Life imprisonment without possibility of parole

Maryland Court of Special Appeals Reports

DANIELS v. STATE, 223 (Md.App. 12-26-2006) SONYA MARIE
DANIELS v. STATE OF MARYLAND. No. 223, September Term,
2005. Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Filed:
December 26, 2006.

FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; PROBABLE CAUSE FOR VEHICULAR STOP; IN CASE WHERE MARTINSBURG, WEST VIRGINIA POLICE WERE INFORMED BY FREDERICK COUNTY MARYLAND POLICE THAT THE VAN, DRIVEN BY APPELLANT AT THE TIME OF THE STOP IN WEST VIRGINIA, FIT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE VEHICLE AT THE SCENE OF THE DOUBLE HOMICIDE ON A STREET IN MARYLAND AND THAT APPELLANT’S FORMER BOYFRIEND HAD TOLD MARYLAND AUTHORITIES THAT APPELLANT HAD SAID THAT HE (THE FORMER BOYFRIEND) WOULD NEVER SEE THE FIVE-MONTH OLD MURDER VICTIM AGAIN, WEST VIRGINIA AUTHORITIES HAD AMPLE PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP AND SEIZE THE VAN; WEST VIRGINIA CODE, §§ 62-1A3 AND 8-14-3, PROVIDING WHICH LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS ARE AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE AND RETURN SEARCH WARRANTS; STEVENSON v. STATE, 287 MD. 504 (1980);

ALTHOUGH FREDERICK COUNTY, MARYLAND OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE WEST VIRGINIA SEARCH WARRANT OF VAN USED IN DOUBLE HOMICIDE, THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT AS PRIVATE CITIZENS, BUT RATHER THEY OPERATED UNDER THE “COLOR OF HIS OFFICE” BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THEY OBTAINED THE INFORMATION THAT ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE COURSE OF THEIR DUTIES AS LAW-ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS; IN LIGHT OF RECEIPT OF SEARCH WARRANT, SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT, INCLUDING DOCUMENTATION OF EVIDENCE SEIZED, AND PREPARATION AND FILING OF RETURN BY MARTINSBURG, WEST VIRGINIA PATROLMAN, ROLE OF FREDERICK COUNTY, MARYLAND POLICE AND CRIME SCENE OFFICERS IN RECOVERING EVIDENCE FROM VAN WAS PROPER; MARYLAND RULE 4-212 (f); MD. CODE ANNO., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 10-912; WILLIAMS v. STATE, 375 MD.404 (2003) AND FACON v. STATE, 375 MD. 435 (2003);

PROMPT PRESENTMENT BEFORE JUDICIAL OFFICER; APPLICABILITY OF RULE 4-212 AND § 10-912 TO CUSTODIAL DETENTION IN FOREIGN JURISDICTION; EXCEPTION WHERE THERE IS COLLUSION BETWEEN AUTHORITIES FROM DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS TO CIRCUMVENT MARYLAND LAW REQUIRING PROMPT PRESENTMENT; IN THE PRESENT CASE, WHERE APPELLANT WAS DETAINED FOR QUESTIONING IN WEST VIRGINIA FROM 1:45 A.M. TO 4:00 A.M., WHEN SHE WAS TRANSPORTED TO A HOSPITAL BECAUSE OF CHEST PAINS, AND WEST VIRGINIA LAW PROVIDES THAT SUSPECTS CHARGED WITH “STATE CRIMES” (MAJOR OFFENSES) ARE NOT TAKEN BEFORE A JUDICIAL OFFICER UNTIL THE MORNING FOLLOWING A NIGHTTIME ARREST, THE TRIAL JUDGE’S FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A DELIBERATE DELAY IN PRESENTMENT WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

Judgment of the Circuit Court For Montgomery County
Affirmed. Costs To Be Paid By Appellant.

DAVIS, SALMON, THIEME, RAYMOND G., Jr. (retired, specially
assigned), JJ.

Opinion by DAVIS, J.

Appellant, Sonya Marie Daniels, was charged in the Circuit
Court for Frederick County with two counts of first-degree
murder, attempted kidnapping and carrying a handgun.
Appellant, facing the death penalty, requested a change of
venue and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County. On October 21, 2003, jury selection
began and, after trial, the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, on November 19, 2003, declared a mistrial after the
jurors were unable to reach a verdict.

On October 18, 2004, appellant’s second trial began. The
State, however, decided not to seek the death penalty and,
on November 8, 2004, appellant elected to proceed by way of
a not guilty agreed statement of facts on two counts of
first-degree murder. Based on the statement of facts, the
trial court entered a finding of guilty as to both counts.
On February 3, 2005, appellant was sentenced to a term of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for
each count of first-degree murder, the sentences to run
concurrent. Appellant filed this timely appeal, presenting
the following questions for our review:

I. Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion
to suppress evidence seized during a search of appellant’s
van?

II. Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion
to suppress statements made by appellant to deputies from
the Frederick County Sheriff’s Department prior to her
presentment before the magistrate?

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the
circuit court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 19, 2002, a dark green mini-van drove onto
Discovery Boulevard and pulled in front of the house of
Deanne Prichard. Nine-year-old Lee Prichard, Jr. was out
front when the van pulled up. Lee, his mother, Patricia
Collins, his sister, sixteen-year-old Deanne Prichard, and
his five week old niece, Makayla, had just returned home
from visiting Tracy Frost, his sister’s boyfriend, at the
Washington County Detention Center. The driver of the van,
an African American female with marks on her face, rolled
down her window and told Lee that she was “Tracy Frost
sister from New York” and that she wanted to see the baby.
Lee then went inside to get his sister.

As Collins walked outside with her daughter, granddaughter
and son, the assailant, in a black ski mask and hood,
jumped out of the van holding a black handgun. The
assailant demanded that Prichard get into the van, but she
refused as she was holding her baby. The assailant pointed
the gun at Prichard and fired. After she and the baby fell
to the pavement, the assailant pointed the gun at the baby
and fired a second shot. The assailant jumped back in the
van and drove off.

The Frederick County Sheriff’s Office responded and arrived
on the scene immediately after the shooting, finding
Prichard and baby Makayla lying on the street. Both were
pronounced dead at the scene. The police spoke with several
individuals at the scene and all gave varying descriptions
of the assailant and the van. In an effort to find possible
suspects, the police went to the Washington County Detention
Center to speak with, Makayla’s father, Tracy Frost. During
their conversation with Frost, police learned that there
had been an altercation at the prison two weeks earlier
between appellant, who was Frost’s ex-girlfriend and
Prichard. Frost informed the police that, on October 5,
2002, appellant was visiting him during the same time that
Prichard, Makayla and Collins were visiting. Following a
confrontation between Prichard and appellant, appellant was
asked to leave.

Based on information gathered from the scene and at the
detention center, the Frederick County police turned their
attention to appellant as a suspect. Detectives Dewees and
Jenkins drove to the Martinsburg, West Virginia Police
Department and requested assistance. Detective Dewees
informed Martinsburg police that appellant was a suspect in
a double homicide investigation and that they were trying
to locate a green mini-van that was registered to
appellant’s father. Detective Dewees then provided the
officers with appellant’s address and license plate number
of the van and instructed the Martinsburg police to conduct
a stop of the vehicle.

On October 19, 2002, at approximately 9:25 p.m.,
Martinsburg police officers stopped appellant while driving
the green mini-van four blocks from her home. After
stopping the vehicle, the officers ordered appellant out of
the mini-van. She was told that she was free to leave, but
that the van was being detained. When appellant was further
told that officers from the Frederick County Sheriff’s
Department were en route to Martinsburg, she agreed to stay
until they arrived.

While waiting for the officers from Frederick County,
Martinsburg police set up a perimeter around the van and
blocked off the area with police tape. Using flashlights to
facilitate an inspection of the vehicle, the officers
noticed several dark stains on one of the rear hubcaps. In
an effort to preserve possible evidence on the vehicle from
rain which had begun to fall, a tent was placed over the
van. When the Frederic County police officers arrived two
hours later, they were met by a Martinsburg’s police
officer who had remained at the scene with the van.

Appellant spoke with police officers briefly, then left the
scene with her sister. Her father, the owner of the van,
remained with the vehicle. A warrant to search the van was
obtained by Martinsburg police at 1:00 a.m., approximately
two hours later. While the search of the van was being
conducted, Martinsburg police, accompanied by a Frederick
County officer, went to appellant’s home and executed the
fugitive warrant they had obtained for her arrest. She was
then taken to the Martinsburg Police Department where she
was processed and placed in a room where she was
interviewed by Detectives Dewees and Jenkins, beginning at
1:48 a.m.

At approximately 4:00 a.m., appellant complained of chest
pains and was taken to the hospital, where she was treated
and released the next morning. At approximately 10:05 a.m.
the next day, appellant was taken before a magistrate. At
approximately 3:15 p.m., she was again interviewed by
Deputies Dewees and Jenkins. Appellant was then returned to
Maryland, where she faced charges of two counts of
first-degree murder and related offenses in Frederick
County.

After the State filed its notice to seek the death penalty,
appellant filed for a change of venue, prior to trial. On
September 29, 2003, a hearing on pre-trial motions was
conducted in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
Appellant’s initial trial commenced on October 29, 2003. On
November 19, 2003, a mistrial was declared after the jury
informed the court that it was unable to reach a verdict.
Prior to the second trial, the State withdrew its notice to
seek the death penalty, seeking instead a maximum penalty
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On
June 30, 2004 and September 2, 2004, additional hearings on
pre-trial motions were held.

After jury selection, appellant’s retrial commenced on
October 25, 2004. On November 3, 2004, six days into the
trial, the State disclosed that it intended to call Joe
Daniels, Jr., appellant’s brother, as a witness on behalf
of the State. He had been an alibi witness for the defense
in the first trial and it was anticipated that he would
again provide an alibi in the second trial. According to
the State’s proffer, Daniels was prepared to implicate
appellant in the murders. Appellant’s defense counsel moved
for a mistrial, specifically conditioned on preclusion of
the State from seeking the death penalty at a subsequent
trial. In the alternative, defense counsel moved to continue
the trial for two weeks. The trial court took the matter
under advisement and continued the case for several days.
On November 8, 2004, trial resumed; defense counsel renewed
her motion for a mistrial with the same condition regarding
seeking exposure to the death penalty at a subsequent
trial. The trial court denied the motion. Defense counsel,
faced with what she considered a Hobson’s choice, proffered
that the defense and the State were negotiating aborting
the trial and entering an agreed statement of facts with
respect to the two counts of murder, coupled with the
State’s agreement to nolle pros each of the remaining
counts in the indictment.

