Federal District Court Opinions
HENDERSON v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., (Conn. 12-8-2006) LISA HENDERSON, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., ET AL., Defendant. No. 3:03cv2176(DJS). United States District Court, D. Connecticut. December 8, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
DOMINIC SQUATRITO, District Judge
On December 17, 2003, plaintiff Lisa Henderson
(“Henderson”) filed this action alleging that her employer,
General Electric Company (“GE”), discriminated against her
because of her gender and race in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on April 26, 2004 and
a Second Amended Complaint on June 23, 2004.[fn1] On July
29, 2005, pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. (Dkt. # 44) For the reasons set forth herein,
defendants’ motion is GRANTED.[fn2]
I. FACTS
In 1987, the General Electric Company (“GE”) hired Lisa
Henderson (“Henderson”) as a Customer Service
Representative. From 1987 through 2002, Henderson worked in
a variety of Page 2 managerial and supervisory jobs for
GE, during which time she performed at a high level.
Henderson consistently placed at the top of the employee
ranking scale and received performance awards for her work.
In November 2001, Henderson was considered for a promotion
to the position of “Director of Quality and Information
Technology at GE IMV” in Riazzino, Switzerland.[fn3]
The parties dispute whether James Shepard (“Shepard”), the
President and CEO of GE Digital Energy, or Antoinette Gawin
(“Gawin”), the CEO of GE IMV, hired Henderson as the
Director of Quality and Information Technology. Henderson
was interviewed by Gawin; Paola Madrisotti (“Madrisotti”),
the Human Resources Manager for GE IMV; and John Burns
(“Burns”), the Quality Leader in Europe. During the
interview process, Gawin’s boss was replaced by Shepard.
Thus, Henderson also met with Shepard, although the parties
dispute whether this meeting was just a “formality.”
Henderson received a letter signed by Gawin and Madrisotti,
which offered her the position of Director of Quality and
Information Technology of GE Systems.
Henderson assumed her new post on January 20, 2002. In her
new role, she was responsible for both Six Sigma and IT
projects. Six Sigma is a methodology used by GE to improve
business performance through statistical analysis, and IT
refers to Information Technology. Initially, plaintiff
worked on both Six Sigma and IT projects. Then, in February
or March of 2002, Gawin and the head of Information
Technology, Mark Lovelace, told Henderson Page 3 to devote
100% of her resources to a large IT project known as SAP.
Plaintiff served as the Joint Project Manager of the SAP
project from approximately March 2002 until late August or
early September 2002. As a result of Henderson’s
performance, she was given the highest award possible at
GE.
In the interim, in February or March 2002, Burns left his
position. Shepard hired Burns’s replacement, Brigitte
LaCroix (“LaCroix”), during the month of July, 2002.
LaCroix was given the responsibility of supervising Six
Sigma projects for all the GE Digital Energy businesses,
including GE IMV. Upon starting her new assignment, LaCroix
discovered that very little progress had been made with
regard to Six Sigma implementation. LaCroix testified that
she was under pressure from Shepard to increase the number
of Six Sigma projects and that she discussed Henderson’s
performance with Blanca Blaney (“Blaney”), the Human
Resources Manager for GE Digital Energy. Blaney also
provided deposition testimony that in July or August of
2002, LaCroix approached her regarding Henderson’s
performance. (Dkt. # 44-10, Blaney Dep., Ex. 13 at
44:2-16.) Henderson alleges that during this time period
she was completely devoted to SAP, and that Blaney and
LaCroix never conveyed Shepard’s displeasure regarding the
lack of Six Sigma projects to her.
After LaCroix assumed the position of Quality Leader, she
told Blaney and Lovelace that she wanted Henderson to be
fully dedicated to Six Sigma. In August 2002, LaCroix
approached Henderson to discuss whether Henderson would
work exclusively on Six Sigma. The parties dispute whether
LaCroix gave Henderson the option of choosing between IT
and Six Sigma. Henderson asserts that LaCroix informed her
that she would only be working on Six Sigma, while LaCroix
and Blaney provided deposition testimony that Henderson was
given a choice and Page 4 that she selected Six Sigma. In
September 2002, Henderson resumed her work on Six Sigma and
all of her IT responsibilities were assigned to
Jean-Michele Zwygart.
The parties dispute the quality of Henderson’s work once
she resumed work on Six Sigma. An August 16, 2002 email
from LaCroix to Henderson contained a list of items for
Henderson to work on. These items included several
completion deadlines. Defendants assert that Henderson
missed all of these deadlines while Henderson maintains
that she only missed some of the deadlines because of
circumstances beyond her control.
On October 1, 2002, Henderson missed a planned meeting
with LaCroix, Blaney, and Madrisotti. Henderson sent an
e-mail to LaCroix, Blaney, and Madrisotti apologizing for
missing the meeting and explaining that she was “stuck in
another meeting and lost track of time.” (Dkt. # 44, Ex.
2.) LaCroix forwarded this email to Shepard and Blaney and
indicated that she was concerned about Henderson’s “ability
to follow through and take her . . . role seriously.” Id.
In the same email, LaCroix also stated that she would give
Henderson “through the end of the year where we can then
make an evaluation,” and that she would “provide the
coaching and give her [Henderson] all the tools and support
she needs to be successful.” Id. Henderson was unaware of
the email at the time it was sent.
On October 29, 2002, LaCroix reviewed a document entitled
“Project Plan for Lisa Henderson” with Henderson over a
conference call. (Dkt. # 44, Ex. 3.) Prior to the
teleconference, LaCroix forwarded the plan to Blaney and
Mauro Canova (“Canova”), the General Manager for GE IMV.
