Wyoming Case Law
MOULTON v. STATE, 2006 WY 152 JAMES THOMAS MOULTON,
Appellant (Defendant), v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee
(Plaintiff). No. 05-244. Supreme Court of Wyoming.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006. December 15, 2006.
Appeal from the District Court of Platte County The
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge.
Representing Appellant: Ken Koski, State Public Defender,
PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane Courselle,
Faculty Director, DAP; Michael Irvin, Student Intern;
Kathryn Hogarty, Student Intern. Argument by Ms. Hogarty.
Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General;
Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling,
Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey,
Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Causey.
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.
KITE, Justice.
[¶ 1] James Moulton was charged with one count of
manufacturing psilocyn, [fn1] a felony, in violation of
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis
2005). Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress
evidence seized from his residence pursuant to a search
warrant obtained by deputies after they entered and
searched the residence without a warrant. The district
court concluded the emergency assistance exception to the
warrant requirement applied, upheld the search and denied
the motion. Mr. Moulton changed his initial plea of not
guilty to guilty, reserving his right pursuant to W.R.Cr.P.
11(a)(ii) to appeal the district court’s order denying his
suppression motion. We affirm the denial.
ISSUES
[¶ 2] Mr. Moulton presents the following issue for
our review:
Did the trial court err in declaring that the search of
Mr. Moulton’s residence was proper under the emergency
assistance exception to the warrant requirement of Article
1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
The State rephrases the issue as follows:
Did the district court err in denying appellant’s motion
to suppress?
FACTS
[¶ 3] On August 20, 2004, at 4:30 a.m., Deputy Bill
Motley of the Platte County Sheriff’s Office received a
telephone call at his home in Wheatland, Wyoming from a
dispatcher indicating she had received a garbled radio
transmission which concerned her. Deputy Motley went to the
dispatch office to listen to the recording of the
transmission. He heard a female voice saying the words “Med
Tech 3” but could not understand the rest of the
transmission. The dispatcher informed Deputy Motley she had
determined through some telephone calls that “Med Tech 3”
was Crystal Moulton, an emergency medical technician (EMT)
who lived in Glendo with her husband and children. The
dispatcher also indicated she had obtained telephone
numbers for Ms. Moulton, tried those numbers and received
no answer.
[¶ 4] The fact that an EMT had attempted to contact
dispatch by radio transmission at 4:30 in the morning
concerned the dispatcher and Deputy Motley. Therefore,
Deputy Motley decided to drive to Glendo and see if he
could locate Ms. Moulton. Accompanied by Deputy Samantha
Klier, Deputy Motley traveled to Glendo and arrived at the
Moulton residence between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m. Deputy Motley
knocked on the door of the mobile home but there was no
response. He tried the door, found it unlocked, and opened
it. From outside the door, he announced that he was with
the sheriff’s department. There was no response and he and
Deputy Klier entered the mobile home.
[¶ 5] Inside, in what appeared to be the living room,
the deputies saw no one. Using their flashlights because
the residence was dark, they proceeded to a closed door to
the right of the living room. Deputy Motley knocked and
announced that he was with the sheriff’s department. No one
answered and Deputy Motley opened the door. Inside, he saw
two teenage girls who appeared to be asleep. He awakened
them and identified himself. The girls identified
themselves as James and Crystal Moulton’s daughters. At the
suppression hearing, Deputy Motley testified he asked one
of them if she knew where her mother was and she responded,
“[I]f she wasn’t home, she was down by the lake with her
dad.” The daughter testified the deputy asked if her
parents were home and she said, “No, sir, they’re not.” She
testified the deputy then asked if she knew where they were
and she responded, “[Y]es, they would be at the river.”
[¶ 6] The deputies left the girls in the bedroom and
continued through the home, opening doors as they came to
them. The last room they came to appeared to be the master
bedroom. The deputies stepped into the room and Deputy
Motley observed a clear plastic piece of PVC tubing
approximately two to three feet long sitting on the lid of a
bucket outside the closet. The closet was open and Deputy
Motley looked inside. He saw a vaporizer on the top shelf
and a box with a covered jar containing an unknown
substance on the floor of the closet. Next to the box he
observed a fluorescent light. On a dresser outside the
closet, Deputy Motley observed a glass jar covered on top
with tin foil poked with tiny holes. Inside the jar was a
tan and gray substance resembling a vermiculite and brown
rice mixture, commonly used for growing mushrooms. He
noticed another jar of the same appearance elsewhere in the
room.
[¶ 7] Having determined Ms. Moulton was not present
in the home, the deputies left the house to search for her
around Glendo Lake where the daughter said she might be.