Appellant, responding to the examination by the court as to
whether she concurred with the proposed agreement between
her counsel and the State, indicated that she wanted to
abort the trial and proceed by way of a not guilty agreed
statement of facts. Appellant then entered a plea of not
guilty to the counts charging the first-degree murders of
Deanne Prichard and Makayla Frost and the State presented
the following agreed statements of facts to the trial
court.

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on October 19th of 2002,
members of the Frederick County Sheriff’s Office,
responded to Discovery Boulevard in Walkersville,
Frederick County, Maryland. The bodies of 16-year-old
Deanne Prichard and 5-week-old Makayla Frost were lying on
Discovery Boulevard. Both were pronounced dead from
single gunshot wounds.

Witnesses at the scene, including Maria Beyer, Leda
Harris, Robert Crouse and Scott Shaffer would testify that
they observed a dark green mini van, pulling away from the
scene of the shooting. Robert Crouse would further
testify that he saw an African American female with
freckles on her face, driving the van. Leda Harris would
further testify that the green mini van had Maryland tags.

Patricia Collins, the mother of Deanne and the
grandmother of Makayla would testify that they had
returned from Washington County Detention Center from
visiting Tracy Frost, the father of Makayla Frost.

Lee Prichard, Jr., age 9, was outside his house on
Discovery Boulevard when a dark green mini van pulled up
He would testify that an African American female with
marks on her face, like chicken pox scars, stated, “I am
Tracy Frost’s sister from New York. I want to see the
baby.”

He goes in his house, walks out to the green mini van
with Pat Collins, Deanne and Makayla. They then walk
around to the driver’s side of the van, at which time, the
driver exits the van, with a black handgun with brown
grips and a long barrel in hand. The person was wearing a
ski mask and black leather gloves. The person told Deanne
to get in the van. Deanne, while holding the baby
refused, at which time, the driver of the green mini van
pointed the gun at Deanne and fired. The baby and Deanne
fell to the street. The driver of the green mini van then
pointed the gun at the baby, Makayla, and a second shot
was fired at the baby by the driver.

Pat Collins would also testify that she walked out with
Lee, Deanne and Makayla and approached the dark green mini
van at the driver’s side. The green mini van had Maryland
tags and tinted windows. At the time she approached the
driver’s side door, a person exited who she would
describe as an African American with a hoodie and a black
ski mask. She would further describe the person as having
the body shape and voice of a female, with a height about
the same as Deanne, who was five foot four inches tall. No
taller. The person had a black handgun, with brown grips,
and was standing on the driver’s side at [the] rear of
the van. At this time, the person tells Deanne to get in
the van, who refuses. The gun was then pointed by the
driver of the green mini van, at the neck of Deanne and
fired. Deanne falls to the ground while the baby was lying
in the street. A second shot was fired by the driver of
the green mini van at the face of the baby. Pat Collins
only saw one person in the van.

The general physical descriptors given by the witnesses
are consistent with the appearance of the defendant,
[appellant]. Dr. Mary Ripple, who is the Deputy Chief
Medical Examiner, would opine that Deanne’s death was
caused by a single gunshot wound to the neck, which round
went through her cervical spine and exited the other
side of her neck. She would state that death was very
quick and that the gun was fired within six inches of her
neck. Her opinion as to Makayla was that she was prone on
the street when shot through the mouth, and the back of
the head, causing death. The shot was fired within two
feet of Makayla.

Tracy Frost would state, would testify that he and the
[appellant] were in a romantic relationship for a period
of about two years and that relationship ended in the Fall
of 2001. Further, he would testify that he and Deanne
Prichard began a romantic relationship in the Fall of
2001. As a result of that relationship, Deanne became
pregnant and gave birth to Makayla Frost on September
13th, 2002 [sic]. He would further testify that he was
incarcerated at the Washington County Detention Center on
August 28th of 2002. The [appellant] visited him on four
occasions. On October 5th of 2002, the [appellant] visited
him at the same time that Deanne Prichard was visiting
with Makayla Frost and Pat Collins. A confrontation
occurred between Deanne and the [appellant], which
precipitated Tracy Frost’s request to have the
[appellant’s] visit terminated.

Deputy Bradley would testify that he, in fact, requested
the [appellant] terminate the visit and leave and she did
leave as a result of his request.

Pat Collins would state during the confrontation, the
[appellant] states that the baby was not Tracy Frost’s. At
which time, Deanne states that the baby is Tracy’s and
that she would get a blood test.

Karlos Smallwood was a co-worker of the [appellant] when
she was working at MAMSI. He would testify that
[appellant] called him at some time prior to the murders
and asked him where she could get a gun for protection.

Joe Daniels, Jr. is the brother of the [appellant]. He
would testify that approximately two weeks prior to the
murders, [appellant] asked him if he could get a gun for
her. He did get a gun for the [appellant]. The gun was a
black Smith & Wesson, 44 caliber magnum revolver with
brown wooden grips. He would further testify that on 10/19
of 2002, at approximately 3:50 p.m. he was at home when
the [appellant] arrived at his house. She stated to him
that, “I think I just shot two people.” At that time, she
handed him a black jacket with clothes and a 44 caliber
magnum revolver and asked him to get rid of the items.
The black jacket had on it what appeared to him to be
blood.

The following day, Joe Daniels, Jr. took the items to
Arthur Lancaster’s house in Frederick, Maryland. At Mr.
Lancaster’s house, Joe Daniels, Jr. proceeded to burn the
items of clothing in a fire pit. He also buried the
weapon.

Arthur Lancaster would corroborate that items of clothing
were burned and a 44 caliber magnum revolver was buried by
Joe Daniels, Jr. on his property.

Several months later, Joe Daniels, Jr. returned to Mr.
Lancaster’s property and unburied the weapon. He took it
to a work site in Martinsburg, West Virginia and buried it
in gravel. Subsequently, concrete was poured over the
weapon. On or about November 3rd of 2004, members of the
Frederick County Sheriff’s Office responded to the
location provided by Mr. Daniels and recovered the weapon
from under the concrete walk.

On October 19th of 2002, the [appellant] was stopped in
Martinsburg, West Virginia, while driving her father’s
green mini van, which van was borrowed by her prior to the
shooting. The van had Maryland plates. Members of the
Martinsburg Police Department made the felony stop and
secured the vehicle.

Lt. Timothy Catlett would testify that on the driver’s
side rear hub cap, there appeared to be blood drops.
Members of the Frederick County Sheriff’s Office responded
to the location and secured the hub cap as evidence.

The [appellant] was subsequently arrested and interviewed
by members of the Frederick County Sheriff’s Office on two
occasions. On both occasions, the [appellant] indicated
that she was in sole possession of the green mini van at
the time of the murders.

The hub cap was transported to the Maryland State Police
Crime Lab. Teresa Roberts, a certified serologist examined
the hub cap. She would testify the areas had an
appearance consistent with dried blood. She would opine
that her testing showed four areas tested positive for
the indication of blood.

She forwarded her results and the hub cap to the DNA
section of the Maryland State Police Crime Lab. Amy Kelly,
a certified forensic chemist, would testify that she
performed a DNA analysis of swabbing from the areas of the
hub cap where blood was indicated. From swabbing Q-1,
she would opine that the DNA profile from the known
standard of Deanne Prichard matched the DNA profile
obtained from swab Q-1 from the hub cap of the
[appellant’s] vehicle. Further, that the probabilities of
selecting an unrelated individual at random would be one
in 1.1 billion. From swabbing Q-2, she would opine that
the DNA profile from the known standard of Deanne
Prichard matched the DNA profile obtained from swab Q-2
from the hub cap of the [appellant’s] vehicle. Further,
that the probabilities of selecting an unrelated
individual at random would be one in 42 million.

At the conclusion of the State’s proffer, the trial court
found appellant guilty of two counts of first-degree
murder. Additional facts will be supplied during
discussion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence
under the Fourth Amendment, we look only to the record of
the suppression hearing and do not consider any evidence
adduced at trial. Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368 (1999).
We extend great deference to the findings of the hearing
court with respect to first-level findings of fact and the
credibility of witnesses unless it is shown that the court’s
findings are clearly erroneous. Reynolds v. State, 130 Md.
App. 304, 313 (1999), cert. denied, 358 Md. 383 (2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 874 (2000). Moreover, we view those
findings of fact, and indeed the record as a whole, in the
light most favorable to the State. Id. We review the
court’s legal conclusions de novo, however, making our own
independent constitutional evaluation as to whether the
officers’ encounter with appellant was lawful. Id.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I

A.

Appellant contends that “the van was `seized’ at the moment
the appellant was stopped and ordered out of the car by the
Martinsburg police and that the officers who conducted that
seizure did so without probable cause.” She argues that
such a seizure requires probable cause, but, “If the
seizure was somehow justified, the evidence obtained during
the execution of the search warrant should have been
suppressed because the Maryland officers who executed the
warrant had no authority to do so.” Appellant further
contends that there was unnecessary delay in appellant’s
presentment before a magistrate. She summarizes her first
assignment of error in her brief:

Initially, it must be noted that the trial court applied
[the] wrong standard when determining whether the seizure
of the appellant’s van was justified. After making
several “findings,” not all of which are supported by the
record, the trial court stated that the Martinsburg
officers “had a substantial amount of information which
would cause them to believe that they that [sic] van might
yield some information if they could get a closer look at
it.” (Emphasis supplied). There is no such test under the
Fourth Amendment. The mere fact that a law enforcement
officer may have a “substantial amount of information
which would cause him to believe that a search of property
might yield some information does not justify a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. While that standard may be
close in nature to a reasonable suspicion standard it is
certainly a far cry from probable cause, and probable
cause is what is required to justify the seizure in this
case. The officer’s [sic] in this case unquestionably
“seized” the appellant’s van for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. They made it absolutely clear to the appellant
the minute they got her out of the car that the van was
not leaving. Such a seizure requires probable cause.

