Iowa Reports

BAHL v. THE CITY OF ASBURY, 118 / 04-1540 (Iowa 12-22-2006)
MARTIN J. BAHL, LINDA C. BAHL, and TERRENCE G. BAHL,
Appellants, v. THE CITY OF ASBURY, IOWA, and the CITY
COUNCIL OF ASBURY, IOWA, Appellees. No. 118 / 04-1540.
Supreme Court of Iowa. Filed December 22, 2006.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
Alan L. Pearson, Judge.

Developers appeal adverse declaratory judgment holding Iowa
law does not protect mobile home parks from discriminatory
zoning. AFFIRMED.

Brian J. Kane and D. Flint Drake of Kane, Norby & Reddick,
P.C., Dubuque, for appellants.

Stephen J. Juergens of Fuerste, Carew, Coyle, Juergens &
Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, for appellees.

STREIT, Justice.

“A rose may still be a rose if called by another name but
not so for manufactured housing.”[fn1] We are called on to
determine whether a “mobile home” is a “manufactured home.”
Developers claim the City of Asbury unlawfully
discriminates against “mobile home” parks through zoning
restrictions. Developers contend Iowa law requires “mobile
homes” — the kind with hitches, wheels, and/or axles
— be treated the same as traditional homes built on
site. We find the statute in question, which prohibits
cities from discriminating against “manufactured housing,”
only pertains to factory-built homes that sit on permanent
foundations. Because developers’ proposal calls for “mobile
homes,” the city may treat it differently in comparison to
other types of housing developments. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s declaratory judgment.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

The Bahls own real estate in Asbury which is zoned A-1 for
agricultural use. Since 1997, the Bahls have repeatedly
sought to have their land rezoned in a manner that would
allow them to develop a community of refabricated[fn2]
homes to be called “Oak Meadows.” The Bahls’ rezoning
applications have been resisted by neighbors and Asbury’s
city counsel.

After the Bahls’ second request for rezoning was denied in
1999, they filed suit alleging Asbury’s zoning ordinance
requiring “mobile home” parks to be located only in R-4
(high density residential) districts violated Iowa Code
section 414.28A (1999). Under section 414.28A, “[a] city
shall not adopt or enforce zoning or subdivision regulations
or other ordinances which disallow or make infeasible the
plans and specifications of land-leased communities because
the housing within the land-leased community will be
manufactured housing.”

The district court held Asbury violated section 414.28A
because one reason for denying the Bahls’ rezoning request
was the fact the proposed development was a land-leased
community of manufactured housing. On appeal, we affirmed.
See Bahl v. City of Asbury, 656 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 2002)
(“Bahl I”).

In Bahl I, we said “the plain language of section 414.28A .
. . reveals a legislative intent to require equal treatment
of land-leased communities that are composed of
manufactured homes with similar communities composed of
site-built housing.” Id. at 345.

We interpreted Asbury’s definition of “mobile home” in its
zoning ordinance to include all types of prefabricated
housing.[fn3] Id. at 337 n. 1. In Bahl I, neither party
disputed the Bahls’ proposed development was a land-leased
community of manufactured housing within the meaning of
chapter 414. Id. Nor did the parties dispute the Bahls’
project was subject to the restrictions imposed on “mobile
home” parks by the City’s zoning ordinance. Id. Notably,
the Iowa legislature used the terms “manufactured housing”
and “manufactured home” in chapter 414 of the Code while
Asbury used the term “mobile home” in its zoning ordinance.
Apparently, the parties were under the impression the terms
could be used interchangeably.

After Bahl I, Asbury amended its zoning ordinance so the
terms “mobile home” and “manufactured home” are now
mutually exclusive. Under the current ordinance, a
“manufactured home” means a “factory-built structure” on a
“permanent foundation,” which does not have a “permanent
hitch” or any “wheels or axles” permanently attached to its
frame. A “mobile home” is defined as all other
factory-built structures — i.e. homes with permanent
hitches, wheels and/or axles. Asbury also defined
“land-leased community” in its ordinance. A “land-leased
community” is any “tract of land under common ownership
upon which 10 or more occupied manufactured homes are
harbored. . . .”

The amendments to Asbury’s zoning ordinance require
manufactured homes be treated the same as site-built
housing. Land-leased communities for manufactured housing
are permitted under the same zoning requirements as for
site-built communities. However, under Asbury’s amended
zoning ordinance, mobile home parks[fn4] are limited to
planned unit developments[fn5] (PUD) in R-3 or R-4 zones.
The effect of the city’s changes is to treat mobile home
parks differently than either site-built housing or
manufactured housing as that term is used in Asbury’s
zoning ordinance.

