Unpaid leave (FMLA and FLSA Claims)

Federal District Court Opinions

RIDINGS v. RIVERSIDE MEDICAL CENTER, (C.D.Ill. 11-30-2006)
JANET M. RIDINGS, Plaintiff, v. RIVERSIDE MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant. No. 05-2134. United States District Court, C.D.
Illinois, Urbana Division. November 30, 2006

OPINION

MICHAEL McCUSKEY, District Judge

On June 3, 2005, Plaintiff Janet Ridings filed a Complaint
(#1) against Defendants Riverside Medical Center, Jeff
Pollock, and Kyle Hansen alleging violations of the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), a state law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and retaliatory discharge.[fn1] This
matter is now before the court on cross motions for summary
judgment. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (#33) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (#35) is GRANTED.

FACTS

Defendant Riverside Medical Center (Riverside) is a
not-for-profit corporation operating a hospital in
Kankakee, Illinois. Plaintiff Ridings began her employment
with Riverside in 1998 as Page 2 a Knowledge
Manager/Systems Analyst. Ridings’ job title was later
changed to Knowledge Manager, although her job duties
remained essentially unchanged. In this position, Ridings
was responsible for responding to requests from Riverside
employees to extract data from Riverside’s computer network
records and convert it into relevant, useful information
through query reports. Ridings spent most of her work day
at her computer. Employees making requests to Ridings
communicated these requests through email, phone, and
personal visits. During the time period relevant to this
lawsuit, Jeff Pollock held the position of Vice President
of Information Technology and Chief Information Officer
with Riverside. Ridings reported to Pollock when she began
her employment at Riverside. On April 12, 2002, Ridings
began reporting to Kyle Hansen, who served as Systems
Applications Manager. Ridings alleges that after Hansen
became her supervisor, he and Pollock began a campaign to
humiliate her because she is a woman.[fn2] According to
Ridings, Hansen and Pollock intended to force her to quit
or, in the alternative, sought to justify her termination.

Throughout her employment, Ridings was classified as a
salaried exempt employee pursuant to the provisions of the
FLSA. Riverside defines a regular full-time employee as one
who is “regularly scheduled to work 30 hours per week or
more.” The policy and procedure for exempt employees
states:

Exempt staff are paid a salary for the job for which they
were hired. The actual hours an exempt staff member works
to complete the job for which they were hired are not
recorded. If the work load for an exempt staff member goes
above 40 hours in a week, that person does not receive
additional compensation. If the work load for an exempt
staff member requires only 30 hours to complete, the
exempt staff Page 3 person still gets paid their full
salary.

Exempt employees “swipe in” when they arrive at work, but do
not “swipe out” when they leave.

On December 14, 2002, Ridings was diagnosed with Graves’
disease. On January 14, 2003, Ridings had surgery to remove
her thyroid. Prior to the surgery, Riverside directed
Ridings to complete FMLA medical certification forms and to
have her leave certified by her physician. Ridings’
physician, Dr. Moss, filled out the medical certification
and Ridings returned the certificate to Riverside. Ridings’
physician stated in the application that Ridings would be
able to perform the essential functions of her job after
recovery from surgery. Riverside designated Ridings’
absence from work for her surgery as FMLA leave. Ridings
returned from FMLA leave in February 2003. Ridings asserts
that she suffered from “mental fatigue” from January 2003
through the end of 2003. Ridings further asserts this
“mental fatigue” is a symptom of Graves’ disease. Ridings
did not work eight hours per day everyday on Riverside’s
premises for the rest of 2003 because, according to
Ridings, her “mental fatigue” prevented her from working an
eight hour day on Riverside’s premises. Ridings testified
that Hansen asked her occasionally for an update on why she
was not working eight hours per day. Ridings informed him
that she became tired in the late afternoon and was taking
work home with her. Pollock understood that Ridings’
reduced schedule was due to her surgery and medication and
that Ridings was unable to work 8 hours per day at the
hospital.

