit drugs. The
defendant admitted receiving and taking illicit drugs from
various sources including from other inmates. Dr. Blanche
further stated that schizophrenia is a chronic condition,
and that psychosis does not come and go in patients with
schizophrenia unless it was related to medication
noncompliance. Dr. Blanche noted that the defendant’s
“psychosis” was entirely self-reported; he had also claimed
to hear voices and see visions of ghosts or spirits.
However, Dr. Blanche testified that seeing visions of
ghosts or spirits is rarely ever seen in true schizophrenia.
On redirect examination, Dr. Blanche testified that the
relatively low dosage of Mellaril prescribed for the
defendant was more consistent with producing a calming
effect rather than true anti-psychotic efficacy. Further,
in regard to a 1988 prison emergency medical report,
stemming from a report of a possible seizure, the treating
physician made the assessment that the defendant was
“probably faking.” Additionally, the defendant’s prison
records indicated that he made multiple requests to see a
psychiatrist. Conversely, Dr. Blanche indicated that one of
the traits that characterizes schizophrenia is denial and
resistance to treatment. Dr. Blanche also noted the
defendant had gone on a hunger strike to change his camp
assignment at Angola. Dr. Blanche indicated that,
generally, a psychotic person would not go on a hunger
strike for any specific purpose, but would rather stop
eating for no apparent reason.
When asked if, assuming for the sake of argument the
defendant was schizophrenic, whether he knew the difference
between right and wrong, Dr. Blanche indicated the
defendant did know the difference between right and wrong.
Dr. Blanche also maintained his opinion that the
defendant’s actions and behaviors were efforts at
malingering and manipulation.
After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced a
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant
failed to rebut his presumed sanity at the time of the
offenses. Contrary to the assertions of the defendant, the
defendant’s medical history and the expert testimony at
trial did not sufficiently establish that the defendant was
unable to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of
the offenses. Moreover, evidence contrary to that
conclusion was presented through the testimony of Dr.
Blanche, as well as the testimony of the State witnesses
concerning the defendant’s actions at the time of the
offenses.
CAPACITY TO PROCEED
In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues his
mental defects rendered him incapable of assisting his
attorney in his defense and made him unable to restrain
himself from attacking his attorney in front of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 642 provides:
The defendant’s mental incapacity to proceed may be
raised at any time by the defense, the district attorney,
or the court. When the question of the defendant’s mental
incapacity to proceed is raised, there shall be no
further steps in the criminal prosecution, except the
institution of prosecution, until the defendant is found
to have the mental capacity to proceed.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 647 provides:
The issue of the defendant’s mental capacity to proceed
shall be determined by the court in a contradictory
hearing. The report of the sanity commission is admissible
in evidence at the hearing, and members of the sanity
commission may be called as witnesses by the court, the
defense, or the district attorney. Regardless of who
calls them as witnesses, the members of the commission
are subject to cross-examination by the defense, by the
district attorney, and by the court. Other evidence
pertaining to the defendant’s mental capacity to proceed
may be introduced at the hearing by the defense and by the
district attorney.
Mental incapacity to proceed exists when, as a result of
mental disease or defect, a defendant presently lacks the
capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to
assist in his defense. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 641. The law
presumes the defendant’s sanity. LSA-R.S. 15:432. The
defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that, as a result of his mental infirmity,
he is incompetent to stand trial. State v. Billiot,
94-2419, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/4/96), 672 So.2d 361, 366,
writ denied, 96-1149 (La. 10/11/96), 680 So.2d655.
While a court is permitted to receive the aid of expert
medical testimony on the issue of a defendant’s mental
capacity to proceed, the ultimate decision of competency is
the court’s alone. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 647. The ruling of the
district court on a defendant’s mental capacity to proceed
is entitled to great weight on appellate review and will
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Billiot,
94-2419 at p. 5, 672 So.2d at 367.
On November 12, 2003, the defense moved for a sanity
hearing. When the court initially received two conflicting
reports concerning the defendant’s sanity and competency,
the court appointed Dr. Blanche on April 7, 2004, to
examine the defendant and report on his sanity and
competency.
On July 26, 2004, the State and the defense submitted the
matter on the basis of the three doctors’ reports. After
reviewing the reports and noting the difference of opinion
of the doctors, the court found the defendant competent to
proceed.
In his November 26, 2003 report concerning a November 25,
2003 evaluation of the defendant, Dr. Zimmermann concluded
the defendant did not appear to be competent and should be
transported to a facility for treatment. In regard to the
defendant’s ability to understand the nature of the
proceedings, Dr. Zimmermann noted:
1. He does not understand the nature of the charge nor
can he appreciate its seriousness. (He believes he is
charged with four murders.)
