Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports

VOJTASEK v. DIOCESE OF ALLENTOWN, 2006 PA Super 372 DIANA
L. VOJTASEK, Appellant v. DIOCESE OF ALLENTOWN, READING
CENTRAL CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL, BISHIP EDWARD P. CULLEN AND
BISHOP THOMAS J. WELSH, Appellees. No. 1191 MDA 2005.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Filed: December 20, 2006.

Appeal from the Order June 30, 2005, In the Court of Common
Pleas of Berks County, Civil Division at No. 04-14021.

BEFORE: LALLY-GREEN, TODD and POPOVICH, JJ.

OPINION BY POPOVICH, J.

¶ 1 Appellant Diane L. Vojtasek appeals the order
granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
Appellees Diocese of Allentown, Bishop Edward P. Cullen,
Bishop Thomas J. Welsh, and Reading Central Catholic High
School (hereinafter “Central Catholic”) on grounds that
Appellees` fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of
limitations. We affirm.

¶ 2 “The standard to be applied upon review of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings accepts all
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true. `The
question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts
averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is
possible. Where doubt exists as to whether a demurrer
should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor
of overruling it.`” Tucker v. Philadelphia Daily News, 577
Pa. 598, 627-28, 848 A.2d 113, 131 (2004) (quoting MacElee
v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 544 Pa. 117, 674 A.2d
1050, 1054 (1996)). “Further, in passing on a challenge to
the sustaining of a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
our standard of review is limited. A motion for judgment on
the pleadings will be granted where, on the facts averred,
the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible.”
American Appliance v. E.W. Real Estate Management, Inc.,
564 Pa. 473, 477, 769 A.2d 444, 446 (2001) (citations
omitted).

¶ 3 Appellant has limited her question on appeal to
whether the trial court erred in refusing to recognize that
particular averments in her complaint create an issue of
fact as to whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine
applies to the case at bar. See Appellant’s brief, at 14
(“[Appellant`s] Complaint asserts factual allegations
sufficient to satisfy the [¶] fraudulent concealment
exception to the two[-]year statute of limitations
[¶].”). Accordingly, we shall determine whether
Appellant’s action should be remanded for further
proceedings or dismissed after reviewing the complaint
under the assumption that the allegations contained therein
are true.

¶ 4 The present lawsuit was commenced on September
28, 2004, with the filing of a fourteen-count complaint
alleging that, in September of 1990, Appellant was sixteen
years of age and in the eleventh grade at Central Catholic
when she was first sexually abused by Father James F.
Gaffney, who was the vice-principal and disciplinarian at
the high school. Central Catholic is a private, religious
educational institution under the charge of the Diocese of
Allentown, whose patriarch was Appellee Bishop Cullen after
February 9, 1998, while his predecessor was Appellee Bishop
Welsh.

¶ 5 When Appellant enrolled at Central Catholic at
the age of sixteen, Father Gaffney immediately befriended
the girl because her parents were going through a divorce,
and she exhibited signs of depression related thereto.
Father Gaffney began meeting with Appellant after school
and routinely took her for rides in his vehicle. During
these sojourns, Father Gaffney broached topics of a sexual
nature and, eventually, engaged in sexual relations with
Appellant at a private residence and in his high school
office. This clandestine relationship (described by Father
Gaffney to Appellant as their “secret”) was disclosed by
Appellant to a friend at the high school. The matter was
also reported to administrators and/or representatives at
Central Catholic, who confronted Appellant about the abuse,
and she confirmed its existence.

¶ 6 Thereafter, the offending priest was reassigned
to a parish in Easton, Pennsylvania, and Appellant was
ostracized by students, priests and other faculty members
and administrators for the remainder of the school year.
Yet, no one from Central Catholic reported the sexual abuse
to Appellant’s parents. In fact, when Appellant’s mother
contacted Central Catholic because she had heard stories
about the relationship, she was deceived by Appellees into
believing that Father Gaffney had not harmed her daughter.
Further, the sexual relationship between Appellant and
Father Gaffney continued when she matriculated into Penn
State University — Berks County campus.

