Connecticut Appellate Decisions
RWEYEMAMU v. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 98 Conn. App. 646
(2006) JUSTINIAN RWEYEMAMU v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND OPPORTUNITIES ET AL. (AC 27108) Appellate Court of
Connecticut.
Flynn, C. J., and Gruendel and Peters, Js.
Syllabus
Pursuant to statute (§ 52-571b [a] and [b]), the
state shall not burden a person’s exercise of religion
except where the state demonstrates that application of the
burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling government interest. Further pursuant to statute
(§ 52-571b Page 647 [d]), nothing in §
52-571b “shall be construed to authorize the state to
burden any religious belief.”
The plaintiff, a Roman Catholic priest, appealed to the
trial court from the decision by the defendant commission
on human rights and opportunities to dismiss the employment
discrimination complaint that the plaintiff had brought
against his diocese. The commission invoked the ministerial
exception to administrative jurisdiction over employment
disputes between religious institutions and their ministers
in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. The
trial court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, from
which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held:
1. The commission properly declined to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction on the basis of the ministerial
exception, which prevents courts or government agencies
from exercising jurisdiction over a religious institution’s
actions regarding the employment of its ministers; because
administrative and judicial intervention in religious
employment relationships would violate the constitutional
prohibition against civil entanglement in ecclesiastic
disputes and because the constitutional guarantee of the
free exercise of religious authority requires secular
institutions to defer to the decisions of religious
institutions in their employment relations with their
religious employees, it was proper to apply the ministerial
exception to Connecticut’s employment discrimination laws.
2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that
pursuant to § 52-571b (b), antidiscrimination
statutes should be enforced against a religious institution
upon a showing of a compelling state interest; although
subdivisions (a) and (b) of § 52-571b authorize the
state to burden the “exercise” of a person’s religion upon
a showing of compelling state interest, subdivision (d) of
that statute expressly precludes the state from burdening
“any religious belief,” and because the internal governance
of a religious institution, including the employment of
ministers and clergy, is a protected religious belief of
the institution, the commission correctly determined that it
lacked jurisdiction.
Argued September 21, 2006.
Officially released December 12, 2006.
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision by the named defendant dismissing
the plaintiff’s employment discrimination complaint against
the defendant Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain,
where the court, Hon. Howard T. Owens, Jr., judge trial
referee, rendered judgment of dismissal, from which the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Page 648
Harold H. Burbank II, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Charles Krich, principal attorney, for the appellee (named
defendant).
Meredith G. Diette, for the appellee (defendant Roman
Catholic Diocese of Norwich).
Opinion
PETERS, J.
The first amendment to the United States constitution
protects religious institutions from governmental
interference with their free exercise of religion.[fn1]
Accordingly, many courts have recognized a ministerial
exception to judicial authority to adjudicate employment
disputes between religious institutions and their religious
leaders. In this case, the commission on human rights and
opportunities (commission) invoked the ministerial
exception to conclude that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear allegations of employment
discrimination brought by a Catholic priest against his
diocese. We must decide whether the trial court properly
dismissed the priest’s appeal from the dismissal of his
administrative complaint. The priest argues that for
prudential reasons buttressed by a recent decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, we
should decline to recognize a ministerial exception to the
jurisdiction of the commission. We disagree and affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
On April 25, 2005, the plaintiff, Father Justinian
Rweyemamu, a Roman Catholic priest, filed a revised
administrative appeal to the trial court to challenge the
validity of a decision by the defendant commission to
dismiss his complaint of discriminatory employment
practices on jurisdictional grounds. His administrative
complaint Page 649 alleged that the defendant, the Roman
Catholic Diocese of Norwich (diocese), had engaged in
discriminatory employment practices in violation of General
Statutes § 46a-60.[fn2] The trial court concluded
that neither state agencies nor state courts have subject
matter jurisdiction to review purely ecclesiastical
disputes. Accordingly, it dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.
In his appeal to this court, the plaintiff’s principal
claim is that the defendant commission and the trial court
improperly invoked a ministerial exception to
administrative jurisdiction because Connecticut law has
never recognized such an exception. In the alternative, he
claims that the jurisprudential underpinnings of the
ministerial exception have been dispositively demonstrated
to be flawed in a binding decision of the Second Circuit,
Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006). We are not
persuaded.
