New York Appellate Division Reports

PEOPLE v. SNAGG, KA 04-01482 [4th Dept 12-22-2006] 2006 NY
Slip Op 09925 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. IAN SNAGG, ALSO KNOWN AS “LOVE,”
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. KA 04-01482. Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department. Decided
on December 22, 2006.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga
County (John J. Brunetti, A.J.), rendered April 25, 2003.
The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first
degree and conspiracy in the second degree.

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PHILIP
ROTHSCHILD OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

ELIOT SPITZER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (HANNAH STITH LONG
OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., MARTOCHE, CENTRA, AND PINE, JJ.

It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal from the judgment
insofar as it imposed sentence be and the same hereby is
unanimously dismissed (see People v Haywood, 203 AD2d 966,
lv denied 83 NY2d 967) and the judgment is affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting
him upon a jury verdict of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree (Penal Law
§ 220.21 [former (1)]) and conspiracy in the second
degree (§ 105.15). Supreme Court properly denied
suppression of the cocaine. The arrest of defendant and the
seizure of the cocaine discarded by him during his
attempted flight from police were supported by probable
cause to believe that defendant was engaged in a criminal
conspiracy to distribute cocaine (see People v Harper, 236
AD2d 822, 823, lv denied 89 NY2d 1094; see generally People
v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254). Moreover, under the
circumstances of this case, in which probable cause for the
arrest of defendant was made out on papers alone, viz., the
applications for the eavesdropping warrants, and in which
the suppression hearing conducted by the court prior to the
retrial appears to have been entirely superfluous (cf.
People v Dunn, 155 AD2d 75, 80, affd 77 NY2d 19, cert
denied 501 US 1219; People v Glen, 30 NY2d 252, 262, cert
denied sub nom. Baker v New York, 409 US 849; People v
Solimine, 18 NY2d 477, 480, rearg denied 21 NY2d 1041), we
conclude that any error in the manner in which the court
conducted the suppression hearing could not have prejudiced
defendant.

Contrary to defendant’s contention, “[a]n indictment for
conspiracy need not allege every overt act” committed by
defendant, and “[i]f the indictment provides sufficient
detail about the scope and nature of the conspiracy and the
major overt acts committed in furtherance of it, then
evidence may be offered at trial of related overt acts”
(People v Ribowsky, 77 NY2d 284, 292-293). Moreover,
evidence of those overt acts, even though they amount to
uncharged crimes, may be adduced at defendant’s trial for
conspiracy without violating the Molineux rule (see People
v Morales, 309 AD2d 1065, lv denied 1 NY3d 576, citing
Ribowsky, 77 NY2d at 292-293; see also People v McKnight,
281 AD2d 293, lv denied 96 NY2d 865, 904; People v Jimenez,
281 AD2d 176, lv denied 96 NY2d 830). The Deputy Attorney
General had statutory authority to obtain the wiretapping
and search warrants and to prosecute this case in Onondaga
County (see Executive Law § 70-a [1], [4], [7]; see
also CPL 700.05 [5]; People v Vespucci, 144 AD2d 48, 51,
55-56, affd 75 NY2d 434, 437-438; People v Leale, 151 AD2d
611, 612-613, lv denied 75 NY2d 869, 76 NY2d 738).

In light of defendant’s subsequent resentencing, we do not
consider the challenge to the severity of the original
sentence. We have considered defendant’s other contentions
and conclude that they are without merit.