¶ 7 It was not until January of 2004 that Appellant
learned through various media sources that civil suits had
been filed against Appellees alleging they had fraudulently
concealed and/or “covered up” their knowledge of the sexual
abuse that had been perpetrated upon minors in the Diocese
of Allentown by predator priests. See Appellant’s
Complaint, 9/28/04, § 74. Within nine months of
discovering via media exposure the proliferation of suits
against Appellees, Appellant initiated the present lawsuit
claiming that Appellees had knowledge of Father Gaffney’s
sexual abuses but engaged in “the covert practice of
concealing the problem,” which “deprive[ed Appellant] of the
knowledge of the essential factual averments which would
have formed the basis of [her] rights to legal redress
against [Appellees].” Id. at 160. Appellant also asserted
that Appellees “obstructed the prosecution of [her] cause
of action against them by continuously concealing the fact
that they had knowledge of Father Gaffney’s predilections
before the time [she] was abused.” Id. at 163.

¶ 8 In reply, Appellees filed an answer with new
matter contending that, inter alia, Appellant’s claims were
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and, prior
to 2002, victims of childhood sexual abuses by the clergy
had instituted lawsuits and filed claims against Appellees
for negligent retention, hiring, and supervision involving
the clergy sufficient to alert Appellant of the possibility
of filing a lawsuit against Appellees.

¶ 9 After hearing and upon consideration of the
parties` respective positions, the trial court found that
the statute of limitations was not tolled, and an order was
entered granting Appellees` motion for judgment on the
pleadings. A timely appeal was filed thereafter raising the
following issue; to-wit:

WHERE [APPELLANT] SPECIFICALLY ALLEGED THAT AS A PART OF
[APPELLEES`] COVER-UP, HER MOTHER WAS PURPOSELY LIED TO BY
SCHOOL OFFICIALS REGARDING THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SCOPE
AND NATURE OF THE SEXUALLY ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ONE OF THEIR PRIESTS/TEACHERS AND [APPELLANT], WAS IT
ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS HER ESTOPPEL CLAIM
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT EXCEPTION TO
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND GRANT [APPELLEES`] MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS?

Appellant’s brief, at 6.

¶ 10 The statute of limitations in an action to
recover damages for personal injury, not resulting in
death, is two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2).
Nonetheless, the running of the statute may be tolled and a
defendant estopped from asserting it as a defense in clear
cases of fraud, deception, or concealment. Baselice v.
Franciscan Friars Assumption BVM Province, Inc., 879 A.2d
270, 278 (Pa.Super. 2005). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
summarized the legal principles relevant to establishing a
claim of estoppel in Walters v. Ditzler, 424 Pa. 445, 227
A.2d 833 (1967):

(a) mere mistake, misunderstanding or lack of knowledge
do not toll the running of the statute of limitations; (b)
if, through fraud, deception or concealment of facts, a
[defendant] lulls an injured person or his representatives
into a sense of security so that such person’s vigilance
is relaxed, then the [defendant] is estopped from evoking
the statute; (c) the fraud which will toll the statute and
effect an estoppel need not be fraud in the strictest
sense, i.e., inclusive of an intent to deceive, but may be
fraud in the broad sense, i.e., inclusive of an
unintentional deception; (d) an estoppel becomes operative
only in clear cases of fraud, deception or concealment;
(e) the statute of limitations will run against persons
under a disability [¶].

Walters, at 449-50, 227 A.2d at 835 (citations omitted).
Accord Ward v. Rice, 828 A.2d 1118, 1123 (Pa.Super. 2003),
aff`d, 575 Pa. 704, 837 A.2d 1178 (2003); Haggert v. Cho,
703 A.2d 522, 527 (Pa.Super. 1997).

¶ 11 Herein, Appellant argues that Appellees`
representatives “lied” to her mother about the scope and
nature of the sexual relationship between herself and
Father Gaffney, which fraudulent conduct caused Appellant
to delay in filing suit. See Appellant’s brief, at 22.
Further, Appellant takes the position that, “[i]f this
Honorable Court accepts [Appellees`] argument in this
regard, it is essentially sanctioning the use of deceit to
enable a defendant to invoke the statute of limitations. In
other words, [Appellees] will be encouraged to misrepresent
to a minor’s parent the fact that a minor had been harmed
if confronted by the parent.” See Appellant’s reply brief,
at 4. We agree in principle with Appellant’s argument but
not to the extent to suspend the running of the statute of
limitations indefinitely.