The State counters that “the record clearly demonstrates
that the police had adequate probable cause to lawfully
conduct a warrantless stop and search of the vehicle at
issue, regardless of the fact that a warrant was ultimately
obtained in this case.” The State further avers, “The
officers’ subjective intent in stopping the vehicle to
detain it for the purposes of obtaining a warrant is
irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis.”
The trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to
suppress, according to the State, because the investigating
officers had probable cause that appellant and her vehicle
were involved in the double shooting earlier that day,
based on information from the officers’ investigations.
Finally, the State asserts that the fact that Frederick
County law enforcement officers acted in concert with the
Martinsburg Police Department during the execution of the
search warrant for the vehicle was lawful.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. . . .” Rosenberg v. State, 129 Md.
App. 221, 239 (1999). The Supreme Court has frequently
remarked that probable cause is a flexible, common-sense
standard. It merely requires that the facts available to
the officer would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief,” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162,
45 S. Ct. 280, 288, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), that certain
items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as
evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that
such belief be correct or more likely true than false. A
“practical, non-technical” probability that incriminating
evidence is involved is all that is required. Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93
L. Ed. 1879 (1949); Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 194-95
(1990).

The law is well established that a vehicle stop by the
police and “detaining its occupants constitutes a `seizure’
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the federal Constitution, even though the purpose of the
stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite
brief.” Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1, 9 (1995), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1203 (1996) (citations omitted). It is the
reasonableness, vel non, by which we measure a
state-initiated search and seizure to determine whether it
passes constitutional muster. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.
S. 248, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991); Maryland
v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1096, 108 L.
Ed. 2d 276 (1990); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
682, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985).

Regarding whether the standard which serves to lawfully
justify the stop of a vehicle, in the first instance,
should be objective or subjective, the Supreme Court, in
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19, 116 S. Ct.
1769, 1777, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), rejected Petitioner’s
claim that an extraordinary factor was “that the `multitude
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations’ is so large
and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone
is guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out
almost whomever they wish for a stop.” The Court concluded
that, since the officers had probable cause to believe that
petitioners had violated the traffic code, the stop was
thereby rendered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and
the evidence discovered as a consequence thereof was
admissible. Id. The decision of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, upholding the
convictions, was therefore deemed correct. Id.

Turning to the issue of the search, recognizing that
certain exigencies were inherent in the mobility of a
vehicle, the Supreme Court, in Carroll, 276 U.S. at 155-56,
held that the search of a vehicle, if there was probable
cause to believe that it contained contraband, was an
exception to the warrant requirement. Accord Nathan v.
State, 370 Md. 648, 665-66 (2002).

In reviewing the particular factors to be considered in a
determination of whether a warrantless search of a vehicle
comports with the “reasonableness” requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, we said in State v. Cabral, 159 Md. App.
354, 372-73 (2004):

A warrantless search of a vehicle is permitted if there
is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband. In general, the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement is premised upon the exigencies
associated with the mobility of a vehicle, and the
diminished expectation of privacy with regard to a
vehicle.

* * *

One of the core protections of the Fourth Amendment is
the warrant requirement. There is, however, a lesser
expectation of privacy associated with automobiles and,
because they are inherently mobile, a warrantless search
of a vehicle is permitted under certain circumstances.
“If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to
believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . .
permits police to search the vehicle without more.” This
exception was derived from Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), and has
since been referred to as the “Carroll doctrine.”

* * *

132 Md. App. at 261, 752 A.2d 620 (internal citations and
footnote omitted).

Writing for this Court in Berry v. State, 155 Md. App. 144,
176, 843 A.2d 93, cert. denied, 381 Md. 674, 851 A.2d 594
(2004), Judge Barbera explained:

The United States Supreme Court, in a series of cases
harkening back almost 80 years, has recognized an
exception to the warrant requirement that allows the
police, when they have probable cause to believe a vehicle
contains contraband or evidence of a crime, to search the
vehicle for that contraband or evidence of a crime and
seize it, without a warrant. It is clear from these cases
that “the automobile exception does not have a separate
exigency requirement: `If a car is readily mobile and
probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband,
the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the
vehicle without more.'”

(Citations omitted).

The concept of probable cause has been described as “a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Brinegar, 338 U.S.
at 175, 69 S. Ct. at 1310, quoted with approval in Carroll,
supra.

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. Id. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of
proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Id.

The Court in Brinegar further observed,

And this `means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation’ or conviction, as Marshall, C.J., said for
the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United
States, 7 Cranch 339, 348, 3 L. Ed. 364 (1813). Since
Marshall’s time, at any rate, it has come to mean more
than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where `the
facts and circumstances within their (the officers’)
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense
has been or is being committed.

Id. at 175-76, 69 S. Ct. at 1310-11.

In a more recent decision, we said in State v James, 87 Md.
App. 39, 46 (1991):

While the standard for probable cause varies with each
occurrence, the experience of a police officer is taken
into account in determining whether the officer could
reasonably believe that the automobile will contain
contraband. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 895
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968, 99 S.
Ct. 458, 58 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1978). Thus, the Court in
United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 376, rehearing
denied, 714 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1067, 104 S. Ct. 1419, 79 L. Ed. 2d 744 (1984),
stated that probable cause includes the “sum total of
layers of information and the synthesis of what police
have heard, what they know, and what they observed as
trained officers.”

(Citations omitted).

In the case at hand, the evidence in support of the State’s
argument that the investigating officers possessed probable
cause centered around the testimony of Detective David
Dewees of the Frederick County Sheriff’s office. Upon
responding to the scene of the crime, he, of course,
immediately determined, from his own observations, that
sixteen-year-old Deanne Prichard and a five-week-old infant,
Makayla Frost, had been murdered. As a result of
interviewing Patricia Collins, who was Prichard’s mother
and Makayla’s grandmother, Detective Dewees learned that,
upon the return from the Washington County Detention
Center, Collins, the two victims, and Deanne Prichard’s
nine-year-old brother, Lee, the latter had walked the dog,
later advising Deanne, when he returned from walking the
dog, that a woman claiming to be Tracy Frost’s cousin was
outside and wanted to see the baby. When Deanne and Makayla
went outside, a female wearing a black ski mask shot the
two victims.

Detective Dewees received information from Deputy Rick Cook
that Cook had additionally learned from Collins that the
assailant was seen in a green minivan and had told Lee that
she was Tracy Frost’s sister from New York. When Collins
and Deanne, who was holding the baby, approached the
driver’s side of the van, the masked assailant exited the
van and, at gunpoint, told Deanne to get in the van and
then, when she refused, to hand over the baby. After
shooting Deanne in the left side of her neck, the woman
then shot baby Makayla.

Deputy Gary Marriotti advised Detective Dewees that he had
learned from the Washington County Detention Center that
the name of appellant had appeared on the visitor log at
the Center as a visitor to Tracy Frost, that there had been
an altercation between appellant and Deanne Prichard at the
detention center a week earlier and that Daniels had been
escorted from the facility. Accompanied by Sergeant Troy
Barrick, en route to the detention center to interview
Tracy Frost, Detective Dewees had the police dispatcher run
the name of appellant through the Motor Vehicle
Administration computer to ascertain her address and
whether a van was registered to her. Registered in the name
of appellant’s father, Joe Daniels, was a Chevrolet van.

Upon being notified by Detective Dewees of the murders of
Deanne and Makayla, Frost informed the officer that Deanne
and appellant had visited him on October 5th and that he
had told appellant that Deanne and the baby were in his
life now, and that he did not want appellant to visit him
anymore. According to Frost, appellant told him, “You’ll
never see that baby again.” Frost provided Detective Dewees
with a description of appellant, i.e., a dark skinned
African-American female with acne scars or pock marks on
her face. In response to an inquiry regarding whether
appellant had access to weapons and a van, Frost told
Detective Dewees that her father, an employee of the
Department of Corrections, had weapons and that he also
owned a green minivan.

After concluding their interview with Frost, Detective
Dewees and Deputy Barrick, having previously obtained an
address for appellant at 110 Georgetown Square in
Martinsburg, West Virginia, drove to Martinsburg, where
they met with officers of the Martinsburg Police Department
at 5:45 p.m. on the same day of the murders. After sharing
all of the information that he had gathered about the
shootings with Detective Sergeant George Swortwood of the
Martinsburg Police Department, Detective Dewees proceeded
to type the narrative for an arrest warrant for appellant,
using one of the computers at the Martinsburg police
station. Informed that appellant might have a look-alike
cousin from New York visiting her, Detective Dewees and
Detective Eric Byer returned to the Washington County
Detention Center to ask Frost about a cousin who had a
similar appearance to appellant; Frost was not aware of any
such cousin. En route to Martinsburg, Detective Dewees and
Detective Byer were notified by Deputy Barrick that the
green minivan was parked in front of appellant’s house, but
it was in the process of leaving. Realizing “that the
vehicle was a part of the — was a part of the crime,
was a part of the crime scene, and we wanted to secure the
vehicle for the purposes of a search and seizure warrant,”
Detective Dewees instructed Detective Swortwood to stop the
vehicle. Due to possible “evidence from the crime scene,
such as what the suspect was wearing, possibly a gun, any
blood evidence,” Detective Dewees believed that the van was
relevant to the crime scene. Additionally, the van had
evidentiary importance because it could be identified by
eyewitnesses to the murders.

At approximately 9:25 p.m. on October 19, 2002, on
instructions from Detective Dewees, the green minivan was
stopped. When he arrived at the scene at approximately 9:35
p.m., Detective Dewees was directed by the Martinsburg
police to look at what appeared to be spots of blood on the
hubcap of the vehicle. Although Corporal Dewees advised
appellant that she was free to leave at least three times,
she was told that the vehicle was being detained until a
search warrant for the vehicle could be obtained. After
Dewees and Corporal Kevin Miller returned to the
Martinsburg police station and completed a search and
seizure warrant for the green mini-van and another warrant
for appellant’s residence, accompanied by Detective
Swortwood, they presented the warrants to the magistrate in
Martinsburg, who issued the search and seizure warrants for
the vehicle and the residence.