After searching for several hours, they were unable to
locate her. Deputy Motley suggested they check the
residence again and, if Ms. Moulton had not returned,
inform the sheriff and search and rescue. Upon returning to
the residence, the deputies found Ms. Moulton. She told
them her vehicle had gotten stuck down by the lake and she
had called dispatch for help.
[¶ 8] Having determined Ms. Moulton was safe and not
in need of assistance, the deputies left the residence and
returned to Wheatland. Later that afternoon, Deputy Motley
spoke to the sheriff and the county attorney about what he
had seen inside the Moulton residence. He submitted an
application for a search warrant to the magistrate based
upon his observations. The magistrate issued a search
warrant and deputies searched the residence and found
evidence related to the possession and manufacture of a
controlled substance.
[¶ 9] Initially, the State filed three charges
against Mr. Moulton: possession of a controlled substance,
marijuana, a felony, in violation of §
35-7-1031(c)(iii); possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, a misdemeanor, in violation of §
35-7-1031(c)(i)(C); and endangering children, controlled
substances, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 6-4-405(b) (LexisNexis 2003). In a separate
proceeding, the State filed a fourth charge against Mr.
Moulton: manufacture of a controlled substance, psilocyn, a
felony, in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii). The
prosecution moved to join the proceedings in one action,
which motion was granted. Mr. Moulton pled not guilty to
all of the charges and the district court set the case for
trial.
[¶ 10] Mr. Moulton filed a motion to suppress the
evidence seized during the search of his residence. At the
hearing on the motion, the district court listened to the
taped radio transmission and heard testimony from Deputy
Motley, Deputy Klier and one of the Moultons’ daughters.
Based upon the evidence presented, the district court made
the following findings of fact relevant to the issue
presented for our review:
— There was a call to the Platte County Sheriff’s
Office by Ms. Moulton in her capacity as a medic;
— The district court listened to the tape and
there did appear to be some urgency in the voice of the
caller;
— The Sheriff’s Office was concerned Ms. Moulton
was either in trouble herself or had found someone in
trouble;
— The deputies proceeded to Glendo and arrived at
the Moulton residence at approximately 5:30 a.m. They
walked around the outside of the residence. Deputy Motley
knocked loudly on the door and received no response. He
tried the door, found it was unlocked, opened the door and
announced his presence. The deputies went into the trailer
and saw no one in the living room or kitchen;
— They then went to a bedroom door, knocked and
announced their presence. The door was opened and two
teen-age girls were discovered asleep in their beds.
Deputy Motley woke up one of the girls and asked her if
she knew where her mother was. She responded that if she
wasn’t at home, she was down at the lake “or river” with
their dad;
— The deputies went to the bedroom at the far end
of the hallway. In the room they saw in plain sight
evidence of some type of drug operation, including a
vaporizer, a cooler, PVC pipe and some jars with material
in them. Both deputies very quickly concluded it looked
like some type of system for growing mushrooms; and
— All of the drug growing equipment was in plain
sight in the bedroom and there was no intentional search
of the residence for drug paraphernalia.
[¶ 11] The district court reached the following
conclusions of law:
— Based on the call, the Platte County Sheriff’s
Office had a reasonable basis to believe that Ms. Moulton
was either in trouble herself or had encountered trouble;
— It was reasonable for the Platte County
Sheriff’s Office to use their best efforts to find Ms.
Moulton;
— It should have been an expectation of Ms.
Moulton’s that once she identified herself as a medic to
the Platte County Sheriff’s Office at 4:30 in the morning
the Sheriff’s Office would try to find her;
— The Sheriff’s Department had a reasonable basis
to believe there was some type of emergency that needed to
be responded to;
— The Deputies then reasonably went to the Moulton
residence for the purpose of finding Ms. Moulton;
— Given the likely emergency, it was reasonable to
enter the Moulton residence to determine if Ms. Moulton
was present;
— It was during this attempt to aid Ms. Moulton
that the drug paraphernalia was discovered;
— There was no search of closed containers but
rather simply a search for the person of Ms. Moulton. The
drug paraphernalia was in plain sight in the bedroom; and
— The search of the Moulton residence for Ms.
Moulton was not illegal or improper, but rather fell
appropriately with the emergency assistance exception to
obtaining a search warrant.
The district court entered an order denying the motion to
suppress.
[¶ 12] After the district court’s ruling, Mr. Moulton
changed his plea to guilty on the charge of manufacturing
psilocyn conditioned upon his right to appeal the order
denying his suppression motion. In exchange for his guilty
plea to the one count, the State dismissed the other three
charges filed against Mr. Moulton. The district court
sentenced Mr. Moulton to forty-eight to seventy-two months
imprisonment and suspended execution of the sentence
pending completion of twelve months incarceration in the
Platte County Jail and three years supervised probation.