Then, on November 7, 2002, LaCroix again discussed this
project plan with Henderson over a conference call. LaCroix
noted that Henderson missed several deadlines, which
Henderson contends were not deadlines at all, but merely
target dates. Page 5 During the teleconference, Henderson
questioned whether the project plan was a formal
“Performance Improvement Plan.”[fn4] When LaCroix responded
that the project plan was a Performance Improvement Plan,
Henderson became upset. The parties dispute whether
Henderson hung-up on LaCroix or whether the call mutually
ended. Following this conversation, LaCroix emailed Blaney
to express her concerns about Henderson. (Dkt # 44, Ex. 4.)
In this email, LaCroix again noted that she hoped to have a
review of Henderson’s performance in mid-January.
Thereafter, Henderson, LaCroix, Canova, and Blaney had a
teleconference where Blaney explained that Henderson was
not on a formal “Performance Improvement Plan” because the
proper procedures had not been followed.
On November 12, 2002, Henderson made three separate
presentations to Shepard on Billing Accuracy and Post Sales
Service Issue Resolution. Henderson was praised for her
performance. Then, on December 3, 2002, Henderson along with
the two Quality Leaders from the other two GE Digital
Energy businesses made presentations to Shepard. The
presentations were considered a “dry run” for a report that
Shepard and LaCroix would present to Shepard’s boss, Lloyd
Trotter, President of Industrial Systems. Henderson admits
that there were technical problems with her presentation
and that she was unable to answer a question posed to her
by Shepard.[fn5] Her PowerPoint slides were missing
information and contained incorrect graphs and incomplete
templates. Additionally, some of her pie charts were
missing numbers, while others had numbers off the page.
LaCroix considered the presentation to have gone “very
poorly.” Page 6 (Dkt. # 44, LaCroix Dep., Ex. 9 at
165:23.) Shepard spoke with Henderson after the
presentation to express his disappointment and to question
whether Henderson should continue in her current role.
Shepard also spoke with Blaney, who was not present for the
presentation, and told her that Henderson’s performance was
“totally unacceptable.” (Dkt. # 44, Blaney Dep., Ex. 10 at
122:5.) Shepard indicated that he never wanted to have a
meeting like that again with one of his leaders.
Later that day, LaCroix expressed her disappointment with
Henderson’s presentation by calling and emailing Henderson.
Henderson responded to LaCroix’s email, indicating that she
had fallen short on delivering what she had been
responsible for and that she was not proud of her
performance. Then, on Thursday, December 5, 2002, a
conference call was set up between Henderson, LaCroix, and
Canova to discuss Henderson’s performance at the December
3, 2002 meeting. Henderson and Canova were in Canova’s
office in Switzerland, while LaCroix was at GE Digital
Energy in Georgia. During the conversation, LaCroix
discussed Henderson’s presentation and informed her that
she was being placed on a formal “Performance Improvement
Plan.” Thereafter, Henderson became very upset. She
provided the following deposition testimony regarding this
meeting:
the statement was said from Brigitte [LaCroix] that I was
going to be put on the performance plan, and I told both
Brigitte [LaCroix] and Mauro [Canova] that I no longer
— if I had to be put on a performance plan, that I
no longer wanted to work in the business, and Brigitte
[LaCroix] asked me if I was — was my resignation;
was I resigning. I said I no longer wanted to be in the
business. Then she asked again, does that mean you want to
resign, and I said yes.
She immediately left the phone and went to get Blanca
[Blaney] and bring Blanca [Blaney] onto the phone. Blanca
[Blaney] came on the call, and her first question she
asked me was what date did I want to leave — did I
want to depart.
The situation was emotional then. I was in the room with
Mauro [Canova]. I was crying in the room with Mauro
[Canova], and Mauro [Canova] Page 7 just asked that we
all just stop and take a break and that we regroup on
Monday. . . .
(Dkt. # 49-4, Henderson Dep., Ex. 2 at 7:14-8:7.) LaCroix
testified that the only reason the meeting was continued
until Monday was to work out the details surrounding
Henderson’s resignation. Henderson counters that she did
not resign and that the purpose of the Monday meeting was
to continue to discuss her performance and her future at GE
after she had composed herself. She avers, “When I made
this statement [that I no longer wanted to work in the
business], I was referring to the fact that I no longer
wanted to work with Ms. LaCroix and Mr. Shepard. I had no
intention of giving up my 15 year career with General
Electric.” (Dkt. # 49-3, Henderson Aff., Ex. 1 §
15.) In addition, Henderson testified, “After the meeting
was over, when everyone was off the phone Mauro [Canova]
and I continued to talk. Mauro [Canova] could physically
see that I was upset. Mauro [Canova] told me to take the
time to think about it. And that’s what I did. And I left
his office and I went back to work.” (Dkt. # 49-4,
Henderson Dep., Ex. 2 at 22:4-10).
At some point following the conference call of December 5,
2002, Blaney informed Shepard that Henderson had resigned
and that her resignation had been accepted. Henderson,
however, returned to work on Friday, December 6, 2002. When
Henderson returned to the office, no one informed her that
she was no longer considered an employee. In addition,
Henderson reported for work on Monday, December 9, 2002.