The testimony of Detective Jenkins of the Frederick County
Sheriff’s office essentially confirmed the testimony of
Detective Dewees. Lee Prichard recounted the same version
of events to Jenkins as had been communicated to Detective
Dewees, i.e., that a black female with chicken pox marks on
her face identified herself as the sister of Tracy Frost
from New York and asked him to summon Deanne and the baby
because she wanted to see the baby. Lee recounted to
Detective Jenkins, as Collins had to Detective Dewees, that
as the four approached the van, the masked female shot the
two victims. In collaboration with Detective Dewees,
Detective Jenkins determined that a 1997 dark green
Chevrolet minivan was owned by appellant’s father, Joe
Nathan Daniels.

Joe Daniels, at a meeting with Detective Jenkins at the
Maryland Correctional Institution in Hagerstown, confirmed
his ownership of the minivan and that appellant had
obtained the vehicle from his home in Martinsburg at
approximately 2:15 that afternoon. He further confirmed
that he had not seen the vehicle since then and that he
owned a 9 millimeter semiautomatic handgun, which he kept
at his house. Detective Jenkins, accompanied by Joe
Daniels, went to the home of Daniels’ other daughter,
Natasha, who told Detective Jenkins that appellant had come
to her home at 4:00 p.m. that day. Detective Jenkins, while
following Joe Daniels and Natasha in a separate car en
route to Martinsburg, learned, via a radio transmission,
that the minivan had been stopped.

The testimony of Detective Derek Creetinstine of the
Frederick County Sheriff’s office provided further
confirmation of the version of events recounted by
Detectives Dewees and Jenkins. He was told by Deborah Frey
that she had heard shots and saw a green minivan flee from
the scene. William Smouse described the getaway vehicle as
a green minivan, whereas Tammy Bothe described it as a
Caravan; Smouse, however, thought the short individual
wearing headgear was a male. Larry Glass saw what “was
possibly” a Dodge Caravan being driven by an
African-American; Maria Precioso, who called 911, saw a
dark green van leave the scene; Leda Harris saw a green
minivan with a license plate number which began with the
letter “M;” and Ron Krause recalled seeing a dark hunter
green van that he believed to be a Dodge Caravan driven by
an African-American female with marks or freckles on her
medium complexion face and wearing a gray hooded
sweatshirt. Krause gave chase, but broke off his pursuit of
the fleeing vehicle when the driver turned and pointed a gun
in his direction. Cassie Krause saw an individual wearing a
hood shoot Deanne and bend down and shoot the baby, then
flee in a dark green van. The information gathered as a
result of the above interviews by Detective Creetinstine
was conveyed to Detectives Dewees and Jenkins.

On the afternoon of October 19, 2002, advised by Detective
Dewees of the murders and that the suspect was appellant
who would probably be returning to 110 Georgetown Square
Apartments in Martinsburg driving a green Chevy van,
Detective Swortwood testified that he located the van at
approximately 9:00 p.m., after being unsuccessful in
locating it when he initially drove past the residence. As
the vehicle began to drive away from the residence, the
officers stopped the van at approximately 9:25 p.m. and
patted down appellant, advising her that she could leave,
but that the van would be detained. According to Detective
Swortwood, he and Detective Kevin Miller proceeded to the
Martinsburg police station to prepare search warrants for
the van and appellant’s residence. Detective Miller
testified that he assisted in the preparation of the search
and seizure warrants and their presentation to the
magistrate for his signature at sometime after midnight on
October 20, 2002.

The motions court made the following findings of fact
regarding the issue of probable cause to support the stop
and seizure of appellant’s father’s van:

The first issue I guess is, is the very stop of the van
which occurred in Martinsburg on the 19th of October at
9:25 p.m.

Initial Investigation

The evidence is that at approximately 1500 or 3 p.m. on
the 19th of October of 2002 there was a shooting of two
individuals, Deanne Pritchard and Makayla Frost, and that
officers began to arrive on the scene shortly thereafter.
Detective Jenkins testified that he arrived on the scene
at 3:12. Detective Dewees received a call at 3:15.
Sergeant Creitenstein (phonetic) was on the scene at 3:40
and so forth. Within those first few minutes and I’ll say
up to 60 because I don’t know that I have the precise
times, a fair amount of information was collected by the
many officers on the scene and, and from I guess to some
extent personal observations, but from many people who
were in the vicinity, not all of whom were witnesses. But
what the deputies did know was that there were two people
who were dead, that it appeared that they were dead by
gunshot wounds. That was pretty obvious. They learned that
the person who, that someone had been on the scene in a
green van, that the someone was an African American. They
had some . . . information it was a male, but they also
had information that it was a person with head gear.
They had some information, however, that . . . it was a
woman and that information came from Lee Pritchard [sic]
and Patricia Collins as testified by Detective Jenkins,
and someone who was about the same height as Deanne, about
five feet, five inches.

Description of Vehicle Involved

There was some fair amount of information about the van.
It wasn’t all consistent. As I recall, the only
information as to its make or model, first of all it was,
it was generally described as green. It think that was
pretty consistent. But as far as a make and model, many
people thought it was a Dodge Caravan. And in fact Lee
said, the young man said that it was, either was or looked
like a van he often saw in the nearby shopping center, and
there was at least one description apparently, although it
was not known to Detective Dewees he testified, that the
van had gold wheels. It was known that the van . . . had
Maryland tags starting with M.

Identification of Assailant

There was information that the person who did the
shooting said I’m Tracy’s sister. Whether it was Tracy
Frost’s sister . . . or — but some connection to
Tracy. It was told to Corporal Dewees by Ms. Collins that
the family had returned from Washington County Detention
Center. Ms. Collins told Detective Jenkins that there had
been problems with Mr. Frost’s former girlfriend . . .
and . . . I don’t recall whether the name was, the full
name of [appellant] was given, but I do know that . . .
Detective Dewees left fairly soon. He arrived on the scene
at 3:34 by his testimony and after he spent some time
there he went on to the Washington County Detention
Center to notify Tracy Frost of the deaths of his child
and the mother of the child, and on the way he must have
had notice, some knowledge of the name of [appellant]
because he called or he was in communication with Motor
Vehicle Administration or the dispatcher who was in
communication with, who learned that [appellant] drove a
BMW which she jointly owned with her father Joseph
Daniels, and upon running further the name of Joseph
Daniels there was information that came back that he in
fact owned a Chevrolet van and . . . he testified that he
learned in that whole process where he got the information
specifically that [appellant] lived in Georgetown Square,
at Georgetown Square in Martinsburg. So that, he has
that information.

Motive for the Murders

He drives to the Washington County Detention Center where
he speaks to Tracy Frost. Tracy Frost tells him that two
weeks earlier on the fifth of October he had told
[appellant] not to come visit him again when she had been
there at the Detention Center and she said you’ll never
see that baby again and he gave a description of
[appellant] as being dark skinned with acne pockmarks and
told, and said that she was capable of violence. . . . But
he also said that [appellant’s] father was a correctional
officer and owned a green minivan.

Information Possessed by West Virginia Authorities

Now this is the information known to Detective Dewees who
then drives on to West Virginia where he meets with
Sergeant Swortwood and Corporal Miller, two detectives
over there. And he speaks to them and gives them
information. . . . Detective Swortwood only knows at that
point a name, a description of the van, an address and a
tag number, and, and it appears to me that and my
recollection is that that may have been what he testified
to. But he also . . . had talked to Detective Dewees at
that time about what had gone on and Detective Miller in
his testimony was well aware of these matters. . . .

Preparation of Affidavit

[Detective Miller] writes in his affidavit . . . that in
fact Detective Dewees arrived at 1745 hours, 5:45, and
described, well, he advised of a double homicide and some
other matters. Now certainly Detective Sergeant Swortwood
knew there had been a double homicide. He testified to
that. . . . New paragraph. We know a name. [Appellant].
New paragraph. Green van. New paragraph. Maryland license
M-something, whatever it was. Paragraph. 110 Georgetown
Square. There clearly was some discussion of further
details, and at that point the only, as far as I, as far
as we know, the only effort that was made right then by
the Martinsburg Police was to drive to 110 Georgetown
Square and they did not observe the van at that point. In
the meantime Detective Dewees left Martinsburg and came
back to Maryland where he went to Washington County to
verify a piece of information with Tracy Frost and . . .
he now learns on his way back, he’s at the Maryland West
Virginia border stopped. He gets word that the van has
been stopped and he testified that, well, we know the van
was stopped at 7, at 9:25. . . . Corporal Dewees arrived
about ten minutes from that stop. He had been notified by
I believe then Corporal, now Sergeant Barrick who was in
Martinsburg and he had been from 5:45, stayed there on.

Court’s Recap of Evidence of Probable Cause

Now I’m gonna back up to earlier starting with the time
Corporal Dewees first went to Martinsburg. He testified
that he had spoken to the [S]tate’s [A]ttorney and I, my
recollection is that was about 7:00 and that the
[S]tate’s [A]ttorney had . . . told him there was
probable cause. Let me try to put together consistent
with what the law tells me I should do to analyze
whether there’s probable cause. . . . An African American
person, a man or woman has been seen whose made a, whose
verbalized a connection with Tracy, . . . Patricia Collins
has seen it, shot these two individuals, has left the
scene, has arrived and left the scene in a green van, has
a connection with the father of the one victim and the
boyfriend of the other, has made threatening statements
about the child whose been shot, whose known to have ac
— or who’s likely to have access because her father
owns a van which somewhat fits the description albeit not
a caravan because it’s a Chevrolet, and who was known to
be in possession of that van that day because the father
said so, Joe Daniels. . . . Who lives in Martinsburg. And
so therefore had the motive, had the possibility certainly
of being there, driving in a vehicle that would be
available, these events occurred very recently. Again, I
don’t know that the police at this point had evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the
evidence to prove anything. But they had a substantial
amount of information which would cause them to believe
that that van might yield some information if they could
get a closer look at it. Search it in the legal term. And
I believe that they had that information, let me put it
this way, that Corporal Dewees had that information from
all that he collected by the time he arrived in
Martinsburg at 5:45.