Riverside maintained during this time period a “Work
Schedules” policy which provided that work schedules may
vary based upon staffing needs and operational demands. The
policy further provided that supervisors would advise
employees of their individual work schedule. Riverside also
maintained an “Attendance and Punctuality” policy which
stated “excessive absenteeism that is not considered a
serious health condition under the [FMLA] will lead to
disciplinary action, up Page 4 to and including
termination.” Riverside further maintained Employee Conduct
and Work Rules that precluded insubordination, excessive
absenteeism, and unauthorized absences from an employee’s
workstation. However, under the section “Essential
Functions” in the job description for Knowledge Manager,
there is no reference to the number of hours to be worked
per day or week.

On January 25, 2004, Hansen met with Ridings and told her
she needed to be on the premises for a full eight hours per
day. Ridings did not begin working eight hours per day on
the premises as a result of this meeting. On February 25,
2004, Hansen again met with Ridings to discuss working
eight hours per day on premises. Ridings continued to fail
to work eight hours per day on premises after this meeting.
Ridings asserts she attempted to work at the hospital until
5:00 p.m., but she almost fell asleep driving home on two
occasions. Ridings asserts that, as a result, she did not
work at the hospital after 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. unless
she had a ride home. Ridings testified that she took work
home and did it during the evenings and weekends to perform
the tasks expected of her. On March 22, 2004, Hansen gave
Ridings a Corrective Action Report and asked her to read
and sign it. The report was given to Ridings because she
was not working eight hours per day and was “arriving at
work between 8 a[.m.] and 8:30 a[.m.], and leaving for the
day between 2:30 p[.m.] and 3:00 p[.m.].” The report
further indicated that “[w]orking a full 8 hour day must
begin immediately.” After receiving the Corrective Action
Report, Ridings still did not work eight hours per day on
the premises. On March 31 or April 1, 2004, Ridings
provided Hansen with documentation from her physician
indicating that she could not work eight hours per day
until further notice due to her medical condition. Hansen
met with Ridings and informed her that, based on her
doctor’s note, she needed to provide FMLA paperwork. Hansen
gave Ridings the form to request “intermittent leave” under
the FMLA and the FMLA medical certification forms. This
form Page 5 states, “Form must be returned within 15 days
or leave request may be delayed.” By April 16, 2004,
Ridings had failed to return the medical certification
form. Ridings received another Corrective Action Report
from Hansen on April 20 or 21, 2004, which was based on
Ridings’ failure to submit her FMLA paperwork within the
requested 15 day period. This Corrective Action Report
stated that “FMLA paperwork requesting intermittent leave
needs to be completed by her physician and presented back
to her supervisor by April 28, 2004.” If that did not occur
Ridings was to be placed on suspension for three days
without pay. If she did not present the paperwork upon her
return from suspension, she “could be terminated.” After
receiving this Corrective Action Report, Ridings again did
not complete the FMLA certification and continued to not
work eight hours per day on premises.

On May 10, 2004, Ridings was suspended for three days. She
was provided with a Corrective Action Report stating that
she was suspended for failing to return the FMLA paperwork
by April 28, 2004. This suspension was without pay.[fn3]
The report again indicated “FMLA paperwork requesting
intermittent leave needs to be completed by her physician
and presented back to her supervisor by May 13, 2004.” When
Ridings returned to work on May 13, 2004, she did not
submit the FMLA medical certification and was terminated.

On July 20, 2003, Ridings filed a workers’ compensation
claim, alleging that she developed Graves disease as a
result of stress at work. In January 2004, Pollock and
Hansen[fn4] decided to discontinue a prepaid plan for
vendor support for a computer software system used by
Ridings, Crystal Reports. The support system was still
available to Ridings, but Riverside now only paid for Page
6 time and materials actually used. Ridings asserts that
this decision was a result of her workers’ compensation
claim. Ridings asserts that this decision occurred right
after she completed a payroll conversion project and, as a
result, she was no longer in a vital position. Ridings
further asserts that in April of 2004, Hansen made a
comment ridiculing Ridings’ workers’ compensation claim.
This comment was made when a coworker climbed on a table to
change the time on a clock. Hansen allegedly stated, “Watch
out, we don’t want a workers’ comp. claim.”

