Pennsylvania Commonwealth Reports
ORLOFF v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 136 C.D. 2006
(Pa.Commw. 12-18-2006) Howard Orloff, Appellant v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing. 136 C.D. 2006. Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania. November 15, 2006. December 18,
2006.
BEFORE: DORIS A. SMITH-RIBNER, Judge; DAN PELLEGRINI,
Judge; ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Judge; BONNIE BRIGANCE
LEADBETTER, Judge; REN?‰E COHN JUBELIRER, Judge; ROBERT
SIMPSON, Judge; MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge.
OPINION BY JUDGE PELLEGRINI.
Howard Orloff (Licensee) appeals from an order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court) denying
his appeal and reinstating a one-year license suspension of
his driving privilege because he failed to establish that
he was prejudiced by a delay in the proceedings related to
the suspension of his driving privilege that was chargeable
to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT).
On July 19, 1997, Licensee was arrested in New Jersey and
charged with violating New Jersey’s statute against driving
under the influence.[fn1] Following a trial, he was
convicted, and New Jersey sent Pennsylvania a notice of the
conviction. PennDOT then sent Licensee an official notice
dated October 3, 1997, informing him that his operating
privilege was being suspended for one year pursuant to
Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S.
§ 3731,[fn2] and the Driver’s License Compact
(Compact), 75 Pa. C.S. § 1581,[fn3] as a result of
his New Jersey conviction.[fn4] Licensee filed a timely
appeal.
A hearing was held before the late Judge Joseph F. Battle,
and on June 30, 1998, Judge Battle entered an order
granting Licensee’s appeal and reversing the suspension.
PennDOT appealed to this Court and by order dated July 7,
1998, Judge Battle consolidated Licensee’s case with 30
other suspension appeal cases upon which he had already
rendered decisions and from which PennDOT had appealed to
this Court. The issue on appeal in all of the cases was
whether
PennDOT had sustained its burden of establishing the basis
for the suspension of the licensees’ operating privileges
by introducing into evidence copies of electronic
transmissions from New Jersey which reported the
convictions to that state. The licensees contended that the
reports failed to comply with the requirements of Article
III of the Compact[fn5] because they did not contain all of
the required information. In 27 of those cases, including
Licensee’s, we granted PennDOT’s appeal, and by order dated
September 15, 1999,[fn6] we reversed in part, affirmed in
part and remanded the cases to the trial court for
consideration of the issue, where such issue was previously
raised, of whether the reporting requirements of Article III
of the Compact were met, as articulated in our decision in
Sweet v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 724 A.2d 1004 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). (See PennDOT’s
Brief at 5).
Following remand to the trial court, Judge Battle died on
March 10, 2001. No further action was taken by the trial
court to comply with our remand order until PennDOT sent
the trial court a letter dated September 7, 2004,
requesting that the cases be listed for hearings. A hearing
was held on February 15, 2005, on the issue raised in the
remand order as well as on Licensee’s contention that his
appeal should be granted because he was prejudiced by the
unreasonable delay in prosecuting the enforcement of the
suspension of his operating privilege.
Before the trial court, Licensee testified that September
1999 was the last time he had heard that his appeal was
still pending, that he thought Judge Battle had ruled in
his favor, and that he neither checked his driving
privilege status with PennDOT nor received notification
that the case was over. He stated that he currently owned
and operated a wire manufacturing company that he purchased
in 1993 and paid off in 2001. Licensee stated that he ran
the company office in 1999 and had other persons making
sales calls and deliveries, but he now drove the company
truck Mondays through Fridays to make sales calls,
interspersed with deliveries. He stated that including
himself, he employed five people — two who ran
machines in the factory and did production, one who ran the
office, and another who was the previous owner who resided
in Florida but remained on the payroll. He testified that
if his license was suspended, he would be required to hire
a delivery driver and a less effective salesman which could
lead to excess inventory and would increase his payroll.