The Stop

But by that point I believe as I said certainly Corporal
Dewees had the information and communicated it to the
Martinsburg Police, who did keep a look-out on 110
Georgetown Square and had determined by 9:00 that they
would stop the van if it moved and it did. Sergeant
Swortwood and Corporal Miller observed the van leaving
the parking area of 110 Georgetown Square just about
9:25 and it drove two or three blocks. They had to turn
around apparently. They followed it and followed it about
two or three blocks where they stopped it with lights
flashing believing that there was, had been a felony
committed. They conducted what they call a felony stop.
That is they approached from both sides of the van with
weapons drawn. It doesn’t apparently appear to be any
problems with [appellant] getting out of the van. She did.
They apparently holstered their weapons. Detective Miller
conducted some Terry type frisk, determined that she had
no weapons and she was outside of the van and yes, right
away they announced to her that the van was going to stay
where it was and they may have said that before they told
her she was free to go, but they also promptly told her
that she didn’t have to stay. There were law enforcement
officers coming from Frederick County, Maryland.

The Seizure of the Van

So they were very clear, unequivocal. The van was gonna
stay where it was until they got a warrant and [appellant]
was told that she could leave. . . . The van remained
where it was until the search warrant was brought and that
came I believe after 1:00.

Now as far as the observation of the blood spatter, I
think my, what I’ve ruled so far pretty well covers that,.
. . . But between that and the fact that the, this blood
splatter was visible, albeit required a flashlight to see
it, it was visible. It was outside the van. It was on
the exterior and it was seen. I don’t think detracts from
the legitimacy of the search of the van that was, was
conducted later.

As noted, the gravamen of appellant’s assignment of error
regarding the court’s finding that the Martinsburg police
had probable cause to stop appellant’s minivan is twofold:
(1) that the court, in its factual findings, stated that
the officers “had a substantial amount of information
which would cause them to believe that [the] van might
yield some information if they could get a closer look at
it,” a standard which appellant describes as “close in
nature to a reasonable suspicion standard [which] is
certainly a far cry from reasonable cause”; and (2) that
there was no testimony that, at the time of the stop, the
Martinsburg police knew that the appellant was in
possession of her father’s green mini-van that afternoon.

Notwithstanding the motion judge’s reference to “a
substantial amount of information,” after recounting the
testimony adduced in support of a finding of probable
cause, he said:

Let me try to put together consistent with what the law
tells me I should do to analyze whether there’s probable
cause . . . keep in mind the issue here isn’t whether it’s
been proven by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond
a reasonable doubt. It’s a matter of putting together
information to create these reasonable conclusions which
one might draw on, on the information that’s reliably
avail — or is available and somewhat reliable. I’ll
say reliable, modify.

While the court’s delineation of the standard of probable
cause could have been more artfully expressed, it certainly
comports with the conception that “[p]robable cause exists
where `the facts and circumstances within their (the
officers’) knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an
offense has been or is being committed.” Brinegar, 338 U.S.
at 175-76.

Finally, regardless of the court’s characterization of the
quantum of information, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly
articulated our role in evaluating a ruling on a motion to
suppress:

When the question is whether a constitutional right, such
as the one here, has been violated, we make our own
independent constitutional appraisal. We make the
appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the
peculiar facts of the particular case. State v. Gee, 298
Md. 565, 571, 471 A.2d 712, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1244,
104 S. Ct. 3519, 82 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1984). When the facts
are in dispute, we accept them as found by the trial judge
unless he is clearly erroneous in his judgment on the
evidence before him. In ascertaining whether he is clearly
erroneous, we give “due regard to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,”
as commanded by Md. Rule 8-131(c). When the question of
the dishonor of a constitutional right arises by the
denial of a motion to suppress, the relevant facts which
we consider “are limited to those produced at the
suppression hearing,” see Trusty v. State, 308 Md. 658,
521 A.2d 749 (1987), which are most favorable to the
State.

Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183 (1990), overruled in part
on other grounds, Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76 (2001)
(emphasis added).

Notwithstanding that we are bound by the court’s factual
findings that are supported by the evidence, we make our
own independent determination of whether the facts produced
at the suppression hearing support the court’s denial of
the motion to suppress. We believe that the court made
clear that the standard upon which it relied was the
well-established standard of probable cause. But, even
assuming, arguendo, that the court articulated an erroneous
standard, the testimony elicited clearly supports the
finding that the officers had probable cause to seize the
vehicle.

In claiming that the officers who stopped the minivan
suspected of being the getaway vehicle lacked probable
cause, appellant adroitly focuses on whether it was known
by the Martinsburg police, at the time of the stop, that
appellant was in possession of her father’s green minivan
when the crime occurred. Detective Swortwood testified that,
on the afternoon of October 19, 2002, he was advised by
Detective Dewees of the murders, that the suspect was
appellant, who would probably be returning to 110
Georgetown Square Apartments in Martinsburg driving a green
Chevy van, and he was provided with the number of the
license plate. Detective Swortwood stopped the van at
approximately 9:00 p.m.

Detective Dewees had earlier informed Detective Swortwood
that “. . . the vehicle was a part of the crime scene and
[the Frederick County officers] wanted to secure the
vehicle for the purposes of a search and seizure warrant.”
The court, in summarizing the information it believed
established probable cause, cited (1) several eyewitness
identifications of the general description of the assailant
and the getaway vehicle as a green minivan; (2) the
identification of appellant by Frost as an unrequited
ex-girlfriend who threatened that he would never see the
baby (the victim, Makayla) again; and, most importantly,
(3) that appellant’s father owned a green minivan which
matched the description of the vehicle used in the crime.
Specifically referring to the above summary of the facts in
support of probable cause, the court concluded:

And I believe that they had that information, let me put
it this way, that Corporal Dewees had that information
from all that he collected by the time he arrived in
Martinsburg at 5:45.

Now the Martinsburg Police, and I believe that they were
aware of, of all this information. If not every detail I
believe they had clearly this, most of this information.
They didn’t talk to the witnesses or neither did Corporal
Dewees talk to all of the witnesses that are involved. But
by that point I believe as I said certainly Corporal
Dewees had the information and communicated it to the
Martinsburg Police, who did keep a look-out on 110
Georgetown Square and had determined by 9:00 that they
would stop the van if it moved and it did.

Regardless of whether anyone had specifically told the
Martinsburg police that the minivan had been in appellant’s
possession at the time of the murders, they had been
informed by Joe Daniels that appellant had picked up the
vehicle and were specifically informed that the vehicle
they had been instructed to stop was used in the murders and
was considered part of the crime scene, possibly containing
relevant evidence of the crime. With respect to the
aggregation of information shared between investigating
officers and law enforcement agencies, the Court held in
Jones v. State, 242 Md. 95, 100 (1966):

The rule as to when an officer may legally arrest a
person, without a warrant, has often been stated by this
Court. The decisions are reviewed in Taylor v. State, 238
Md. 424, 430, 209 A.2d 595 (1965). In Farrow v. State, 233
Md. 526, 532, 197 A.2d 434, 437 (1964), we said: `If the
police team working on the particular case had
accumulated sufficient information to furnish probable
cause for a reasonable man to believe that the alleged
crime had been committed and that there was probable cause
to believe that the defendant was involved therein, there
was sufficient cause for his arrest.’ It is the
sufficiency of the information which the police
organization, working as a team of which the arresting
officer is a part, has placed on the lookout, which is
determinative. Johnson et al. v. State, 238 Md. 528, 539,
209 A.2d 765 (1965) [sic] and cases therein cited.

(Emphasis added).

Armed with the information that the green minivan was
believed to be part of the crime scene along with its tag
number, the Martinsburg police had more than ample
information to support a finding of probable cause to stop
and secure the vehicle.

SEARCH WARRANT

Appellant next argues that the Maryland officers who
executed the search warrant had no authority to do so under
West Virginia law. The search warrant, she contends, was
directed to West Virginia officers, resulting in the
Maryland officers acting as private citizens. After the
search warrant, prepared by Detectives Swortwood and Miller,
had been signed by a magistrate, it was delivered to
Officer Brian Rausch of the Martinsburg police, who had
been stationed at the seized minivan, who then delivered a
copy of the warrant to Joe Daniels, the owner of the
vehicle. Present during the recovery of evidence from the
vehicle, Officer Rausch testified that he documented what
was taken from the vehicle and bagged by Frederick County
officers; Officer Rausch then prepared a return for the
warrant. In demonstrating that the search and seizure were
done under the control of the Maryland authorities,
appellant reproduces in her brief Officer Rausch’s testimony
that the Maryland crime scene investigator essentially
gathered all of the evidence from the vehicle.

Appellant relies upon Section 62-1A-3 of the West Virginia
Code, which governs the issuance of search warrants. That
section provides:

A warrant shall issue only upon complaint on oath or
affirmation supported by affidavit sworn to or affirmed
before the judge or magistrate setting forth the facts
establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the
judge or magistrate is satisfied that there is probable
cause to believe that grounds therefore exist, he shall
issue a warrant identifying the property and particularly
describing the place, or naming or particularly describing
the person, to be searched. The warrant shall be directed
to the sheriff or any deputy sheriff or constable of the
county, to any member of the department of public safety
or to any police officer of the municipality wherein the
property sought is located, or to any other officer
authorized by law to execute search warrants. It shall
state the grounds or probable cause for its issuance and
the names of the persons whose affidavits have been taken
in support thereof. It shall command the officer to search
forthwith the person or place named for the property
specified, to seize such proper and bring the same before
the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant. Such warrant
may be executed either in the day or night.

(Emphasis added).

Appellant also cites § 8-14-3 of the West Virginia
Code, Powers, Authority and Duties of Law-enforcement
Officials and Policemen. In prescribing the authority of
“other officers authorized by law and in conferring powers
to all members of the police force or department of a
municipality,” § 8-14-3 provides:

The chief and any member of the police force or
department of a municipality and any municipal sergeant
shall have all of the powers, authority, rights and
privileges within the corporate limits of the municipality
with regard to the arrest of persons, the collection of
claims, and the execution and return of any search
warrant, warrant of arrest or other process, which can
legally be exercised or discharged by a deputy sheriff of
a county. In order to arrest for the violation of
municipal ordinances and as to all matters arising within
the corporate limits and coming within the scope of his
official duties, the powers of any chief, policeman or
sergeant shall extend anywhere within the county or
counties in which the municipality is located, and any
such chief, policeman or sergeant shall have the same
authority of pursuit and arrest beyond his normal
jurisdiction as has a sheriff. . . .