Mr. Moulton appealed the district court’s order denying his
motion to suppress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 13] The question of whether an unreasonable search
or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights
presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo. O’Boyle
v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo.
2005). We reverse a district court’s factual findings on a
motion to suppress only when they are clearly erroneous.
Id.
DISCUSSION
[¶ 14] Mr. Moulton claims the district court erred in
ruling the search of his residence was proper under the
emergency assistance exception to the warrant requirement
of Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Citing People v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421 (Colo. 2004), Mr.
Moulton asserts for a search to be reasonable under the
emergency assistance exception law enforcement officials
must have a reasonable basis approximating probable cause
that associates the emergency with the area searched. He
argues the garbled radio transmission did not provide
deputies a reasonable basis associating an emergency with
the Moulton residence. He claims the radio transmission may
have given them a reasonable basis for going to the
residence but it did not provide a reasonable basis for
searching the residence. He characterizes the radio
transmission as giving rise to a theoretical possibility
that an emergency existed at the residence, not the
required reasonable basis associating an emergency with the
residence.
[¶ 15] Citing Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶
29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004), the State asserts the
emergency assistance exception applies when law enforcement
officials have a reasonable basis for believing a person’s
life, safety or property is in danger. In such cases, the
State argues, officers may enter and search an area to
render assistance but not to look for evidence. Because the
deputies in this case entered the residence to look for Ms.
Moulton and provide assistance in response to her radio
transmission and because their search of the residence was
limited to looking for her, the State contends the search
was proper under the emergency assistance exception.
[¶ 16] The substantive law governing searches is well
established. Unreasonable searches and seizures are
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming
Constitution. Searches and seizures conducted without a
warrant are per se unreasonable under both constitutions
unless they are justified by probable cause and established
exceptions. Pena, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d at 870. Consent is
one exception to the warrant requirement. Id. Other
exceptions include a search: 1) of an arrested suspect and
the area within his control; 2) conducted while in pursuit
of a fleeing suspect; 3) to prevent the imminent
destruction of evidence; 4) of an automobile upon probable
cause; 5) which results when an object is inadvertently in
the plain view of police officers while they are where they
have a right to be; and 6) which results from an entry into
a dwelling in order to prevent loss of life or property
(also referred to as the emergency assistance exception).
Id. The question of whether an exception applies to support
a search without a warrant is dependent upon all of the
facts and circumstances viewed in their entirety. Id. When
a defendant properly objects to or moves for suppression of
evidence seized, the State bears the burden of proving that
one of the exceptions applies. Id.
[¶ 17] This Court has considered the applicability of
the emergency assistance exception to the warrant
requirement in two prior cases. In Pena, law enforcement
received a 911 report that two people had been shot in a
mobile home. Deputy Doyle initially entered the mobile home
to determine who was inside and whether anyone needed
medical attention. He found two dead bodies and no one else
inside, left the mobile home and called for an
investigator. The investigator arrived and entered the home
to inspect the scene. He observed rifle caliber shell
casings on the floor and two dead bodies. Law enforcement
later obtained a search warrant.
[¶ 18] Addressing the defendant’s claim that the
searches were unconstitutional, we held the searches were
justified without a warrant by exigent circumstances and
were constitutional. Specifically, we concluded the
searches fell within two of the recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement: a search resulting from entry into
a dwelling to prevent loss of life and a search to prevent
the imminent destruction of evidence. We said:
The emergency assistance exception applies when police
have a reasonable basis for believing that another’s life
or safety is in danger. In that case, they may search the
area to render assistance, but not to search for evidence.
To prevent loss of life or property, an officer may walk
through a home to determine if anyone else is present when
officers have a reasonable belief that the area harbors an
individual posing a danger to those present. Further, in
previous decisions, we have upheld warrantless searches
to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.
. . . [T]he evidence supports finding that the
warrantless entries by the law enforcement officers onto
the crime scene were justified under these exceptions.
Deputy Doyle testified that he did not know that anyone
inside was deceased and entered to see if anyone needed
medical attention. The deputy had a reasonable basis for
believing emergency aid was required, and his initial
entry was justified. Immediately after determining that no
one inside the home was alive and the suspect was not
inside, Deputy Doyle left the home because he was
concerned that the killer might return to it and waited
outside for other law enforcement to arrive.