She testified, “On the Monday [December 9, 2002], I spoke
with Mauro [Canova] first, and we talked and I told him
that I thought about it, and I had decided not to resign
and that I was going to stay with the business.” (Dkt. #
49-4, Henderson Dep., Ex. 2 at 23:5-8.) Thereafter, Canova,
Henderson, Blaney, and Page 8 LaCroix participated in a
conference call. Henderson stated that she wanted to
rescind her resignation, but LaCroix and Blaney refused,
explaining that they had already accepted her resignation.
According to LaCroix, she did not allow Henderson to
rescind her resignation both “because of her performance”
and because she had “lost confidence in her [Henderson’s]
ability to perform in that position.” (Dkt. # 44, LaCroix
Dep., Ex. 9 at 197:16-17.) Blaney agreed. She testified
that “it is not in the best interest of the corporation to
maintain leaders who cannot make decisions,” and that GE
“can’t afford to have those leaders making decisions who
are going to change their minds.” (Dkt. # 44, Blaney Dep.,
Ex. 10 at 146-47:22-3.) According to both Blaney and
LaCroix, Henderson would not have been terminated if she
had not resigned. The parties do not dispute that Shepard
approved Blaney and LaCroix’s decision not to allow
Henderson to rescind her resignation. (Dkt. # 49-2,
§ 40.)
After the December 9, 2002 conference call, Henderson
refused to submit an official letter of resignation. She
returned to work on December 10, 2002, and December 11,
2002. On Wednesday, December 11, 2002, Canova told
Henderson to leave the building and to wait for further
instruction from the company. Thereafter, Shepard, Canova,
and LaCroix sent a termination letter to Henderson dated
December 16, 2002. The letter reads,
This is to confirm our meeting on Thursday, December 5,
2002 in which you announced to us your resignation from GE
Digital Energy SA and our subsequent discussions. At that
meeting, you voluntarily resigned, as we understood you
did not want to continue in your role. We agreed to accept
your resignation and begin your transition. Given your
emotional state we all agreed to give you time to collect
yourself and we would follow up on the transition plan on
Monday December 9, 2002.
We were surprised, therefore, when you came back into the
office and stated that you wanted to retract your
resignation. Given the performance issues we have
discussed and the feedback you received concerning your
presentation to Page 9 the CEO last week, we do not feel
able to continue the employment relationship and have to
insist on the validity of your resignation. Given what has
happened, we sent you home pending confirmation of your
status.
Accordingly and for the avoidance of any doubt as to the
status of your employment with GE Digital Energy SA this
letter serves as notice that we are terminating your
employment should your resignation against our
expectations not be valid.
(Dkt. # 44-7, Ex. 9.) Henderson was paid until March 2003.
The parties dispute whether Henderson was permitted to
return to GE IMV during her severance period and whether
she was allowed to return company property and to pick up
her personal property. The parties also dispute who
performed Henderson’s duties following her departure.
Defendants maintain that the Six Sigma program was
restructured and that Janice Burr, a female employee
working in the United States, assumed Henderson’s
responsibilities. Henderson argues that her employer offered
her position to Otavio Kehdi (“Kehdi”) and that although he
declined the offer, he performed some of her duties, such
as staff meetings and updates.
According to Henderson, her termination was a product of
gender discrimination. In support of this assertion,
Henderson argues: (1) during her tenure at GE IMV, Shepard
terminated four female executives and replaced them with
men; (2) these females told her that they were removed
because they were women; (3) she witnessed Shepard make
sexist comments about Blaney; and (4) the male employees
who gave poor presentations or resigned were treated more
favorably than she was. Specifically, Henderson alleges
that GE IMV was referred to as “the company run by women”
and that Shepard replaced Cigdem Kasdan (“Kasdan”), Gawin,
Madrisotti, and Henderson with male employees. The parties
agree that Kasdan, the Chief Page 10 Financial Officer,
and Gawin, the CEO of GE IMV in Switzerland, were both
removed for performance reasons. Kasdan was replaced by
Neville Jones, and Gawin was replaced by Mauro Canova. Both
Jones and Canova are males. Madrisotti, the former Human
Resources Manager of GE IMV, resigned and was replaced by
Fausto Polumbo, also a male employee. The parties dispute
whether Madrisotti resigned to start her own business or
because she felt that she was being discriminated against.
The parties also dispute whether Henderson was replaced
with a male or a female employee.
In further support of her claim that Shepard removed
Gawin, Kasden, and Madrisotti because they were women,
Henderson testified that Gawin, Kasdan, and Madrisotti told
her that they believed they were removed because they were
women. Indeed, Henderson alleges that when Madrisotti was
leaving the company she stopped by Henderson’s office and
warned her that “they were getting rid of the women in the
company and [she] was next.” (Dkt. # 49-4, Henderson Dep.,
Ex. 2 at 39:7-9.) Henderson also claims that following her
termination, she spoke with Neville Jones (“Jones”), the
new Chief Financial Officer, and that Jones also felt that
Henderson, Gawin, and Kasdan, were terminated because they
were women. Henderson, however, did not submit sworn
affidavits or deposition testimony of Gawin, Kasdan,
Madrisotti, or Jones.