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is granted “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court must decide, based on the evidence of
record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that
requires a trial. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24
F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). In reaching this decision,
the court must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). The
burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material
fact exists rests with the movant. Jakubiec v. Cities Serv.
Co., 844 F.2d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 1988).

I. FMLA Interference Claim

Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), eligible
employees of a covered employer are provided the right to
take unpaid leave for a period of up to twelve work weeks
in any twelve-month period for a serious health condition
as defined by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). After
the period of qualified leave expires, the employee is
entitled to be reinstated to the former Page 7 position
or an equivalent one with the same benefits and terms of
employment that existed prior to the exercise of the leave.
29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). The FMLA makes it “unlawful for
any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right
provided.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). When an employee
alleges a deprivation of these substantive guarantees, the
employee must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence only entitlement to the disputed leave. King v.
Preferred Tech. Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs may also bring claims under the FMLA if they are
discriminated against for exercising their rights under the
statute. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) & (2). “A claim
under the FMLA for wrongful termination can be brought
under either a discrimination/retaliation or
interference/entitlement theory; the difference is that the
first type of claim requires proof of discriminatory or
retaliatory intent while the latter requires only proof
that the employer denied the employee his or her
entitlements under the Act.” Kauffman v. Fed. Express
Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir. 2005).

Ridings first asserts a claim under an
interference/entitlement theory. An employee alleging that
her employer interfered with her substantive rights under
the FMLA must demonstrate that she is entitled to leave by
a preponderance of the evidence.[fn5] Furthermore, to
succeed on an FMLA interference claim, an employee need not
demonstrate discriminatory or retaliatory intent. Rather,
the employee must simply demonstrate that the employer
denied her the entitlements of the FMLA. Kauffman, 426 F.3d
at 884. To take leave under the FMLA, an employee must
first notify her employer of the need for FMLA leave. Price
v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. Page
8 1997).[fn6] It is then the employer’s responsibility to
determine the applicability of the FMLA. Price, 117 F.3d at
1026. An employer may require that an employee obtain, in a
timely manner, a written certification by a health care
provider regarding the medical condition necessitating
leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a); 29 C.F.R. §
825.305(a). A request for medical certification must be in
writing unless the employee has, within the preceding six
months, been given the required written notice regarding the
FMLA and the employer’s specific FMLA policies. 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.301(c)(2)(ii). If an employer requires the
employee to submit this certification, it must give the
employee at least fifteen calendar days within which to do
so and must notify the employee of the consequences of a
failure to comply with this requirement. 29 C.F.R. §
825.301(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) & (d). If the
employer requires certification and the employee fails to
provide sufficient certification, then the absence is not
FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b).[fn7]

Ridings was terminated after she failed to submit a
medical certification requested by Riverside. There is no
issue that Ridings did not submit the requested medical
certification. Rather, Ridings asserts that she was not
required to do so because Riverside failed to follow the
regulations governing how this certification is to be
acquired. Specifically, Ridings argues that the
notification she received was inadequate because she was
not informed 15 days before her termination or suspension
that she could receive this specific discipline if she
failed to submit the requested Page 9 certification.