Licensee stated that had he known his driving privilege
could be suspended, he would not have gone out on the road
in 2001; would not have arranged for a $200,000 line of
credit; would not have moved to a far more expensive
residence in 2003; would not have entered a lease for an
expensive car; and would not have paid a two-year
membership to a gym that was not located near public
transportation. He also testified that he provided
transportation for his mother, and if his license had been
promptly suspended, she would not have been adversely
affected because she was healthier and able to drive at
that time.
By order dated December 29, 2005, the trial court
attributed the delay in prosecuting Licensee’s appeal of
his operating privilege to PennDOT. However, it found that
Licensee failed to establish the requisite prejudice
resulting from the delay and denied his appeal and
reinstated the suspension of his operating privilege.
Licensee then filed the present appeal[fn7] contending that
the trial court erred in concluding that he had not
suffered prejudice as a result of PennDOT’s unreasonable
delay in prosecuting the appeal.
For a licensee to sustain an appeal of a license suspension
based upon delay, he must prove: (1) an unreasonable delay
chargeable to PennDOT led the licensee to believe that his
operating privilege would not be impaired; and (2)
prejudice would result by having his operating privilege
suspended after such delay. Fisher v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 682 A.2d 1353
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1996). What constitutes an unreasonable delay
will depend upon the circumstances of each individual case.
Lancos v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 689 A.2d 342, 344 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). An
administrative delay may be held against PennDOT for
purposes of determining whether there was an unreasonable
delay. Ciaccia v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing, 782 A.2d 639 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001). Where
there is an unreasonable delay, it is PennDOT’s burden to
prove that the delay was caused by some factor other than
mere administrative inaction. Grover v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 734 A.2d 941
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1999).
Admitting that the five-year delay in this case was
unreasonable, PennDOT counters by contending that Licensee
did not meet either prong of his burden. It argues that the
trial court was responsible for the delay by not
reassigning the case to another judge,[fn8] and judicial
delay may not be attributable to it when determining whether
there was an unreasonable delay. Because there is no need
to address Licensee’s argument if the delay is not properly
chargeable to PennDOT, we will address that issue first.
To whom the delay is chargeable after a license suspension
case has been remanded after appeal was addressed by our
Supreme Court in Terraciano v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 562 Pa. 60, 753
A.2d 233 (2000). In that case, following the trial court’s
sustaining of a licensee’s appeal of a license suspension,
PennDOT appealed to this Court. We reversed and remanded the
matter to the trial court for a new hearing, and the matter
then lay dormant for seven years before it was reactivated.
The licensee contended that his appeal should be sustained
because of the unreasonable delay in hearing the case after
remand, causing him prejudice. Finding that the delay was
not chargeable to PennDOT, the trial court reimposed a
one-year license suspension. We affirmed but our Supreme
Court, however, reversed, holding that the delay was
chargeable to PennDOT, explaining:
The rule that judicial delay may not be attributable to
PennDOT in license suspension matters, however, stems from
the underlying principle that PennDOT is unable to suspend
a driver’s license until it receives a certified record
from the court system that the licensee has been convicted
of an offense for which a suspension may be imposed. Walsh
v. Department of Transp., 137 Pa. Cmwlth. 549, 586 A.2d
1034, 1036-37 (1991). Such a situation differs markedly
from an appeal from a suspension matter, because the
conviction or event for which a suspension may be imposed
has already been established. See id. at 1037. Thus,
despite PennDOT’s assertions to the contrary, the judicial
delay rule is simply not applicable here. Rather, as
discussed above, the delay in the instant case resulted
from the laxity of PennDOT, an active party in the appeal
proceedings, in allowing this case to languish for seven
years.
Id. at 237 n. 9.
PennDOT contends that this case is much different than what
occurred in Terraciano because that case was remanded for
further evidentiary proceedings, while, in this case, it
was only remanded for consideration of a legal issue. In
effect, PennDOT is proposing that under Terraciano, where a
case is remanded for a hearing, the delay is chargeable to
PennDOT; however, if no hearing is required, then it is
chargeable as a judicial delay and not chargeable to
PennDOT. Following PennDOT’s reasoning to its logical
conclusion would expand Terraciano’s holding to make
PennDOT responsible for any delay where a hearing is
required, including the original appeal, because PennDOT,
as an active party to the case, is charged “with a duty to
keep abreast of all developments in the appeal process.”