Because the Bahls’ development proposal includes mobile
homes as defined by Asbury’s current zoning ordinance, the
Bahls filed a declaratory judgment action in the district
court asking the court to find Asbury’s current zoning
ordinance violates Iowa Code section 414.28A (2003).[fn6]
The district court found in favor of Asbury. It stated:

Mobile homes as defined in the city’s zoning ordinance
are not protected by §§ 414.28 or 414.28A.
Asbury defines mobile homes as structures the Iowa
legislature has excluded from protection. Asbury’s
treatment of exempted structures does not offend
§§ 414.28 or 414.28A.

The Bahls appeal.

II. Standard of Review

The standard of review for a declaratory judgment action
tried at law is for correction of errors. Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Petersen, 679 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Iowa 2004)
(citing United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home,
Inc., 642 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Iowa 2002)).

III. Merits

The issue before us is whether Asbury’s treatment of
“mobile home” parks under its current zoning ordinance
violates section 414.28A. Section 414.28A provides:

A city shall not adopt or enforce zoning or subdivision
regulations or other ordinances which disallow or make
infeasible the plans and specifications of land-leased
communities because the housing within the land-leased
community will be manufactured housing.

“Land-leased community” means any site, lot, field, or
tract of land under common ownership upon which ten or
more occupied manufactured homes are harbored, either free
of charge or for revenue purposes, and shall include any
building, structure, or enclosure used or intended for
use as part of the equipment of the land-leased
community. . . . A manufactured home located in a
land-leased community shall be taxed under section 435.22
as if the manufactured home were located in a mobile home
park.

Section 414.28A does not define “manufactured home” or
“manufactured housing.” Asbury contends the definition
found in section 414.28 also applies to section 414.28A.
Section 414.28 states:

As used in this section, `manufactured home’ means a
factory-built structure, which is manufactured or
constructed under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 5403
and is to be used as a place for human habitation, but
which is not constructed or equipped with a permanent
hitch or other device allowing it to be moved other than
for the purpose of moving to a permanent site, and which
does not have permanently attached to its body or frame
any wheels or axles.

(Second emphasis added.) In other words, according to
Asbury, section 414.28A only protects foundation-ready
prefabricated homes from discrimination and does not
protect prefabricated homes with permanent hitches, axles
and/or wheels. Using this interpretation of section
414.28A, Asbury contends its zoning ordinance satisfies
section 414.28A because it requires foundation-ready
prefabricated homes to be treated the same as traditional
on-site built homes. Asbury argues section 414.28A does not
prohibit the city from restricting the location of mobile
home parks (i.e. two or more prefabricated homes with
hitches, wheels and/or axles).

The Bahls claim Asbury’s amended zoning ordinance “is a
transparent attempt through word play to circumvent a
banned form of discrimination. . . .” The Bahls make two
arguments on appeal. First, they argue our decision in Bahl
I established the “law of the case” and consequently the
prefabricated homes with hitches, axles and/or wheels
described in their rezoning application are “manufactured
homes” for purposes of their continuing application.
Second, the Bahls disagree with Asbury’s interpretation of
section 414.28A. The Bahls contend “manufactured home” has
a different meaning in section 414.28A than it does in
section 414.28. According to the Bahls, section 414.28
protects foundation-ready prefabricated homes from
discrimination while section 414.28A protects prefabricated
homes with axles, hitches and/or wheels. The Bahls
therefore conclude section 414.28A prevents Asbury from
discriminating against its proposed development.

A. Law of the Case

The Bahls contend the law of the case doctrine prevents
Asbury from “argu[ing] that the type of homes proposed in
the Bahls’ application (mobile homes) are not `manufactured
homes’ within the meaning of the City’s ordinance or
Chapter 414.” They base this contention on the fact the
parties in Bahl I did “not dispute that the development
proposed by the Bahls is a land-leased community of
manufactured housing within the meaning of chapter 414.”
Bahl I, 656 N.W.2d at 337 n. 1.

Under the law of the case doctrine, “an appellate decision
becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the
trial court and on any further appeals in the same case.”
United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 612 N.W.2d 101,
103 (Iowa 2000) (citing Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 475
N.W.2d 630, 632 (Iowa 1991)). The doctrine is based on a
public policy against reopening matters which have already
been decided. Id. (citing Wolfe v. Graether, 389 N.W.2d
643, 651 (Iowa 1986)). Thus, issues decided by an appellate
court generally cannot be reheard, reconsidered, or
relitigated. Id. (citing 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §
975, at 476-77 (1993)). The appellate court decision is
final as to all questions decided and the trial court is
obligated to follow that decision. Id. (citing 5 C.J.S.
Appeal and Error § 975, at 476-77 (1993)).