(Emphasis added).

Appellant contends that “neither of these statutes gives a
member of a police force outside the jurisdiction of West
Virginia the power to execute a West Virginia search
warrant. Yet, that is precisely what occurred in this
case.”

The court, in denying the motion to suppress based on the
claim that the Maryland officers were without authority,
ruled as follows:

. . . Sergeant Swortwood testified that he left the scene
at 11:25 that evening. That is, left the scene of the
traffic stop. The officers went back. They typed up what
they needed to make their applications for the warrant and
the search warrant and the fugitive arrest warrant, and
saw the magistrate just after 1:00, and I note the
fugitive, the application for the fugitive warrant is
based upon the information on the NCIC at 1 and 35 seconds
on the 20th of October, and that delay has been testified
was due to those issues I mentioned with preparing the,
the application back here in Frederick. So they see the
magistrate shortly after 1:00. The magistrate agrees and
I’ve, as I’ve said I believe appropriately on probable
cause to issue the search warrant. The Patrolman
Rausch had been called to the scene of the traffic stop
and the warrant was delivered to him. And it was brought
to him by Sergeant Swortwood and Corporal Miller.
Patrolman Rausch had established the perimeter to secure
the, the van and he then was present while officer, ah,
Deputy First Class Myers and Deputy First Class Catliff
(phonetic) then searched the van. I might quickly say
that although some other officers had testified they had
looked into the van from the outside, it’s not been raised
and I don’t think it could legitimately be raised as any
issue. As I said there was probable cause, but those were
nothing more than glances from the outside looking in.

At any rate the Frederick County deputies, two of them,
conducted the search of the van, and as they described it,
they would describe to Patrolman-Rausch what they were
doing. He would then take notes on what they, they took
from the van and I recognize that there was an issue with
the number of gunshot residue tests made of the steering
wheel because as I understand it, Deputy Myers conducted a
test of each, each of the four quadrants of the steering
wheel. I think there was some confusion in his testimony.
What I took it to be was he may not have said I’m doing
the upper left, upper right, lower left, lower right,
but he said I’m gonna take gun-residue tests of
the steering wheel.

At any rate, there’s nothing to tell me and I don’t
believe that the fact that every physical act that was
involved in the search itself was not done by a West
Virginia officer invalidates that search. It seems to me
that Patrolman Rausch was there. He, and I don’t know that
it’s too great a stretch to say that he acted through
maybe that is a stretch. But I’ll say it appears
to me that he acted as agents, or, or he acted through
agents from Frederick County.

Now I accept Mr. Morrissette’s, for purposes of my
conclusion, characterization that they were private
citizens at the time and place, but I don’t believe that
invalidates the search. It’s to be conducted by a West
Virginia law enforcement officer as described in the
warrant. And there’s apparently, ah, I, I took from the
testimony that Patrolman Rausch was, was in close
observation and in close proximity to what occurred as the
search was being undertaken. I don’t believe that the
search was improperly conducted. Certainly, again the,
anything in the exterior of the van was, was observable
from the outset and I don’t find fault with any of those
items. In conclusion, I deny any motion, the motion to
suppress the physical evidence that was obtained from the
van for those reasons.

(Emphasis added).

In the instant case, the court concluded that the Frederick
County police officers conducted their search of the
vehicle owned by appellant’s father pursuant to the West
Virginia search warrant. The court concluded that the
search of the vehicle and the seizure of evidence therefrom
was “to be conducted by the West Virginia law-enforcement
officers as described in the warrant.” Noting that
Martinsburg Patrolman Rausch was present during the
execution of the warrant, the court decided that Officer
Rausch had “acted through agents from Frederick County.”
Basing his decision on the fact that Officer Rausch “was in
close observation and in close proximity to what occurred
as the search was being undertaken,” the trial judge ruled,
“At any rate, there’s nothing to tell me and I don’t
believe that the fact that every physical act that was
involved in the search itself was not done by a West
Virginia officer invalidates the search.”

Appellant’s argument is based on the language of West
Virginia Code § 62-1A-3, which confers authority
only on the sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, department
of public safety official or police officer of the
municipality wherein the property sought is located, or any
other officer authorized by law to execute search warrants.
Because the words, “of the municipality wherein the
property sought is located,” excludes law-enforcement
officials from a foreign jurisdiction, the only other
category which could include the Frederick County officers
is “any other officer authorized by law to execute search
warrants.” The provisions of West Virginia Code §
8-14-3, insists appellant, defines “all the officers
authorized by law” as “[t]he chief and any member of the
police force, or department of a municipality and any
municipal Sergeant” who “shall have all of the powers,
authority, rights and privileges within the corporate
limits of the municipality with regard to . . . the
execution and return of any search warrant. . . .”

Appellant contends that, “Contrary to the opinion of the
trial court, this is not a case where officer Rouse [sic]
simply failed to perform `every physical act that was
involved in the search itself,” he did not perform any
physical act that was involved in the search.” Officer
Rausch, she says, merely stood outside while the Maryland
officers executed the search warrant issued by a West
Virginia magistrate. Citing Stevenson v. State, 287 Md.
504, 509-13 (1980), she acknowledges that a private citizen
may make an arrest if he or she has reasonable grounds or
probable cause to believe that a felony was committed and
that the person whom he or she arrests committed it.
Arguing that the Maryland officers were acting as private
citizens when they conducted their search of the van, she
contends that “there simply is no right for citizens to
`seize’ or `search’ the property of others.”

The State answers that it was the Martinsburg Police
Department that executed the West Virginia warrant and that
it consented to the assistance of the Frederick County
officers, who were most familiar with the investigation in
the proper search of the vehicle.” Although the State, in
its brief, does not adopt the judge’s determination that he
accepted, “for the purposes of [his] conclusion,
[appellant’s counsel’s] characterization that they were
private citizens at that time and place,” the State sets
forth the excerpt from the record containing the court’s
conclusion.

Stevenson v. State, supra, cited by appellant, discusses
the development, from the common law to the present, of the
law of arrest by private citizens. There, the appellants
sought to suppress “all evidence concerning the arrest,
including any in-court identification” by District of
Columbia officers who effectuated their arrest in the
Marlow Heights area of Prince George’s County, Maryland.
The Court of Appeals, in its initial determination of the
status of the District of Columbia officers, observed that,
generally, a peace officer’s authority to make an arrest is
limited, in the absence of statutory authority expanding
it, to the confines of the geographical unit of which he is
an officer. Id. at 509. After recognizing that “fresh
pursuit” of a suspected felon historically provided a
limited exception to an extra territorial arrest, the court
observed that in all other situations, however, a peace
officer who makes an arrest while in another jurisdiction
does so as a private person, and may only act beyond his
bailiwick to the extent that the law of the place of arrest
authorizes such individuals to do so. Id. at 509. The Court
in Stevenson explained that, historically, before the
advent of modern police departments and technology, arrests
of individuals suspected of criminal acts was often
performed by the citizenry:

The felon who is seen to commit murder or robbery must be
arrested on the spot or suffered to escape. So, although
not seen, yet if known to have committed a felony, and
pursued without warrant, he may be arrested by any person.
And even when there is only probable cause of suspicion,
a private person may without warrant, at his peril, make
an arrest. (Wakley v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 318-19 (Pa.
1814).

Stevenson, 287 Md. at 519 (emphasis added).

Since the District of Columbia officers were not in “fresh
pursuit” of the suspects at the time they arrested them in
Prince George’s County, but were in the county on other
business, the Court of Appeals explained that they no
longer had authority to arrest as police officers. Their
acts, therefore, had to be examined as those of private
citizens. Id. at 510. Citing State v. O’Kelly, 211 N.W.2d,
589, 595 (1973) (quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest s 50, at 742),
the Court concluded, “An officer who seeks to make an
arrest without warrant outside his territory must be
treated as a private person.” The Stevenson Court
ultimately held that, under the circumstances of that case,
the District of Columbia police officers were functioning
in a private rather than official capacity for the purpose
of evaluating the legality of the arrests.

Notably, in footnote 3, 287 Md. at 511, the Court carved
out the following limitation on the above holding:

This statement should not be read as an endorsement of
the Court of Special Appeals’ conclusion that, for fourth
amendment purposes, there is no “state action” involved
whenever a private person makes an arrest. We do not
reach that issue.

In responding to the argument by the appellants in
Stevenson, that an extraterritorial arrest by a peace
officer is not that of a private citizen if the officer was
acting “under color of his office” at the time he made the
arrest, the Court of Appeals concluded that a fair reading
of the Florida decisions[fn1] led to the conclusion that
the phrase “color of his office” applies not to the modus
operandi of the arrest, but to whether the official
authority of the arresting officers was used to gain access
to the information which led to the belief that an arrest
should be made.

Although the appellants in Stevenson were seeking the
suppression of evidence as the fruit of an allegedly
illegal arrest, the issue before the court devolved upon
the status of the officers in arresting Stevenson and his
accomplice outside of their jurisdiction. Because there had
been no prior collaboration with the Prince George’s County
police, any issue of whether the District of Columbia
officers were acting as private citizens was clearly
presented, uncomplicated by the legal implications of the
extensive investigation that preceded the felony stop,
search and seizure. Applying the above test, as to whether
an officer is acting in his official capacity, as enunciated
in Stevenson, however, it is beyond cavil that the
Frederick County officers gained access to information
which led to the belief that an arrest should be made as a
result of their official authority as Maryland law
enforcement officers engaged in the investigation of a
double homicide. The Maryland officers, therefore, were not
acting as private citizens when they conducted the search
and seizure of the van. We now turn to the question of
whether the role of Frederick County officers, in
participating in the execution of the search warrant,
unquestionably operating beyond their jurisdiction, rendered
the search and seizure of the van invalid.

