California Courts of Appeal Reports
CONNELLY v. COUNTY OF FRESNO, F049021 (Cal.App. 12-22-2006)
KAREN CONNELLY, Plaintiff and Appellant v. COUNTY OF FRESNO,
et al., Defendant and Respondent. F049021 Court of Appeal
of California, Fifth District December 22, 2006 Certified
for Publication
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno
County. Mark W. Snauffer, Judge, Super. Ct. No.
00CECG10224.
Jacobson, Hansen, Najarian & McQuillan, Jube J. Najarian,
Leith B. Hansen; Darrel R. Rustigian for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth, Brian M.
Arax, Todd W. Baxter and Shane M. Cahill for Defendants and
Respondents.
OPINION
GOMES, J.
Plaintiff Karen Connelly (Connelly) appeals from the
judgment entered after the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants County of Fresno (County)
and Kristina Elizabeth Martinez (Martinez) (collectively
respondents). We will reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Summary of Facts
On October 27, 1999, Connelly was involved in an automobile
accident when a County vehicle driven by County employee
Martinez hit the pickup Connelly was driving. On December
8, 1999, Connelly served a “Claim for Damages,” which was a
preprinted County form, on the clerk of the County Board of
Supervisors. On the form, Connelly identified the date of
the injury or damage as October 27, 1999, stated the
location of the accident, listed the police report as the
source of witnesses’ names, and named Martinez as the
County employee involved. The claim form asked how the
injury or damage occurred; Connelly responded “County
vehicle went through stop sign and hit private owned Chev
P-U.” The form also asked what action or inaction of the
County employee caused her injury or damage; Connelly
responded “The County acted negligent[ly] by letting their
driver operate a vehicle” and “[i]mproper driving —
failure to obey stop sign — unsafe operation.” The
form also specifically asked “What injuries or damages did
you suffer?” Connelly responded, “Damage to my `96 Chevy
S-10 pickup — Car Rental until my Truck is Replaced.
Unspecified Medical, Lost Income, future Medical.” Finally,
the form asked “Total Amount Claimed[.]” Connelly responded
“Unspecified.” Connelly signed and dated the claim form. At
the bottom of the form, below her signature, the form
stated “Attach & include, with this completed form, any
bills for medical treatment and expenses and any estimates
or bills for personal property damage.” No bills for
medical treatment or property damage were attached to the
claim form Connelly submitted.
In response to the claim, the County mailed Connelly a
letter dated December 13, 1999, which stated her potential
claim was “insufficient in that it fails to meet with
requirements of Government Code Section 910 for the
following insufficient information: [] No dollar
amount and No description of injuries.” The letter advised
Connelly she “may amend the claim to conform to the
Government Code[,]” and failure to do so within 15 days of
the notice “will result in its rejection as being
insufficient.” The letter further advised “[s]uch claim must
be received by the County within six months of the incident
which gives rise to the claim[,]” and if Connelly had any
questions, she should call Tracy Meador.
On December 15, 1999, Connelly’s husband, Robert Connelly,
spoke with Meador by telephone and asked what they needed
to do in response to the County’s letter. According to Mr.
Connelly, “Ms. Meador said it would be easy to fix the
claim form.” Meador instructed him to file a written
amendment to the claim stating the total amount claimed is
“‘within the Superior Court limit.'” Mr. Connelly said
Meador told him that to receive any settlement “my wife and
I would have to submit specific documentation of the nature
and amount of the property damage and car rental, and of my
wife’s personal injury.” Mr. Connelly told her they “could
provide documentation on the property damage and car rental,
but that we did not yet know the nature of my wife’s
injuries, or what the resulting medical expenses and loss
of income would be.” Meador told Mr. Connelly “we could
promptly settle the property damage and car rental by
submitting the supporting documents at that time, while
reserving the personal injury claim until we could submit
adequate claim documentation to settle.” Mr. Connelly asked
if the personal injury documentation had to be submitted
within 15 days of the letter’s date or six months from the
date of the incident. Meador responded it should be
submitted within six months of the incident. According to
Mr. Connelly, Meador instructed him to write in a letter:
“I am Claiming only Property Damage, and Car Rental at this
time, however, I request and reserve the right to file a
claim for Personal Injury at a later time. Notably within 6
Months of the Incident which gave rise to this Claim.”