As further evidence that Shepard discriminated against
women, Henderson alleges that other employees warned her
about Shepard’s attitude towards women. According to
Henderson, her prior boss, Gary Randolph, told her “to be
very careful, because Jim [Shepard] didn’t play fair and
that he had a problem with women.” (Dkt. # 49-4, Henderson
Dep., Ex. 2 at 162:12-14.) She also asserts that Blaney
testified (1) that Gawin told her that she was
uncomfortable around Page 11 Shepard because he had been
demeaning towards her and (2) that Madrisotti told Blaney
that Shepard put more pressure on Gawin than on her male
colleagues. In her deposition, however, Blaney testified
that she did not recall whether anyone specifically told
her that Shepard was biased against women. (Dkt. # 44,
Blaney Dep., Ex. 10 at 112-13:25-1.) Blaney also
characterized the conflict between Gawin and Shepard as one
of clashing personalities, not one of gender bias. (Dkt. #
44, Blaney Dep., Ex. 10 at 111:11.)
Henderson also testified that Shepard made demeaning
remarks toward Blaney. Henderson claims that at a staff
meeting, she witnessed Shepard made a derogatory remark
about Blaney leaving to “fix her lipstick” when Blaney
excused herself from the meeting. (Dkt. # 44, Henderson
Dep., Ex. 8 at 56:6-7.) She also states that on another
occasion, Shepard commented about Blaney wearing a skirt
and high heels on the factory floor. (Dkt. # 44, Henderson
Dep., Ex. 8 at 40:14-18.)
Lastly, Henderson claims that she was treated differently
than her male co-workers. She claims: (1) that she was
excluded from the annual sales meeting because she was a
woman; (2) Tiziano Christian and Mohammed Alwan, two male
employees, were not terminated even though they made poor
presentations to Shepard; (3) male employees were allowed
to rescind their resignations; and (4) Henderson was locked
out of the building following her termination and was
denied the opportunity to access the GE network or find
alternative work within GE.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants’ Motion To Strike
Defendants urge the court not to consider Henderson’s
deposition testimony that Gawin, Kasdan, and Madrisotti told
her that they believed the reason they were leaving GE IMV
was Page 12 because they were women. Defendants maintain
that these statements are inadmissible and that the court
cannot consider them when deciding the pending motion for
summary judgment because they are unsupported, speculative,
and hearsay. (Dkt. #s 44, 56.) The court shall construe
defendants’ request as a motion to strike.
1. Standard Of Review
“[A] motion to strike is appropriate if documents submitted
in support of a motion for summary judgment contain
inadmissable hearsay or conclusory statements, are
incomplete, or have not been properly authenticated.” Merry
Charters, LLC v. Town of Stonington, 342 F. Supp. 2d 69, 75
(D. Conn. 2004) (citing Spector v. Experian Info. Serv.
Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 348, 352 (D. Conn. 2004)). “In ruling
on a motion to strike, the court applies the Federal Rules
of Evidence to determine whether evidence would be
admissible at trial and thus whether a court can consider
them in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Glynn
v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., No. 3:02CV1802 (AVC), 2005 WL
2028698, at *1 (D. Conn. Aug. 23, 2005) (citing Raskin v.
Wayatt Co., 125 F. 3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1997)). Rule 56(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
“[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
2. Analysis
Defendants contend that Henderson’s deposition testimony
that Gawin, Kasdan, and Madrisotti told her that they were
leaving GE IMV because they were women constitutes hearsay,
which the court cannot consider when deciding a motion for
summary judgment. Page 13 “Hearsay is a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). While testifying at
her deposition, Henderson repeated comments that Gawin,
Kasdan, and Madrisotti told her during private
conversations that were not part of a court proceeding.
With respect to Gawin, Henderson testified that Gawin told
her “[t]hat she [Gawin] believed that Jim [Shepard] had a
problem with women and that her [Gawin’s] departure was
because she was a woman and she was concerned with my
[Henderson’s] well-being.” (Dkt. # 49-4, Henderson Dep.,
Ex. 2 at 53:17-20.) Henderson also testified that Kasdan
said that her removal “was based on the fact that she
[Kasdan] was a woman.” (Dkt. # 49-4, Henderson Dep., Ex. 2
at 58:6-7.) As for Madrisotti, Henderson testified, “[t]hat
Paola [Madrisotti] had stopped by my office to warn me to
beware, because they were getting rid of the women in the
company and that I was next.” (Dkt. # 49-4, Henderson Dep.,
Ex. 2 at 39:7-9.) In each instance, Henderson is offering
out of court assertions, made by her co-workers, for the
truth of the matter asserted. As such, defendants argue
that these statements are inadmissible hearsay. Henderson,
however, argues that these assertions qualify as
non-hearsay statements pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(D).
A statement is not hearsay if it is “a statement by the
party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the
scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D).
To support the introduction of statements offered against
an employer, the plaintiff must establish, (1) the
existence of the agency relationship, (2) that the
statement was made during the course of the agency
relationship, and (3) that it relates to a matter within
the scope of the agency. Pappas v. Middle Earth Condominium
Assoc., 963 F.3d 534, 537, (2d. Cir. 1992). Page 14
It is undisputed that both Gawin and Kasdan were agents of
GE because Gawin was the CEO of GE IMV and Kasdan was the
Chief Financial Officer of GE IMV. Although it is unclear
precisely when Gawin and Kasdan made these statements,
neither statement qualifies as an admission by a party
opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D)
because neither statement relates to a matter within the
scope of the agency relationship. Gawin’s comment that she
believed that Shepard had a problem with women and Kasdan’s
remark that her removal was based on the fact that she was
a woman do not qualify as statements that Gawin or Kasdan
made in their official capacity as GE executives. Rather,
they are Gawin’s and Kasdan’s opinions about the
circumstances surrounding their own impending termination,
which do not fall within the scope of their agency powers.
Accordingly, these statements, which do not satisfy Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), shall be stricken as
inadmissible hearsay.
