Federal District Court Opinions
COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION v. GRANHOLM, (E.D.Mich. 12-27-2006) COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND IMMIGRATION RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY (BAMN), UNITED FOR EQUALITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, RAINBOW PUSH COALITION, CALVIN JEVON COCHRAN, LASHELLE BENJAMIN, BEAUTIE MITCHELL, DENESHA RICHEY, STASIA BROWN, MICHAEL GIBSON, CHRISTOPHER SUTTON, LAQUAY JOHNSON, TURQOISE WISE-KING, BRANDON FLANNIGAN, JOSIE HUMAN, _ISSAMAR CAMACHO, KAHLEIF HENRY, SHANAE TATUM, MARICRUZ LOPEZ, ALEJANDRA CRUZ, ADARENE HOAG, CANDICE YOUNG, TRISTAN TAYLOR, WILLIAMS FRAZIER, JERELL ERVES, MATTHEW GRIFFITH, LACRISSA BEVERLY, D’SHAWNM FEATHERSTONE, DANIELLE NELSON, JULIUS CARTER, KEVIN SMITH, KYLE SMITH, PARIS BUTLER, TOUISSANT KING, AIANA SCOTT, ALLEN VONOU, RANDIAH GREEN, BRITTANY JONES, COURTNEY DRAKE, DANTE DIXON, JOSEPH HENRY REED, AFSCME LOCAL 207, AFSCME LOCAL 214, AFSCME LOCAL 312, AFSCME LOCAL 836, AFSCME LOCAL 1642, AFSCME LOCAL 2920, and the DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PARTY, Plaintiffs, v. JENNIFER GRANHOLM, in her official capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan, the REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, the BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, and the TRUSTEES of any other public college or university, community college, or school district, Defendants, and Page 2 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY and the BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, Cross-Plaintiffs, v. JENNIFER GRANHOLM, in her official capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan, Cross-Defendant. Case No. 06-15024. United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division. December 27, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO EXPEDITE, GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO INTERVENE, AND STRIKING MOTION TO DISMISS
DAVID LAWSON, District Judge
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO EXPEDITE, GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE BY ERIC RUSSELL, DENYING REMAINING MOTIONS TO INTERVENE, AND STRIKING MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS FOUNDATION AND THE MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE COMMITTEE
Before the Court are three motions by various parties to
intervene in this action either as plaintiffs or defendants.
This case was commenced on November 8, 2006 by several
plaintiffs as a challenge to a recently-approved state
constitutional amendment, Proposal 06-2, now known as
Article 1, section 26 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963,
that purports to bar the use of race, sex, color, ethnicity,
or national origin to promote diversity in public hiring,
contracting, and university admission decisions. The
plaintiffs allege that the amendment violates the United
States Constitution. The Court has reviewed the submissions
of the parties and finds that the relevant law and facts
have been set forth in the motion papers and that oral
argument will not aid in the disposition of the motion.
Further, the parties have sought expedited treatment of
their motions, and oral argument is impractical in light of
that request. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion be
decided on the papers submitted. See E.D. Mich. LR
7.1(e)(2). The Court finds that the interests of the
proposed intervenors, save those of Eric Russell, are
represented adequately by the parties Page 3 presently
before the Court, allowing intervention would interfere with
the expeditious disposition of the present action, and
therefore intervention is not in the interest of justice.
Proposed intervenor Russell, however, has identified an
individual interest that may not be represented adequately
by the institutional parties now before the Court, and
therefore his motion to intervene will be granted.
I.
A.
Although the lawsuit’s filing the day after the election
received some press coverage, there was little activity in
the case for over a month after it was filed. Then on
December 11, 2006, the three University defendants filed a
cross-claim against co-defendant Governor Jennifer Granholm
seeking declaratory relief, together with a motion for a
preliminary injunction to delay the implementation of the
state constitutional amendment until the current enrollment
season is completed, and a motion for expedited
consideration. The Court ordered responses to the motion for
injunction by December 18, 2006. Thereafter, the Michigan
Attorney General sought permission to intervene as a
defendant in the matter, together with a motion to expedite
consideration of the motion to intervene. The parties to the
case either took no position or consented to the relief, and
the Court granted the motion to intervene on December 14,
2006.