Meador also told Mr. Connelly “we could submit additional
information regarding my wife’s injuries when[] the doctors
told us what was wrong with her.”
Following this conversation, Mr. Connelly prepared a letter
to the County dated December 15, 1999, which Connelly
signed. The letter stated it was in response to the
County’s December 13, 1999 letter and the telephone contact
with Meador on December 15. The letter further stated, in
pertinent part: “Please accept this letter as an amendment
to the Original you received on Dec. 7, [19]99. [–]
I am also Enclosing copies of car rental bills to date.
[–] I Calculated the Vehicle as a Total using
Fresnobee.com/// cars.com for local prices and have
enclosed Copies. [–] Reply #1 for TOTAL AMOUNT
CLAIMED= “Within The Superior Court limit”. [–] I am
Claiming only Property Damage, and Car Rental at this time,
however, I request and reserve the right to file a claim
for Personal Injury at a later time. Notably within 6
Months of the Incident which gave rise to this Claim.
[–] Is this the Proper information to comply with GC
Sec. 910 (insuff. Information)? [–] Please reply
within 5 days. [–] I would appreciate being notified
in advance of any procedure, protocol, or Deadlines that
could be Detrimental to the fair conclusion of my claim.”
No further amendments or claims were filed with respect to
Connelly’s claim and she provided no further information.
Connelly never spoke with Meador on the telephone. The
County paid Connelly’s insurance carrier $6,668.77 for the
property damage, and a release of all claims for property
damage and loss of use was signed on March 7, 2000. Around
March 8, 2000, Connelly received a notice of rejection and
denial of her claim by the County Board of Supervisors.
According to Connelly, she learned from her doctors in May
2000 that she had serious injuries to her neck that would
require surgery. Connelly subsequently had fusion surgery
on her neck and later learned she would need back surgery.
This Lawsuit
On August 23, 2000, Connelly filed a complaint which named
the County and Martinez as defendants and alleged one cause
of action for negligence arising from the automobile
accident. Connelly alleged she had complied with the
applicable claims statute. Connelly sought damages for wage
loss, hospital and medical expenses, general damages and
loss of earning capacity. Connelly did not serve the
complaint on the County until September 28, 2001.
Respondents filed answers generally denying the complaint’s
allegations and alleging as an affirmative defense failure
to comply with the claims presentation requirements of the
Government Tort Claims Act.
Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, which
contended they were entitled to summary judgment because
Connelly failed to file a claim for personal injury within
the statutory time limits of the Government Tort Claims
Act. Connelly opposed the motion, arguing (1) the County
was put on notice that she had a personal injury claim
against it; (2) there is a triable issue of fact regarding
whether Connelly intended to waive or withdraw her personal
injury claim; (3) the County admitted in its discovery
responses it had no evidence that a claim was not properly
filed; and (4) the County is estopped from asserting the
personal injury claim was either withdrawn or not made. In
their reply brief, respondents asserted that (1) Connelly’s
claim did not substantially comply with the Tort Claims
Act, as it failed to describe her injuries, and therefore
was defective on its face; (2) since Connelly never made a
valid personal injury claim, Connelly’s argument that she
never waived that claim is irrelevant; and (3) Connelly’s
estoppel claim is without merit, as she did not plead
estoppel in the complaint and the facts do not support
estoppel as a matter of law.
