Connecticut Appellate Decisions

STATE v. ALOI, 280 Conn. 824 (2007) STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.
PAUL ALOI. (SC 17350). Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.

Syllabus

The statute ([Rev. to 2001] § 53a-167a, as amended
by P.A. 01-84, § 11) prohibiting a person from
interfering with an officer provides in relevant part that
“a person is guilty of interfering with an officer when
such person obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any
peace officer or firefighter in the performance of such
peace officer’s or firefighter’s duties. . . .”

The defendant was convicted of the crimes of interfering
with an officer, criminal trespass in the second degree and
criminal mischief in the third degree in connection with an
incident in which he allegedly trespassed on private
property on which certain pumping machinery had been
vandalized. A police officer who responded to a complaint
regarding the defendant’s alleged trespass asked the
defendant, who was standing on public property adjacent to
the pumping machinery at the time, to produce
identification. The defendant refused the officer’s
request, however, stating that “this isn’t Russia. I’m not
showing you any. . . .” The defendant appealed to the
Appellate Court, which, inter alia, reversed the
defendant’s conviction of interfering with an officer. The
Appellate Court concluded that the defendant’s refusal to
provide the officer with identification did not constitute
a violation of § 53a-167a. The state, on the
granting of certification, appealed to this court, claiming
that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s
conviction of interfering with an officer. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that, as a
matter of law, a person can not be convicted under §
53a-167a for refusing to provide identification to a police
officer who is investigating possible criminal activity
pursuant to Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1), under which a
police officer may briefly detain a person suspected of
engaging in criminal activity and take additional steps to
investigate the matter further; a suspect’s refusal to
comply with a lawful police command to provide
identification in connection with a Terry stop may hamper
or impede a police investigation, even when that refusal is
peaceable, and § 53a-167a reflects the intent of the
legislature to establish a broad proscription against
conduct that may be deemed to impede or hinder a police
officer in the discharge of his or her duties, including a
refusal to provide identification.

2. The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support
the defendant’s conviction of interfering with an officer;
the evidence was sufficient to establish, first, that the
defendant’s refusal to provide identification hindered the
police in investigating the defendant’s alleged trespass
by Page 825 delaying the progress of their investigation
and, second, that the defendant intentionally impeded the
efforts of the police to investigate the alleged trespass.

Argued March 9, 2006.

Officially released January 2, 2007.

Procedural History.

Substitute information charging the defendant, in three
cases, with two counts each of the crimes of burglary in
the third degree, criminal mischief in the third degree and
criminal trespass in the first degree, and with one count
each of the crimes of tampering with a motor vehicle,
interfering with an officer, disorderly conduct and attempt
to commit criminal mischief in the first degree, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain,
geographical area number fifteen, and tried to the court,
Shortall, J.; judgment of guilty in one case of criminal
trespass in the second degree as a lesser included offense
and criminal mischief in the third degree, and judgment of
guilty in a second case of interfering with an officer,
from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court,
Schaller, Bishop and Mihalakos, Js., which reversed only as
to the conviction of interfering with an officer and
remanded the case with direction to render judgment of not
guilty of that crime, and the state, on the granting of
certification, appealed to this court. Reversed in part;
judgment directed.

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Scott J. Murphy, state’s attorney,
and Louis Luba, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, for the
appellant (state).

Glenn T. Terk, with whom, on the brief, was P. Jo Anne
Burgh, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

PALMER, J.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found the
defendant, Paul Aloi, guilty of interfering with Page 826
a police officer in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to
2001) § 53a-167a, as amended by Public Acts 2001,
No. 01-84, § 11 (P.A. 01-84),[fn1] criminal trespass
in the second degree in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-108 and criminal mischief in the third degree
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-117.[fn2] The
court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of
imprisonment of ninety days, execution suspended, with two
years of conditional discharge, and imposed a total of
$2000 in fines. The defendant appealed to the Appellate
Court, which concluded, inter alia, that the defendant’s
refusal to provide identification to a police officer who
reasonably suspected that the defendant had been involved
in criminal activity did not support the defendant’s
conviction of interfering with a police officer under
§ 53a-167a. State v. Aloi, 86 Conn. App. 363, 374,
861 A.2d 1180 (2004). Accordingly, the Appellate Court
reversed the judgment of conviction pertaining to that
count.[fn3] Id., 381. We granted the state’s petition for
certification to appeal limited to the following issue:
“Did the Appellate Court properly construe and apply . . .
§ 53a-167a” State v. Aloi, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d
840 (2005). We answer the certified question in the
negative and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the
Appellate Court Page 827 with respect to the defendant’s
conviction of interfering with a police officer.