Appellant relies on the decision of the Florida District
Court of Appeal, Second District, in Hesselrode v. State,
369 So.2d 348, 349-51 (1979). There, officers of the
Longboat Key Police Department contacted a representative
of the State’s Attorney’s Office who had drafted and
prepared a search warrant for use by the police. However,
the author of the warrant so strictly structured the
warrant’s terms as to have it issued and directed to an
extremely closed category of persons, namely: “To: All and
singular the Sheriff and/or Deputy Sheriffs of Manatee
County,. . . .” The execution of the warrant and the ensuing
search and seizure of contraband located within the
described premises was conducted solely by members of the
Longboat Key Police Department. Section 933.08, Florida
Statutes (1977) reads:

The search warrant shall [i]n all cases be served by any
of the officers mentioned in its direction, but [b]y no
other person except in aid of the officer requiring it,
said officer being present and acting in its execution.

Id. at 350.

The appellant in Hesselrode argued that the warrant was
fatally defective because it was directed to one category
of peace officers and yet another category of police
executed the warrant.

The Court held:

Valiantly as did the State Attorney’s Office try here, it
could not cure the original sin initiated by the hand of
one of its members. The State would have us say that
because there were members of the Manatee Sheriff’s Office
out and about the scene, then service of the warrant by
the Longboat Key officers satisfied the statute and the
constitution. The State points to Nofs v. State, 295 So.2d
308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). In Nofs the warrant was directed
to “the Sheriff and/or Deputy Sheriffs of Pinellas
County, Florida; and police off of the City of St.
Petersburg, Florida.” Service o warrant was made in the
City of Gulfport by, and th another twist, a St.
Petersburg police officer. warrant in Nofs was saved for,
although the officer was technically out of his
jurisdiction as a St. Petersburg police officer, he was,
however, a bonded deputy sheriff. He thus belonged to one
of the categories to which the warrant was directed. He
also accompanied and assisted the other officers in
searching the premises subject to the warrant. Thus, Nofs
differs from this case.

A fair reading of the transcript of the hearing in the
case sub judice leads us to but one conclusion and that is
this investigation was solely the work of the Longboat Key
Police Department and only incidentally others. No
member of the Manatee Sheriff’s Office on July 4, 1977
participated in this investigation, the execution of the
warrant or the search of the premises subject to the
warrant. At best, what Manatee deputies were present were
there as passive observers obtaining what intelligence
information they could gather for the separate use of
their own department.

Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added).

The Florida court’s rationale in Hesselrode was that the
statute was intended to prevent the loss of evidence, in
consideration of the fact that no court official is present
when evidence is seized and the judiciary has nothing to do
with the direction of the officers as they accomplish their
task. Contravention of the procedure mandated by the
statute, the court said, results in suppressed evidence
gathered by law enforcement agencies after many hours of
hard labor. Lamenting that, “Save for the First and Fifth
Amendments, the Fourth Amendment, from which we receive
Section 12 to Article I of our own Florida Constitution, is
probably most important to the liberty of all freedom
loving citizens.” Id. at 351. It concluded, “One cannot sit
idly by and observe its meaning be slowly eroded away even
by well-meaning police and prosecutors.” Id.

The ills extant and the factual backdrop in Hesselrode are
certainly not present in the case sub judice. At the
outset, the State questions whether it is within this
Court’s jurisdiction to entertain appellant’s claim under
foreign law.[fn2] In this regard, we note that Hesselrode
turned on the restrictive language of Section 933.08,
Florida Statutes, “but [b]y no other person except in aid
of the officer requiring it, said officer being present and
acting in its execution.” Although we do not dismiss the
State’s jurisdictional issue out of hand, we shall assume
that the issue is properly before us. The question, as we
see it, is whether collaboration with a law-enforcement
entity which clearly is authorized to execute a search and
seizure warrant invalidates the warrant and compels the
exclusion of the fruits of any such seizure. We hold that
it does not.

It is undisputed that the evidence recovered from the
vehicle owned by Joe Daniels was gathered principally by
the Maryland crime scene officers. It is particularly
important, however, that the safeguards against loss or
alteration of evidence alluded to in Hesselrode were under
the control of Officer Rausch, who was present at the
scene, during the entire time that the evidence was being
collected. It was, in fact, Officer Rausch who was
responsible for documenting the items recovered and logging
them in on the return to be filed with the court. Mindful
that the double murders were being investigated and
prosecuted by Maryland officials, they were in the unique
position of knowing the underlying facts and what evidence
was useful, relevant and probative. Notably, the language
of the Florida statute providing for assistance of
unauthorized personnel, “except in aid of the officer
requiring it,” we believe, is certainly instructive.
Whether we view the role of the Frederick County officers
as agents of the Martinsburg police in the execution of the
search warrant or as simply assisting the local
authorities, in light of their administrative/supervisory
authority exercised, particularly by Officer Rausch, we
perceive no error requiring invalidation of the search
warrant and suppression of the evidence.

DELAY IN PRESENTMENT

Citing the trilogy of decisions recently handed down by the
Maryland Court of Appeals,[fn3] appellant next contends
that, because of her unnecessary delay in presentment
before a magistrate pursuant to Md. Rule 4-212, statements
made by her were not voluntary and should be suppressed.

The State, for its part, counters that “there is no basis
whatsoever on which to conclude that the Frederick County
or Martinsburg police deliberately delayed [appellant’s]
presentment.” In addition, the State, in alternatively
arguing harmless error, points out in a footnote that
“[a]ppellant’s brief gives no indication as to the content
or nature of [appellant’s] statements that she sought to
suppress.”[fn4]

Maryland Rule 4-212 (f) provides:

(f) Procedure — When Defendant in Custody.

(1) Same Offense. When a defendant is arrested without a
warrant, the defendant shall be taken before a judicial
officer of the District Court without unnecessary delay
and in no event later than 24 hours after arrest. When a
charging document is filed in the District Court for the
offense for which the defendant is already in custody a
warrant or summons need not issue. A copy of the charging
document shall be served on the defendant promptly after
it is filed, and a return shall be made as for a warrant.
When a charging document is filed in the circuit court
for an offense for which the defendant is already in
custody, a warrant issued pursuant to subsection (d)(2) of
this Rule may be lodged as a detainer for the continued
detention of the defendant under the jurisdiction of the
court in which the charging document is filed. Unless
otherwise ordered pursuant to Rule 4-216, the defendant
remains subject to conditions of pretrial release imposed
by the District Court.

Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, §
10-912 also speaks to the proper procedure prior to an
arrestee’s initial appearance before a judicial officer:

Bringing defendant before judge; failure

(a) A confession may not be excluded from evidence solely
because the defendant was not taken before a judicial
officer after arrest within any time period specified by
Title 4 of the Maryland Rules.

(b)Failure to strictly comply with the provisions of
Title 4 of the Maryland Rules pertaining to taking a
defendant before a judicial officer after arrest is only
one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in
deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a
confession.

Prior to appellant’s arrest at approximately 1:25 on the
morning of October 20, 2002, the fugitive warrant was
signed at 1:00 a.m., but appellant was not presented to a
magistrate until 10:05 a.m. Examined at length on direct
and on cross-examination about the availability of a
magistrate in Martinsburg before whom appellant could have
been taken after her arrest, Detective Swortwood testified
that, with regard “to magistrate court where like a felony
charge or a state warrant in our state is, people are not
arraigned in the evening hours.” The witness added, “We
have a municipal city magistrate that is on call for city
charges, not for fugitive charges, not for other state
charges.” Thus, according to Swortwood, no suspect arrested
on a charge of murder at night in Martinsburg could be
presented until the following morning.

Appellant relies on the holding in Williams that [t]he
same approach can easily and effectively be used with
respect to the right to prompt presentment for an accused
detained pursuant to an arrest. It would be a simple
matter for the police to advise the accused as well of his
or her right to prompt presentment before a District Court
Commissioner, that the Commissioner is a judicial officer
not connected with the police, and that the Commissioner,
among other things, will inform the accused of each
offense with which he or she is charged, including the
allowable penalties attached to those charges, furnish the
accused with a written copy of the charges, advise the
accused of his or her right to counsel, make a pre-trial
release determination, and if, as here, the accused has
been charged with a felony beyond the jurisdiction of the
District Court, of his or her right to a preliminary
hearing before a judge. See Md. Rule 4-213. The police
could inform the defendant that he or she may waive that
right of prompt presentment and agree to submit to
interrogation, subject to the right to end the
interrogation at any time and demand to be taken promptly
before a Commissioner. That kind of advice and a form for
the written waiver can as easily be standardized as the
Miranda advice and waiver have been, and should not take
more than a few minutes to accomplish.

* * *

We hold that any deliberate and unnecessary delay in
presenting an accused before a District Court
Commissioner, in violation of Rule 4-212(e) or (f) must be
given very heavy weight in determining whether a resulting
confession is voluntary, because that violation creates
its own aura of suspicion. The violation does not, of
itself, make the confession involuntary or inadmissible.
It remains a factor to be considered, along with any
others that may be relevant, but it must be given very
heavy weight.

Williams, 375 Md. at 432-34.

Appellant acknowledges that, in interpreting Williams, the
Court in Facon, 375 Md. at 441, held that “the requirement
of Maryland Rule 4-212 (e) that a defendant shall be taken
before a judicial officer of the District Court without
unnecessary delay begins only when the arrestee enters the
prosecuting jurisdiction. . . .” Ergo, “for purposes of
determining whether the rule has been violated, that period
of time following arrest in a neighboring jurisdiction is
not included in the time calculation.” Id. Appellant
maintains, however, that Facon provides for an important
exception here pertinent:

We hold that the prompt presentment requirement under the
Rule is not triggered where the defendant is held in
custody outside of this State, absent evidence that
officers of this State were working in conjunction with
the other jurisdiction for purposes other than to secure
extradition. In the instant case, the record does not
reflect any collusion between the District of Columbia
authorities and Prince George’s County authorities apart
from arranging for extradition. Petitioner was not
interrogated until he arrived in Prince George’s County.
The delay in presenting petitioner therefore consisted of
roughly 12 hours, commencing when Maryland State Police
took custody of petitioner in Prince George’s County.

