Probation and Juvenile Court Act

Illinois Supreme Court Reports

IN RE JAIME P., A MINOR, 101602 (Ill. 12-21-2006) In re
JAIME P., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois,
Appellee, v. Jaime P., Appellant). Docket No. 101602.
Supreme Court of Illinois. Opinion filed December 21, 2006.

OPINION

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald,
Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and
opinion.

On November 19, 1999, at age 17, respondent, Jaime P., was
adjudicated delinquent based upon her admission of guilt to
the offense of aggravated arson, a Class X felony, and was
sentenced to, inter alia, five years’ probation. On October
27, 2003, several weeks after her twenty-first birthday,
respondent petitioned the juvenile division of the circuit
court of Kane County to terminate her probation on the
ground that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court expired
when she attained the age of 21. The juvenile court held
that respondent’s probation did not automatically
terminate. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed, finding
that the plain language of section 5-715(1) of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 (hereinafter, the Juvenile Court Act or
Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West 1998)), “evince[d] the
legislature’s intent to limit probationary periods to 5
years or until the minor is 21, whichever is less, with
exceptions for those convicted of first-degree murder, a
Class X felony, or a forcible felony.” 361 Ill. App. 3d
213, 215-16. The appellate court rejected respondent’s
alternate interpretation of the statute, finding that it
would “render[ ] meaningless the reference to the exception
appearing in the first sentence of section 5-715(1).” 361
Ill. App. 3d at 216. This court granted respondent’s
petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

Respondent was born on October 3, 1982. On June 26, 1999,
when she was 16 years of age, respondent and five other
youths entered the home of an acquaintance whom they knew
was away on vacation. Respondent and her codefendants took
items from the house and set a fire inside. Firefighters
responded to the blaze and one firefighter suffered injury
to his lung while trying to extinguish the fire. Respondent
was prosecuted under article V of the Act (705 ILCS
405/5-101 et seq. (West 1998)), and was adjudicated guilty
of aggravated arson. On November 19, 1999, the juvenile
court ordered respondent to: (1) pay, jointly and severally
with her codefendants, restitution of $6,250 to the victim;
(2) serve a period of residential placement; (3) perform 100
hours of community service or volunteer work; and (4) serve
five years of probation. Additionally, the court entered a
money judgment of $191,457 to Country Mutual Insurance, to
be paid jointly and severally with respondent’s
codefendants. While the juvenile court told respondent that
it would have jurisdiction over her “until you are 21,” the
written sentencing order states: “Minor placed on 5 years
[sic] probation until 11-19-04.” Respondent completed her
community service and was discharged from residential
placement when she reached 18, in 2000.

During 2000 and 2001, the State filed several petitions to
revoke respondent’s probation alleging, inter alia, that
she had violated her curfew, had committed criminal damage
to property, and was not living in the placement approved
by the court. Following a hearing on September 18, 2001,
the juvenile court found that respondent had violated
probation by failing to follow through with aftercare
following her residential placement. The petitions to
revoke probation were resolved by negotiated disposition on
October 24, 2001, and respondent was ordered to spend 45
days on work release. On December 20, 2002, the juvenile
court ordered an end to respondent’s curfew and to her
mandatory counseling.

On January 6, April 10, June 9, September 11, and October
2, 2003, the State filed additional petitions to revoke
probation. The record does not show any resolution of these
petitions. On October 27, 2003, respondent filed a motion
seeking relief from judgment. She asked the court to
terminate her probation and to dismiss the pending petitions
to revoke probation based on the fact that the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court had expired on October 3, 2003, when
she attained the age of 21. Following a hearing on November
20, 2003, this motion was denied. After respondent’s
counsel stated that she intended to appeal the juvenile
court’s ruling, the court stated: “That’s fine. In the
meantime, the case continues to go on because you are
appealing just an issue, not the minor’s underlying
sentence. So we will continue this over to January
[2004] for status.”