Terraciano, 753 A.2d at 236 (quoting Fisher, 682 A.2d at
1356).
Given that a license suspension appeal automatically stays
the suspension notice and that the General Assembly placed
in PennDOT the responsibility to prosecute license
suspension cases, much recommends PennDOT’s inadvertent
suggestion to ensure that no case “falls through the
cracks” and license suspensions are imposed as expeditiously
as possible. However, where a license suspension case no
longer follows the “normal” procedure, the cases relied on
in Terraciano indicate that our Supreme Court only intended
to charge PennDOT with a delay when it causes the license
suspension case before the trial court to be waylaid,
stating:
When PennDOT fails to take responsibility for moving a
case forward under circumstances where it is reasonable
for it to be expected to do so, the delay is attributable
to PennDOT. Howarth v. Department of Transp., 124 Pa.
Cmwlth. 39, 555 A.2d 285, 286-87 (1989). In Howarth, the
Commonwealth Court concluded that the onus was on PennDOT
to move the proceeding forward when an appeal was
continued at PennDOT’s request and then not relisted for
six years. Id. at 287. Likewise, in Fisher, the
Commonwealth Court found unreasonable delay attributable
to PennDOT when PennDOT failed to file a motion to quash
a licensee’s untimely appeal and allowed the appeal to
remain active on the docket for three and one-half years
before reinstating the license suspension. Fisher, 682
A.2d at 1356.
Terraciano, 753 A.2d at 236.[fn9] Accord Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Gombocz, ___
Pa. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (No. 196 MAP 2004, filed November 21,
2006) (PennDOT’s action in requesting change of venue did
not make it responsible for delay because it only started
license suspension case anew.)
In this case, PennDOT successfully appealed the trial
court’s order to this Court. Once it was remanded, its
appeal to this Court caused the license suspension case to
be outside the “normal” processing of an appeal and more
likely to go off track. Under Terraciano, PennDOT was
responsible for taking the appropriate action to have the
case heard and, absent taking such action to carry out its
responsibility to prosecute the appeal, PennDOT is charged
with the delay.
Now to Licensee’s appeal and contention that the trial
court erred in concluding that he had not suffered
prejudice as a result of PennDOT’s unreasonable delay in
prosecuting the appeal. “Prejudice is shown when the
licensee is able to demonstrate that he changed his
circumstances to his detriment in reliance on his belief
that his operating privileges would not be impaired.”
Fisher, 682 A.2d at 1356. Furthermore, the loss of a job or
required closing of a business requiring a driver’s license
constitutes prejudice. Id. Also, prejudice is established
when a licensee has changed jobs to a position that
requires driving as part of the new job’s duties. Bennett
v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 642 A.2d 1139 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1994).
Here, the trial court found that Licensee was not
prejudiced because his employment situation would not be
affected and, at most, other or additional employees would
need to perform certain functions and duties which he
currently performs.[fn10] This raises the issue of whether
an owner of a multi-employee business that could use other
employees or hire other employees to perform his functions
could ever establish that he was prejudiced by the delay in
suspending his license. We disagree that prejudice can only
be established by the loss of a job or the closing of a
business; it can also be established by showing that an
owner changed his job duties so that a license is necessary
for the financial well-being of his company. In this case,
Licensee changed his role to the “outside” person of the
company and can no longer reclaim his role as an “inside”
person without disrupting his company and incurring
additional costs by hiring additional people to do the job
that he now performs. Because PennDOT’s delay in suspending
Licensee’s operating privilege was unreasonable and
Licensee established that he relied to his detriment on the
belief that his license would not be suspended, Licensee
met his burden of proving that the suspension should not be
imposed.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed.
Judge Leadbetter dissents.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 18th day of December, 2006, the order of the
Court
of Common Pleas of Delaware County, dated December 29,
2005, is reversed.
