Federal District Court Opinions

U.S. v. PALOMINO, (S.D.Tex. 11-29-2006) UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA v. CHRISTOBAL PALOMINO. CRIMINAL NO. C-06-594.
United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Corpus Christi
Division. November 29, 2006

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

HAYDEN HEAD, Chief Judge

On November 16, 2006, the Court heard Defendant’s Motion
to Suppress Evidence (D.E. 17). After considering the
pleadings on file, the evidence presented and arguments of
counsel, the Court finds Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
Evidence should be DENIED.

I. Statement of Facts

On July 26, 2006, Texas Department of Public Safety
Trooper Ramey Saenz and Narcotics Sergeant Ronald Saenz
were patrolling US 77 in Kleberg County when they saw
Defendant swerve from the center stripe to the shoulder
lane stripe. Out of concern that Defendant may have been
drinking, Trooper Saenz initiated a traffic stop at
approximately 2:59 p.m.

Defendant pulled to the side of the road, and Trooper
Saenz asked him to exit the vehicle. Trooper Saenz began
questioning Defendant about the nature of his trip and
employment and asked for his driver’s license and insurance
papers. Trooper Saenz testified Defendant’s hand was
shaking when he presented his license to the officer, and
the address on his license was incorrect. Defendant told
him he was traveling to San Antonio to visit his Page 2
children. Defendant told Trooper Saenz that he was a
mechanic, and Trooper Saenz thought it was odd for a
mechanic to be traveling during the middle of a work week.
Furthermore, Defendant was not dressed as a typical
mechanic and did not have any tools or equipment in his
vehicle. Defendant told Trooper Saenz that he had not been
drinking, was not tired, and the steering on his truck was
functioning properly. Trooper Saenz subsequently patted
down Defendant but found no weapons. Defendant avoided eye
contact and was nervous throughout the initial interview.

At approximately 3:02 p.m., Trooper Saenz went back to his
patrol vehicle and initiated a computer check on
Defendant’s driver’s license. Trooper Saenz returned to
Defendant and asked if he was carrying anything illegal in
the vehicle. Defendant said “no,” and Trooper Saenz
subsequently asked Defendant for his consent to conduct a
thorough search of his vehicle. Defendant consented to the
search at 3:05 p.m. While he was waiting for the results of
the computer check, Trooper Saenz began searching
Defendant’s vehicle. Meanwhile, Sgt. Saenz began
questioning Defendant about the details of his trip.
Defendant was unable to provide the address and phone
number for his children.

At approximately 3:07 p.m., the computer check results
came back, which revealed there were no wants or warrants
for Defendant or his vehicle. At this point, Trooper Saenz
and Sgt. Saenz continued to search the vehicle. They found
a black bag that contained one change of clothing, a
toothbrush and deodorant. At 3:09 p.m., Trooper Saenz
opened the hood of the truck and saw wooden, non-factory
screws in the firewall. He testified this Page 3
indicated that somebody had tampered with the vehicle.

Trooper Saenz requested a K-9 search at 3:21 p.m. The K-9
arrived approximately ten minutes later and alerted to the
left side of the dashboard. Defendant subsequently agreed
to follow Trooper Saenz to the Highway Patrol office in
Kingsville for further inspection of the vehicle. Upon
arrival and further search of Defendant’s vehicle, Sgt.
Saenz found three bundles of cocaine and arrested Defendant
at 4:15 p.m.

II. Analysis

The issue before the Court is whether Defendant was
unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In reaching a determination on the issue, the Court must
decide (1) whether the traffic stop was legal under Terry
v. Ohio; and (2) whether Defendant gave valid consent to
search.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 434 (5th
Cir. 1993). A routine traffic stop is a “seizure” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v.
Valdez, 267 F.3d 35, 397 (5th Cir. 2001). Courts analyze
the legality of a traffic stop under the framework
established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 19 (1968). According
thereto, courts must answer two questions: (1) was the
initial stop justified at its inception, and (2) was the
intrusion reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
that justified the interference in the first place. United
States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2005)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 19 (1968)). Page 4

In order to properly evaluate the second prong of Terry,
the court must make the following fact determinations: (1)
when did the justification for the initial stop end; and
(2) did the government have reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity before that time. United States v.
Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). This
means the detention must end once the justification for the
initial stop has ended. Id.

In a valid traffic stop, an officer can request a driver’s
license, insurance papers, run a computer check, and issue
a citation. United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437
(5th Cir. 1993). Detention beyond the time required to
complete those tasks is an illegal seizure under the Fourth
Amendment unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion
supported by articulable facts that a crime has been
committed. United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 342
(5th Cir. 2002).

In this case, Defendant does not challenge the legitimacy
of the initial traffic stop. Rather, Defendant’s argument
focuses on the second prong of Terry. Specifically,
Defendant argues he was unlawfully detained after the
computer check results came back clean because (1) the
justification for the initial traffic stop had ended; and
(2) the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.

Here, Trooper Saenz asked Defendant to exit the vehicle
and produce his driver’s license and insurance papers. He
then initiated a valid computer check on Defendant’s
license. While Trooper Saenz was waiting for the results,
Defendant voluntarily gave consent to a thorough search of
his truck. Defendant admits that he gave consent to search
Page 5 his vehicle, and he has made no argument to the
Court that his consent was not voluntary or that Trooper
Saenz exceeded the scope of the consent given. Moreover,
there is no evidence that Defendant placed any limitations
on his consent, and there is nothing to suggest his consent
was in any way predicated on the outcome of the records
check.

The Court agrees that the justification for initial
traffic stop ended when the computer check came back clean.
Furthermore, the Court makes the following findings: (1)
Trooper Saenz developed reasonable suspicion that
contraband was hidden in Defendant’s vehicle when he opened
the hood of the truck and saw non-factory screws in the
firewall; and (2) Trooper Saenz had probable cause to
search the vehicle when the K-9 alerted to the left side of
the dashboard.

Nevertheless, the Court’s ruling on this motion does not
hinge on the Court making a finding as to whether Trooper
Saenz had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
justify Defendant’s continued detention. In this case,
Defendant voluntarily gave consent to search during a valid
traffic stop and while the officers were awaiting the
results of the computer check. Therefore, the Court finds
that Defendant gave consent before the justification for
the initial stop ended. The Court further finds that
Defendant’s consent was not limited and justified searching
wherever drugs might be concealed. Untied States v.
Torrellas, 2006 WL 2505425 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Florida
v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). Accordingly, the
Court finds the subsequent detention of Defendant was
justified by Defendant’s consent and therefore lawful.
Page 6

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
is DENIED.

ORDERED. Page 1