Deputy Doyle’s search was limited to the emergency
assistance exception. He only checked on the health and
safety of persons in the home. Pena, however, was still at
large and reportedly armed. Officer safety concerns, as
well as evidence preservation, support the second entry
by the more highly trained investigator. Investigator
Thompson arrived and spent three to four minutes inside
the home assessing the crime scene. He observed the
presence and location of the two bodies and rifle shell
casings. [The 911 report indicated] use of a shotgun.
Because the shell casings were from a rifle, Deputy Doyle
immediately advised other officers who were still looking
for Pena that Pena was armed with a rifle, a longer-range
weapon.
Pena, ¶¶ 31-33, 98 P.3d at 871.
[¶ 19] In Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935 (Wyo. 1983),
law enforcement officials arrested the defendant outside
his home after he called and reported shooting his wife.
Upon arresting the defendant, one of the officers went
inside the home to check on the condition of the victim. We
held the officer’s entry into the home was proper under the
emergency assistance exception. Id. at 941. We further held
once inside the home the police officer was authorized to
take cognizance of items within plain view. He was
entitled, we said, to see what came into his field of
vision while he was where he had a right to be. So long as
the initial intrusion was justified, “the police while
within the legitimate scope of their entry may search the
premises with their eyes.” Id.
[¶ 20] In Pena and Ortega, officers entered private
residences without a warrant in response to reported
shootings. Like these Wyoming cases, the majority of cases
in which other courts have applied the emergency assistance
exception to uphold a warrantless search have involved
reports of violence where the victims were thought to be
seriously injured. The general rule is that application of
the emergency assistance exception is strictly limited to
situations involving specific, clearly described
emergencies occurring inside the residence from which
officers perceived an immediate need to respond in order to
protect life or limb. See State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032 (NM
2005) (containing an instructive discussion of the
exception). In cases involving generalized, non-specific
information that someone might be inside the residence and
might be injured, courts typically have not applied the
emergency assistance exception to uphold a warrantless
search. Id.
[¶ 21] Mr. Moulton’s case does not involve a
specific, clearly described report of an emergency
occurring inside the Moulton residence from which the
deputies perceived an immediate need to respond in order to
protect life or limb. Rather, it involved a garbled radio
transmission received at 4:30 a.m. from an EMT from which
the sheriff’s office could discern very little. Neither the
parties’ briefs nor our research has produced any cases
involving facts similar to those presented in this case in
which courts have considered the emergency assistance
exception. Having carefully considered in their entirety
the facts and circumstances presented, we hold the search
was constitutional based upon the emergency assistance
exception to the warrant requirement.
[¶ 22] The radio transmission received by dispatch
was from an EMT. Deputy Klier testified the dispatcher who
received the transmission was very upset because she was
afraid someone was in danger but could not determine who or
what kind of danger. Deputy Klier testified: “[Danger] is
inherent in our line of work. We don’t get called on the 911
or on a radio transmission, unless something is wrong.”
Deputy Klier further testified when Deputy Motley picked
her up to drive to Glendo he said, “We have a broken radio
transmission. We think somebody is in trouble.” Deputy
Motley testified he was concerned Ms. Moulton had come upon
an accident or was involved in an accident and needed help.
The district court listened to the tape and found there was
some urgency in the caller’s voice.
[¶ 23] Given these circumstances — the urgent
4:30 a.m. radio transmission from an EMT using a portable
radio — the sheriff’s office had no real choice but to
respond. Ignoring the call was not a reasonable option. Law
enforcement had a reasonable basis to believe that an
emergency existed to which an immediate response was
required. Efforts to reach Ms. Moulton by telephone were
unsuccessful. The only other information the sheriff’s
office had to make contact with her was her home address.
Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the
deputies to attempt to locate her and to proceed to her
residence in an effort to do so.
[¶ 24] Upon arriving at the residence and receiving
no response to their efforts to make their presence known,
it was reasonable given the urgent sounding early morning
radio transmission from an EMT for the deputies to enter
the home to look for Ms. Moulton. Even after talking with
the daughter, it was reasonable for the deputies to look for
Ms. Moulton in other areas of the house, including the
master bedroom. Once inside the bedroom, the deputies were
authorized to see what was in plain view. All of the
evidence indicated the drug growing paraphernalia was in
plain view. No evidence was presented to suggest the
deputies had intentions, other than to locate Ms. Moulton,
when they looked inside the home. After discovering the
items in the master bedroom, Deputy Motley said to Deputy
Klier, “[W]e are not here for this. We have got a possible
emergency. We are here to find Ms. Mouton and make sure she
is all right.” Once they determined Ms. Moulton was not
there, the deputies left the residence. They were inside
the house for about seven minutes. Under these
circumstances, the district court correctly concluded the
search of the Moulton residence for Ms. Moulton was not
illegal or improper, but rather fell appropriately with the
emergency assistance exception to obtaining a search
warrant.