This court concludes under the unique circumstances of
this case that Riverside complied with the FMLA in
notifying Ridings of her need to provide a medical
certification to justify her reduced schedule leave. Hansen
provided Ridings with a medical certification form on March
31 or April 1, 2004, which indicated Ridings needed to
complete the certification within 15 days or the leave
request could be delayed. More than 15 days passed after
Ridings received this form before Ridings was suspended on
May 10, 2004, and terminated on May 13, 2004.[fn8] Hansen
had given Ridings a Corrective Action Report on March 22,
2004, because she was not working eight hours per day and
was “arriving at work between 8 a[.m.] and 8:30 a[.m.], and
leaving for the day between 2:30 p[.m.] and 3:00 p[.m.].”
The report further indicated that “[w]orking a full 8 hour
day must begin immediately.” Riverside maintained an
“Attendance and Punctuality” policy which stated “excessive
absenteeism that is not considered a serious health
condition under the [FMLA] will lead to disciplinary action,
up to and including termination.” Thus, Ridings was aware
if her absences were not considered leave, she could be
terminated. Furthermore, Riverside provided Ridings with
additional written notification in the form of Corrective
Action Reports on April 21, 2004, and May 10, 2004, that
she would be subject to suspension and termination if she
did not submit the certification, and Ridings failed to
comply. Thus, this court concludes Ridings was provided
sufficient written notice of the consequences of failing to
provide certification on March 31 or April 1, 2004, when
she was given the medical certification form, particularly
in light of the subsequent Page 10 corrective action
reports received by Ridings. See Poteet v. Potter, 2005 WL
1115805 at *19 (S. D. Ind. 2005) (employee received
sufficient written notification of consequences for failure
to provide certification where letter given to employee
indicated failure to submit certification could result in
absences being considered unauthorized and employee was
terminated for these unauthorized absences).[fn9]

II. Retaliation Claims

Ridings also asserts her termination was in retaliation for
her assertion of rights under the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Act, the FMLA, and the FLSA. On each of these
claims, Ridings can prove a claim of retaliation through
either the direct or indirect method of proof. Haywood v.
Lucent Tech., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2003).
Ridings asserts direct evidence of retaliation only with
regard to her retaliation claim under the workers’
compensation statute. Ridings first argues that the
temporal proximity of the filing of her workers’
compensation claim to her termination is circumstantial
evidence to sustain her claim. However, her workers’
compensation claim was filed in July 2003 and she was not
terminated until May 2004. This gap of almost one year is
insufficient to provide direct evidence of discrimination.
See Haywood, 323 F.3d at 532 (one year gap between time
plaintiff informed employer of her internal discrimination
complaint and her termination did not support inference of
causation); Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d
499 (7th Cir. 1998) (no causal inference where employee
terminated five months after filing EEOC Page 11
complaint).[fn10] Ridings further asserts that because
Hansen sent an email to two members of Riverside’s Risk
Services Department detailing the proposed disciplinary
action with regard to her failure to file her FMLA
certification, there is circumstantial evidence of
discrimination. Ridings bases this assertion on the fact
that these two people were in charge of handling Ridings’
workers’ compensation claim. However, there is no evidence
that this email contained any reference to Ridings’
workers’ compensation claim. Finally, Ridings asserts that
Hansen once remarked to a coworker who climbed on a table
to change the time on a clock, “Watch out, we don’t want a
workers’ comp. claim.” “When a plaintiff offers an
employer’s stray remark in a discrimination case, it is
necessary to demonstrate `some nexus’ between the remark
and the challenged employment decision.” Scaife v. Cook
County, 446 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2006), quoting Cowan v.
Glenbrook Sec. Servs., Inc., 123 F.3d 438, 444 (7th Cir.
1997). While Hansen was a decision maker with regard to
Ridings’ termination, this remark is simply too attenuated
to constitute evidence of discrimination as it makes no
reference to Ridings or the complained of action.