The trial court granted the motion. The court found that
although Connelly filed a timely claim asserting property
damage and personal injuries as a result of the incident,
it was insufficient to support a personal injury claim
against the County because it failed to state the nature or
extent of Connelly’s alleged injuries. The court further
found the County’s discovery responses did not preclude it
from relying on the failure to file a proper claim in
support of the summary judgment motion and Connelly’s
estoppel argument failed because she did not plead estoppel
in the complaint and the evidence did not show the County
acted unconscionably or frustrated her efforts to comply
with the Tort Claims Act. After entry of judgment, Connelly
filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
The procedure for making and grounds for granting a motion
for summary judgment are set forth in Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c. The court must grant the motion if
“all the papers submitted show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “There is a triable issue
of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow
a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in
favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with
the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, fn. omitted
(Aguilar).) A moving party has the initial burden of
producing evidence to make a prima facie showing that no
triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.) Where the
defendant is the moving party, this means the defendant must
produce evidence showing that the plaintiff cannot
establish at least one element of each of its causes of
action. (Id. at p. 854.) It does not mean that a moving
defendant must “conclusively negate” an element of
plaintiff’s causes of action. (Id. at pp. 853-854.) The
burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving party who
must produce evidence to make a prima facie showing that a
triable issue of material fact exists. (Id. at p. 850.)
Unlike the burden of production, the burden of persuasion
never shifts but remains on the moving party. (Ibid.)
On appeal from a summary judgment, “we determine de novo
whether an issue of material fact exists and whether the
moving party was entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law. [Citation.] In other words, we must assume the role
of the trial court and reassess the merits of the motion.
[Citation.] In doing so, we will consider only the facts
properly before the trial court at the time it ruled on the
motion. [Citation.]” (Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42
Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601; see also Chaknova v. Wilbur-Ellis
Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 962, 967.) In this role, we do
not decide the merits of the issues, but limit our review
to “determining if `there is evidence requiring the
fact-weighing procedures of a trial. [Citation.]'”
(Pensinger v. Bowsmith, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 709, 717
(Pensinger), disapproved on other grounds in Colmenares v.
Braemar County Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1029, 1031, fn.
6.) We review directly those papers submitted in connection
with the motion. (Hussey v. Operating Engineers Local Union
No. 3 (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1218.)
Because of the severity of the consequences of summary
judgment, we carefully scrutinize the moving party’s papers
and resolve all doubts regarding the existence of material,
triable issues of fact in favor of the party opposing the
motion. (Pensinger, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.)
“‘”[T]he moving party’s affidavits are strictly construed
while those of the opposing party are liberally construed.”
. . . We accept as undisputed facts only those portions of
the moving party’s evidence that are not contradicted by
the opposing party’s evidence. . . . In other words, the
facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary
judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom must be
accepted as true.’ [Citation.]” (Cheyanna M. v. A.C.
Nielsen Co. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 855, 861.) Like the trial
court, we must consider all the evidence properly
identified in the papers submitted, “except that to which
objections have been made and sustained by the court.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c ); Barber v. Marina
Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 561, fn. 2.)
With these principles in mind, we evaluate whether summary
judgment was proper.
B. The Tort Claims Act
Under the Tort Claims Act (Govt. Code, § 810 et
seq.)[fn1], a plaintiff may not maintain an action for
money or damages against a public entity unless first a
written claim has been presented to the public entity and
rejected in whole or in part. (§§ 905; 905.2;
945.4.)[fn2] Failure to timely present a claim for money or
damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a
lawsuit against that entity. (State of California v.
Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1245.)
Before a cause of action may be stated, a plaintiff must
allege either compliance with this procedure or
circumstances excusing compliance. (Ibid.)
A claim relating to a personal injury cause of action must
be presented within six months after accrual of the cause
of action. (§ 911.3.) For the purposes of the claim
presentation requirements, the cause of action accrues on
the same date a similar action against a nonpublic entity
would be deemed to accrue under the pertinent statute of
limitations. (§ 901.)
Section 910 lists the information that must be included in
a notice of claim.[fn3] As pertinent here, the claim must
state the “date, place, and other circumstances of the
occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim
asserted[,]” provide a “[a] general description of the . .
. injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known
at the time of presentation of the claim[,]” and state the
amount of the claim if it is less than $10,000, or, if the
claim exceeds $10,000, the dollar amount cannot be stated
but the claim must indicate whether the claim would be a
limited civil case. (§ 910.) Section 910.2 requires
the claim to be signed by the claimant or some person on
his or her behalf.
“The purpose of these statutes is `to provide the public
entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately
investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate,
without the expense of litigation.’ [Citation.]
Consequently, a claim need not contain the detail and
specificity required of a pleading, but need only `fairly
describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done.’
[Citations.] As the purpose of the claim is to give the
government entity notice sufficient for it to investigate
and evaluate the claim, not to eliminate meritorious
actions [citation], the claims statute `should not be
applied to snare the unwary where its purpose has been
satisfied’ [citation].” (Stockett v. Association of Cal.
Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34
Cal.4th 441, 446 (Stockett).)
Where a claimant attempted to comply with the claim
requirements but the claim is deficient in some way, the
doctrine of substantial compliance may validate the claim
“if it substantially complies with all of the statutory
requirements . . . even though it is technically deficient
in one or more particulars.'” (Santee v. Santa Clara County
Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 713.) “The
doctrine is based on the premise that substantial
compliance fulfills the purpose of the claims statutes,
namely, to give the public entity timely notice of the
nature of the claim so that it may investigate and settle
those having merit without litigation. [Citations.]”
(Ibid.) The doctrine of substantial compliance, however,
“cannot cure total omission of an essential element from
the claim or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply
meaningfully with the statute.” (Loehr v. Ventura County
Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1083.)
The test for substantial compliance is whether the face of
the filed claim discloses sufficient information to enable
the public entity to make an adequate investigation of the
claim’s merits and settle it without the expense of
litigation. (Ibid.)
If in the public entity’s opinion the claim as presented
fails to comply substantially with the requirements of
sections 910 and 910.2, within 20 days after the claim has
been presented the public entity may give the claimant
written notice of any defects or omissions in the claim.
Once the public entity has done so, it may not take action
on the claim for 15 days. (§ 910.8.) This notice
gives the claimant an opportunity to cure the defect or
supply the missing information by amendment. (Martinez v.
County of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 242, 244-245.)
Failure to give such notice results in a waiver of any
defense as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a
defect or omission in the claim as presented, with the
exception of a lack of the claimant’s address. (§
911; Martinez, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 245.)
As pertinent here, a claim may be amended at any time
within six months of accrual of the cause of action for
personal injury or before the entity takes final action on
the claim, whichever is later, but only if the amended
claim relates to the same transaction or occurrence which
gave rise to the original claim. (§ 910.6, subd.
(a).) Any amendment is considered part of the original
claim for all purposes. (Ibid.) Regardless of whether a
notice of insufficiency is given, a failure or refusal to
amend a claim “shall not constitute a defense to any action
for which the claim was presented if the court finds that
the claim as presented complied substantially with Sections
910 and 910.2. . . .” (§ 910.6, subd. (b).)
The public entity must act “within 45 days after the claim
has been presented” and give written notice of its action
on the claim. (§§ 912.4, subd. (a), 913.) Any
notice that a claim is rejected, in whole or in part, or
allowed must state the action the entity is taking and give
a warning that the claimant has six months from the date of
the notice to file a civil action. (§ 913.) If the
entity gives proper notice of rejection of the claim, with
the requisite warning, a civil action must be brought
within six months of the notice. (§ 945.6, subd.
(a).)
C. Compliance with the Tort Claims Act
Respondents’ motion was brought on the ground Connelly
failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act because she did
not give the County notice of the personal injuries she
allegedly suffered in the accident, which Connelly now
seeks to recover damages for in her complaint. Respondents
argue the trial court properly granted summary judgment
because Connelly’s claim was insufficient under section 910,
subdivision (d) to support recovery of personal injury
damages as it failed to provide a general description of
her injuries. Connelly contends she is not precluded from
seeking such damages because the statement in her claim
that she suffered injuries or damages in the form of
“[u]nspecified medical, lost income, future medical” was
sufficient, at least under the doctrine of substantial
compliance, to put the County on notice that she was
asserting a personal injury claim. We agree with Connelly.