[fn1] N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) defines a driving under the
influence offender as:
A person who operates a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor . . . or operates a motor
vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent
or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood . .
.
[fn2] Pennsylvania’s driving under the influence law was
contained in 75 Pa. C.S. § 3731 until February 2004.
Effective February 1, 2004, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3731 was
repealed and replaced by 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802. This
dispute arose when 75 Pa. C.S. § 3731 was in effect
and is not affected by its subsequent repeal. 75 Pa. C.S.
§§ 3731(a)(1) and (4) provide:
(a) A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual
physical control of the movement of a vehicle in any of
the following circumstances:
(1) While under the influence of alcohol to a degree which
renders the person incapable of safe driving.
(4) While the amount of the alcohol by weight in the blood
of an adult is .10% or greater.
[fn3] The Compact is an agreement among most of the states
to promote compliance with each party state’s motor vehicle
law. Pennsylvania became a party state to the Compact in
1996 by adopting Sections 1581-1585 of the Motor Vehicle
Code. In order for PennDOT to treat an out-of-state
conviction as though it occurred in Pennsylvania, the
out-of-state conviction must be from a state that has
entered the Compact and enacted a statute to that effect.
New Jersey is a party state. See Leftheris v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 734
A.2d 455 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1999).
[fn4] Specifically, the notice stated:
Section 1581 of the Vehicle Code requires the Department
to treat certain out of state convictions as though they
had occurred in Pennsylvania. Therefore, as a result of
the Department receiving notification from NEW JERSEY of
your conviction on 09/09/1997 of an offense which occurred
on 07/19/1997, which is equivalent to a violation of
Section 3731 of the Pa. Vehicle Code, DRIVING UNDER
INFLUENCE, your driving privilege is being SUSPENDED for a
period of 1 YEAR(S), as mandated by Section 1532B of the
Vehicle Code.
[fn5] Article III of the Compact provides:
The licensing authority of a party state shall report
each conviction of a person from another party state
occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing
authority of the home state of the licensee. Such report
shall clearly identify the person convicted, describe the
violation specifying the section of the statute, code or
ordinance violated, identify the court in which action was
taken, indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was
entered or the conviction was a result of the forfeiture
of bail, bond or other security and shall include any
special findings made in connection therewith.
[fn6] See Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing v. Avato, 740 A.2d 1233 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1999). This
case is unreported but may be cited for the law of the
case.
[fn7] Our scope of review of a decision in a license
suspension case is limited to determining whether the trial
court’s findings of facts are supported by competent
evidence and whether the trial court committed an error of
law or an abuse of discretion in reaching its decision.
Finnegan v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 844 A.2d 645 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2004).
[fn8] PennDOT cites to 42 Pa. C.S. § 325(e) in
support of its contention of judicial delay, but
that statute is irrelevant in the matter at hand. 42 Pa.
C.S. § 325(e) provides:
(e) Powers of President Judge. — Except as
otherwise provided or prescribed by this title, by general
rule or by order of the governing authority, the president
judge of a court shall:
(1) Be the executive and administrative head of the court,
supervise the judicial business of the court, promulgate
all administrative rules and regulations, make all
judicial assignments, and assign and reassign among the
personnel of the court available chambers and physical
facilities.
(2) Exercise the powers of the court under section
2301(a)(2) (relating to appointment of personnel).
[fn9] In Tarka v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing, 756 A.2d 138 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2000), we held
that after PennDOT was successful on appeal and the matter
was remanded to the trial court, any delay in hearing the
case was chargeable to licensee because it was licensee’s
burden to move the case through the system. Because that
holding is inconsistent with Terracino, where PennDOT was
also successful on appeal, the matter was remanded to the
trial court and PennDOT was charged with the delay, it is
overruled.