Defendants also seek to strike Henderson’s testimony that
Madrisotti stopped by her office following the departure of
the Gawin and Kasdan to warn Henderson “to beware because
they were getting rid of the woman in the company and
[Henderson] would be next.” (Dkt. # 49-4, Henderson Dep.,
Ex. 2 at 39:7-9.) According to Henderson, these statements
were made “on the day that she [Madrisotti] was leaving the
facility.” (Dkt. # 44, Henderson Dep., Ex. 8 at 38:22-23.)
It is unclear from the record whether Madrisotti was still
an agent of GE when she made these statements to Henderson.
Madrisotti’s personal reasons for voluntarily leaving the
company, however, are distinct from her authority to speak
as an executive. Additionally, the warnings she gave to
Henderson do not fall within the scope of her agency powers
because she did not provide them within her official
capacity as a GE executive. Therefore, Madrisotti’s
statements do not satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(D). Accordingly, Henderson’s Page 15 deposition
testimony as to what Madrisotti told her is stricken as
hearsay.
Defendants’ motion to strike, as inadmissible hearsay,
Henderson’s deposition testimony that Gawin, Kasdan and
Madrisotti told her that, in their opinion, the reason they
were leaving GE IMV was because they were women is
GRANTED.[fn6]
B. Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment
Henderson accuses defendants of discriminating against her
on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII.
Defendants claim Henderson has not brought forth sufficient
evidence to sustain her claim and seek summary judgment.
1. Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment may be granted, “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue of fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate if,
after discovery, the nonmoving party “has failed to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case
with respect to which [it] has the burdens of proof.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “The
burden is on the moving party `to demonstrate the absence
of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute.'”
American Int’l Group, Inc. v. London Am. Int’l Corp., 664
F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. Page 16 1981) (quoting Heyman v.
Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (2d Cir.
1975)). A dispute concerning a material fact is genuine
“`if evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Aldrich v. Randolph
Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The court must view all inferences and ambiguities in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Bryant v.
Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). “Only when
reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the
evidence is summary judgment proper.” Id.
2. Discrimination Claim
Henderson claims that she was terminated because of her
gender. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against its
employees because of an employee’s sex. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1). One method of proving gender discrimination
is for the plaintiff to introduce circumstantial evidence
by way of the burden-shifting framework established in
McDonnell Douglass Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), and its progeny. Specifically, plaintiff must
initially prove a prima facie case of gender discrimination
by demonstrating that she suffered an adverse employment
action under circumstances supporting a reasonable
inference of gender discrimination. See Patterson v. County
of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004). To
establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, the
plaintiff must prove that (1) she was a member of a
protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she
held; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and
(4) the adverse employment action occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 221; Norville v. Staten Island
University Hospital, 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999);
Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2000). Page
17 Plaintiff’s burden in this regard has been described as
“minimal.” Zimmerman v. Associates First Capitol Corp., 251
F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001). “The mere fact that a
plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected
class will suffice for the required inference of
discrimination at the prima facie stage of Title VII
analysis.” Id.
If the plaintiff is able to establish the elements of her
prima facie case, a presumption arises that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against her, and the burden shifts
to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. See id.;
Stern v. Trustees of Columbia University, 131 F.3d 305, 312
(2d Cir. 1997). The reason provided must be both “clear and
specific.” Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 997 (2d Cir.
1985). The defendant’s burden at this stage is one of
production only; the defendant is not required to prove
that its stated reason actually motivated its actions. The
burden of persuasion rests, at all times, with plaintiff to
prove that she was discriminated against because of her
gender. Zimmerman, 251 F.3d at 381; Farias v. Instructional
Systems, Inc., 259 F.3d. 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2001).
Once the employer has articulated a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action,
the presumption dissipates and the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the “legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.” Patterson, 375 F.3d at 221. In order to
avoid summary judgment at this stage, the plaintiff must
show that there is sufficient evidence to permit a rational
jury to infer that the employer’s stated reason is a
pretext for discrimination. Conclusory and substantially
unsupported assertions of pretext are inadequate in this
regard. See id. (citing Smith v. American Express Co., 853
F.2d 151, 154-55 (2d Cir. Page 18 1988)). To meet this
burden, the plaintiff may rely on “evidence constituting
the prima facie case, together with supportable inference
to be drawn from the false or erroneous character of the
employer’s proffered reason for the adverse action.”
Carlton v. Mystic Transportation, Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 135
(2d Cir. 2000); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). The plaintiff is
not required to prove that the prohibited motivation was
the sole or even the principal factor in the decision, or
that the employer’s proffered reasons played no role in the
employment decision, but only that the plaintiff’s
membership in a protected class contributed to the
employer’s decision. See Holtz v. Rockerfeller & Co., 258
F.3d 62, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2001); Renz v. Grey Advertising,
Inc., 135 F.3d 217, 220-22 (2d Cir. 1997); Cronin v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1995).