¶ 12 To elaborate, at the pre-trial stage of the
case, we must view the non-moving party/Appellant’s
pleadings as true. Tucker, supra. This translates into
accepting as accurate Appellant’s averment that, “when
[her] mother contacted Central Catholic because she
suspected something [was] wrong with [the] daughter and she
had heard stories about the relationship between [the]
daughter and Father Gaffney, [her] mother was deceived by
[Appellees] and/or their representatives into believing
that Father Gaffney had not harmed [the] daughter.” See
Appellant’s Complaint, 9/28/04, § 42. This
concealment by Appellees` personnel lulled the “injured
person and/or her representative” into a sense of security
so that such person’s vigilance was relaxed. Walters,
supra. Our inquiry does not come to an end with such a
finding.

¶ 13 We have already stated that viewing Appellant’s
fraudulent concealment claim as true, the statute of
limitations was tolled, but only for a finite period.
Appellant was sixteen years of age upon entering the
eleventh grade at Central Catholic, and this is also when
the sexual abuses began, but the statute of limitations
would not begin to run until Appellant reached eighteen
years of age. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533(b), which
provision is implicated here to the extent that the sexual
abuses began in September of 1990, and this point in time
is after the 1984 General Assembly enactment tolling the
running of the statute of limitations for minors until the
age of majority. Meehan v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 870
A.2d 912, 916 n. 4 (Pa.Super. 2005). Stated otherwise,
under Section 5533(b) and the assignment of fraudulent
concealment to Appellees, the statute of limitations was
tolled until 1994: With Appellant being sixteen years of age
in 1990, her age of majority occurred in 1992, and the
two-year statute of limitations began to run thereafter,
which made the expiration date for Appellant instituting
suit no later than 1994. Appellant having instituted suit
in 2004, the complaint was filed beyond the two-year
statute of limitations.

¶ 14 The essence of Appellant’s fraudulent
concealment argument is that the Appellees` representatives
“lied” when her mother made inquiry as to a sexual
relationship between Appellant and Father Gaffney. This
tolled the statute of limitations until 1994, at which time
Appellant was beyond the age of majority and conceded “at
the time of the sexual assault [beginning in September of
1990] that she suffered an `injury` at the hands of Father
Gaffney [¶].” See Appellant’s Complaint, 9/28/04,
§ 87. Consequently, Appellant having admitted being
“injured” by Father Gaffney as early as September of 1990,
she should also have been aware that Appellees, as the
priest’s employers, were potentially liable for that abuse.
See Meehan, 870 A.2d at 922 (“for a cause of action to
accrue, the entire theory of the case need not be
immediately apparent [¶] as soon as [Appellants]
became aware of the alleged abuse, they should also have
been aware that the [Appellees], as the priests` employers,
were potentially liable for that abuse.” (quoting Kelly v.
Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 201 (1sustesu; Cir. 1999)).

¶ 15 We must keep in mind that it is the duty of a
party asserting a cause of action to use all reasonable
diligence to be informed of the facts and circumstances
upon which a potential right of recovery is based to
institute suit within the prescribed statutory period. Fine
v. Checcio, 582 Pa. 253, 269, 870 A.2d 850, 859 (2005);
Pocono International Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce Ave.,
503 Pa. 80, 468 A.2d 468, 471 (1983). At bar, even
conceding that Appellant`s minority at the time of the
sexual abuses would toll the statute of limitations (under
Section 5533(b)), Appellant still brought suit (in 2004)
beyond even the extended period of time under the minority
tolling statute, which began in 1990 and expired in 1992.
Appellant’s inaction spanned fourteen years after
acknowledging being “injured” (in September of 1990) by
Father Gaffney and ten years after the tolling of the
applicable statute of limitations (beginning with 1992
through 1994). Such events render Appellant’s complaint too
late in time to avoid the barring effect of the statute of
limitations. See Meehan, supra.

¶ 16 Order affirmed.