The case of White v. Moreno Valley Unified School District
(1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1024 (White), is instructive. There,
a high school student and her parents filed a claim with
the school district stemming from an automobile accident,
which stated: “‘A general description of the injury, damage
or loss incurred so far as it may be known at this time is:
Personal injuries to Claimant [student]. Medical expenses
incurred by Claimants [the parents].” The claim further
stated that the amount claimed was in excess of $500,000
based on “Medical specials (present and future), pain and
suffering, loss of present and future earnings, and
permanent physical injuries, among other things.” (White,
supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1026-1027.) After the school
district rejected the claim, the student and her mother
filed a complaint against it, which sought to recover
medical expenses incurred on the student’s behalf. The
mother’s cause of action to recover medical expenses she
incurred on the student’s behalf subsequently was
voluntarily dismissed. At trial, the court excluded all
evidence of the amount of medical expenses the student’s
mother had paid based on its conclusion the tort claim only
stated the mother claimed medical expense damages and did
not include any claim for medical expenses incurred by the
student. The trial court denied the student’s motion for a
new trial and the student appealed. (Id. at pp. 1028-1029.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the claim was
sufficient to cover the student’s cause of action to
recover medical expenses. (White, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 1029-1030.) The court explained: “[w]hile the claim
filed on behalf of [student] was far from a model of
clarity, we do not agree with School District that it so
utterly failed to indicate [student] was seeking recovery
of her medical expenses that she was precluded from suing
therefor. The claim indicated that [student] was the
injured person, and the amount of the claim `in excess of
$500,000.00,’ indicated [student’s] personal injuries were
serious in nature. Substantial medical expenses would, of
course, naturally and certainly result from serious
personal injuries.” (Id. at p. 1031.) The court reasoned
the claim was susceptible to the interpretation that both
the student and her parents were claiming the right to
reimbursement of medical expenses since the amount of
damages claimed, $500,000, did not specify any particular
amount separately as to any of the parties, which made it
appear that the claims were lumped together, especially “in
view of the fact that less than two months had passed since
the accident and that, no doubt, many of the medical
expenses had yet to be incurred or paid.” (Id. at pp.
1031-1032.)
Based on this interpretation, the court found the student’s
claim sufficient to reasonably enable the school district
to make an adequate investigation and settle the claim,
“including the medical expenses which were clearly
encompassed within the overall claim.” (White, supra, 181
Cal.App.3d at p. 1032.) In the alternative, the court found
“the combined claim of the minor and her parents in the case
at bench, undifferentiated as to the amount claimed by each
and making specific reference to past and future medical
expenses as part of the overall claim is sufficient to
support an action by the injured minor for recovery of her
medical expenses.” (Id. at p. 1033.)
This case shows that in considering whether a claim
substantially complies with the Tort Claims Act, the claim
should be viewed in its entirety and a determination made
as to whether the claim is susceptible to an interpretation
that reasonably enables the public entity to make an
adequate investigation and settle the claim. Here,
Connelly’s claim revealed that she was the injured or
damaged party, the injury or damage occurred when a County
vehicle ran a stop sign and hit her pickup truck, and
Connelly claimed her injury or damage was caused by
improper driving, failure to obey a stop sign and unsafe
operation of the County vehicle. In response to the
question “What injuries or damages did you suffer?[,]”
Connelly stated: “Damage to my `96 Chevy S-10 pickup
— car rental until my truck is replaced. Unspecified
Medical, Lost Income, future Medical.” Evaluating this
response in the context of this claim, namely one based on
an automobile accident which would be expected to involve
both property damage and personal injuries, it is apparent
Connelly is stating she suffered both property damage, in
the form of damage to her truck and car rental expenses,
and damages due to personal injuries suffered in the
accident. While Connelly does not specifically state she
suffered personal injuries or describe those injuries, the
statement “unspecified medical, lost income, future medical”
is certainly susceptible to the interpretation that
Connelly was seeking to recover damages for personal
injuries in the form of medical expenses and lost income,
and that she did not know the extent of those damages.