Whether a plaintiff met her ultimate burden of proving
discrimination should be determined on a case-specific
approach upon consideration of a number of factors,
including the strength of the prima facie case, the
probative value of any proof that the employer’s stated
reason for the adverse employment action is false, and any
other evidence that supports the employee’s case and that
properly may be considered in a motion for summary judgment
as a matter of law. See Zimmerman, 251 F.3d at 381 (citing
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49). Proof that the employer’s
proffered reason for the adverse employment action is
unworthy of belief constitutes “circumstantial evidence
that is probative of intentional discrimination.” Reeves,
530 U.S. at 147. Evidence that the employer’s reason is
false, combined with the prima facie case, could be
sufficient to allow the issue to go to the jury. See
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. Summary judgment may be granted if
the record reveals conclusively that there was “some other
non-discriminatory reason for the employer’s decision [or]
the plaintiff created only a weak issue of Page 19 fact as
to whether the employer’s reason was untrue, and there was
abundant and uncontradicted evidence that no discrimination
had occurred.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
Here, both parties have met their respective initial
burdens with respect to the first two steps of the burden
shifting analysis. Henderson has established a prima facie
case of gender discrimination. She was female, she was
qualified for the position she held, and she did suffer an
adverse employment action when she was terminated. With
regard to circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discriminatory intent, Henderson offers evidence that a
male employee, Otavio Kehdi (“Kehdi”), was offered her job.
Henderson further maintains that Kehdi assumed her duties.
The defendants dispute Henderson’s assertion. They claim
that no one was hired to replace Henderson because Six
Sigma was reorganized and Janice Burr, a female employee
already working for GE in the United States, was assigned
Henderson’s duties in addition to her prior
responsibilities. While the parties dispute whether a male
or female employee assumed Henderson’s duties, at the
summary judgment stage, such ambiguities must be viewed in
a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Bryant,
923 F.2d at 982. Therefore, Henderson’s offer of proof that
Kehdi assumed her duties is sufficient to give rise to an
inference of discriminatory intent at this stage in the
analysis. See Zimmerman, 251 F.3d at 381-82 (finding that
the evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case is
“minimal” and “de minimis” and that the mere fact the
plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected
class will suffice for the inference of discrimination at
this stage.)
In response to Henderson’s prima facie claim, defendants
have articulated a non-discriminatory reason for
Henderson’s departure from the company. The defendants have
offered evidence showing that Henderson had a documented
period of inadequate performance, Page 20 culminating in
her poor presentation on December 3, 2002. According to the
defendants, following this poor performance, Henderson
resigned on December 5, 2002. It was only after Henderson
later refused to submit a letter of resignation that GE
sent her a letter of termination. Defendants assert that
Henderson was not allowed to retract her resignation because
of her failure to meet expectations and because her
superiors had lost confidence in her ability to perform the
required duties of her position. This offer of proof is
sufficient to meet the defendants’ burden at this stage in
the analysis. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142.
The burden, therefore, shifts back to Henderson to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that defendants’ proffered
reasons are not true and that the true reason for
Henderson’s termination was impermissible gender
discrimination. See Carlton, 202 F.3d at 135.; see also
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142. Henderson has not met this burden.
Henderson has not offered any evidence to indicate that
GE’s proffered reasons for her termination are not true or
that they were pretext for discrimination. Although
Henderson claims that her work was excellent and offers a
list of accomplishments that she effectuated while working
in her Six Sigma role, she does not dispute that LaCroix
attempted to monitor her work closely by giving her lists
with specific tasks and deadlines and that LaCroix and
Blaney testified that they had conversations about the
quality of her work.[fn7] Further, Henderson admits that on
October 29, 2002, and November 7, 2002, she and LaCroix
participated in teleconferences during which LaCroix noted
that Henderson had Page 21 missed deadlines. Plaintiff
also admits that she did not attend a pre-scheduled meeting
with her supervisors on October 1, 2002, and that on the
same day, LaCroix emailed Shepard and Blaney about her
concerns regarding Henderson’s performance. Furthermore,
Henderson concedes that LaCroix again emailed her concerns
about Henderson to Blaney on November 7, 2002. She also
admits that she gave a sub-par presentation to the CEO of
GE Digital Energy on December 3, 2002, and that she
subsequently informed her supervisors, on December 5, 2002,
that she no longer wanted to work in the business. Lastly,
although Henderson argues that LaCroix and Blaney were not
the primary decision-makers with respect to her
termination, Henderson admits that Shepard did not
participate in the teleconferences of December 5, 2002 and
December 9, 2002. Henderson also does not dispute that
Blaney and LaCroix lost confidence in her ability after she
said that she wanted to leave the business and that Shepard
only approved of LaCroix and Blaney’s decision not to allow
her to rescind her resignation. Accordingly, Henderson has
not shown that there is a factual dispute surrounding the
veracity of defendants’ proffered explanations for her
termination.
Henderson has also not shown that her status in a
protected class contributed to her employer’s decision to
terminate her. Although she asserts that the demeaning
remarks Shepard made regarding Blaney furthers her claim
that she terminated because of her gender, these comments
are “stray remarks” that cannot be used to prove
discrimination. Stray remarks, absent some nexus between
the alleged comments and the adverse action, cannot prove a
claim of employment discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir. 2001). To
determine whether a comment is a probative statement
evidencing an intent to discriminate or a nonprobative
“stray remark,” courts consider the following factors:
Page 22
`(1) who made the remark, i.e., a decision-maker, a
supervisor, or a low-level coworker; (2) when the remark
was made in relation to the employment decision at issue;
(3) the content of the remark, i.e., whether a reasonable
juror could view the remark as discriminatory; and (4) the
context in which the remark was made, i.e., whether it was
related to the decision-making process.’