On December 18, 2006, the Court received a stipulation [dkt
#26] from all parties to the case, including intervening
defendant Michigan Attorney General, consenting to the
temporary injunctive relief sought by the cross-claimants
(the University defendants), and agreeing to dismiss with
prejudice the portion of the cross-claim seeking a temporary
injunction, and the balance of the cross-claim without
prejudice. The Court approved the stipulation and entered an
appropriate order on December 19, 2006. Page 4
Also on December 14, 2006, a motion to intervene was filed
by the American Civil Rights Foundation and the Michigan
Civil Rights Initiative Committee. The American Civil Rights
Foundation appears to be a California-based organization and
represents that it is a coalition of individuals who are
opposed to the use of racial, gender, and ethnic factors by
government in making decisions about letting contracts,
education, and employment. The Michigan Civil Rights
Initiative Committee is the ballot question committee that
sponsored the challenged ballot proposal. These two groups
seek to intervene as defendants in the action. Along with
their motion to intervene, they filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint, but the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
on December 17, 2006. They filed no motion for immediate
consideration at that time.
On December 18, 2006, a motion to intervene as defendants
was filed by a group called Toward a Fair Michigan, and an
individual named Eric Russell. The mission of Toward a Fair
Michigan, according to the affidavit of its chairperson, is
to “promot[e] and foster[] balanced debate” on the ballot
proposal, and “insure that the deliberate will of the
people” is enforced. Aff. of William Allen at § 1.
Eric Russell states that he is a Michigan citizen who
intends to apply to law school at the University of Michigan
next year.
Also on December 18, 2006, the City of Lansing filed a
motion to intervene as plaintiff in the action. The City
seeks a delay in the effective date of the constitutional
amendment as to it because, it contends, it must work within
the framework of certain municipal ordinances that mandate
the use of racial and gender preferences in employment and
letting contracts. The next day, Lansing filed a
supplemental emergency motion to intervene in which it asks
that it be allowed the benefit of the stipulation reached by
the parties to the case with respect to the delay of the
effective date of the constitutional amendment as to the
University defendants’ admission programs. Page 5
The American Civil Rights Foundation and Toward a Fair
Michigan filed their motions to expedite the hearings on
their intervention motions on December 19, 2006. They both
make reference to the (now dismissed) cross-claim filed by
the University defendants and the “additional filings” in
the case as grounds for expedited consideration.
B.
The main thrust of the motions to intervene filed by the
American Civil Rights Foundation, the Michigan Civil Rights
Initiative Committee, Toward a Fair Michigan, and Eric
Russell is that some of the named defendants have evidenced
through public statements their opposition to Proposal 2 or
have otherwise demonstrated they will not vigorously defend
its constitutionality. These contentions are focused on the
Michigan Governor and the University defendants, since the
motions were filed presumably without the benefit of
learning that the Michigan Attorney General, who publicly
supported the proposal during the election, was allowed to
intervene in the case. The City of Lansing seeks
intervention as a plaintiff based on its “substantial
interest in preserving its legislatively mandated purchasing
and hiring ordinances and civil rights policies and
procedures.” Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Intervene at 7.
Lansing’s main goal is obtaining additional time to comply
with the amendment’s provisions.
The American Civil Rights Foundation and the Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative Committee argue that their request is
timely even though it comes after the cross-claim by the
University defendants was resolved and dismissed, they have
a substantial interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit
because of their activity in promoting passage of the
proposal, their interest in ending affirmative action would
be impaired if Proposal 2 were invalidated or narrowly
interpreted, and the Page 6 other parties could not
represent their interests because those interests are
inconsistent with the defendants’ pre-election
pronouncements about the ballot proposal.
The University defendants and the Governor respond with the
arguments that the intervention request is untimely because
the cross-claim has been resolved and the proposed
intervenors failed to ask for expedited treatment of their
motion despite the time-sensitive nature of the cross-claim.
They also argue that the proposed intervenors failed to
demonstrate a substantial interest in the litigation that is
different than any voter who supported the proposal. They
next contend that with the entree of the Michigan Attorney
General into the case, a full range of arguments addressing
all the relevant issues will be presented to the Court,
particularly in light of the attorney general’s pledge to
vigorously defend the amendment. Finally, the Governor
asserts that the Court should view with skepticism the
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative Committee’s request to
intervene because of the misconduct its members were found
to have committed by the deception of Michigan citizens in
obtaining the requisite number of signatures in support of
Proposal 2 as described in Operation King’s Dream v.