[fn10] The trial court stated:
Thus, the evidence presented by [Licensee] established
only that the delay in prosecuting the suspension of his
operating privilege would have a possible and marginal
effect on his life. His employment situation will not be
affected. At most, certain functions and duties which he
currently performs will need to be done by other or
additional employees. However, as the sole owner of his
business, [Licensee] possesses complete autonomy in
delegating duties and job functions within the business.
Likewise, his contention that having another individual
perform outside sales will have adverse results on the
profitability of the business is sheer speculation. No
evidence was presented that the outside sales position was
so highly specialized as as [sic] to require only
[Licensee’s] attention nor was there any evidence that the
profitability of the business increased after the
[Licensee] assumed responsibility for outside sales in
2001. Thus, [Licensee’s] inference that he will be
prejudiced by having purchased a new home and entered into
a lease for an expensive vehicle likewise is mere
speculation not based upon any facts presented to the
Court.
Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence that
[Licensee] was prejudiced by the delay in prosecuting the
suspension of his operating privilege, we conclude that
[Licensee’s] Appeal could not properly be granted. It is
for these reasons, therefore, that [Licensee’s] Appeal
was denied and it is submitted that our decision in this
regard is supported fully by the record and the applicable
legal authority.
(Trial Court Opinion at 5-6).
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: December 18,
2006
I respectfully dissent. Assigning responsibility for what
was purely judicial delay to PennDOT in this case
misapplies the standard established in Terraciano v.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing,
562 Pa. 60, 753 A.2d 233 (2000). Further, the majority
creates an unworkable standard for future cases where a
license suspension matter is remanded to this Court or to a
court of common pleas solely for reconsideration of a legal
issue.
In Terraciano, as in the case sub judice, the trial court
sustained the licensee’s statutory appeal, and PennDOT
appealed to this Court. We found that the trial court had
erred in a crucial evidentiary ruling and “reversed the
order of the trial court and remanded the matter for
further proceedings.” Terraciano, 562 Pa. at 65, 753 A.2d at
235 (emphasis added). The case languished for seven years
until PennDOT praeciped the trial court for a hearing. When
confronted with the question of whether to attribute the
delay to PennDOT or the licensee, the Supreme Court noted
that “[w]hen PennDOT fails to take responsibility for
moving a case forward under circumstances where it is
reasonable for it to be expected to do so, the delay is
attributable to PennDOT.” Id. at 66, 753 A.2d at 236
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court attributed the delay to
PennDOT because, as the appellant to this Court, it “was
responsible for pursuing its appeal to conclusion.” Id. at
67, 753 A.2d at 236-237. The Supreme Court noted that “to
place the case back before the trial court, PennDOT merely
had to file a praecipe after the Commonwealth Court issued
its order remanding the case. . . .” Id. at 67, 753 A.2d at
236.
The case at bar is markedly different from Terraciano.
Here, this Court’s remand order did not contemplate further
proceedings; it stated that:
The case is remanded to the common pleas court for [its]
consideration of the issue, where such issue was
previously raised, of whether the reporting requirements
of Article III of the Compact were met, as articulated in
our decision in Sweet v. Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 724 A.2d 1004 (Pa.Cmwlth.
1999).
Avato v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing (Pa.Cmwlth., No. 2138 C.D. 1998, filed September
15, 1998) (emphasis added).[fn1] Stated otherwise, there
was no action required of PennDOT to have the appeal
concluded. Nevertheless, the majority states in conclusory
fashion, purporting to apply Terraciano, that “PennDOT was
responsible for taking the appropriate action to have the
case heard.” Majority Opinion at 10. There are several
glaring problems with this statement.
First, the majority reaches this conclusion without any
explanation as to why it is “reasonable” to impose the
burden on PennDOT in the circumstance where the court has
failed to act upon a remand. Terraciano requires a
case-by-case inquiry into the circumstances to determine
whether it is “reasonable” to hold PennDOT liable. Contrary
to this central feature of the Terraciano holding, the
majority establishes an inflexible rule that arbitrarily
chooses PennDOT as the party always liable for a “delay”
that results from a court’s quiescence in responding to a
remand order.