Although not argued by the State, we note our agreement
with respondent’s contention that this appeal is not moot,
as even though she is now 24 years of age, her juvenile
proceeding has not been completely terminated. The record
on appeal shows that status hearings in respondent’s case
have continued throughout 2004 and 2005, and, additionally,
a supplemental petition to revoke probation was filed on
January 5, 2005. The parties agree that the juvenile court’s
docket sheet reveals that the court terminated respondent’s
probation as “unsatisfied” on January 6, 2006, over a year
after the written termination date of November 19, 2004,
but ordered that the file remain open. Indeed, the case
apparently remains open to this day, with the juvenile
court continuing to regularly conduct status hearings,
according to the State, “to enforce the restitution order.”
See 705 ILCS 405/5-710(4) (West 1998); 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(f),
(i) (West 1998).[fn1]

Under section 5-710(4) of the Act, section 5-5-6 of the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 1998))
provides the terms and conditions of restitution in
delinquency cases. Respondent does not argue the propriety
of the continued “open” status of her case to “enforce the
restitution order,” and, indeed, a restitution order is not
discharged by the completion of the sentence imposed for the
offense. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(n) (West 1998). However,
restitution is to be paid in full within “a period of time
not in excess of 5 years” (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(f) (West
1998)), except that where certain circumstances exist, the
court may impose an additional period of time, not to exceed
two years, within which to make restitution (730 ILCS
5/5-5-6(f), (i) (West 1998)). Thus, here, the court-ordered
period for payment of restitution cannot extend beyond
November 19, 2006, seven years from the date the order was
imposed. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(f), (i) (West 1998); People
v. Brooks, 158 Ill. 2d 260, 267-68 (1994) (restitution
period normally begins at sentencing for nonincarcerated
defendants). Regardless, payment of any amounts remaining
due on the restitution and money judgment orders after
seven years may be enforced by means of a proceeding
provided by section 2-1601 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-1601 (West 1998)). See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(m)(3),
(m)(4) (West 1998); 735 ILCS 5/12-108(a) (West 1998).

Addressing the merits of respondent’s contention that the
lower courts’ reading of section 5-715(1) is erroneous, we
first note that resolving an issue of statutory
interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo
review. In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 364 (2005);
In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001). This court, in
People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157 (2006), recently decided
another case involving a question of statutory
interpretation involving a minor adjudicated delinquent in
proceedings conducted under article V of the Act. In
Taylor, we set forth the principles governing our analysis
of such statutory questions, stating: “Courts should
consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the
subject it addresses and the legislature’s apparent
objective in enacting it. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130,
135 (2002). But our inquiry must always begin with the
language of the statute itself, which is the surest and
most reliable indicator of the legislature’s intent. People
v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). When the language of
a statute is clear, it must be applied as written without
resort to further aids or tools of interpretation. In re
R.L.S., 218 Ill. 2d 428, 433 (2006). Furthermore, criminal
or penal statutes are to ‘be strictly construed in favor of
the accused, and nothing should be taken by intendment or
implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the
statute.’ People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 337 (1998).
However, if the language of a statute is ambiguous, we
may look to tools of interpretation-such as the doctrine of
in pari materia-to ascertain the meaning of a provision.”
Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 162-63. The statute at issue here,
section 5-715(1), entitled “Probation,” provides as
follows: “(1) The period of probation or conditional
discharge shall not exceed 5 years or until the minor has
attained the age of 21 years, whichever is less, except as
provided in this Section for a minor who is found to be
guilty for an offense which is first degree murder, a Class
X felony or a forcible felony. The juvenile court may
terminate probation or conditional discharge and discharge
the minor at any time if warranted by the conduct of the
minor and the ends of justice; provided, however, that the
period of probation for a minor who is found to be guilty
for an offense which is first degree murder, a Class X
felony, or a forcible felony shall be at least 5 years.”
705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West 1998). We agree with the
appellate court that the plain language of section 5-715(1)
“evinces the legislature’s intent to limit probationary
periods to 5 years or until the minor is 21, whichever is
less, with exceptions for those convicted of first-degree
murder, a Class X felony, or a forcible felony.” (Emphasis
added.) 361 Ill. App. 3d at 215-16. However, we disagree
with the appellate court’s further finding that “[t]he
legislature did not intend the automatic-termination
provision of the statute to apply to Class X offenders.”
361 Ill. App. 3d at 216.[fn2]