Connerly, 2006 WL 2514115 (E.D. Mich. 2006). The Michigan
Attorney General did not respond to the intervention motion
by the American Civil Rights Foundation and the Michigan
Civil Rights Initiative Committee.
In their motion to intervene, Toward a Fair Michigan and
Eric Russell likewise contend that their request is timely.
Russell says that he has an interest in the subject matter
of the litigation because he is a white male seeking
admission to the University of Michigan Law School next
fall. The interest of Toward a Fair Michigan is less
concrete; it asserts that it did not take a position
concerning whether Proposal 2 should be passed, and its
objective was to educate the public and see that the will of
the electorate, whatever its decision, was implemented.
Russell also argues that his Page 7 interest in achieving
admission to the University of Michigan would be impaired if
Proposal 2 is struck down or narrowly construed, and Toward
a Fair Michigan argues that its interests will be impaired
if the will of the people is not upheld. These proposed
intervenors also contend that their interests will not be
represented adequately by the present parties based on the
Governor’s pre-election statements in opposition to the
proposal.
The University defendants and the Governor have repeated
their responses in opposition to the intervention motions
filed by Toward a Fair Michigan and Russell. The Michigan
Attorney General did not respond to the intervention motion
filed by these proposed intervenors.
The City of Lansing argues that its motion for intervention
is timely because it filed the present motion promptly after
discovery of its interest in the litigation. In identifying
its interest in the subject matter of the present lawsuit,
Lansing asserts that like the plaintiffs who seek to
overturn Proposal 2, Lansing “has a similar interest not
necessarily in overturning Proposal 2, but at least in
delaying its implementation.” Br. in Supp. of Mot. to
Intervene at 7. Lansing also contends that disposition of
the case may, as a practical matter, impair Lansing’s
interest because an adverse decision would defeat Lansing’s
efforts to achieve race and gender equality through local
legislation. Finally, Lansing asserts that its interests are
not adequately represented because none of the current
parties will represent the interests and concerns of local
governments effected by Proposal 2.
The Michigan Attorney General opposes Lansing’s request to
intervene primarily on the ground that Lansing has failed to
establish that its interests will be inadequately
represented by the current parties to the case. The attorney
general insists that the movant has the burden of
establishing inadequacy of representation, and this burden
includes overcoming the presumption of adequacy of
representation when the proposed intervenor and a party to
the suit share the same Page 8 ultimate objective. The
University defendants and the Governor did not respond to
the intervention motion filed by the City of Lansing.
All movants also have sought permissive intervention as an
alternative form of relief.
II.
Motions to intervene are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24. Rule 24 allows two types of intervention:
intervention by right and permissive intervention. With
respect to both types of intervention, the Sixth Circuit has
held that although “Rule 24 should be `broadly construed in
favor of potential intervenors,'” the court has cautioned
that “this does not mean that Rule 24 poses no barrier to
intervention at all.” Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d
467, 472 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Purnell v. Akron, 925 F.2d
941, 950 (6th Cir. 1991)). The court has affirmed the denial
of motions to intervene by right and permissively for a
variety of reasons. See, e.g., Jordan v. Michigan Conf. of
Teamsters Welfare Fund, 207 F.3d 854, 863 (6th Cir. 2000)
(affirming denial of a motion to intervene as of right,
because the motion was untimely and the proposed
intervenor’s interests were adequately represented); Bradley
v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1194 (6th Cir. 1987) (affirming
denial of motions to intervene permissively and as of right,
in part because “the district court has already taken steps
to protect the proposed intervenors’ interests by inviting
[their counsel] to appear as amicus curiae in the case”).
A.
Rule 24(a), dealing with intervention of right, states:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action . . . when the applicant claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately
represented by existing parties. Page 9
Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a). “[T]o intervene as of right under Rule
24(a)(2), a proposed intervenor must establish the following
four elements: (1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2)
the proposed intervenor has a substantial legal interest in
the subject matter of the case; (3) the proposed
intervenor’s ability to protect that interest may be
impaired in the absence of intervention; and (4) the parties
already before the court may not adequately represent the
proposed intervenor’s interest.” United States v. Michigan,
424 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2005). “Failure to meet [any]
one of the [four] criteria will require that the motion to
intervene be denied.” Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345
(6th Cir. 1989).