There is a noteworthy, albeit narrow, exception to our
holding that extraterritorial delays will not begin the
running of time under Rule 4-212(e). As both Federal and
other state courts have recognized, the police cannot
avoid the requirement of the presentment rule through
collusion with a foreign jurisdiction. See United States
v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 114 S. Ct. 1599, 128 L.
Ed. 2d 319 (1994); Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S.
350, 63 S. Ct. 599, 87 L. Ed. 829 (1943); State v.
Guthrie, 173 W. Va. 290, 315 S.E.2d 397 (1984). Where it
is demonstrated that officers from this State are working
in collaboration with the other jurisdiction,
interrogating a defendant prior to his transfer, the
presentment requirement may apply to the officers’
activities. See Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. at 359, 114 S.
Ct. at 1604, 128 L. Ed. 2d 319 (stating that a confession
obtained through collusion by state and federal agents to
avoid presentment requirement would be suppressed).

Id. at 449-50 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

In denying the motion to suppress appellant’s statement,
the court ruled:

Now at the time that the magistrate issued the search
warrant she issued the fugitive arrest warrant and the
testimony is that at 1:25 Sergeant Swortwood went to
[appellant’s] home again at 110 Georgetown Square and he
arrested her, went into the house, arrested her without
incident and transported her to the headquarters at
Martinsburg. Police headquarters. There he processed her,
took fingerprints, photographs and did those other things
that he might do and he had been informed by the deputies,
Deputy Dewees that they, that Deputy Dewees wanted to talk
to [appellant] and so he escorted [appellant] to their
presence where they spoke to her in an interrogation room,
interview room.

* * *

The detectives were aware that she was a high school
graduate and that she was taking or had taken some college
courses. She was calm. She was unemotional. Her responses
seemed to be appropriate to the questions d she didn’t ask
to stop the proceedings. They talked in a rather,
whether it was logical or not, a sequence. They talked
about the events of that day and then Tracy Frost and then
talked about, apparently, I believe talked about her
vehicle, her car and eventually moved on to discussing a
crime scene. Now [appellant] at some point after about
two hours began to, ah, evidence some physical
discomfort. Balled her fist up, kind of clutched her
chest, either she was or, seemed to be short of breath,
brushed off a first request for medical attention, but,
but afterwards agreed on a follow-up question yes, she
wanted some attention at that point. That particular
interview ended and she was transported to the local
hospital. I might go back just briefly to say the
voluntary, the, the, the explanation of Miranda rights
took approximately five minutes. Began at 1:48 a.m. and
completed, was completed at 1:53 a.m.

* * *

Now before I talk about the presentment itself, I’m just
going to move on to what I understand of the events then
that transpired later that day. After she was released
from the emergency room she was transported to the Eastern
Regional Jail. Detective Dewees and Detective Jenkins
returned that afternoon, this time armed with the
Frederick County Sheriff’s Office forms for cons, of
constitutional rights. They went over them with her again,
one after the other. [Appellant] initialed each one and
then Detective Dewees initialed each one, and after they
advised her again of her rights she agreed to talk. There
was some reference again to the attorney on Monday, but
nothing changed in that regard. She agreed to talk. They
continued it. There were some questions. Why did you go
back the second day? Well, they went back the second day I
suppose, one reason given at any rate, I don’t need to
suppose, the, two reasons. One was they hadn’t really felt
they were finished from the night before and I think
Detective Dewees was remarkably candid. We all know one of
the reasons they went back. They wanted some more
information if they could. Now maybe they would like to
have heard answers change. I suspect that’s the case.
But that didn’t mean they were gonna hear different
answers at any cost. There’s nothing about their
motivations for this interview which cause it to be
anything but appropriate and her responses to be anything
but voluntary, and again with knowledge of the Miranda
warnings which she had now been given for the second time.

The issues arise, that is of presentment, to the, the
magistrate. Apparently, from the evidence before me the
magistrate issued . . . this fugitive warrant . . . before
1:25 because that’s when it was executed and the defense
argues logically that gee, the magistrate was there at,
right after 1:00. The thing was executed within a few
minutes. Why wasn’t she there when, why couldn’t they have
taken her right back there? And that’s a fair, fair
question based on the evidence. We know that [appellant]
was arrested at 1:25. She was taken back to the police
station and from, we just have a general description of
what was done in the processing. We know that the
voluntary, her statement of Miranda rights started at 1:48
so there was approximately, that would be a 23 minute
period of time from the arrest to the beginning of the
interrogation or the interview. I will say candidly I
think it’s a fair question why the magistrate wouldn’t
have been available. Sergeant Swortwood, all I’m gonna
take from his evidence is . . . he didn’t figure there was
one available. He didn’t say he made any efforts, but he
didn’t figure there was a magistrate available. I take it
from the Uniform Extradition Act that, that one should be
taken before the magistrate. It doesn’t say, it doesn’t
specify a period of time. . . . [B]ut it, it’s clear to
me that that’s one of the things that should be done.
I’m gonna use the word for the moment, promptly. . . . But
the point is that events, the emergency events that
occurred when [appellant] began to feel physical distress
occurred from the testimony a couple, after a couple of
hours. So somewhere close to 4:00 in the morning. At that
point she was taken to the hospital. She certainly was
not, there was a period of time when she couldn’t have
been taken before the magistrate. There is nothing that
tells me that the very fact that she didn’t first go to
the magistrate requires me to, to suppress any
statements made. It’s a factor I should take into account
and certainly I think it becomes more and more important
as time goes on. But the fact that she had not been taken
before the magistrate by 4 a.m. I don’t believe
invalidates the, the statement, the voluntariness of it.
It doesn’t cause me to feel that I should really consider
that care, too carefully. It appears to me from the
exhibit, State’s Exhibit 3, that she was taken before the
magistrate . . . 10:05 a.m. . . .

* * *

So she was taken before the magistrate and after that
then she was questioned again at the Eastern Regional
Jail, and I’ve said earlier I don’t find anything about
the facts of that interview or interrogation to cause me
to believe that it was involuntarily given or given with
anything other than full knowledge of her rights under
the Miranda decision.

The State points out that the Facon Court explained, “Most
of the accused’s protections under the Rule relate to an
application of Maryland law.” Facon, 375 Md. at 448-49. The
assessment of probable cause for a Maryland offense,
advisement of penalties, right to counsel under Maryland
law, as well as federal law, and pretrial release
determinations “are uniquely Maryland considerations and
could not be performed adequately by a foreign judicial
officer. . . . Rule 4-212(e) does not have extraterritorial
effect.” Id. Detective Swortwood testified that there is no
judicial officer available to whom the police may present
an individual arrested at night in Martinsburg for a felony
or “state offense.” In light of the recognition in Facon
that unique features of the Maryland presentment process
excuse extra-judicial arraignments on Maryland charges,
Maryland Rule 4-212 is inapplicable where, as here, there
was no attempt to circumvent the Rule.

Additionally, because of the onset of appellant’s illness,
the interview only lasted from 1:48 to 4:00 in the morning.
Although the court stated that appellant “agreed to talk”
and “they continued it,” there is no indication of what
appellant told the officers. The State, assuming arguendo,
that any statement made by appellant was rendered
involuntary as a result of a delay in presentment, directs
our attention to the holding of the Supreme Court in
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 303, 111 S. Ct. 1246,
1261, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991):

The Court today properly concludes that the admission of
an “involuntary” confession at trial is subject to
harmless error analysis. Nonetheless, the independent
review of the record which we are required to make shows
that respondent Fulminante’s confession was not in fact
involuntary. And even if the confession were deemed to be
involuntary, the evidence offered at trial, including a
second, untainted confession by Fulminante, supports the
conclusion that any error here was certainly harmless.

The collusion between jurisdictions contemplated in Facon
is a collaboration in which law enforcement authorities in
one jurisdiction insulate the authorities in a sister
jurisdiction by keeping the arrestee beyond the reach of
the laws of the sister jurisdiction. Not only was there no
attempt to utilize jurisdictional barriers to circumvent
Maryland Rule 4-212, but appellant overlooks the principal
purpose of the Rule, to avoid an extended incommunicato
custodial interrogation before an arrestee has the benefit
of the advisement of a neutral judicial officer.

The sanction for violation of Rule 4-212(f) is exclusion of
any statement obtained as a result of the deliberate delay
in order to continue the interrogation before presentment.
Although the evidence in this case was, to say the least,
overwhelming, we acknowledge that appellant’s admission to
the police interrogators, on two occasions, that she was in
sole possession of the green minivan at the time of the
murders confirmed the lynchpin of the body of evidence that
the detectives had assembled against her. The record,
however, clearly demonstrates that the admission was not
the product of a deliberate delay to obtain same.

[fn1] State v. Crum, 323 So.2d 673 (Fla.App. 1975) (per
curiam); Collins v. State, 143 So.2d 700 (Fla.App. 1962).

[fn2] It should be noted that in Hesselrode the Florida
District Court of Appeal construed a Florida statute,
relying on Florida case law to the effect that “statutes
authorizing searches and seizures must be strictly
construed and affidavits and search warrants issued
thereunder must strictly conform to the constitutional and
statutory provisions authorizing their making an issuance.”
The decision further refers to the adoption by “the people
of Florida in an even more organic part of our law in
Florida” of Article I, Declaration of Rights, Section 12,
of the Florida Constitution in providing for the manner of
searches and seizures. The court was called upon to
determine whether a warrant which restricted the category
of peace officer who could execute the warrant was fatally
defective because a category of peace officer not named in
the warrant, acted exclusively in carrying out the search
and seizure. Of note, the decision devolved upon the
construction of a Florida statute rooted in the Florida
State Constitution and involved two law enforcement
agencies within the State of Florida and under the
jurisdiction of its laws. Here, appellant seeks to have us
invalidate a search and seizure based on an alleged
violation of a West Virginia law governing the issuance of
a warrant by a West Virginia law enforcement agency.

[fn3] Williams State, 375 Md. 404 (2003); Facon v. State,
375 Md. 435 (2003); Hiligh v. State, 375 Md. 456 (2003).

[fn4] The agreed statement of facts submitted by the
prosecutor, upon which the trial court based its guilty
verdict, contains only the following reference to a
statement or confession by appellant:

The [appellant] was subsequently arrested and interviewed
by members of the Frederick County Sheriff’s Office on two
occasions. On both occasions, the [appellant] indicated
that she was in sole possession of the green mini van at
the time of the murders.

The court, in its findings, however, opines that there was
no coercive atmosphere or tactics employed in the interview
or in the administering of Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1968)] warnings, and does not disclose what appellant
actually said in the interview.