Second, the majority’s statement is opaque on what was to
be “heard” in this case. The record was closed, and the
case was not remanded for further evidentiary proceedings.
The trial court was directed to write a new opinion, and it
was slow to do so.
Third, the majority offers no analysis of what would be an
“appropriate action” by PennDOT in this scenario, where,
because of judicial inaction, the matter languishes on the
docket. I posit that there is no such mechanism.
Pennsylvania’s rules of civil and appellate procedure do
not provide for any type of application or motion by which
PennDOT, or any litigant, can ask a court, appellate or
trial, to speed up the discharge of its judicial duties. In
this case, PennDOT sent a letter to the trial court, and
this step resuscitated the proceedings. However, this
informal communication is not an “appropriate” or reliable
method for achieving that result in future cases. A
petition for writ of mandamus is one possible mechanism but
hardly a desirable option. It is doubtful that PennDOT
could establish a clear legal right to expedited review, or
a corresponding duty in the trial court to comply more
quickly with a remand order. Whatever mechanism the
majority may have in mind, it places PennDOT in the
untenable position of acting as a “super-prothonotary” over
the docket of any court, including this Court, that is
directed by a higher court to reconsider a legal issue in a
license suspension proceeding.
Finally, the majority offers no standard for when and how
PennDOT must take this “appropriate action.” Should PennDOT
wait six months, a year or two years before nagging the
court? Is the standard different depending on whether
PennDOT is awaiting a decision from our Supreme Court or
from a court of common pleas? Is it different depending on
whether the court of common pleas is a single-judge judicial
district or has numerous judges?[fn2] Unfortunately for
Licensee, under applicable precedent, if one of the parties
must bear the burden of moving the case forward, it is
Licensee, as is suggested by a recent ruling of our Supreme
Court in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing v. Gombocz, ___ Pa. ___, 909 A.2d 798 (2006). In
Gombocz, the Supreme Court soundly reaffirmed the standards
and rules of law announced in Terraciano. The Supreme Court
also cited with approval this Court’s decision in Tarka v.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing,
756 A.2d 138 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2000), for the proposition that
“[t]he moving party has the burden to move the case
forward.” Gombocz, 909 A.2d at 801. Because our Supreme
Court has effectively given its imprimatur to Tarka, it is
inappropriate for the majority to overrule that decision
today. The rule in Tarka should control the outcome of this
case.
In Tarka, the trial court sustained the licensee’s license
suspension appeal and PennDOT appealed to this Court. We
vacated the trial court’s order and remanded “for the Trial
Court to re-examine its evidentiary rulings, reverse said
rulings if deemed legally correct to do so, and to conduct
additional hearings if appropriate.” Id. at 140. Further
proceedings, though contemplated, were not required as was
the case in Terraciano. Three years passed before the case
was eventually docketed for a new hearing. In rejecting the
licensee’s subsequent claim that the three-year delay was
attributable to PennDOT, this Court held:
[T]his Court’s order of April 25, 1995, which vacated and
remanded the matter to the Trial Court, returned the
parties to the status quo ante. Therefore, Tarka, having
initially appealed the Department’s suspension of his
license in the Trial Court, was again the Appellant and
moving party, with the burden of moving his case
forward.
Id. at 141.
A straightforward application of Tarka in the present case
yields the same result: Licensee initially appealed
PennDOT’s suspension of his license and prevailed before
the trial court. PennDOT successfully appealed and obtained
a remand order that directed the trial court to reconsider
its decision. Licensee, having initially appealed his
license suspension, was again the appellant and moving
party, with the burden of moving his case forward. For the
foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order of the trial
court’s conclusion that the delay should be chargeable to
PennDOT.
Judge Leadbetter and Judge Cohn Jubelirer join in the
dissent.
[fn1] Licensee was one of twenty-seven appellants in Avato.
[fn2] PennDOT’s new role may be particularly vexing in a
single-judge judicial district, where the judge considering
PennDOT’s request to hasten judicial action and the judge
whose action PennDOT seeks to hasten will be one and the
same.