Federal District Court Opinions

BOBADILLA v. MDRC, (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ROLANDO BOBADILLA,
Plaintiff, v. MDRC, Defendant. No. 03 Civ. 9217. United
States District Court, S.D. New York. August 23, 2005

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN KOELTL, District Judge

The plaintiff, Rolando Bobadilla (“Bobadilla”), alleges
that his former employer, the defendant, Manpower
Demonstration Research Corporation (“MDRC”), violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-19, by failing to pay Bobadilla
time-and-a-half for hours worked in a given week in excess
of forty hours. The defendant, MDRC, moves for summary
judgment. MDRC argues that the plaintiff qualifies as a
computer services employee pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
213(a)(17) as well as a bona fide administrative or
professional employee pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
213(a)(1) and is therefore exempt from the FLSA’s overtime
requirements.

I.

The standard for granting summary judgment is well
established. Summary judgment may not be granted unless
“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show Page 2 that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Gallo v.
Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219,
1223 (2d Cir. 1994). “The trial court’s task at the summary
judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully
limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of
material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty,
in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it
does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at
1224. The moving party bears the initial burden of
“informing the district court of the basis for its motion”
and identifying the matter that “it believes demonstrate[s]
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323. The substantive law governing the case
will identify those facts which are material and “only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a
court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable
inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
Page 3 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S.
654, 655 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary
judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record
from any source from which a reasonable inference could be
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM
Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). If the
moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to come forward with “specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmoving party must produce
evidence in the record and “may not rely simply on
conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits
supporting the motion are not credible.” Ying Jing Gan v.
City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993). See
also Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998)
(collecting cases); Estevez-Yalcin v. Children’s Village,
331 F. Supp. 2d 170, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

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