I
We begin our analysis of the plaintiff’s principal claim
that the commission should have exercised jurisdiction by
setting forth our standard of review. “Jurisdiction of the
subject-matter is the power [of the court] to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong. . . . A court has subject
matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a
particular type of legal controversy. . . . It is a
familiar principle that a court which exercises a limited
Page 650 and statutory jurisdiction is without
jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise
circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by
the enabling legislation. . . .
“This concept, however, is not limited to courts.
Administrative agencies [such as the commission] are
tribunals of limited jurisdiction and their jurisdiction is
dependent entirely upon the validity of the statutes
vesting them with power and they cannot confer jurisdiction
upon themselves. . . . We have recognized that [i]t is clear
that an administrative body must act strictly within its
statutory authority, within constitutional limitations and
in a lawful manner. . . . It cannot modify, abridge or
otherwise change the statutory provisions, under which it
acquires authority unless the statutes expressly grant it
that power.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Figueroa v.
C & S Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1, 4, 675 A.2d 845 (1996).
“We . . . note that because [a] determination regarding [an
agency’s] subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law,
our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 58
Conn. App. 642, 649, 754 A.2d 828 (2000), rev’d on other
grounds, 259 Conn. 288, 788 A.2d 1199 (2002).
Our starting point for determining whether the commission
properly relied on the ministerial exception to decline to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
complaint is the affidavit that the plaintiff filed to
initiate these proceedings. The plaintiff alleged that he
was a “black African ordained Catholic priest from
Tanzania, East Africa who [had] been employed by [the
diocese] as a priest for over ten years in the position of
parochial vicar; the last five of which [had been] at St.
Bernard’s Church, Rockville, Connecticut.” He further
alleged that he had been refused a promotion to the position
of administrator for St. Bernard’s parish Page 651 and
that a less-qualified, white deacon had been appointed in
his place.
The plaintiff also alleged that the diocese had harassed
him about his role in working for a nondenominational,
nonprofit organization called Buguruka Orphan and Community
Economic Development, Inc. (organization). The plaintiff
claimed that the diocese “has demanded, and continues to
demand to date, through its top administrator, Bishop
Michael Cote, to investigate [the organization] by
interviewing me about [the organization] in Bishop Cote’s
office, under alleged but canonically incorrect church
authority. . . .” (Emphasis in original.)
The plaintiff further alleged that the diocese had engaged
in race, ethnicity, national origin and alienage based
discrimination when it failed to promote him on April 7,
2004, and August 27, 2004. Additional alleged instances of
discrimination, beginning on March 30, 2004, included poor
evaluations, retaliation and harassment.
The commission’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction was based on its
recognition that “the courts and the commission recognize a
`ministerial exception’ with respect to individuals
employed by religious institutions in a `clergy’ or
`ministerial’ capacity. The commission and the courts have
determined that such are the `lifeblood’ of the church, and
any government [interference] between a church and its
ministers would violate the first amendment to the
constitution.”
The trial court upheld the commission’s application of the
ministerial exception as reflected in federal
antidiscrimination statutes and case law. The court decided
that the ministerial exception grants “religious
institutions . . . the authority to manage their internal
affairs, select their leaders without interference and
Page 652 resolve their own disputes.” The court concluded
that “[t]he case before [it] involve[d] the basic and
fundamental question of who will preach from the altar and
who will occupy the rectory at St. Bernard’s. The very
nature of the question in and of itself makes it clear that
this court lacks jurisdiction. Whether it comes from the
priest, rabbi or clergyman or from an administrative agency
such as the [commission], the court is without jurisdiction
to interfere.”
The issue of whether the ministerial exception applies to
Connecticut’s employment discrimination laws is one of first
impression for our appellate courts. Like the federal
government in its enactment of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et. seq., Connecticut prohibits
discrimination in employment. General Statutes §
46a-60. When interpreting § 46a-60, our Supreme
Court has “often looked to federal employment
discrimination law for enforcing our own
[antidiscrimination] statute.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Thames Talent, Ltd. v. Commission on Human Rights
& Opportunities, 265 Conn. 127, 139, 827 A.2d 659 (2003).