The law of the case doctrine does not apply to the present
case because we were not asked in Bahl I to determine the
meaning of “manufactured home” as the term is used in
section 414.28A. The doctrine applies “only to those
questions that were properly before us for consideration
and passed on” and “[a] question not passed on is not
included” under the doctrine. In re Lone Tree Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 159 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Iowa 1968) (citations omitted).
Thus, we now turn to section 414.28A and the meaning of
“manufactured home.”

B. Iowa Code Section 414.28A

Section 414.28A states “[a] city shall not adopt or enforce
zoning or subdivision regulations or other ordinances which
disallow or make infeasible the plans and specifications of
land-leased communities because the housing within the
land-leased community will be manufactured housing.” A
land-leased community is any property “under common
ownership upon which ten or more occupied manufactured homes
are harbored. . . .” Iowa Code § 414.28A. Section
414.28A does not include a definition of “manufactured
homes.” The definition, of course, is critical to our
determination of the scope of the statute.

“The polestar of statutory interpretation is to give effect
to the legislative intent of a statute.” State v. Schultz,
604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999) (citing Harris v. Olson, 558
N.W.2d 408, 410 (Iowa 1997)). “If the legislature has not
defined words of a statute, we may refer to prior decisions
of this court and others, similar statutes, dictionary
definitions and common usage.” Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v.
Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa 2002) (citing Bernau v.
Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 580 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Iowa 1998)).

The Bahls argue “[i]n all previous proceedings, the City,
the City’s legal counsel, the courts, and the participants
in the public hearings have used the terms `mobile home’
and `manufactured home’ interchangeably, indicating a
general understanding that the mobile homes proposed by the
Bahls were in fact `manufactured homes’ and protected by
414.28A.” They also point to decisions from other
jurisdictions finding the terms “mobile home” and
“manufactured housing” are synonymous. See, e.g., Wilmoth
v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1987) (noting in the
late 1970’s, the industry began using the term
“manufactured home” instead of “mobile home”). But the cases
the Bahls cite address restrictive covenants, not the
statute at issue here. We are only concerned with how the
Iowa legislature defines “manufactured home.” In this
particular case, we need not look beyond sections 414.28
and 414.28A because they offer enough clues to determine
the legislature’s intent.

Section 414.28A states “[a] manufactured home located in a
land-leased community shall be taxed under section 435.22
as if the manufactured home were located in a mobile home
park.” (Emphasis added.) The words “as if” indicate the
legislature understood the difference between the terms
manufactured home and mobile home and did not intend
“manufactured home” to include mobile homes.

Because of the reference to section 435.22, the Bahls
invite us to consider the definitions found in chapter 435,
which pertains to taxing of mobile homes and manufactured
housing in parks and communities. We think the Bahls are
reading too much into the reference to section 435.22. The
statute reads “[a] manufactured home . . . shall be taxed
under section 435.22 as if the manufactured home were
located in a mobile home park.” Iowa Code § 414.28A
(emphasis added). It does not say a manufactured home is
defined in chapter 435.

We think it makes more sense to refer to a definition
within the chapter at issue. See State v. Hawk, 616 N.W.2d
527, 529 (Iowa 2000) (“[C]ourts are obliged to consider a
challenged statute in its entirety and in pari materia with
other pertinent statutes.”). Section 414.28, which protects
manufactured homes located outside of a manufactured home
community from discrimination, defines “manufactured
home.”[fn7] Section 414.28 states:

As used in this section, “manufactured home” means a
factory-built structure, which is manufactured or
constructed under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 5403
and is to be used as a place for human habitation, but
which is not constructed or equipped with a permanent
hitch or other device allowing it to be moved other than
for the purpose of moving to a permanent site, and which
does not have attached to its body or frame any wheels or
axles.

Thus, the definition found in section 414.28 is limited to
prefabricated homes intended to be placed on permanent
foundations. There is no indication the legislature
intended to expand the definition of “manufactured home”
for purposes of section 414.28A.

In Bahl I, we said “it is instructive in our search for the
meaning of section 414.28A to consider what the legislature
intended when it enacted section 414.28.” Bahl I, 656
N.W.2d at 342. This is because sections 414.28A and 414.28
are “very similar.” Id. at 341. We said:

There appears to be very little difference between
section 414.28 and section 414.28A with respect to the
operative language. The primary distinction of course is
that section 414.28 applies to “residential structure[s]”
whereas section 414.28A governs “land-leased
communities.”