2. He does not understand what defenses are available.
3. He can not distinguish a guilty from a not guilty plea
and [understand] the consequences of each.
4. He does not have an awareness of his legal rights.
5. He does not understand the range of possible verdicts
and the consequences of a conviction.
In regard to the defendant’s ability to assist in his
defense, Dr. Zimmermann found:
1. He can not recall and relate facts pertaining to his
actions and whereabouts at certain times.
2. He can not assist counsel [with] locating and
examining relevant witnesses.
3. He is able to maintain a consistent defense.
4. He is not able to listen to the testimony of witnesses
and inform his attorney of any distortions or mistakes.
5. He has the ability to make simple decisions in
response to well explained alternatives.
6. He is not capable of testifying in his own defense.
7. It is unlikely that his mental condition will
deteriorate significantly under the stress of trial.
[[fn2]]
In his April 6, 2004 report concerning his February 3, 2004
and March 1, 2004 evaluations of the defendant, Dr. F. A.
Silva concluded the defendant was malingering. At the
February 3, 2004 evaluation, the defendant told Dr. Silva
that he was accused of killing four people in New Orleans.
When Dr. Silva inquired as to the defendant’s knowledge of
the function of the officers of the court, the defendant
reported to Dr. Silva that the judge “did a lot of
talking,” and the prosecutor tried to “help defense
counsel.” The defendant claimed not to know the function of
the jury. The defendant also denied to Dr. Silva that he had
any knowledge of the pleas available to him.
At the March 1, 2004 evaluation, the defendant claimed not
to remember Dr. Silva from the Febmary 3, 2004 evaluation.
He also claimed not to remember any of the facts related to
the offenses listed in the affidavit of probable cause.
When Dr. Silva challenged the defendant’s claims of lack of
memory, the defendant became increasingly angry, stopped
the interview, and left Dr. Silva’s office.
In his July 19, 2004 report concerning his examination and
evaluation of the defendant on that date, Dr. Blanche also
concluded the defendant was malingering or exaggerating a
mental illness. Dr. Blanche noted:
It is my opinion that Mr. Williams is currently able to
assist his attorney in his defense (if he chose to) and he
. . . also seems to be able to understand the nature of
the charges against him, the basic functions of the court,
the role of the attorneys involved, and the basic
proceedings against him. He answered questions and used
words that indicate that he has at least a rudimentary
or basic understanding of the legal process. For example,
[h]e understood what it meant when I asked him what he was
going to plead and when I asked if there was evidence
against him, he made reference to having a gun.
There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
finding the defendant competent to proceed. The defense
failed to prove that the defendant was incompetent to stand
trial.
This assignment of error is without merit.
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE
In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues the
trial court erred in denying the defense challenge for
cause against prospective juror Lawrence Addy because the
totality of his statements indicated he was unable to be
impartial due to his strong feelings.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 797, in
pertinent part, provides:
The state or the defendant may challenge a juror for
cause on the ground that:
* * *
(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his
partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be
sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares,
and the court is satisfied, that he can render an
impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence;
* * *
(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by
the court[.]
In order for a defendant to prove reversible error
warranting reversal of both his conviction and sentence, he
need only show the following: (1) erroneous denial of a
challenge for cause; and (2) use of all his peremptory
challenges. Prejudice is presumed when a defendant’s
challenge for cause is erroneously denied and the defendant
exhausts all his peremptory challenges.[fn3] An erroneous
mling depriving an accused of a peremptoiy challenge
violates his substantial rights and constitutes reversible
error. State v. Taylor, 2003-1834, pp. 5-6 (La. 5/25/04),
875 So.2d 58, 62.
A trial court is vested with broad discretion in mling on
challenges for cause and these rulings will be reversed
only when a review of the voir dire record as a whole
reveals an abuse of discretion. A trial judge’s refusal to
excuse a prospective juror for cause is not an abuse of his
discretion, notwithstanding that the juror has voiced an
opinion seemingly prejudicial to the defense, when
subsequently, on further inquiiy or instruction, he has
demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the case
impartially according to the law and the evidence. Taylor,
2003-1834 at p. 6, 875 So.2d at 62-63.
Lawrence Addy was on the first panel of prospective jurors.
During the State’s discussion of presentation of evidence
concerning insanity of the defendant, a colloquy occurred
between Mr. Addy and the Assistant District Attorney,
during which the following questions were asked:
Q: . . . Yes, Sir, Mr. Addy?