It is clear that the circuit court in juvenile proceedings
maintains jurisdiction only until the minor turns 21 years
of age. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 181. The purpose of article
V of the Juvenile Court Act is to “deal[ ] with the problem
of juvenile delinquency” (705 ILCS 405/5-101(1) (West
1998)), and, indeed, article V is entitled “DELINQUENT
MINORS.” By definition, ” ‘[m]inor’ means a person under
the age of 21 years subject to this Act.” (Emphasis
added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-105(10) (West 1998). Thus, where the
overriding purpose of article V of the Act is to deal with
delinquency in those “under the age of 21,” a reading of
section 5-715(1) that would entail extending jurisdiction
beyond that age appears to be contrary to the intent of the
legislature and cannot be correct.

Thus, in our view, a plain reading of the first sentence of
section 5-715(1) explains the general rule that
probationary periods “shall not exceed 5 years or until the
minor has attained the age of 21 years, whichever is less,”
with the proviso that there exists an exception “provided
in this Section for a minor who is found to be guilty for
an offense which is first degree murder, a Class X felony,
or a forcible felony.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS
405/5-715(1) (West 1998). The second sentence of section
5-715(1) then sets forth this exception to the general
rule, i.e., that minors found guilty of those enumerated
offenses shall be sentenced to “at least 5 years ” of
probation, subject only to the jurisdictional cap of 21
years. 705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West 1998); see also 705 ILCS
405/5-710, 5-755 (West 1998). Contrary to the appellate
court’s contention, this interpretation of the statute does
not render meaningless the reference to the exception
appearing in the first sentence of section 5-715(1). See
Cassens Transport Co. v. Illinois Industrial Comm’n, 218
Ill. 2d 519, 524 (2006) (“We must construe the statute so
that each word, clause, and sentence is given a reasonable
meaning and not rendered superfluous, avoiding an
interpretation that would render any portion of the statute
meaningless or void”); People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148,
156 (2006). Further, the second clause of the second
sentence of section 5-715(1) serves as a limitation on
early termination of probation “at any time if warranted by
the conduct of the minor and the ends of justice,” for those
minors found guilty of first degree murder, a Class X
felony, or a forcible felony. 705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West
1998).

Additionally, we agree with respondent that the appellate
court’s reading of the “plain language” of the statute
creates a conflict with other sections within the Act,
whereas a close inspection of article V of the Act and the
predecessor to section 5-715(1) leads to the conclusion
that our interpretation is that which was intended by the
legislature. As stated earlier, our analysis of a statute is
governed by a consideration of the legislature’s objective
in enacting it. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 162; see also
Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 364 (the primary objective
of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect
to the legislature’s intent). Thus, in determining the
proper construction of the Juvenile Court Act provision at
issue, we believe it helpful to understand the historical
background of article V, the delinquency portion of this
legislation, and the interrelation of its sections. See
Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 156 (all provisions of a statutory
enactment are viewed as a whole).

The Juvenile Court Act was “radically altered” when the
General Assembly amended the Act with Public Act 90-590,
effective January 1, 1999. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 165,
citing 705 ILCS Ann. 405/5-101 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1999).
“The amendatory changes renumbered the sections and largely
rewrote article V of the Act to provide more accountability
for the criminal acts of juveniles.” Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d
at 165. The 1999 amendments provided a new purpose and
policy section, which begins: “(1) It is the intent of the
General Assembly to promote a juvenile justice system
capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile
delinquency, a system that will protect the community,
impose accountability for violations of law and equip
juvenile offenders with competencies to live responsibly
and productively.” 705 ILCS 405/5-101 (West 1998). This
policy statement “represents a fundamental shift from the
singular goal of rehabilitation to include the overriding
concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile
offenders accountable for violations of the law.” Taylor,
221 Ill. 2d at 167; In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317
(2001).