The opinion of the Appellate Court contains the following
facts that the trial court reasonably could have found.
“Since 1985, the defendant has resided adjacent to Mill
Woods Park, a public park in Wethersfield. Winding Brook
Turf Farm (Winding Brook) is located on the opposite side
of Mill Woods Park from the defendant’s residence. Winding
Brook has pumped water from a stream in Mill Woods Park for
several years to irrigate its crops. The noise associated
with the pumping activities has been a cause for contention
between the defendant and Winding Brook for some time. In
2002, Winding Brook began using a fire truck, which was
stationed in close proximity to the defendant’s home, to
pump water from Goff Brook at Mill Woods Park. During the
summer of 2002, some Winding Brook employees discovered
that the fire truck had been vandalized and contacted the
Wethersfield police department. In response, the police
installed a video surveillance camera to monitor the fire
truck.

“On August 2, 2002, the defendant approached Winding
Brook’s fire truck and stood on its side platform. He
subsequently opened the door to the cab of the fire truck,
leaned inside and placed his hands on the dashboard as well
as on the front seat. The exterior emergency lights on the
fire truck flickered on and off while the passenger door was
still open. The emergency lights remained on for
approximately fifty minutes. Consequently, William D.
Morgan, the owner of Winding Brook, filed a complaint
against the defendant for trespassing. In response, a
Wethersfield police officer told the defendant to stay off
of the Winding Brook property and to stay away from the
pumping equipment.

“On August 14, 2002, after the fire truck unexpectedly
ceased operating, Richard Peruta, an employee of Winding
Page 828 Brook, approached the fire truck to inspect the
equipment. He noticed that the defendant was standing
nearby. The defendant stated to Peruta: `Why don’t you call
the police, and I’ll have you arrested for false arrest.’
Peruta, consequently, contacted the Wethersfield police and
complained that the defendant was trespassing. [Sergeant
Robert LaBonte and Officers Jay Salvatore and Jenny Keys of
the Wethersfield police department] arrived at Mill Woods
Park in response to Peruta’s complaint and found the
defendant [with mud all over his shirt] standing on public
property near the fire truck. . . . Salvatore approached and
advised the defendant that Peruta had complained that the
defendant was trespassing and possibly had damaged the fire
truck.[fn4] Salvatore requested that the defendant produce
identification. The defendant did not immediately hand over
his identification. The defendant also stated that he did
not need to produce identification, that he was on public
property and that `this isn’t Russia. I’m not showing you
any [identification]. . . .'”[fn5] State v. Aloi, supra, 86
Conn. App. 365-66. At the conclusion of the trial, the
court found the defendant guilty of several charges,
including interfering with a police officer in violation of
§ 53a-167a.

In explaining why the state had proven the elements of the
offense of interfering with a police officer,[fn6] the
trial court stated that the police “[were not] asking for
Page 829 identification just to ask for identification”
but, rather, were acting within the scope of their duties
in investigating the defendant’s alleged trespass. The
court further stated that, “although [the defendant] may
not have known what in particular the police were
interested in” when Salvatore asked him for identification,
in view of the “past history” of police involvement in the
dispute between the defendant and Winding Brook, the
defendant “had every reason to know” that the police were
investigating that matter.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed
that the evidence was insufficient to establish a violation
of § 53a-167a because his comment and refusal to
provide identification immediately did not hinder Salvatore
in the performance of his duties.[fn7] State v. Aloi,
supra, 86 Conn. App. 368. The defendant also claimed that
the state had failed to establish that he had the requisite
intent to interfere with Salvatore in the performance of
his duties.[fn8] Id., 367 n. 2. In response, the state
maintained that ” § 53a-167a proscribes verbal as
well as nonverbal conduct that is intended to interfere with
a police officer in the performance of his or her duties”;
id., 369; and, further, that a refusal to comply with a
legitimate police request is equivalent to Page 830
interfering with an officer. See id. The state also
maintained that the evidence was sufficient to establish
that the defendant was guilty of interfering with an
officer in violation of § 53a-167a.