While Connelly’s claim, like the claim in White, is not the
model of clarity, we do not agree with respondents that it
so utterly failed to indicate Connelly suffered personal
injuries in the accident and was seeking to recover damages
for those injuries as to preclude her from suing for those
damages.[fn4] As in White, the claim was filed less than
two months after the accident and by its language, purported
to set forth only such injuries and damages as were then
known. The evidence Connelly presented in opposition to the
summary judgment motion showed that although Connelly knew
she was injured in the accident, she did not know the
extent of her injuries when she filed this claim, and did
not know until two months after the County rejected her
claim what the injuries in her neck were or that she needed
surgery. Since Connelly did not know the extent of her
injuries, it is hardly surprising that she described her
medical expenses and lost income as “unspecified.”[fn5]
Respondents assert it can be inferred from this evidence
that Connelly at least knew she had some sort of injury to
her neck, and her failure to list that on the form rendered
her claim deficient. Even if we were to agree her failure
to describe whatever symptoms she was suffering from when
she filed her claim rendered it technically deficient, we
do not agree she failed to satisfy the test of substantial
compliance. This is because she stated adequate information
on the form to advise the County that she suffered personal
injuries in the accident. That was all that was required to
substantially comply with the statutes. As the Supreme
Court explained in Stockett, “[i]n comparing claim and
complaint, `we are mindful that “[s]o long as the policies
of the claims statutes are effectuated, [the statutes]
should be given a liberal construction to permit full
adjudication on the merits.”‘ [Citations.] If the claim
gives adequate information for the public entity to
investigate, additional detail and elaboration in the
complaint is permitted.” (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p.
449.) Here, having given the County enough information to
investigate her personal injury claim by stating she
suffered damages in the form of medical expenses and lost
income, the policies of the claims statutes were
effectuated.
Respondents also contend the inclusion of the word
“unspecified” rendered the claim hopelessly vague. We do
not agree that it did so for purposes of determining
whether there was substantial compliance. As stated above,
the test for substantial compliance is whether the face of
the claim discloses sufficient information to enable the
public entity to make an adequate investigation of the
claim’s merits and settle it. (Loehr, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1083.) Here, the information disclosed was that
Connelly incurred unknown medical expenses and lost income
as a result of the accident, which naturally would have
arisen from her personal injuries. This information
certainly was sufficient to enable respondents to
adequately investigate the extent of Connelly’s personal
injuries and attempt to settle the claim if it chose to do
so.
Respondents complain, however, that the County never was
given a realistic opportunity to settle the personal injury
claim because Connelly never submitted a detailed
description of her injuries or medical bills to support her
claim despite a request to do so. That Connelly did not
provide this information, however, does not negate the fact
her claim provided sufficient notice she was personally
injured and was seeking to recover damages for those
injuries. Instead of pursuing the matter further, the
County chose to reject the claim. Although pursuant to
section 910.6, subdivision (a) Connelly could have amended
her claim even after it was rejected to specify the personal
injuries she suffered, respondents do not cite any
authority that she was required to do so. To the contrary,
a failure to amend a claim is not a defense to an action if
the court finds the claim as presented complied
substantially with the Tort Claims Act. (§ 910.6,
subd. (b).) Having submitted a claim that substantially
complied with the Tort Claims Act, Connelly was not
required to submit additional documentation or file a
second claim in order to comply with the Act’s notice
provisions.
The cases respondents rely on are distinguishable. In
Loehr, the court held the plaintiff could not maintain an
action for damages based on wrongful termination where the
letter that purported to be a claim only demanded the
plaintiff’s reinstatement to his position and nowhere
stated there was a claim for money damages or an estimate of
the amount of any prospective injury, damage or loss.