An examination of the only significant difference between
section 5-715(1) and its predecessor, section 5-24(1) (705
ILCS 405/5-24 (West 1996)), shows this intent by the
General Assembly to hold juvenile offenders more
accountable. The previous section begins: “The period of
probation or conditional discharge shall not exceed 5 years
or until the minor has attained the age of 19 years,
whichever is less.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-24(1)
(West 1996). The raising of the maximum period of probation
in section 5-715(1) from the lesser of either five years
“or until the minor has attained the age of 21 years” thus
indicates a conscious decision by the legislature to stiffen
the penalty available to a juvenile court imposing
probation. 705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West 1998). However, this
action does not support the State’s claim that probation
for a minor who commits certain serious crimes, as here,
may be extended beyond the age of 21. Indeed, the “at least
5 years” language in the second sentence of the statute,
limiting the court’s ability to terminate a minor’s
probation early when certain offenses are involved, remains
unchanged, supporting a reading of the statute which sets
the age of 21 as the upper limit of any probation term
available under the delinquency portion of the Act.

Further support for this interpretation of section 5-715(1)
can be found in its interrelation with section 5-755,
entitled “Duration of wardship and discharge of
proceedings,” which states, in pertinent part: “(1) All
proceedings under this Act in respect of any minor for whom
a petition was filed on or after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of 1998 automatically terminate upon his or
her attaining the age of 21 years except that provided in
Section 5-810. (3) The wardship of the minor and any
legal custodianship or guardianship respecting the minor
for whom a petition was filed on or after the effective
date of this amendatory Act of 1998 automatically
terminates when he or she attains the age of 21 years except
as set forth in subsection (1) of this Section. The clerk
of the court shall at that time record all proceedings
under this Act as finally closed and discharged for that
reason.” 705 ILCS 405/5-755(1), (3) (West 1998). The State
argues that the more specific statute, section 5-715,
setting forth periods of probation, should prevail over what
it terms the more general statute, section 5-755, providing
the “Duration of wardship and discharge of proceedings.”
See Moore v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470, 480 (2006) (“Where a
general statutory provision and a more specific statutory
provision relate to the same subject, we will presume that
the legislature intended the more specific provision to
govern”). However, this court, in Moore, 219 Ill. 2d at
479, also stated that “[w]here two statutes conflict, we
will attempt to construe them together, in pari materia,
where such an interpretation is reasonable.” See also
People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Booth, 215 Ill.
2d 416, 424 (2005). As section 5-755 clearly states that it
governs “[a]ll proceedings under this Act in respect of any
minor for whom a petition was filed,” a reading of section
5-715(1) which does not comport with the plain language of
section 5-755 creates such a conflict. We presume the
legislature, in amending the Act and rewriting article V,
did not place contradictory sections within that article,
and we believe our interpretation of section 5-715(1) is
not only reasonable but construes those sections in pari
materia.

Additionally, section 5-755(1) states that the sole
exception to the Act’s rule of automatic termination of
“[a]ll proceedings” at age 21 is “that provided in Section
5-810.” 705 ILCS 405/5-755(1) (West 1998). Therefore, if
the legislature, in amending the Act, had wanted to include
the period of probation imposed on minors who had committed
certain serious offenses as an exception to the automatic
termination rule, it could easily have done so by adding
section 5-715(1) to the exception listed for section 5-810.
See Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 179 (“[T]he legislature in the
present case has not chosen to include juvenile
adjudications in the definition of ‘conviction’ for purposes
of the escape statute, and again we may not read such an
inclusion into a penal statute by intendment or
implication”); Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw,
182 Ill. 2d 262, 281 (1998) (“If the legislature had
intended to include as business income all gain from the
sale of any property ‘used’ by the taxpayer in the regular
course of its business, it could have easily written the
statute to say so”). Under the enumerated exception to the
automatic-termination rule, the “Extended jurisdiction
juvenile prosecutions” (EJJP) statute (705 ILCS 405/5-810
(West 1998)), if the State, prior to trial, files a petition
to designate the respondent’s case as an extended
jurisdiction juvenile prosecution, and the juvenile court
so designates, the minor has the right to a trial by jury.
705 ILCS 405/5-810(1), (3) (West 1998); see also
Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 354-55. If the trial results
in a guilty verdict, the court must impose a juvenile
sentence and an adult criminal sentence, staying the adult
sentence on the condition that the minor not violate the
provisions of the juvenile sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)
(West 1998); Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 355.