The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant that his
refusal to produce identification did not constitute a
violation of § 53a-167a. Id., 374. In support of its
conclusion, the Appellate Court relied on General Statutes
§ 14-217,[fn9] which expressly requires that a motor
vehicle operator provide identification to the police on
demand. Id., 370. The Appellate Court reasoned that, if the
legislature had intended a refusal to provide
identification to come within the purview of the conduct
proscribed under § 53a-167a, the legislature would
have said so explicitly, as it did under § 14-217.
Id. The Appellate Court also concluded that mere
declaratory words ordinarily cannot constitute interference
for purposes of § 53a-167a unless those words “exhort
or incite others in their dealings with [the] officer” or
unless the words Page 831 represent “a threat of violence
to the officer.”[fn10] Id., 374; cf. State v. Williams, 205
Conn. 456, 473, 534 A.2d 230 (1987) (“we construe §
53a-167a to proscribe only physical conduct and fighting
words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace” [internal
quotation marks omitted]). In light of its determination
that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the
defendant had hindered Salvatore in the performance of his
duties, the Appellate Court did not address the defendant’s
claim that the state had failed to prove that the defendant
intended to interfere with Salvatore. State v. Aloi, supra,
86 Conn. App. 367 n. 2.

On appeal to this court, the state maintains that the
evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to warrant a
finding of guilty with respect to the charge of interfering
with an officer under § 53a-167a. Specifically, the
state first contends that, under the doctrine of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968),
and its progeny, Salvatore was justified in approaching the
defendant and questioning him because Salvatore reasonably
suspected that criminal activity had occurred and that the
defendant was involved in it. The state further contends
that when, as in the present case, a police officer makes a
legitimate investigatory stop under Terry, the person
subject to the Terry stop must honor the officer’s
reasonable demand for identification. Finally, the state
maintains that the defendant’s refusal to identify himself
to Salvatore promptly provided a sufficient factual basis
for the defendant’s conviction under § 53a-167a. The
defendant contends that his peaceable refusal to provide
identification does not constitute a violation of §
53a-167a and that, in any Page 832 event, the evidence
adduced in the present case was insufficient to establish
either that he had hindered Salvatore in the performance of
his duties or that he had intended to do so.[fn11] We agree
with the state.

I

We first must determine whether a person lawfully may be
convicted of interfering with a police officer under
§ 53a-167a for refusing to provide identification to
that police officer who is investigating possible criminal
activity pursuant to a Terry stop. The resolution of that
question ultimately gives rise to an issue of statutory
construction over which our review is plenary. E.g., State
v. Ramos, 271 Conn. 785, 791, 860 A.2d 249 (2004). Our
review of § 53a-167a is guided by well established
principles, the fundamental objective of which is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature. E.g., Thames
Talent, Ltd. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities,
265 Conn. 127, 135, 827 A.2d 659 (2003). As in all cases of
statutory construction, we begin with the statutory
language itself.[fn12]

As the Appellate Court has observed, § 53a-167a
“defines interfering to include obstruction, resistance,
hindrance or endangerment.”[fn13] (Emphasis in original.)
Page 833 State v. Hampton, 66 Conn. App. 357, 375, 784 A.2d
444, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 901, 789 A.2d 992 (2001).
“Those words . . . have a broad scope. By using those words
it is apparent that the legislature intended to prohibit
any act which would amount to meddling in or hampering the
activities of the police in the performance of their duties.
. . . The [defendant’s] act, however, does not have to be
wholly or partially successful . . . [nor must it] be such
as to defeat or delay the performance of a duty in which
the officer is then engaged. The purpose of the statute,
which had its origin in the common law, is to enforce
orderly behavior in the important mission of preserving the
peace; and any act that is intended to thwart that purpose
is violative of the statute.” (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Beckenbach, 1 Conn. App.
669, 679, 476 A.2d 591 (1984), rev’d on other grounds, 198
Conn. 43, 501 A.2d 752 (1985); see also State v. Williams,
supra, 205 Conn. 471 ( § 53a-167a proscribes “conduct
that amounts to meddling in or hampering the activities of
the police in the performance of their duties”); State v.
Laws, 37 Conn. App. 276, 297, 655 A.2d 1131 (same), cert.
denied, 234 Conn. 907, 659 A.2d 1210 (1995). Thus, “[t]he
broad intent of § 53a-167a is to prohibit conduct
that hampers the activities of the police in the
performance of their duties. . . .” State v. Hampton,
supra, 375-76.