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has observed, “[t]he ministerial exception
is judicial shorthand for two conclusions: the first is
that the imposition of secular standards on a church’s
employment of its ministers will burden the free exercise
of religion; the second, that the state’s interest in
eliminating employment discrimination is outweighed by a
church’s constitutional right of autonomy in its own
domain.” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir.
1996). We are mindful that the protections afforded by the
first amendment apply to state as well as federal
governmental actions. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940) (“Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as
incompetent as Page 653 Congress to enact . . . laws
[that violate the first amendment’s religion clauses]”).
The ministerial exception’s role in protecting important
constitutional rights was first articulated in McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 896, 93 S. Ct. 132, 34 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1972). In that
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the District Court did not have
jurisdiction to decide a gender discrimination claim under
Title VII. Id. The reason for the invocation of this
ministerial exception was that “[a]n application of the
provisions of Title VII to the employment relationship
which exists between . . . a church and its minister, would
involve an investigation and review of these practices and
decisions and would, as a result, cause the [s]tate to
intrude upon matters of church administration and
government which have so many times before been proclaimed
to be matters of a singular ecclesiastical concern. Control
of strictly ecclesiastical matters could easily pass from
the church to the [s]tate. The church would then be without
the power to decide for itself, free from state
interference, matters of church administration and
government.” Id., 560.
It bears emphasis that the ministerial exception is
jurisdictional rather than evidentiary. Religious
institutions need not rely on proof of affirmative defenses
in employment discrimination suits but may categorically
resist the judicial intrusion implicit in inquiry into
their employment practices and relationships. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catholic University of
America, supra, 83 F.3d 466, citing National Labor
Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490, 502, 99 S. Ct. 1313, 59 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1979); Combs v.
Central Texas Annual Conference of the United Methodist
Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[i]n short, we
cannot conceive how the Page 654 federal judiciary could
determine whether an employment decision concerning a
minister was based on legitimate or illegitimate grounds
without inserting ourselves into a realm where the
Constitution forbids us to tread, the internal management
of a church”).
We are persuaded that Connecticut administrative law,
consistent with these persuasive precedents, must recognize
the ministerial exception in the enforcement of our
employment discrimination statutes.[fn3] The constitutional
guarantee of the free exercise of religious authority
requires secular institutions to defer to the decisions of
religious institutions in their employment relations with
their religious employees.[fn4] In broader terms,
administrative and judicial intervention in religious
employment relationships would violate the constitutional
prohibition against civil entanglement in ecclesiastic
disputes. Cf. New York Annual Conference v. Fisher, 182
Conn. 272, 278, 438 A.2d 62 (1980).
The ministerial exception prevents courts or government
agencies from exercising jurisdiction over a religious
institution’s actions regarding the employment of its Page
655 ministers. In concluding that the commission properly
relied on the ministerial exception in not exercising
subject matter jurisdiction, we limit the exception’s scope
to the narrow scope recognized by the commission, namely
that the exception applies only to the employment of
ministers and clergy broadly defined.[fn5]
II
The plaintiff’s alternate claim is that, to the extent that
federal case law has established a ministerial exception,
that case law should not be given persuasive effect because
the exception has been set aside by Congress through its
enactment of the Religious Freedom Reformation Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.[fn6] In particular, the
plaintiff urges us to follow the Page 656 decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Hankins . Lyght, supra, 441 F.3d 99. In that case, a
divided court held that Congress impliedly had amended the
antidiscrimination statutes, such as the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., to make
them enforceable without regard to the free exercise clause
of the first amendment. In asking us to follow the Second
Circuit, the plaintiff asks us to apply the reasoning of
Hankins to a Connecticut statute, General Statutes §
52-571b.[fn7] The plaintiff claims that this statute has the
same effect as the Religious Freedom Reformation Act and
that we should find that § 52-571b similarly
precludes the application of the ministerial exception. We
disagree. Page 657
The plaintiff’s argument for the direct applicability of
Hankins is flawed for two reasons. First, the decisions of
the Second Circuit, while often persuasive, do not bind the
decisions of Connecticut courts. See Turner v. Frowein, 253
Conn. 312, 341, 752 A.2d 955 (2000). Second, the federal
statute on which the court of appeals relied, the Religious
Freedom Reformation Act, is unconstitutional as applied to
state law. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536, 117 S. Ct.