We agree with respondent that the plain intent of the
Juvenile Court Act was to set the age of 21 as the maximum
for all juvenile dispositions, with the limited exception
of the EJJP provided in section 5-810. We note that when
the legislature crafted that exception, it was careful to
include a right to a jury trial and a trial open to the
public. See 705 ILCS 405/5-810(3) (West 1998). Under the
State’s reading of section 5-715(1), there would be no such
safeguards and the period of “juvenile” probation would
have no maximum term, potentially extending, as here, well
past the age of 21, even though the possibility of
committing the “delinquent minor” to the Department of
Corrections for violating that probation would
automatically terminate at age 21. See 705 ILCS 405/5-750
(3) (West 1998). As respondent cogently argues: “It is
unlikely that the legislature would have intentionally
authorized juvenile probation for an unlimited time,
potentially continuing for natural life, without some sort
of comment or legislative finding.” See Progressive
Universal Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 134 (2005) (in interpreting a statute,
we must presume that when the legislature enacted a law, it
did not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient or unjust
results). Thus, we conclude that, under the plain language
of section 5-755, read in concert with our interpretation
of section 5-715(1), the only exception to the rule of
automatic termination of all proceedings under the Act at
age 21 is that set forth in section 5-810. As the State
never filed a petition to designate this case as an EJJP,
it is clear this exception has no application here.

Finally, because penal statutes are to be strictly
construed in favor of the accused, we find that the State’s
interpretation, adopted by the lower courts, is not to be
favored over respondent’s interpretation. See Taylor, 221
Ill. 2d at 182; see also 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(a) (“Appeals
from final judgments in delinquent minor proceedings
shall be governed by the rules applicable to criminal
cases”). Indeed, where, as here, the circuit court’s power
to act is controlled by statute, the court must proceed
within the statute’s strictures, and any action taken by
the court that exceeds its statutory power to act is void.
See In re Gerald D., 308 Ill. App. 3d 628, 631 (1999). “A
court exercising jurisdiction over a minor pursuant to the
terms of the Act ‘is not free to reject or expand its
statutory authority despite the desirability or need for
such action.’ ” Gerald D., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 631, quoting
In re Ardedia L., 249 Ill. App. 3d 35, 40 (1993). Thus, the
juvenile court simply possessed no jurisdiction under the
Act to continue respondent’s probation beyond the end of
the court’s jurisdiction, i.e., the date the minor turns 21
years of age. Therefore, we reject the appellate court’s
holding that the legislature did not intend the
automatic-termination provision of section 5-755(1) of the
Act to apply to Class X felons like respondent.

Accordingly, we hold that under the plain meaning of
section 5-715(1), the period of probation for a minor who
is found to be guilty for an offense which is first degree
murder, a Class X felony, or a forcible felony shall be at
least five years or until the minor has attained the age of
21 years, at which time, under section 5-755(1), all
proceedings shall automatically terminate. Thus, in the
instant case, respondent’s probation period should have
automatically terminated on October 3, 2003, her
twenty-first birthday, although the court, as any circuit
court, could oversee payment of restitution as provided in
sections 5-5-6(f) and (i) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(f), (i) (West 1998)) until,
at the latest, November 19, 2006.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
appellate court and the circuit court’s denial of
respondent’s petition and remand this matter to the circuit
court in order for the clerk to record all proceedings
under this Act as finally closed and discharged as required
by section 5-755(3).

Judgments reversed; cause remanded.

[fn1] Docket sheet entries made in January 2005 indicate
payment checks had been returned, with the notation, “NEED
NEW ADDRESS for counry [sic] companies,” and a status order
was entered January 31, 2005, stating: “CLERK TO SEND
RE-ISSUED CHECKS TO WILBUR & ASSOCIATES ATTORNEYS ON BEHALF
OF VICTIM.” These entries would seem to indicate continued
compliance by respondent with the money judgment, as well
as with the separate restitution order entered as
conditions of her probation in 1999.

[fn2] Section 5-755(1) of the Juvenile Court Act states, in
pertinent part, that “[a]ll proceedings under this Act in
respect to any minor automatically terminate upon his
or her attaining the age of 21 years.” (Emphasis
added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-755(1).