Because a refusal to provide identification in connection
with a Terry stop may hamper or impede a police
investigation into apparent criminal activity, we see no
reason why such conduct would be categorically excluded
under the expansive language of § 53a-167a.[fn14]
Page 834 Indeed, the state expressly alleged in the
information that the defendant had “hinder[ed]” the police
in the performance of their duties. “To `hinder’ is defined
as `to make slow or difficult the course or progress of.'”
State v. Biller, 5 Conn. App. 616, 621, 501 A.2d 1218
(1985), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 803, 506 A.2d 146, cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1005, 106 S. Ct. 3296, 92 L. Ed. 2d 711
(1986), quoting Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary. Although each case must be decided on its own
particular facts, as a general matter, a suspect’s refusal
to comply with a lawful police command to provide
identification following a Terry stop is likely to impede
or delay the progress of the police investigation, even
when that refusal is peaceable. See Marrs v. Tuckey, 362 F.
Sup. 2d 927, 946 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (refusal to comply with
police officer’s request to identify oneself “surely hinders
[that] police officer’s legitimate efforts to carry out his
lawful duties”). Thus, a refusal to comply with a police
command to provide identification in the course of a Terry
stop may constitute a violation of § 53a-167a even
if that refusal is unaccompanied by any physical force or
other affirmative act; § 53a-167a broadly proscribes
conduct that hinders, obstructs or impedes a police officer
in the performance of his or her duties irrespective of
whether the offending conduct is active or passive. Cf.
State v. Simmons, 86 Conn. App. 381, 388, 861 A.2d 537
(2004) (refusal to calm down and permit officer to perform
patdown search accompanied by use of abusive language was
sufficient to establish violation of § 53a-167a),
cert. denied, 273 Conn. 923, 871 A.2d 1033, cert. denied,
U.S., 126 S. Ct. 356, 163 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2005). We therefore
reject the defendant’s categorical contention that a
refusal to comply with a lawful police Page 835 request
for identification necessarily falls outside the purview of
§ 53a-167a.[fn15]

Notwithstanding the broad scope of § 53a-167a, the
Appellate Court concluded that, because §
14-217[fn16] expressly provides that motorists must produce
identification upon request in a variety of different
circumstances, including upon the request of a uniformed or
properly credentialed officer, the legislature would have
used similar language if it had intended to incorporate
such a requirement into § 53a-167a. State v. Aloi,
supra, 86 Conn. App. 370-71; see, e.g., Asylum Hill Problem
Solving Revitalization Assn. v. King, 277 Conn. 238,
256-57, 890 A.2d 522 (2006) (“[When] a statute, with
reference to one subject contains a given provision, the
omission of such provision from a similar statute
concerning a related subject . . . is significant to show
that a different intention existed. . . . That tenet of
statutory construction is well grounded because [t]he
General Assembly is always presumed to Page 836 know all
the existing statutes and the effect that its action or
non-action will have upon any one of them.” [Internal
quotation marks omitted.]). We disagree with the reasoning
of the Appellate Court. First, we are not persuaded that
§ 53a-167a and § 14-217 bear a sufficiently
close relationship to warrant the conclusion that the
legislature necessarily would have used similar language in
both § 53a-167a and § 14-217 if it had
intended for § 53a-167a to apply to a refusal to
provide identification. In particular, the scope and
purpose of the two provisions are different. Section
53a-167a is a criminal statute that broadly prohibits any
conduct intended to impede an officer in the performance of
his or her duties, whereas § 14-217 is a regulatory
provision that applies only to motorists, who, upon
request, are required to provide an array of identifying
information to the police and, in the event of an accident,
to any other person.[fn17] Thus, § 53a-167a, a class
A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year imprisonment, is
contained in our Penal Code, where it is classified as an
“[Offense] Against the Administration of Justice. . . .” By
contrast, § 14-217, which is punishable as an
infraction, is a motor vehicle statute codified in the
chapter of the General Statutes pertaining to “Vehicle
Highway Use.” Because the two statutory provisions address
appreciably different concerns in significantly different
ways, we do not believe that the two statutes properly may
be characterized as relating to the same subject matter for
purposes of triggering the rule of pari materia.[fn18] See,
e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, Page 837
179 Conn. 415, 422, 426 A.2d 1324 (1980) (for purposes of
rule of pari materia, only statutory provisions relating to
same subject matter may be considered for guidance).