The first element — timeliness — “should be
evaluated in the context of all relevant circumstances.”
Stupak-Thrall, 226 F.3d at 472 (internal quotation marks
omitted). A variety of factors are usually considered,
including the developments in the case, the purpose for
intervention, and how long the proposed intervenors knew of
their interest in the property or transaction at issue
before they sought permission to intervene. Id. at 473-74.
In this case, the lawsuit challenges the implementation of a
state constitutional amendment that was to go into effect on
December 23, 2006. None of the parties save Russell has
offered an explanation why they waited for over a month to
join the suit. Russell’s individual interest became apparent
when the University defendants sought a delay in the
effective date of the state constitutional amendment and
reached an agreement to that effect with others in the
lawsuit. Since Russell’s own admission prospects may be
affected by that agreement, it was sensible for him to seek
intervention when that information came to light. The other
proposed intervening defendants, however, have interests
that are no different than any Michigan citizen who voted in
favor of the ballot proposal, and there was no obstacle to
their taking action shortly after the lawsuit was filed and
well in advance of the effective date of the amendment. Page
10 Similarly, the City of Lansing no doubt was aware of the
pending litigation and the effective date of the amendment,
but it chose to wait for over a month before seeking an
entree into the case. The Court believes that the citizens
of the State are best served by a prompt resolution of the
issues framed by the pleadings as to the constitutionality
of their new state constitutional provision, and the delay
in reaching that objective occasioned by the tardy requests
to intervene, in light of all the circumstances of the case,
renders the requests (save Russell’s) untimely.
The second element — that the proposed intervenor
proves a substantial legal interest in the property or
transaction involved in the lawsuit — was addressed
by the Sixth Circuit in Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller,
103 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir. 1997), which the court denominated a
“close case.” There, the court of appeals wrote:
This circuit has opted for a rather expansive notion of the
interest sufficient to invoke intervention of right. See
Purnell, 925 F.2d at 948; Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d
1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[T]his court has acknowledged
that `interest’ is to be construed liberally.”). We have,
for example, noted that an intervenor need not have the same
standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit, Purnell, 925 F.2d
at 948, and cited with approval decisions of other courts
“reject[ing] the notion that Rule 24(a)(2) requires a
specific legal or equitable interest.” Id.. . . . The
inquiry into the substantiality of the claimed interest is
necessarily fact-specific.
Id. at 1245. The court in Miller held that the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce had a sufficient legal interest in a
suit challenging an amendment to Michigan’s Campaign Finance
Act not only due to its role in the political process that
resulted in the adoption of the disputed amendment, but also
by the fact that it was also specifically regulated by the
legislation. See id. at 1247. Further guidance is provided
by Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999), where
the court held that pro-affirmative action groups and
minority applicants to the University of Michigan’s
undergraduate and law programs had a sufficient interest to
justify intervention in a suit challenging the university’s
Page 11 race-conscious admission programs because, if the
lawsuit was successful and the affirmative-action programs
eliminated, they would have a lesser chance of gaining
admission. See id. at 400.
In this case, the American Civil Rights Foundation and the
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative Committee argue that they
were integrally involved in the drafting and promotion of
Proposal 2. It would not be unreasonable to posit that the
amendment would not have reached the ballot without their
efforts. Therefore, although under Miller, the question of
whether these organizations have a sufficient interest in
the outcome of this litigation is perhaps a close one.
However, involvement in the pre-election activity does not
automatically establish a substantial interest in this
litigation, as these proposed intervenors contend. Miller
does not stand for the proposition that an organization that
supports legislation ipso facto has a substantial legal
interest in the outcome of a suit challenging such
legislation. Rather, the court found a substantial interest
where the Chamber of Commerce in that case was not a mere
supporter of the legislation; it was also directly
“regulated by at least three of the four statutory
provisions challenged by the plaintiffs.” 103 F.3d at 1247.
There is no suggestion that either of these organizations
will be affected by rulings concerning the amendment at
issue in this case. They have not asserted that whatever
ruling this Court hands down will have an impact on the
vitality of the organizations, subject them to regulation,
or expand or curtail their rights as organizations. They
have not proved, therefore, that they have an “interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a).
The interest of Toward a Fair Michigan is even more tenuous.