Young v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., No. 3:03CV1161 (PCD), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20788, at *59-60 (D. Conn. Mar. 21, 2006)
(quoting Schreiber v. Woldco, LLC, 324 F. Supp. 2d 512,
518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). Henderson claims that Shepard’s
derogatory remark about Blaney leaving to “fix her
lipstick” when Blaney excused herself from the staff
meeting (dkt. # 44, Henderson Dep., Ex. 8 at 56:6-7) and
his comment about Blaney wearing a skirt and high heels on
the factory floor (dkt. # 44, Henderson Dep., Ex. 8 at
40:14-18.) are not stray remarks. Although it is unclear
when the remarks in question were made, the court finds
that taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, the remarks were made by a decision-maker, Shepard,
and could be viewed as discriminatory. These remarks,
however, are unconnected to both the decision-making
process to terminate Henderson and the adverse employment
action that was taken against Henderson. Shepard made the
remarks with respect to Blaney, not Henderson. Further, the
remarks did not relate to Henderson’s job performance. In
addition, the parties agree that Shepard did not partake in
either the telephone call where Henderson informed Blaney,
LaCroix, and Canova that she no longer wanted to work for
the business or the telephone call where Blaney and LaCroix
told Henderson that she could not rescind her resignation.
Lastly, Henderson admits that Shepard alone approved of
Blaney and LaCroix’s decision not to allow Henderson to
rescind her termination. Accordingly, Shepard’s remarks
concerning Blaney qualify as stray remarks, which cannot be
used to prove gender discrimination. Page 23
In support of her contention that she was terminated
because of her sex, Henderson argues that GE IMV was
referred to as “the company run by women” and that Shepard
replaced four high ranking female executives (Madrisotti,
Kasdan, Gawin, and Henderson) with men during the time
period of January 2002 to December 2002. With respect to
her claim that Shepard terminated Madrisotti, Henderson
admits that Madrisotti left the company on her own
volition, thus making any claim of an adverse employment
action due to gender discrimination inapplicable to
her.[fn8] Additionally, Henderson admits that Kasdan and
Gawin were removed for performance reasons and that both
Kasdan and Gawin were given an opportunity to transfer to
another GE business unit. Further, although Kasdan, Gawin,
and Madrisotti were replaced with men, this development is
tempered by Henderson’s admission that Shepard hired
Brigitte LaCroix, during this time period, to replace a
male employee as the Quality Leader for all of the GE
Digital Energy businesses. In addition, Henderson herself
notes that she met with Shepard before she was hired to
replace a male employee as the Director of Quality and
Information Technology.
Although Henderson claims that Shepard terminated her
because she was a woman, she does not dispute Blaney’s and
LaCroix’s deposition testimony that she would not have
been Page 24 terminated had she not resigned during the
meeting of December 5, 2002. She further admits that she
told Blaney, LaCroix, and Canova that she no longer wanted
to work in the business and that it was Blaney and LaCroix
who did not allow her to rescind her resignation during the
teleconference of December 9, 2002. Henderson does not
challenge the veracity of LaCroix’s testimony that she did
not allow Henderson to rescind her resignation both
“because of her performance” and because she had “lost
confidence in her [Henderson’s] ability to perform in that
position,” (dkt. # 44, LaCroix Dep., Ex. 9 at 197:16-17),
or Blaney’s statement that GE “can’t afford to have those
leaders making decisions who are going to change their
minds,” (Dkt. # 44, Blaney Dep., Ex. 10 at 146-47:22-3).
Henderson also asserts that she was treated differently
from male employees both prior to and after her termination
and that this further proves her claim of gender
discrimination. For example, she asserts that Shepard did
not take disciplinary actions against Tiziano Christian
(“Christian”) or Mohammed Alwan (“Alwan”) even though these
male employees gave poor presentations to Shepard. Even
assuming that Christian and Alwan performed poorly,
Henderson offers no evidence to indicate that they were
treated differently because they were male or that
following their poor performances they told their superiors
that they wished to leave the business. Henderson also
claims that Canova permitted Lauro Strozzi, the head of
engineering, to rescind his resignation. Other than her own
testimony, however, she offers no evidence to support this
assertion. Nor does she indicate when this event occurred,
what the circumstances were surrounding this event, or
whether Shepard, LaCroix, or Blaney were involved in the
decision to allow Strozzi to remain with the company. Page
25
In addition, Henderson claims that in September 2002, she
was excluded from the annual sales meeting, which was
hosted by GE Digital Energy’s Sales Department. According
to Henderson, she was not invited to the meeting, which was
hosted Syed Jafry, the head of sales for GE Digital Energy
Europe, even though the male members of the staff, Tiziano
Christian, Lauro Strozzi, and Joe Flanagan attended the
event. Henderson testified that she learned of the meeting
“[b]ecause the last day of the sales meeting, they were
doing a report-out to Jim Shepard, and Mauro Canova had
approached me and told me that I needed to be there because
they did not want Jim to know that I had not been at that
meeting the entire time.” (Dkt. # 49-4, Henderson Dep., Ex.
2 at 51:3-7.). Henderson makes no claim that she was not
invited to the meeting at request of Shepard, LaCroix,
Blaney, or Canova. Nor does she indicate who sent out the
invitations. Indeed, her testimony indicates that Shepard
and Canova wanted her to attend the meeting.
According to Henderson, other terminated employees, such
as Peter Elemer, Thomas Host, and Gawin, were allowed
access to the GE infrastructure and were permitted to seek
other employment opportunities within GE. Henderson claims
that she was denied the same access, and that such a denial
was a result of gender discrimination. According to
Henderson’s own deposition testimony and affidavit,
however, her treatment was different from all of these
individuals, which included both men and women in high
ranking positions. For instance, she averred, “After Ms.