Furthermore, the broad language of § 53a-167a
reflects a recognition by the legislature that, because
police officers are confronted daily with a wide array of
diverse and challenging scenarios, it would be impractical,
if not impossible, to craft a statute that describes with
precision exactly what obstructive conduct is proscribed. In
other words, § 53a-167a necessarily was drafted
expansively to encompass a wide range of conduct that may
be deemed to impede or hinder a police officer in the
discharge of his or her official duties. Because §
53a-167a reflects the intent of the legislature to establish
a broad proscription against conduct that intrudes upon the
ability of a police officer to perform his or her duties,
we are unwilling to conclude that the legislature did not
intend for § 53a-167a to cover a refusal to provide
identification — regardless of the extent to which
such a refusal actually may hinder or obstruct the police
in any particular set of circumstances — merely
because § 53a-167a does not expressly refer to that
conduct.

Finally, as the United States Supreme Court recently has
noted in upholding the constitutionality of a so-called
Page 838 “stop and identify” statute,[fn19] “[a]sking
questions is an essential part of police investigations. .
. . Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, [supra] 392 U.S. 1 . . .
the [c]ourt has recognized that a law enforcement officer’s
reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in
criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for
a brief time and take additional steps to investigate
further. . . .

“[The court’s] decisions make clear that questions
concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted
part of many Terry stops. See United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 229 [105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604] (1985)
(‘[t]he ability to briefly stop [a suspect], ask questions,
or check identification in the absence of probable cause
promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes
and bringing offenders to justice’); Hayes v. Florida, 470
U.S. 811, 816 [105 S. Ct. 1643, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705] (1985)
(‘[i]f there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion that a person has committed a criminal offense,
that person may be stopped in order to identify him, to
question him briefly, or to detain him briefly while
attempting to obtain additional information’); Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 [92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d
612] (1972) (‘[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in
order to determine his identity or to maintain the status
quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be
most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer
at the time’).

“Obtaining a suspect’s name in the course of a Terry stop
serves important government interests. Knowledge of
identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for
another offense, or has a record of violence Page 839 or
mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity may
help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate
their efforts elsewhere.” (Citations omitted.) Hiibel v.
Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177,
185-86, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004). Thus,
“[t]he principles of Terry permit a [s]tate to require a
suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop
. . . [because] [t]he request for identity has an immediate
relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands
of a Terry stop.”[fn20] (Citation omitted.) Id., 187-88.
Page 840

The fact that important government interests are served by
obtaining a suspect’s identity during the course of a Terry
stop provides additional reason to reject the narrow
construction of § 53a-167a advanced by the defendant
and adopted by the Appellate Court because, as the court
underscored in Hiibel, “[t]he threat of a criminal sanction
helps ensure that the request for identity [in connection
with a Terry stop] does not become a legal nullity.”[fn21]
Id., 188. In light of those important interests, and in the
absence of any overriding countervailing considerations, we
are unwilling to construe § 53a-167a as
categorically excluding from its purview a refusal to
provide identification to a police officer who has sought
such identification pursuant to a valid Terry stop.

In the present case, Salvatore reasonably suspected that
the defendant had committed a criminal trespass, the crime
that Salvatore was investigating when he approached the
defendant and asked him for identification. Furthermore,
Salvatore’s request for identification was undertaken in
accordance with Terry, and, therefore, Salvatore was
authorized to stop the defendant briefly and ascertain his
identity. Finally, the defendant Page 841 knew why
Salvatore had asked him for identification; the defendant
had encouraged the complaining witness, Peruta, to call the
police, and, when the police arrived, Salvatore explained
to the defendant that he was responding to that complaint.
Under the particular circumstances presented, therefore,
the defendant cannot prevail on his claim that his conduct
in refusing to provide identification does not, as a matter
of law,[fn22] constitute a violation of §
53a-167a.[fn23]

II

Having concluded that the defendant’s refusal to comply
with Salvatore’s request for identification is not
categorically excluded from the purview of §
53a-167a, we next must determine whether, in light of the
particular facts adduced, the evidence was sufficient to
support the defendant’s conviction on that charge. In
support of his claim of evidentiary insufficiency, the
defendant contends, first, that the state failed to
demonstrate that his refusal to provide identification to
Salvatore hindered the police in their investigation of the
alleged criminal trespass and, second, that the evidence
Page 842 adduced by the state was inadequate to establish
that the defendant intended to interfere with the police.
Before considering the merits of the defendant’s claims, we
first set forth the well established principles that govern
our review.