It has represented that it took no pre-election position of
whether the proposal should pass, but it only sponsored
debates about the merits of the ballot initiative. It states
that its present mission is to ensure that public officials
carry out the will of the electorate and advise people of
their rights under the new amendment. Page 12 Toward a Fair
Michigan has not identified any interest in its brief that
would be impacted by a ruling of the Court.
The City of Lansing primarily seeks a delay in the
application of the constitutional amendment to itself. It
has argued that it is subject to regulation by the new law,
and its impact will materially affect the operations of the
City in its hiring and contract-letting decisions. Lansing
has established a substantial interest in the litigation
under Miller.
Likewise, Eric Russell is situated similarly to the
intervenors in Grutter v. Bollinger, in that if the present
plaintiffs are successful in obtaining a ruling that the
constitutional amendment is invalid, Russell’s chances of
gaining admission to the University of Michigan law school
may be diminished. See Grutter, 188 F.3d at 400.
Proof of the third element — that the proposed
intervenor’s ability to protect its interest may be impaired
in the absence of intervention — is not an onerous
task. “`To satisfy this element of the intervention test, a
would-be intervenor must show only that impairment of its
substantial legal interest is possible if intervention is
denied. This burden is minimal.'” Grutter, 188 F.3d at 399
(quoting Miller, 103 F.3d at 1247). Of course, the inability
to protect one’s interest posits the existence of an
interest to begin with. The American Civil Rights
Foundation, the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative Committee,
and Toward a Fair Michigan have failed in that proof. Eric
Russell and the City of Lansing have not.
The fourth element requires the proposed intervenor to prove
the inadequacy of representation by others who are in the
case, and it appears to be the most critical issue with
respect to the present motions to intervene. In Michigan,
the Sixth Circuit explained that
[a]pplicants for intervention bear the burden of proving
that they are inadequately represented by a party to the
suit. Meyer Goldberg, Inc. v. Goldberg, 717 F.2d 290, Page
13 293 (6th Cir. 1983). This burden has been described as
minimal because it need only be shown `that there is a
potential for inadequate representation.’ Grutter, 188 F.3d
at 400. Nevertheless, applicants for intervention must
overcome the presumption of adequate representation that
arises when they share the same ultimate objective as a
party to the suit. Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1192
(6th Cir. 1987).
United States v. Michigan, 424 F.3d at 443-44. In Grutter,
the courts of appeals held that the burden of proof
concerning inadequacy of representation remains the same
when the existing party (the putative representative of the
proposed intervenor’s interests) is a governmental entity.
Grutter, 188 F.3d at 400. To meet this burden, “[i]t may be
enough to show that the existing party who purports to seek
the same outcome may not make all of the prospective
intervenor’s arguments.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The main argument by the proposed intervening defendants on
the adequacy of representation is that the original parties
to the lawsuit all had been opposed to the ballot proposal
before the election. That argument certainly had some force
before the Michigan Attorney General was allowed to
intervene in the case. There is evidence showing that
Governor Granholm made public statements calling for the
rejection of Proposal 2 prior to election day and lamenting
its subsequent passage. The University defendants plainly
oppose Proposal 2 as evidenced by their cross-claim in this
action contesting the constitutionality of the amendment and
seeking the delay of its implementation. However, the
Michigan Attorney General took a pre-election position in
support of Proposal 2 and urged its passage. The Attorney
General’s office has taken pains to divide its sections
representing the Governor and its own interests and has
isolated the two divisions. For his own part, the assistant
attorneys general assigned to represent the General’s own
interests have averred that the Michigan Attorney General
will “ensure that the Court is presented with a full Page 14
range of arguments . . . so that a vigorous defense of the
constitutionality of [Proposal 2] may be had.” Mot. to
Expedite Mot. to Intervene by Attorney General at §
9.
The proposed intervening defendants have challenged the
attorney general’s ability to represent their interests by
arguing that, no matter how well the attorney general may
represent the electorate, it is doubtful that he will be
able to represent the specific interests of the sponsors and
drafters of Proposal 2. This argument is as imprecise as it
sounds, but the theory essentially appears to be that the
attorney general will not defend Proposal 2 with as much
fervor as the proposed intervenors would. However, the
“interest” of the proposed intervenors in seeing the
constitutional amendment upheld is no different than the
majority of Michigan citizens who voted for its passage.