Gawin was told to move on, she was given the opportunity to
transition to another GE business unit. During this
transition period, she continued to come to the office and
had access to the building and to the Company network to
seek to find alternative employment.” (Dkt. # 49-3,
Henderson Aff., Ex. 1 at § 40; Dkt. # 49-4,
Henderson Dep., Ex. 2 at 61:19-20.) Page 26 Both Henderson
and Blaney also testified that Kasdan was afforded an
opportunity to look for another job with GE. (Dkt. # 49-4,
Henderson Dep., Ex. 2 at 61:19-20; Dkt. # 49-7, Blaney
Dep., Ex. 5 at 108:13-17.) Given that Henderson was treated
differently from both men and women, this proffer only shows
that Henderson was treated differently from other
employees, it does not show that she was treated
differently because she was a woman.
Looking at the totality of the evidence offered by
Henderson, she has not presented sufficient evidence to
give rise to an inference of discrimination. Much of
Henderson’s evidence of gender bias consists of her own
deposition testimony that several other individuals within
GE, such as Madrisotti, Gawin, Kasdan, Randolph, and Jones,
made statements agreeing with her conclusions that GE
discriminated against women. Yet, Henderson did not provide
affidavits or deposition testimony from these individuals.
Nor has Henderson provided any evidence to indicate why
Blaney and LaCroix, the two women directly involved in the
decision to terminate Henderson, would have terminated
Henderson because of her gender. All the evidence presented
concerns the supposed biases of Shepard, not Blaney or
LaCroix. In order to find for the plaintiff, a jury would
have to believe that Lacroix and Blaney either carried out
an unstated policy of Shepard’s, or, even more
unbelievably, acted on their own to discriminate against a
member of their own class. Henderson has neither given nor
proposed any evidence or any theory to indicate why Blaney
and LaCroix acted to effectuate Shepard’s supposed gender
biases. And Henderson has offered no evidence to indicate
that Shepard and Blaney would purposely discriminate
against their own suspect class. Furthermore, during her
deposition, when Henderson was asked, “When Mr. Canova said
Brigitte [LaCroix] hated you, did Mr. Canova indicate that
it was because of your race or your gender?” she responded,
“No.” (Dkt. # 49-4, Page 27 Henderson Dep., Ex. 2 at
147:4-7.) Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to provide any
concrete particulars that could prove gender discrimination
on the part of GE. Therefore, defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on plaintiff’s gender discrimination
claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (dkt. # 44) is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut.
[fn1] In her Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff names four
defendants: General Electric Company, GE Industrial Systems,
GE Digital Energy, and GE IMV.
[fn2] Plaintiff, in her opposition to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, elected to “drop her claim of race
discrimination.” (Dkt. # 49.) Accordingly, Count One and
Count Three of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are
hereby DISMISSED.
[fn3] At the time of the events alleged, GE IMV reported to
GE Digital Energy, which was located in Georgia. GE Digital
Energy was a sub-business of GE Industrial Systems, which
was based in Connecticut. Due to a series of
reorganizations, the entities formerly known as GE
Industrial Systems and GE Digital Energy no longer exist.
[fn4] At GE, a “Performance Improvement Plan” is a formal
plan that sets specific deadlines for an employee to
improve her performance before facing termination or other
disciplinary action.
[fn5] Henderson also notes that Mohammed Alwan, one of the
other presenters at the meeting of December 3, 2002, was
not able to answer a Six Sigma question that Shepard asked
him.
[fn6] The court observes that plaintiff did not depose
Gawin, Kasdan, or Madrisotti. Nor did plaintiff offer
affidavits completed by Gawin, Kasdan, or Madrisotti. To
the extent that the statements made by Gawin, Kasdan, and
Madrisotti are offered to show that Henderson was a victim
of gender discrimination, they are stricken as inadmissible
as lay opinion statements. See Hester v. Bic Corp., 225
F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding “that in an
employment discrimination action, Rule 701(b) [of the
Federal Rules of Evidence] bars lay opinion testimony that
amounts to a naked speculation concerning the motivation
for a defendant’s adverse employment decision.”). Further,
a review of the record reveals that these statements are
unsupported by the evidence and speculative.
[fn7] Henderson asserts that LaCroix’s attempts to place her
on a formal “Performance Improvement Plan” are evidence of
gender discrimination. Henderson, however, does not offer
any evidence relating to whether LaCroix attempted to place
male employees on similar plans. Indeed, other than
Henderson’s own conclusory statements, she offers no
evidence to support the proposition that LaCroix attempted
to place her on a formal Performance Improvement Plan
because she was a woman.
[fn8] Henderson also offers Blaney’s deposition testimony
that Gawin and Madrisotti did not feel comfortable around
Shepard. Although Blaney acknowledged that Shepard could be
very intimidating, strong, and sarcastic, (see dkt. # 49-7,
Blaney Dep., Ex. 5 at 111-112) Blaney also testified that
she did not recall whether anyone specifically told her
that Shepard was biased against women (Id. at
112:25-113:19). Blaney further characterized the conflict
between Gawin and Shepard as one of clashing personalities,
not one of gender bias. (Dkt. # 44, Blaney Dep., Ex. 10 at
111:11.) Accordingly, the statements concerning Shepard’s
“strong” and “intimidating” personality (Id. at 111:1-2)
are unrelated to whether Henderson is biased against women
and to whether Henderson, or any other women at GE IMV,
suffered an adverse employment action because of her gender.