“In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply
a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we
determine whether upon the facts so construed and the
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably
could have concluded that the cumulative force of the
evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not required
to accept as dispositive those inferences that are
consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The trier
may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts
established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and
logical. . . . This does not require that each subordinate
conclusion established by or inferred from the evidence, or
even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . because this court has held that a jury’s
factual inferences that support a guilty verdict need only
be reasonable. . . .

“[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt
does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor
does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of
every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that,
had it been found credible by the trier, would have
resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask
whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that
would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask,
instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence
that supports the jury’s verdict of guilty. . . .
Furthermore, [i]n [our] process of review, it does not
diminish the probative force of the evidence that it
consists, in whole or in Page 843 part, of evidence that
is circumstantial rather than direct. . . . It is not one
fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts
which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial
circumstantial evidence. . . . Indeed, direct evidence of
the accused’s state of mind is rarely available. . . .
Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct . . . and
from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence
and the rational inferences drawn therefrom. . . . [A]ny
such inference cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or
conjecture. . . . It is axiomatic, therefore, that [a]ny
[inference] drawn must be rational and founded upon the
evidence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 79-81, 905 A.2d
1101 (2006). With these principles in mind, we now turn to
the defendant’s claims.

A

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s
refusal to identify himself to the police hindered the
police in their investigation of his alleged trespass.
First, the police needed to ascertain the defendant’s
identity because they had been informed by Peruta that a
person by the name of Paul Aloi had committed a trespass.
Upon arriving at the scene, the police observed two
individuals, one of whom turned out to be the defendant,
standing in the vicinity where Peruta claimed that the
trespass had taken place. Because Peruta had identified the
alleged trespasser by name, obtaining the identity of those
individuals was a logical and necessary step in the police
investigation of the complaint. Although the police
eventually ascertained the identity of the defendant, his
refusal to comply with Salvatore’s request for
identification delayed the progress of the police
investigation. That delay need not have been substantial to
have constituted a hindrance for purposes of §
53a-167a; rather, the delay need only have impeded Page
844 the police to some appreciable degree. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we
cannot say that the trial court was required to find that
the delay was insufficient to hinder the police in their
investigation of Peruta’s complaint.[fn24]

The defendant nevertheless contends that his refusal to
identify himself to Salvatore did not interfere with the
investigation because one of the officers who had arrived
at the scene in response to Peruta’s complaint, namely,
LaBonte, was familiar with the defendant.[fn25] We reject
the defendant’s contention for several reasons. First, the
evidence indicated that LaBonte himself had instructed
Salvatore to identify the two individuals — one of
whom was the defendant — who were at the scene when
the officers arrived there. In light of that evidence, it
is reasonable to presume that LaBonte did not recognize the
defendant. Moreover, the defendant himself testified that he
did not know either LaBonte or Salvatore prior to August
14, 2002, the day on which the police responded to Peruta’s
complaint about the defendant’s alleged trespass. Finally,
during closing arguments, defense counsel asserted that
LaBonte did not learn of the defendant’s identity until it
eventually became known that day. Therefore, we are not
persuaded that LaBonte’s purported familiarity with the
defendant obviated any need for Salvatore to seek his
identification. Page 845

B

The defendant further asserts that the evidence adduced by
the state was insufficient to prove that the defendant
intended to interfere[fn26] with the police.[fn27] This
claim also lacks merit. The evidence established that,
prior to refusing Salvatore’s request for identification,
the defendant knew that he was the subject of the police
investigation because Peruta, who had accused the defendant
of trespassing, had told the defendant that he was going to
call the police. Indeed, as we have explained, the
defendant himself suggested that Peruta contact the police.
Moreover, the police explained to the defendant why they
were there before asking him for identification. Thus, the
defendant knew that the police needed to ascertain his
identity in connection with their investigation of Peruta’s
complaint. The trial court, therefore, reasonably found
that the defendant’s failure to identify himself to
Salvatore reflected an intent by the defendant to hinder,
delay or impede the police in their efforts to determine
whether a trespass had occurred and, if so, whether the
defendant was the person who had committed the trespass.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed in part and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm
the judgment of conviction with respect to the charge of
interfering with an officer; the judgment of the Appellate
Court is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.