Ridings seeks to proceed under the indirect method of proof
as to all three claims. The indirect method utilizes the
burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), as adapted for use in
retaliation claims. Marchman v. Advocate Bethany Hosp.,
2006 WL 1987815 at *7 (N. D. Ill. 2006). Under this
framework, Ridings must establish that: (1) she was engaged
in statutorily protected activity; (2) she was performing
her job according to Riverside’s legitimate expectations;
(3) she suffered a materially adverse action by Riverside;
and (4) she was treated worse than a similarly situated
employee who did not engage in statutorily Page 12
protected activity. Marchman, 2006 WL 1987815 at *8. If
Ridings is able to establish a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to Riverside to provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Marchman, 2006 WL 1987815 at *8. If Riverside provides a
legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to Ridings to
show that Ridings’ proffered reasons are pretextual.
Marchman, 2006 WL 1987815 at *8.

Ridings’ retaliation claims must fail under the indirect
method because she is unable to establish a prima facie
case. Initially, Ridings has failed to demonstrate that she
was engaged in statutorily protected activity with regard
to her FLSA or FMLA claims. It is uncontested Ridings did
not raise an issue with Riverside pursuant to the FLSA
prior to her termination. With regard to her FMLA claim,
Riverside did not believe she was required to take FMLA
leave and thus refused to submit the medical certification
to enable her to take leave. Ridings testified during her
deposition she “did not have a serious health condition
that made [her] unable to perform the essential functions
of [her] job” and believed Riverside was “using this as an
attempt to violate the FLSA and Workers’ Compensation Act.”
Because Ridings did not assert her entitlement to leave
under the FMLA, she cannot assert a retaliation claim. See
Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 2005 WL 3312573 at *3 (N. D. Ill.
2005).

On all three retaliation claims, Ridings has also failed
to identify similarly situated employees who did not engage
in statutorily protected activity who were treated
differently. There is no dispute that Ridings was not
working 8 hours per day on the premises at Riverside or
that Riverside asked Ridings to fill out FMLA certification
forms to continue working this schedule. There is also no
dispute that Ridings did not submit this certification.
Ridings points to two employees, Dee Anna Hillebrand and
Kurt Ciabattarri, who worked from home during the years
Page 13 2003 and 2004. However, these employees did not
work at home for portions of every day. Rather, the
evidence indicates that Hildebrand worked from home one day
per week and Ciabatarri worked from home less than one day
every two weeks. Furthermore, neither of these employees
cited a health reason requiring to work from home. As a
result, Riverside did not ask them to complete FMLA
certification forms. Ridings was terminated for failing to
complete the requested forms. Without presenting
information on this critical factor, Ridings cannot
establish her prima facie case. See Hull v. Stoughton
Trailers, 445 F.3d 949, 952-53 (7th Cir. 2006).

Furthermore, even if Ridings were able to establish a
prima facie case, Ridings has not demonstrated that
Riverside’s proffered reason for her termination is
pretextual. Riverside has stated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, Ridings’
refusal to submit FMLA certification justifying her
inability to work 8 hours per day on Riverside’s premises.
As concerns her FMLA retaliation claim, Ridings asserts
this reason is pretextual because she was already on FMLA
leave and Hansen termed the leave “intermittent” rather
than “reduced schedule.” However, while Riverside has
conceded that in light of discovery it has determined
Ridings qualified for FMLA leave, during the time
certification was requested Riverside had not designated
Ridings’ for FMLA leave. With regard to Ridings’ argument
regarding intermittent versus reduced schedule leave, there
is no indication in the record that this was anything other
than a mistake by Hansen. Ridings never pointed out that
she wanted reduced schedule over intermittent leave. As
concerns her FLSA retaliation claim, Ridings makes no
argument of pretext other than stating it “occurred
together” with the FMLA violation. Finally, with regard to
her workers’ compensation retaliation claim, Ridings points
to no other evidence than the circumstantial evidence
discussed above which this court has already determined is
insufficient to sustain her claim. Because Ridings is
unable to Page 14 make a viable argument that Riverside’s
nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual, summary judgment
is appropriate on her retaliation claims.