2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1997).
The plaintiff’s argument devolves, therefore, into the
proposition that we should look to Hankins as persuasive
guidance for the interpretation of § 52-571b
because, in his view, our statute is analogous to the
federal Religious Freedom Reformation Act. The court of
appeals read the federal statute as evidencing Congress’
intent that antidiscrimination statutes should be enforced,
even against religious institutions. Hankins v. Lyght,
supra, 441 F.3d 102. The question is whether §
52-571b manifests a similar intent.
We might simply dismiss the plaintiff’s statutory argument
because he has failed to support it by adequate briefing.
See Knapp v. Knapp, 270 Conn. 815, 823 n. 8, 856 A.2d 358
(2004) (Supreme Court “consistently [has] held that
[a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure
to brief the issue properly. . . . Where the parties cite no
law and provide no analysis of their claims, we do not
review such claims.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).
In light of the importance of the plaintiff’s argument,
however, we have undertaken to ascertain its merits by
examining its text and its legislative history. Our
examination persuades us that the plaintiff’s argument has
no merit.
To decide whether § 52-571b has displaced the
ministerial exception, we look to well-established rules
of Page 658 interpretation. “[Although] [o]rdinarily,
this court affords deference to the construction of a
statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by
law to carry out the statute’s purposes . . . when a state
agency’s determination of a question of law has not
previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . . the
agency is not entitled to special deference. . . . [I]t is
for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound
and apply governing principles of law.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Board of Education v. State Board of
Education, 278 Conn. 326, 331, 898 A.2d 170 (2006). In the
present case, § 52-571b has not been subject to
judicial scrutiny in determining its application to our
state’s employment discrimination laws. Our review
therefore is plenary.
Our interpretation of § 52-571b must begin by
ascertaining whether the statute has a plain meaning.
General Statutes § 1-2z;[fn8] see also Kinsey v.
Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 277 Conn. 398, 408, 891 A.2d
959 (2006). In our view, the language of § 52-571b,
particularly with respect to its application to the
ministerial exception, is not plain and unambiguous.
At first glance, the most directly relevant provisions of
§ 52-571b are subsections (a) and (b), which require
courts to find a compelling state interest before a
governmental actor, such as the commission, may
substantially burden “a person’s exercise of religion.”
Under the circumstances of this case, subsections (a) and
(b) would seem to require the commission, in its
adjudicative capacity, to apply the strict scrutiny test to
any Page 659 claim of infringement of the diocese’s
religious freedom rather than to apply the ministerial
exception.
These subsections must, however, be read in conjunction
with subsection (d), which provides that “[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to authorize the state or any
political subdivision of the state to burden any religious
belief.” General Statutes § 52-571b (d). The
question becomes, therefore, whether secular interference
with the employment of ministerial staff by a religious
organization would constitute a “burden” on “religious
belief.” To answer this question, we must decide whether a
religious institution’s employment of ministerial staff is
considered an “exercise of religion” under subsections (a)
and (b) or a “religious belief” under subsection (d).
Because the text of § 52-571b does not provide an
unambiguous answer to this question, it is useful to recall
the historical events surrounding its passage. Beginning
with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S. Ct. 1790,
10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
required that governmental actions burdening the free
exercise of religion be tested to determine whether they
further a “compelling state interest.” See also Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15
(1972). Sherbert and its progeny apply the compelling state
interest test because, in protecting religious freedom,
“[i]t is basic that [the] showing merely of a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest would [not]
suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests,
give occasion for permissible limitation.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherbert v.
Verner, supra, 406-407.
After twenty-seven years in which the United States Supreme
Court followed Sherbert, that court changed course in
Employment Division, Dept. of Human Page 660 Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L .Ed.
2d 876 (1990). Smith held that the free exercise rights of
a member of the Native American Church did not prohibit the
government from enforcing the generally applicable drug laws
that criminalize the use of peyote, even if used in a of
religious ceremony. Id., 885. In so holding, the court
concluded “that the sounder approach, and the approach in
accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold
the [compelling state interest] test inapplicable to such
challenges. The government’s ability to enforce generally
applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like
its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy,
cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental
action on a religious objector’s spiritual development. . .