[¶ 25] Mr. Moulton cites Allison as supporting his
argument that the radio transmission was not enough to
avoid the warrant requirement. In Allison, police were
dispatched to a residence after a 911 hang-up call. A woman
answered the door, revealed that a domestic dispute had
occurred, and eventually let an officer inside. The officer
removed the individuals involved in the altercation from
the residence and then reentered the residence without a
search warrant. The trial court found, and no party
disputed, that the initial entry was either consensual or
justified by an emergency. Allison, 86 P.3d at 423. The
question was whether the re-entry was valid without a
search warrant based upon the emergency assistance
exception.
[¶ 26] The Colorado Supreme Court held the emergency
aid exception did not support the officer’s re-entry into
the home after arresting and removing the offenders. The
Court concluded no emergency existed at the time the
officer re-entered the home because the domestic incident
was over, the individuals involved had been removed from
the premises and there was no indication anyone else was
involved in the incident. Therefore, the officer had no
reasonable basis to believe an emergency continued to exist
requiring his assistance. Additionally the Court found the
evidence demonstrated the officer entered the residence the
second time to conduct a criminal investigation, rather than
to render emergency assistance. The Court affirmed the
trial court’s order suppressing the evidence. We cited
Allison in Pena for the principle that when police have a
reasonable basis for believing another’s life or safety is
in danger, they may search the area to render assistance
but not for evidence.
[¶ 27] Mr. Moulton’s case is distinguishable from
Allison in important ways. In Allison, the officer
re-entered the home without a warrant after the emergency
was over with no reasonable basis for believing at that
point anyone was in danger. Here, the deputies entered the
home knowing only that the resident of the home, an
emergency medical technician, placed an urgent sounding
call to dispatch at 4:30 that morning, circumstances we
have concluded created a reasonable basis for believing Ms.
Moulton was in need of emergency assistance. Unlike in
Allison, the emergency justifying the initial entry into the
Moulton residence remained unresolved. It was not clear
until the deputies inspected the home that it was secure.
At that point, the party whom the deputies reasonably
believed needed emergency assistance had not been found.
Thus, the emergency giving rise to the initial entry still
existed and the deputies were justified in looking through
the home.
[¶ 28] Additionally, there was no evidence presented
in Mr. Moulton’s case that the deputies entered the home
for any purpose other than to locate Ms. Moulton. In fact,
the evidence was that even after observing the drug growing
paraphernalia, the deputies continued their search for Ms.
Moulton outside the residence for two more hours. Unlike
the situation in Allison, the totality of the circumstances
at the time the decision was made to look for Ms. Moulton
inside the residence demonstrated that the deputies had a
reasonable basis to believe an emergency existed requiring
their assistance.
[¶ 29] Mr. Moulton emphasizes his daughter’s
testimony that she told Deputy Motley her parents were not
home and were down by the lake. He argues that once the
deputies were told Ms. Moulton was not in the residence,
their reason for being there was no longer viable and they
were not authorized to continue looking through the home.
Our response to this contention is twofold.
[¶ 30] First, the district court heard the testimony
of both Deputy Motley and Mr. Moulton’s daughter. After
weighing their testimony, the district court entered a
finding of fact in accordance with Deputy Motley’s
testimony. Although our review of the constitutionality of
the search is de novo, we review the district’s court
factual findings pursuant to the clearly erroneous
standard. We do not find the district court’s factual
finding on the disputed testimony clearly erroneous.
[¶ 31] Second, regardless of whose testimony was
believed, the deputies had a reasonable basis even after
talking with the daughter to continue looking for Ms.
Moulton inside the residence. Based on Ms. Moulton’s
urgent, early morning radio transmission identifying
herself as an EMT, the deputies reasonably believed she
needed assistance. Whether or not they were told by the
just awakened teenage daughter that her mother was not
there, it was reasonable under the circumstances for them
to finish looking inside the residence before continuing
their search elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
[¶ 32] Considering the totality of the circumstances
in this case, we conclude the officers were acting
reasonably when they investigated the possible emergency
and properly limited their efforts to determining whether
anyone was in need of assistance rather than investigating
a crime. The emergency assistance exception applies in
these circumstances and the deputies’ entry into and search
of the Moulton residence was constitutional. Affirmed.
[fn1] Psilocyn is not defined in the Wyoming Statutes.
Psilocyn, like psilocybin, is a chemical obtained from
certain mushrooms found in Central America and Mexico; it
is a Schedule 1 hallucinogenic substance classified
chemically as a tryptamine.
http://www.dea.gov/concern/psilocybin.html.