III. FLSA Claim

Finally, Ridings brings a claim pursuant to the FLSA based
upon her three day suspension without pay. The FLSA sets
the federal standards for overtime compensation. These
overtime requirements do not apply to employees serving in
a “bona fide executive, administrative or professional
capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Rather, an
employee is considered paid on a “salary basis” for
purposes of the FLSA where, on a weekly or less frequent
basis, she receives a predetermined amount of pay which is
not subject to reduction regardless of the quality or
quantity of work. 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a). “`If an
employer docks an employee’s pay for partial day absences,
violations of rules other than those of safety, or based on
the quantity or quality of the employee’s work, the
employee is not considered to be on a salary basis.'”
Kennedy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 F.3d 365, 370 (7th
Cir. 2005), quoting Piscione v. Ernst & Young, 171 F.3d
527, 534 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the consequence to an
employer for failing to abide by the FLSA with regard to
docking the pay of salaried employees is the loss of the
exemption. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.603(a).

In the instant case, Ridings makes no argument that as a
result of her three day suspension she should be considered
an hourly employee and receive lost overtime compensation.
Rather, Ridings seeks merely to recover the pay from the
three days she was suspended.[fn11] Ridings has cited Page
15 no decision which allows an employee to recover for one
instance of being placed on suspension for the lost days
worked, nor has Ridings indicated any statutory basis for
such a recovery. Accordingly, this court finds no basis for
relief on Ridings’ FLSA claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#33) is
DENIED.

(2) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#35) is
GRANTED.

(3) Defendant’s Motion to Supplement Motion for Summary
Judgment (#47) is DENIED.

(4) This case is terminated.

[fn1] On October 10, 2006, the intentional infliction of
emotional distress count was dismissed by this court on
motion of Plaintiff. Because this was the only count
against Defendants Pollock and Hansen, they have been
terminated as Defendants in this action.

[fn2] Ridings has not alleged a sex discrimination claim in
this case.

[fn3] On February 24, 2005, Riverside sent Ridings a check
in the amount of $555.93 for payment of wages from her
three day suspension. Ridings’ attorney returned the check
to counsel for Riverside.

[fn4] The parties dispute whether Hansen was involved in
this decision.

[fn5] In the instant case, there is no issue Ridings
suffered from a serious health condition qualifying her for
FMLA leave as Riverside concedes in its reply to its motion
for summary judgment.

[fn6] There is no dispute that Ridings provided this notice.
Ridings provided Hansen with documentation from her
physician indicating that she could not work eight hours
per day until further notice due to her medical condition
on March 31 or April 1, 2004.

[fn7] Ridings argues she was not required to submit a
certification in this matter because she was on some form
of de facto FMLA leave beginning February 3, 2003. However,
even if this were true, Riverside was entitled to request a
subsequent certification pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §
825.308.

[fn8] It is apparent from the record that Ridings did not
intend to submit the certification. Ridings specifically
testified in her deposition that she “did not have a
serious health condition that made [her] unable to perform
the essential functions of [her] job” and believed
Riverside was “using this as an attempt to violate the FLSA
and Workers’ Compensation Act.”

[fn9] Ridings also argues that she could not have been
terminated for failure to file the certification because
Hansen had characterized her request for leave as
intermittent rather than reduced schedule. The court finds
this argument without merit. Ridings cites no authority for
the proposition that essentially referring to the leave
sought by the employee by the wrong name negates the
requirement for certification. Furthermore, there is
nothing in the record to indicate that Riverside intended
for Ridings to take any leave other than reduced schedule
leave.

[fn10] Ridings asserts that her attorney sent a settlement
offer to Riverside’s attorney on March 8, 2004. However,
there is no indication any decision maker with regard to
Ridings’ termination was aware of this offer.

[fn11] The court notes that Riverside offered to pay Ridings
for the three days she was suspended. This may entitle
Riverside to utilize the “window of correction” and
maintain Ridings’ exempt status. See 29 C.F.R. §
541.603(c); Kennedy, 410 F.3d at 372. However, this court
need not address this argument because Ridings is not
arguing that she should be compensated for lost overtime
wages.