A: I have to be honest. I’ve never really been a juror
before anywhere for anything. I’ve always — when
I’ve seen insanity pleas I’ve always gone, yeah, right
—
Q: So does the State as attorneys.
A: I just don’t — I never bought it.
Q: That’s what [defense counsel is] going to talk to you
about.
A: Okay.
Q: I would suggest to you that your professional
skepticism is warranted. Of course, [defense counsel] may
disagree with me.
A: I understand.
In a colloquy that subsequently occurred between defense
counsel and Mr. Addy, the following questions were asked:
Q: But what I’m asking is, are you going to put a higher
burden of proof than just normal burden of proof on me[?]
A: I’ll do my best, Sir, within the law.
Q: Okay.
A: But I am — I’m not going to lie to you. I am
skeptical about it. You’re talking about PCP drug use.
Well, you held that young man responsible for a
difference. What’s the difference? That’s my opinion. I’m
going to be honest with you.
Thereafter, the trial judge questioned Mr. Addy as follows:
Q: . . . Mr. Addy, concerning your questioning on the
issue of insanity, everyone — is everyone starting
on a level playing field?
A: I’d like to think so, yes.
Q: Okay. Well that’s what we’re going to try to get to.
We talked about the instmctions on the law. I would
instruct you on the law —
A: Right.
Q: — and whether you agreed with it or not the law
requires you to accept the law as given to you by the
court.
A: Correct. Yes, Sir.
Q: You’ve been given some general outlines of what the
law is and what is required. Will you be able to accept
the law as given to you by the court and apply it to the
facts in this case on the issue of insanity?
A: I certainly would want to say, yes, Sir; I could. But
I’m like that gentleman there. I’m not a hundred percent
sure. He’s presumed innocent now.
Q: Correct.
A: That’s a later — the insanity would come later;
correct?
Q: That’s —
A: Wouldn’t I have to decide from that point on?
Q: Well, you would be instructed on the issue of insanity
and what the law is on the issue of insanity defense.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And regardless of what your personal feelings are in
regards to the issue of insanity —
A: Right.
Q: — my question to you would be, would you be
able to put aside any personal beliefs that you have and
accept the law as given to you and apply it to the facts
in this case and render a just verdict?
A: I’d like to say I could. I’m not — I’d like
— I want to say yes. But I have a natural
skepticism that I —
Q: And that’s —
A: I know the law —
Q: — that’s okay.
A: The law is —
Q: We all have certain beliefs, we all have certain
skepticism on different issues.
A: Right.
Q: And there’s nothing wrong with that. But we all also
have common sense that we’re asked to bring back into the
jury room as well.
A: Right.
Q: And it’s your common sense that is requested of you
once you have listened to all the evidence and are about
to go into the jury room and begin your deliberations.
A: Right.
Q: But the deciding factor is whether or not someone
would be able to put aside any of those skepticisms or
personal differences with what the law might be and say
—
A: Right.
Q: — yes, I will accept the law as given to me and
I will apply it to the facts in this case. Will you be
able to do that?
A: I think so. Yes, Sir.
The defense challenged Mr. Addy for cause, arguing he could
not accept the law as to the insanity defense. The court
denied the challenge for cause, citing Mr. Addy’s responses
to the court’s questioning concerning his ability to follow
the court’s instructions. The defense objected to the
denial of the challenge for cause and thereafter used a
peremptory strike against Mr. Addy.
Initially, we note that the defendant exhausted his
peremptory challenges in this matter. Thus, if he has
established an erroneous denial of a defense challenge for
cause, prejudice is presumed, and there is reversible trial
court error.
Considering Mr. Addy’s responses to the voir dire
examination as a whole, there was no abuse of the great
discretion of the trial court in regard to the ruling on
the defendant’s challenge for cause against Mr. Addy.
Although Mr. Addy initially expressed skepticism concerning
accepting the law in regard to the insanity defense, on
further inquiry and instruction, he demonstrated a
willingness and ability to decide the case impartially
according to the law and the evidence.
This assignment of error is without merit.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
[fn1] The victims of counts IV, VI, VIII, and IX either
could not be located or were unavailable at the time of the
trial.
[fn2] See State v. Bennett, 345 So.2d 1129,1138 (La. 1977)
(on rehearing).
[fn3] The rule is now different at the federal level. See
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 120 S.Ct.
774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (exhaustion of peremptory
challenges does not trigger automatic presumption of
prejudice arising from trial court’s erroneous denial of a
cause challenge).