. To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious
beliefs, except where the State’s interest is compelling
— permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, to
become a law unto himself . . . contradicts both
constitutional tradition and common sense.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Although the legislative history of our statute is silent
as to the precise meaning of either “exercise of religion”
or “religious belief,” the history does reveal that the
overarching purpose of § 52-571b was to provide more
protection for religious freedom under Connecticut law than
the Smith decision would provide under federal law. As
Representative Richard D. Tulisano stated when introducing
the bill to the House of Representatives: “This bill
enhances religious freedom and puts Connecticut once again
in the forefront of supporting the variety of denominations
that exist in the State and supporting that free exercise
there.” 36 H.R. Proc., Pt. 14, 1993 Sess., p. 4923. Members
of the Senate echoed this sentiment: “[T]o be absolutely
clear, this does not — this bill Page 661 does not
expand, contract or alter the ability of a claimant to
obtain relief in a manner consistent with the Supreme
Court’s free exercise jurisprudence under the compelling
interest test prior to the Smith case.” 36 S. Proc., Pt. 8,
1993 Sess., p. 2785, remarks of Senator George C. Jepsen.
The legislature illustrated its intent to reverse the
effects of the Smith case by considering a number of
specific situations in which its application would lead to
the decreased protection of religious freedoms. Of
particular import for our decision in this case is the
testimony of one proponent who pointed out that Smith would
have the undesired consequence of making employment
discrimination laws applicable to religious
institutions.[fn9] Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,
Judiciary, Pt. 3, 1991 Sess., p. 801. Although this
testimony was presented at a public hearing on a similar
bill introduced two years prior to the passage of §
52-571b, this history demonstrates that the legislature was
aware of the impact that Smith might have had on employment
discrimination laws.
Our review of the legislative history leads us to conclude
that the legislature was, in general, mindful of the impact
that Smith might have had on employment discrimination
laws, but that the legislature was, in particular,
protecting individual religious practices Page 662 through
the strict scrutiny test. In protecting the religious
practices of individuals, the legislature made the
distinction between the “exercise of religion,” which it
protected with the strict scrutiny test found in
subsections (a) and (b) of § 52-571b, and “religious
beliefs,” which the legislature prevented from being
burdened by subsection (d). When interpreting what the
legislature meant by using this distinction, we are mindful
that when the legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed
to be aware of the status of the law relevant to the
statute. See St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 553, 825
A.2d 90 (2003) (“legislature is presumed to have acted with
knowledge of existing statutes” [internal quotation marks
omitted]); Considine v. Waterbury, 279 Conn. 830, 844, 905
A.2d 70 (2006) (“legislature is presumed to be aware of
prior judicial decisions involving common-law rules”
[internal quotation marks omitted]).
In our interpretation of the meaning that the legislature
intended to give to “religious belief” in subsection (d) of
§ 52-571b, we look to United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the distinction between the protection of
religious practices and religious beliefs. In particular,
we note that the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that the internal governance of a religious institution,
including the employment of ministers and clergy, is a
protected religious belief of the institution. See Serbian
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevech, 426 U.S. 696, 713, 96 S.
Ct. 2372, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S. Ct. 143, 97 L. Ed. 120
(1952); see also Petruska v. Gannon University, 462 F.3d
294, 306-307 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[L]ike an individual, a
church in its collective capacity must be free to express
religious beliefs, profess matters of faith, and
communicate its religious message. Unlike an individual who
can speak on her own behalf, however, the church as an
institution must retain the corollary right to select its
voice. A minister Page 663 is not merely an employee of
the church; she is the embodiment of its message.”
[Emphasis added.]).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
has elaborated on the different protections provided for
religious practice and religious belief under federal
constitutional law: “The Smith decision focused on the
first type of government infringement on the right of free
exercise of religion — infringement on an
individual’s ability to observe the practices of his or her
religion. The second type of government infringement
— interference with a church’s ability to select and
manage its own clergy — was not at issue in Smith.
The Court’s concern in Smith was that if an individual’s
legal obligations were contingent upon religious beliefs,
those beliefs would allow each individual to become a law
unto himself. . . . The ministerial exception does not
subvert this concern; it was not developed to provide
protection to individuals who wish to observe a religious
practice that contravenes a generally applicable law.