Id. at 342. Therefore, it is logical to use the definition
of “manufactured home” found in section 414.28 to interpret
section 414.28A. When we do, it is obvious the legislature
only intended section 414.28A to protect foundation-ready
prefabricated housing from discrimination.[fn8] Our
decision in Bahl I supports this conclusion. There, we
said:

[T]he plain language of section 414.28A . . . reveals a
legislative intent to require equal treatment of
land-leased communities that are composed of manufactured
homes with similar communities composed of site-built
housing. Our interpretation of section 414.28A does not
mean the City must allow mobile home parks in all zoning
districts. Nor does it mean the City cannot regulate
manufactured housing developments. The statute merely
mandates that land-leased communities of manufactured
housing be allowed in any district in which similar
communities of site-built housing are allowed, under the
same terms and conditions imposed on such developments
containing traditional housing.

Id. at 345 (emphasis added). Thus, Asbury’s zoning ordinance
requiring only foundation-ready homes be given the same
treatment as site-built homes and relegating prefabricated
homes with hitches, wheels, and/or axles to PUD R-3 and PUD
R-4 is permissible. As the district court said,

Iowa has never protected housing that comes with a
permanent hitch and axles. To the extent mobile homes come
with permanent hitches and axles, they have never been a
protected form of housing in Iowa and were, in fact,
specifically excluded from protected status.

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

IV. Conclusion

Section 414.28A requires land-leased communities that are
composed of manufactured homes be treated equally to
similar communities composed of site-built housing.
Manufactured homes means foundation-ready prefabricated
homes. The statute does not apply to mobile homes —
the kind of housing with hitches, wheels, and/or axles.
Thus, Asbury may limit mobile home parks to high density
PUD zoning districts.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except Appel, J., who takes no part.

[fn1] A line from the ever-witty Chief Judge Alan Pearson’s
decision upholding Asbury’s city zoning ordinance. Bahl v.
City of Asbury, No. CVCV053776, slip op. at 4 (D. Iowa
Sept. 13, 2004).

[fn2] We use the term “prefabricated home” because the
parties disagree on the meaning of “mobile home” and
“manufactured home.”

[fn3] In the current action, the district court noted “it
appears that the Supreme Court [in Bahl I] misread the
definition of `mobile home’ under the city zoning
ordinance.” However, we need not revisit that ordinance
because this appeal concerns Asbury’s revised ordinance,
which clearly distinguishes between “mobile homes” and
“manufactured homes.”

[fn4] Asbury defines a “mobile home park” as a “tract of
land upon which two (2) or more occupied mobile homes are
harbored, either free of charge or for revenue purposes,
whether or not site-built homes or manufactured homes are
also in the same development site. . . .”

[fn5] A PUD is a district described as encouraging flexible
and innovative design in the development of an appropriate
site. PUDs are not typically subject to normal zoning
restrictions. Instead, the project is negotiated between
the developer and the city on a case-by-case basis.

[fn6] All further references to the Iowa Code are to the
2003 version.

[fn7] Under section 414.28,

A city shall not adopt or enforce zoning regulations or
other ordinances which disallow the plans and
specifications of a proposed residential structure solely
because the proposed structure is a manufactured home.
However, a zoning ordinance or regulation shall require
that a manufactured home be located and installed
according to the same standards, including but not limited
to, a permanent foundation system, set-back, and minimum
square footage which would apply to a site-built, single
family dwelling on the same lot, and shall require that
the home is assessed and taxed as a site-built dwelling. .
. . When units are located outside a manufactured home
community or mobile home park, requirements may be imposed
which ensure visual compatibility of the permanent
foundation system with surrounding residential structures.

[fn8] In Bahl I, we said “the Asbury zoning ordinance
contravenes section 414.28A by relegating `mobile home
parks,’ not all condominium-type communities, to R-4 zoning
districts.” Bahl I, 656 N.W.2d at 345 (emphasis added). We
used the term “mobile home parks” only because that was the
term Asbury used in its zoning ordinance in effect at the
time of the previous litigation. According to Asbury, under
its prior zoning ordinance manufactured homes (i.e. the
foundation-ready kind) were included within its broad
definition of “mobile homes.” In contrast to the prior
zoning ordinance, Asbury’s current ordinance treats “mobile
homes” and “manufactured homes” as mutually exclusive. We
did not imply in Bahl I that prefabricated homes with
hitches, wheels, and/or axles are protected under section
414.28A.