There is no proof in this record that the proposed
intervenors or their lawyers would be more capable than the
elected attorney general of mounting a defense to the
amendment, or that their arguments would be more compelling
or credible or better founded. Since the interests of
proposed intervenors the American Civil Rights Foundation,
the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative Committee, and Toward a
Fair Michigan are precisely aligned with those of the
Michigan Attorney General, and because there is little
likelihood that their participation would shed any new light
on the issues presented, they have not shown that the
present parties, as they are now aligned, would be
inadequate to advance their interests.
Similarly, the City of Lansing has not made a convincing
argument that its interests are not well-represented. The
named plaintiffs oppose Proposal 2, the Universities largely
oppose Proposal 2, and Governor Granholm has publicly
displayed her disagreement with the amendment. The current
parties to the suit — private organizations, a
variety of individuals, and labor unions — seem to be
interested in the amendment’s impact on education,
employment, and public contracts. Under Page 15 these
circumstances, the Court finds that Lansing’s interests
appear to be adequately represented.
The circumstances of Eric Russell are different. Russell is
the only intervenor who has alleged an individual interest
that may not be taken into account by the present parties.
He has alleged a personal stake in seeing that his law
school admission chances are not diminished by a narrow
construction or invalidation of the amendment. His interest
extends beyond those of the citizens and election groups
that promoted or opposed the ballot proposal. He seeks the
implementation of Proposal 2 now, while his application is
being processed. The other parties do not represent that
position. Russell, therefore, has established the fourth
element for intervention by right.
The Court finds that none of the proposed intervenors except
Eric Russell have made the proper showing to establish a
right to intervene in this case under Rule 24(a).
B.
Rule 24 also sets out the standard for permissive
intervention. It states:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene
in an action . . . when an applicant’s claim or defense and
the main action have a question of law or fact in common. .
. . In exercising its discretion the court shall consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b). An applicant for permissive
intervention, therefore, must prove that the motion for
intervention is timely, there is at least one common
question of law or fact, and the balancing of undue delay,
prejudice to the original parties, and any other relevant
factors favors intervention. Michigan State AFL-CIO v.
Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1248 (6th Cir. 1997). Page 16
The Court has found that the motions to intervene by the
American Civil Rights Foundation, the Michigan Civil Rights
Initiative Committee, Toward a Fair Michigan, and the City
of Lansing are not timely. Moreover, it is paramount that
the issues in this case are resolved promptly. Michigan’s
public institutions will serve its citizens best when they
have a clear understanding of the requirements and
limitations of the State’s new constitutional amendment.
That clear understanding will not be achieved until the
conclusion of the judicial process. This Court has no
delusion that its pronouncement will be the last word on the
subject. History has confirmed that the district courts, in
cases of this importance, are mere way stations on the
judicial road to a final resolution by courts beyond.
Nonetheless, the case must pass through this stage —
and promptly — before the goal of finality can be
realized.
Allowing additional parties into the lawsuit at this stage
of the proceedings will inhibit, not promote, a prompt
resolution by this Court. Additional parties no doubt could
seek to file more claims, amend pleadings even further, and
inject issues that may not lead directly to a resolution of
the issues circumscribed by the present pleadings. The rules
of civil procedure, including Rule 24(b), must be “construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. After
balancing the relevant factors, the Court determines that
allowing discretionary intervention will not advance that
objective.
III.
The Court has found that proposed intervenor Eric Russell
has established a right to intervene. The Court is not
persuaded that the remaining proposed intervenors ought to
intervene in the present action. One of the proposed
intervenors has filed a motion to dismiss, which will be
stricken because it was not filed by a proper party to the
case. Page 17
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motions to expedite the
motion to intervene by Eric Russell and Toward a Fair
Michigan [dkt #43], the American Civil Rights Foundation and
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative Committee [dkt #41], and
the City of Lansing [dkt #38] are GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to intervene by Eric
Russell [dkt #27] is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to intervene by Toward
a Fair Michigan [dkt #27] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to intervene by
American Civil Rights Foundation and Michigan Civil Rights
Initiative Committee [dkt # 16] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to intervene by City
of Lansing [dkt # 31] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to dismiss by American
Civil Rights Foundation and Michigan Civil Rights Initiative
Committee [dkt # 21] is STRICKEN.