Rather, the exception only continues a long-standing
tradition that churches are to be free from government
interference in matters of church governance and
administration. . . . Also, because the ministerial
exception is based on this tradition and not on strict
scrutiny, the Court’s rejection in Smith of the compelling
interest test does not affect the continuing vitality of
the ministerial exception.” (Citations omitted; emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gellington v.
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299,
1303-1304 (11th Cir. 2000). Indeed,”[a]ll circuits to have
addressed the question have recognized the continuing
vitality of the exception after the Supreme Court’s
decision in [Smith]. See Gellington v. Christian Methodist
Episcopal Church, [supra, 1302-1304]; Combs v. Central Tex.
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, [supra,
173 F.3d 347-50]; [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Page 664 Catholic University of America, supra, 83
F.3d 461-63].” (Citation omitted.) Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh,
North Carolina, 213 F.3d 795, 800 n.* (4th Cir. 2000).
In light of the distinctions made between religious
practice and religious belief in the federal courts, we
conclude that the legislature intended to maintain this
distinction with its use of the language in §
52-571b. By protecting “free exercise” with the strict
scrutiny test of subsections (a) and (b), the legislature
intended to provide greater protection to religious
practices, such as the ritualistic use of peyote at issue
in Smith. As noted, the legislative history is replete with
examples of religious practices that the legislature
intended to protect under § 52-571b’s strict
scrutiny test.[fn10]
If we interpreted the “exercise of religion” language used
in subsections (a) and (b) to apply to all religious
beliefs, including a religious institution’s employment of
ministers and clergy, we would render the language
exempting religious beliefs from the application of the
statute superfluous. We do not interpret the language of one
part of a statute in a manner that would make another part
of the statute superfluous. See Semerzakis v. Commissioner
of Social Services, 274 Conn. 1, 18-19, 873 A.2d 911 (2005)
(“[T]he legislature did not intend to enact meaningless
provisions. . . . [S]tatutes must be construed, if
possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be
superfluous, void or insignificant.” [Internal quotation
marks omitted.]). If subsections (a) Moncrease v. Chase
Manhattan Auto Finance Corp. Page 665 and (b) provided the
only means of protecting religious freedom in Connecticut,
then there would be no need for subsection (d)’s protection
of “religious belief.” Because we must give meaning to the
language used by the legislature; see id.; we conclude that
the employment of ministers and clergy by a religious
institution is a “religious belief” under subsection
(d).[fn11]
Because we are persuaded that the employment practices of
religious institutions are a form of “religious belief” for
purposes of subsection (d), we conclude that the language
of that subsection prevents the application of the strict
scrutiny test of subsections (a) and (b). Section 52-571b,
therefore, does not displace the ministerial exception.
Accordingly, the trial court properly affirmed the
commission’s application of the ministerial exception and
its determination that it lacked jurisdiction.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
[fn1] The free exercise clause of the first amendment to
the United States constitution provides: “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” (Emphasis
added.)
[fn2] General Statutes § 46a-60 (a) provides in
relevant part: “It shall be a discriminatory practice in
violation of this section: (1) For an employer, by the
employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a
bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to
hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment
any individual or to discriminate against such individual
in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment because of the individual’s race, color,
religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin,
ancestry, present or past history of mental disability,
mental retardation, learning disability or physical
disability, including, but not limited to, blindness. . .
.”
[fn3] We note that this court has upheld a trial court’s
determination that it lacked jurisdiction, on first
amendment grounds, to delve into the workings of a church
where one of its ministers was sued for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. DeCorso v. Watchtower
Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 78 Conn. App. 865,
880, 829 A.2d 38, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931, 837 A.2d 805
(2003). This court concluded that “[u]nder both the free
exercise clause and the establishment clause, the first
amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving disputed
issues of religious doctrine and practice.” Id. Although we
did not specifically adopt a ministerial exception for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in DeCorso, our
holding in that case did recognize that our courts are not
well-suited to resolve disputes involving religious
doctrine.
[fn4] It bears mention that our General Statutes recognize
that religious institutions, as incorporated entities, are
governed by their own internal doctrine and laws. See
generally General Statutes §§ 33-265 through
281a. In particular, corporations formed under the Roman
Catholic Church “shall at all times be subject to the
general laws and discipline of the Roman Catholic Church .