(Loehr, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1083-1084.) The court
concluded this and other deficiencies were material
omissions which made the letter insufficient as a matter of
law to satisfy the requirements of a claim. (Id. at p.
1084.) Similarly, in Wood v. Riverside General Hospital
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, the court found documents in
which the plaintiff’s mother complained about the
plaintiff’s care while hospitalized did not substantially
comply with the Tort Claims Act because they were not
transmitted to the statutorily designated agent and did not
indicate that a monetary claim was being asserted. (Id. at
pp. 1117-1118.) In contrast to these cases, Connelly’s
claim specifically mentions her injuries or damages as
including unspecified medical, lost income and future
medical. This description does not constitute a total
failure to comply with the requirement that the claim
provide a general description of the injury or damage
incurred, as it adequately advises the County that she has
incurred personal injuries which resulted in damages for
medical and lost income in an unknown amount.
Having concluded Connelly’s claim was sufficient to apprise
the County of her personal injury claim, we need not decide
Connelly’s contention that her claim meets the pleading
standard required of a civil complaint. As our Supreme
Court has pointed out, “[a] claim need not contain the
detail and specificity required of a pleading, [it] need
only `fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have
done.’ [Citations.]” (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p.
446.) Since a claim need not contain the same specificity
as a complaint, it is irrelevant whether the claim here
satisfied that standard. We also need not address the
issues regarding the effect of the County’s discovery
responses on the motion or whether the County is estopped
from relying on failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act.
In summary, Connelly adequately presented to the County her
personal injury claim arising from the accident. Her notice
of claim satisfied the purposes of the claims statutes by
providing sufficient information for the County to conduct
an investigation into her injuries. The trial court,
therefore, erred in granting respondents’ summary judgment
motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Connelly
is awarded her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
Vartabedian, Acting P.J.,
Wiseman, J.
[fn1] All further statutory references are to the Government
Code unless otherwise noted.
[fn2] Section 945.4 provides in full: “Except as provided in
Sections 946.4 and 946.6, no suit for money or damages may
be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for
which a claim is required to be presented in accordance
with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2
(commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this division
until a written claim therefor has been presented to the
public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has
been deemed to have been rejected by the board, in
accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this
division.”
[fn3] Section 910 provides in full: “A claim shall be
presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his or
her behalf and shall show all the following: [¶] (a)
The name and post office address of the claimant.
[¶] (b) The post office address to which the person
presenting the claim desires notices to be sent. [¶]
(c) The date, place and other circumstances of the
occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim
asserted. [¶] (d) A general description of the
indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred
so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of
the claim. [¶] (e) The name or names of the public
employee or employees causing the injury, damage or loss,
if known. [¶] (f) The amount claimed if it totals
less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of
the presentation of the claim, including the estimated
amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar
as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the
claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount
claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars
($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim.
However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a
limited civil case.”
[fn4] In fact, Meador testified in her deposition that she
understood when she received the claim form that Connelly
was claiming she had been injured and could not tell the
County what her medical expenses or lost income were. While
as respondents point out the County’s knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the claim, “standing alone,”does
not constitute substantial compliance (City of San Jose v.
Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455), Meador’s
understanding shows the claim form accomplished its
purpose, namely it put the County on notice Connelly was
claiming damages for personal injuries.
[fn5] Although Connelly originally stated the total amount
claimed was “Unspecified[,]” respondents acknowledged in
their reply papers filed below and continue to acknowledge
on appeal that she amended the dollar amount claimed to
“within the Superior Court limit” in her December 15, 1999,
letter to the County. Significantly, although the trial
court stated in its written ruling that the County was
arguing Connelly withdrew her personal injury claim in that
letter, respondents specifically conceded below that “it is
not, nor has [it] been, [respondents] contention in this
Motion for Summary Judgment that [Connelly] made a proper
personal injury claim, then withdrew it.” Respondents do
not contend otherwise on appeal.