. .” General Statutes § 33-281.
[fn5] There is no dispute in this case that the plaintiff
was a ministerial employee as he had been ordained a Roman
Catholic priest in April, 1992, and has served continuously
in the Diocese of Norwich.
The issue of whether the ministerial exception may be
applied to nonministerial staff of a religious institution
is not before us in this case. We note, however, that
Connecticut has not applied the exception to such
situations in the past. See Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities v. Archdiocesan School Office, 202 Conn. 601,
608, 522 A.2d 781 (reversing judgment of dismissal where
commission had served interrogatories on archdiocesan
school office during investigation of religious
discrimination), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 805, 108 S. Ct.
51, 98 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1987).
[fn6] The substantive portion of the Religious Freedom
Reformation Act at issue in Hankins v. Lyght, supra, 441
F.3d 99, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, provides: “(a) In
general. Government shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
“(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person —
“(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
“(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
“(c) Judicial relief. A person whose religious exercise has
been burdened in violation of this section may assert that
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding
and obtain appropriate relief against a government.
Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section
shall be governed by the general rules of standing under
article III of the Constitution.”
[fn7] General Statutes § 52-571b provides: “Action or
defense authorized when state or political subdivision
burdens a person’s exercise of religion. (a) The state or
any political subdivision of the state shall not burden a
person’s exercise of religion under section 3 of article
first of the Constitution of the state even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
“(b) The state or any political subdivision of the state
may burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.
“(c) A person whose exercise of religion has been burdened
in violation of the provisions of this section may assert
that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the state
or any political subdivision of the state.
“(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
authorize the state or any political subdivision of the
state to burden any religious belief.
“(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect,
interpret or in any way address that portion of article
seventh of the Constitution of the state that prohibits any
law giving a preference to any religious society or
denomination in the state. The granting of government
funding, benefits or exemptions, to the extent permissible
under the Constitution of the state, shall not constitute a
violation of this section. As used in this subsection, the
term `granting’ does not include the denial of government
funding, benefits or exemptions.
“(f) For the purposes of this section, `state or any
political subdivision of the state’ includes any agency,
board, commission, department, officer or employee of the
state or any political subdivision of the state, and
`demonstrates’ means meets the burdens of going forward
with the evidence and of persuasion.”
[fn8] General Statutes § 1-2z provides: “The meaning
of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained
from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to
other statutes. If, after examining such text and
considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is
plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or
unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of
the statute shall not be considered.”
[fn9] The following colloquy took place at the March 22,
1991 public hearing:
“Michael Farris: . . . Connecticut has a law that says you
can’t discriminate in employment on the basis of gender, as
it should.
“[Representative Richard D. Tulisano]: Right.
“Michael Farris: Application of [the Smith case] to the
Catholic church. Catholic church will not hire women
priests, will not ordain women priests.Should the Catholic
church be forced to ordain women priests? Well as a matter
of constitutional law, they should not.
“Should the black Musl[i]m church be forced to ordain white
people — no. The black Musl[i]m church should be
allowed to have their view about the proper people that
they’re going to have as their ministers.” Conn. Joint
Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 3, 1991 Sess.,
pp. 800-801.
[fn10] Such examples include the lighting of candles in
church, the receiving of wine at holy communion, wearing a
yarmulke in court; 36 H.R. Proc., Pt. 14, 1993 Sess., p.
4923, remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano;
forcing the Amish to use reflectors on their horse drawn
buggies, and performing autopsies where it was against the
deceased’s religion. Conn. Joint Standing Committee
Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 4, 1993 Sess., p. 1232, remarks of
Robert Leikind, director, Connecticut office of the
Anti-Defamation League.
[fn11] We note that there have been several Superior Court
cases dealing with the applicability of General Statutes
§ 52-571b to zoning laws. Cambodian Buddhist Society
of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission,
Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No.
CV-03-0350572-S (November 18, 2005) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 410);
First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Historic District
Commission, 46 Conn. Sup. 90, 738 A.2d 224 (1998), aff’d,
55 Conn. App. 59, 737 A.2d 989, cert. denied, 251 Conn.
923, 742 A.2d 358 (1999). Because of the factual difference
between those cases and the present one, we do not address
the issue of how the compelling state interest